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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

OF PASSIONATE INTENSITY:

RIGHT-WING POPULISM AND THE REFORM PARTY OF CANADA

BY

TREVOR HARRISON

©

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING, 1993

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

Trevor Harrison

88 Fawcett Crescent,
St. Albert, Alberta
T8N 1W3

Dated: January 14, 1993

Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
Their ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

(from W. B. Yeats, The Second Coming, 1921)

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled, "Of Passionate Intensity: Right-Wing Populism and the Reform Party of Canada," here submitted by Trevor Harrison in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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DEDICATION

To my wife, Terri

and

my daughter, Jayna

ABSTRACT

This thesis presents an historical-sociological account of the rise of the Reform Party of Canada. As such, the study goes beyond a strictly political analysis to include also the historical, social, economic, and ideological contexts in which Reform rose.

On a broader level, this study uses the case of Reform for a return to traditional debates about populism. The study addresses, in particular, two questions of political and sociological importance: 1) Why do populist parties arise? and 2) And what factors influence the ideological orientations of such parties?

The theory used to explore answers to these questions draws upon Gramsci's concepts of "hegemony" and "organic crises" as applied to coalitional politics. The resultant findings provide general support for the theory while recognizing also the impact of contingent events upon the rise of populist parties.

PREFACE

"All the money in the world can't spark a movement if the time isn't right, and all the money in the world can't stop one when it gets rolling" (Preston Manning, at the Western Assembly, April, 1987 quoted in the Alberta Report [hereafter "AR"], 1987a:6).

In the federal election of November 21, 1988, the newly-created Reform Party of Canada, under the leadership of Preston Manning, received 15 percent of the popular vote in the province of Alberta, and 7 percent of the vote in British Columbia. Despite failing to win a seat, the party did finish second (to the Progressive Conservative party) in nine Alberta ridings. The following spring, the Reform Party stunned political observers by winning a federal by-election in the Alberta riding of Beaver Lake. In the fall of the same year, a Reform Party candidate won an Alberta election held to nominate a representative to the federal Senate. Over the next three years, the party's popularity soared throughout Canada. In 1991, the party moved out of its western base. That same year, several polls placed Reform in third place -- ahead of the ruling Tories. By early 1992, the party was boasting an (unconfirmed) membership of over a hundred thousand and financial backing in the millions of dollars.

Reform's impact, however, upon the Canadian political scene cannot be measured by these facts alone. Rather, the Reform Party already has had a major influence upon Canadian politics, altering the terms of discourse and otherwise shifting the ideological terrain on which Canada's political battles are fought to one occupied by the neo-conservative right. This influence can be seen in the moves of the federal (Tory) government to impose more restrictive immigration policies. In the context of a real rise in government expenditures, Reform's single-minded emphasis upon deficit reduction also has swayed the Tories to withdraw support for universal social programs and to cap medicare expenditures. But Reform's influence is not limited to the federal Tories alone. The Liberals, too, (and, to some extent, various NDP provincial governments) have been forced by Reform's articulation of Canada's problems to reevaluate the role of government in the economy, the political rights of citizens, and the policies of the welfare state.

How did the Reform Party phenomenon come about? Recently, a number of books have appeared dealing with this question (Dobbin, 1991; Sharpe and Braid, 1992; Manning, 1992). Whether critical or supportive, however, these texts (in common with various magazine and newspaper articles) tend to portray Reform as a "white, Anglo-Saxon, male" western rump of the federal Tories, welded together by Preston Manning, the devoutly religious son of a former Alberta premier. Moreover, and with few exceptions (e.g., McCormick, 1991), these texts are largely atheoretical and ahistorical.

In the main, I do not quarrel with the arguments put forward by these authors, and readers familiar with these works will recognize in this thesis a necessary repetition of some material. What readers will find, however, is a more textured analysis that focuses upon the historical, social, and ideological forces that give rise to changing political formations.

In particular, the thesis that follows situates the rise of the Reform Party in the

problems of liberal democracy since the 1960s and the unique political cultures of Alberta and British Columbia that made those provinces a fertile seed-bed for a neo-conservative revolt. I further show how the neo-conservatism of Reform Party leaders, members, and supporters can be linked to a peculiarly Anglo-Canadian form of nativism with firm roots in history. In an empirical fashion, I also examine the effects of economic instability in Alberta and BC during the 1980s upon Reform's later success. Along the way, I also provide a more empirically grounded portrait of Reformers' class, age, gender, educational and other characteristics than has been detailed previously. Finally, while not disavowing Preston Manning's substantial influence within the party, I provide a fuller examination of other key members of the Reform Party and its organizational structure and finances.

At a deeper level, I employ the "case" of the Reform Party in an attempt to answer two specific theoretical questions: Why do populist parties arise? And what factors influence the ideological orientation of populist parties? These questions lie at the heart of this thesis.

Additionally, however, a sub-text runs through this thesis: What is the nature of populist politics -- and the promise of popular democracy generally -- at this stage of the late 20th century? The question is topical, given the apparent rise in demands by people the world over -- whether tax-payers in California or Britain, or newly liberated peoples in Eastern Europe -- for a greater say in running their lives. Where economies experience "globalization," what does popular democracy mean? Is popular democracy, in a meaningful sense, even possible?

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the course of writing this thesis, I have acquired numerous debts that I gladly acknowledge. First and foremost, I would like to thank, in general, those members of the Reform Party who kindly submitted to completing questionnaires used in this thesis and/or those who otherwise engaged me in a dialogue. Although I personally disagree with many of the party's policies, I nonetheless liked and respected the party's grass-roots supporters. I hope that they will view this thesis as a continuation of our dialogue over the future direction of Canada and of democracy in general.

I wish also to acknowledge the specific contribution of certain individuals connected with the party. Mr. Francis Winspear was candid, friendly, and helpful in our face-to-face conversations, and deserves special mention. I am also indebted to Stephen Harper and Ted Byfield who took the time out to be personally interviewed. Although I am unfortunately unable to thank personally Mr. Alfred Hooke, who has since passed away, I nonetheless acknowledge his contribution to my work. I would also like to note the contributions of several other individuals, notably Robert Grbavac, Neil and Pia Roberts, Gordon Gibson, Tom Flanagan, and Ian McLelland.

Regarding those on my Thesis Committee, I must give first mention to my supervisor, Dr. Gordon Laxer, for his academic tutelage and friendship during this period. It would be difficult to overestimate Gordon's contributions to this thesis, both academically and stylistically.

I would be severely remiss if I did not also give special mention to Dr. Harvey Krahn. Harvey made significant contributions to the analysis of much of the data used in this thesis. Above all, however, I want to publicly thank Harvey for his unswerving support and friendship during the entire period of my doctoral program. My debts to both Gordon and Harvey are only surpassed by my respect for them.

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Finally, but not least, I want to express public thanks and gratitude to my wife, Terri, and to my daughter, Jayna, for their emotional support and numerous sacrifices during my academic tenure. I could not have done it without them.

To those whose contributions I have failed in noting, I apologize. Conversely, any errors, omissions, or distortions contained in this thesis are my responsibility alone.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

DEDICATION .....
ABSTRACT .....
PREFACE .....
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....
CHAPTER

I THE "PROBLEM" OF POPULISM 1
INTRODUCTION 1
POPULISM: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 2
THEORY AND METHOD IN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY 6
A THEORY OF POPULISM 8
THE CASE OF REFORM 12
CONCLUSION 18

II THE ROOTS OF REFORM 20
INTRODUCTION 20
THE POLITICAL CULTURES OF THE WEST 20
THE MANNINGS AND SOCIAL CONSERVATISM 25
THE REBIRTH OF REGIONALISM 29
THE BUSINESS CLASS IN WESTERN CANADA 31
THE RISE OF NEO-CONSERVATISM IN THE WEST 37
THE ELECTIONS OF 1979 AND 1980 AND THEIR AFTERMATH 42
THE CANADA WEST FOUNDATION 50
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE RIGHT "FRINGE" 56
CONCLUSION 62

III THE RISE OF THE REFORM PARTY 63
INTRODUCTION 63
THE TORIES' WINNING COALITION OF 1984 63
THE BEGINNINGS OF DISILLUSIONMENT 67
BRIMELOW AND THE GHOST OF GOLDWIN SMITH 71
THE ECONOMICS OF WESTERN DISCONTENT 72

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE REFORM PARTY 83
THE WESTERN ASSEMBLY AND THE ROAD TO WINNIPEG 86
THE PARTY IS BORN 90
REFORM AND THE NORTHERN FOUNDATION 96
REBUILDING THE TORY ALLIANCE 97
THE ELECTION OF 1988 104
THE REFORM PARTY AND THE ELECTION OF 1988 106
CONCLUSION 110

IV THE LEGITIMATION OF REFORM 111
INTRODUCTION 111
GREY AND WATERS: GAINING A PLATFORM 111
REFORM, MEECH LAKE, AND THE RECESSION OF 1990-92 114
PRESTON MANNING'S "OLD CANADA" 127
THE PECULIARITY OF ANGLO-CANADIAN NATIVISM 133
CONCLUSION 144

V THE TRANSFORMATION(S) OF REFORM 145
INTRODUCTION 145
ROADS CHOSEN AND ABANDONED: THE SASKATOON CONVENTION 145
THE TIME OF INFLUENCE 148
REFORM'S ORGANIZATION AND FINANCES 154
WHO ARE THE REFORMERS? 162
WHAT DO REFORMERS BELIEVE? 171
REFORM AND THE POPULIST "IDEAL" 179
PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS: THE FUTURE OF THE PARTY 184
CONCLUSION 187

VI THE "PROBLEM" OF POPULISM REVISITED 188
INTRODUCTION 188
REFORM AND THE POPULIST DEBATES 188
RIGHT-WING AND LEFT-WING POPULISM 193
POPULISM AND THE NATION STATE 195

FOOTNOTES 198
BIBLIOGRAPHY 207
APPENDICES 248
"A" SUPPORT FOR THE MAJOR CANADIAN POLITICAL PARTIES, CANADA, 1990-1992 (IN PERCENTAGES, BY MONTHLY QUARTERS 248
"B" SUPPORT FOR THE MAJOR CANADIAN POLITICAL PARTIES, PRAIRIES, 1990-1992 (IN PERCENTAGES, BY MONTHLY QUARTERS 249
"C" SUPPORT FOR THE MAJOR CANADIAN POLITICAL PARTIES, BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1990-1992 (IN PERCENTAGES, BY MONTHLY QUARTERS 250

CHAPTER ONE

THE "PROBLEM" OF POPULISM

At a certain point in their historical lives, social groups become detached from their traditional parties .... are no longer recognized by their class (or fraction of a class) as its expression" (Gramsci, 1988:217-18).

INTRODUCTION

The Reform Party emerged at the end of a tumultuous decade in Canadian politics, a period that featured (among other events) the fracturing of support for the traditionally dominant Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties, the rise of Quebec (and other) nationalist sentiments, and a series of divisive Constitutional and policy debates (the National Energy Program, Free Trade, Meech Lake). Even in the context of these occurrences, however, the success of the Reform Party may appear incongruous, particularly given the situation of western Canadian politics earlier in the decade.

In 1979, the federal Progressive Conservative party, headed by a western (Albertan) leader, Joe Clark, won election. Clark's minority government held office, however, only for eight months. The subsequent election (in 1980) saw the return of a majority government headed by Liberal leader Pierre Trudeau whose previous tenure in office (1968-1979) had ended in defeat and retirement only a few months earlier. Particularly galling for many western Canadians was the fact that the Liberals had won a majority government despite winning only two of seventy-seven seats in the region (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia).

In the weeks and months that followed, right-wing populist parties emerged like locusts out of the prairie landscape. Some were openly separatist, such as Western Canada Concept and West-Fed. Others, like the Unionest Party, called for the region joining the United States. These parties seemed to represent the widespread frustration of many western Canadians with the federal political system, a frustration that increased as the left-of-centre Liberal party enacted nationalist and state-centralist policies, such as the hated National Energy Program (NEP). During the same period, Canada's economy entered into a prolonged recession. The economic downturn was particularly emotionally scarring for many Albertans, contrasting as it did with the oil-fed prosperity of the late 1970s. Many blamed the impact (if not the cause) of the recession on the NEP. Despite these political advantages, however, the right-wing populist parties failed to thrive. By the end of 1983, beset by internal squabbles and lacking widespread public support, most had faded from significance on the political scene.

The following year, the federal Progressive Conservative party under Brian Mulroney gained a resounding victory, winning 211 of 282 seats, fifty-eight of seventy seven in the western region (Chief Electoral Officer of Canada [hereafter, "CEOC"], 1984a). Within a short time, the Tories dismantled state-nationalist economic policies and decentralized political authority and control. What was the effect of this political change upon the western region? Though the left-wing, headed by the New Democratic Party, organized labour, and other groups, was able to mount sporadic opposition to this

agenda, ironically right-wing populism gained in momentum! The fall of 1987 saw the formation of both the religiously oriented Christian Heritage Party and the Reform Party of Canada. Although the Mulroney Tories won again in the federal election of 1988, taking 169 of 295 seats, forty-eight in the West, each of these new right-wing parties received significant popular electoral support, the CHP in Ontario and the Reform Party in the West (CEOC, 1988a). Since then, the Reform Party in particular has continued to gain in popularity.

In summary, other right-wing populist parties sputtered and fell at a time of apparently conducive political circumstances, yet the Reform Party has gained its success in opposition to, and during the time in office of, the right-wing federal Progressive Conservative party. How can this apparent incongruency be explained?

An answer to this question must be sought within a wider examination of populist movements and their causes, debates concerning which are the subject of the section that follows.

POPULISM: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE(1)

"Populism" is a notoriously slippery concept (see Canovan, 1981). As Laycock (1990:15) has noted, the term has almost been rendered analytically useless by the journalistic practice of assuming that "any folksy appeal to the 'average guy,' or some allegedly general will, is evidence of populism." On this basis, writers in the past have referred to Hitler, Mao, Juan Peron, Huey Long, and Father Coughlin as populists, while, more recently, such diverse personalities as Ronald Reagan, George Wallace, Jesse Jackson, Bill Vander Zalm, and Ross Perot have received the same label.

But if, as Laycock asserts, populism cannot be reduced to merely a type of political leadership style what, then, is it?

For Laycock, the essential feature of populist movements is their mass-organizational nature, a view elaborated upon by others who have stated that the core notion underlying populism is that of "a people" defined by their historic, geographic, and/or cultural roots (Boyte, 1986; Schwartz, 1980; Dietz, 1986). Perhaps the clearest definition of populism, however, is provided by Sinclair (1979:74-5). According to Sinclair, a populist movement frequently "stresses the worth of the common people and advocates their political supremacy," rejects "intermediate associations between the mass and leaders," and directs its protests "against some group which lies outside the local society."

In short, populism constitutes an attempt to create a mass political movement, mobilized around symbols and traditions congruent with the popular culture, which expresses a group's sense of threat, arising from "outside" elements and directed at their perceived "peoplehood." In this sense, populist movements occupy a middle ground between traditional sources of collective identity, such as "nation" and "ethnic group" which primarily revolve around (real or imagined) notions of consanguinity, and modern territorially-based forms of nationalism. While populist movements are theoretically more inclusive than the former, they are practically more exclusive than the latter, thus allowing populist movements to include among their entry qualifications such things as class, occupation, and/or status.

The notion, however, of what groups lie "outside" the movement is problematic, and goes beyond mere geographic location. Hence, while populism often gains its power

through appeals that cross class and ethnic lines, the notion of peoplehood is not all encompassing. Indeed, the identification of a group "not of the people" possessing illegitimate political and economic power in opposition to "the people" serves to bind the latter closer (see Richards, 1981:5-6; Finkel, 1989:202-3; Laycock, 1990:19; McCormick, 1991:350).

Finally, concrete expressions of populism frequently vary (see Conway, 1978; Richards, 1981; Canovan, 1981; Finkel, 1989; Laycock, 1990). What is the particular source of such movements? And what factors determine their ideological orientations and political actions? These questions have lain at the heart of debates on populism for over a century.

Although examples of populist revolt can be found in earlier periods -- Watt Tyler and, later, the Luddites in England, for example -- the concept of populism is primarily associated with the various agrarian movements that arose throughout North America, Russia, and parts of Western Europe in the late nineteenth century. Indeed, American journalists coined the term "populism" in 1896 to describe the People's Party that contested the American election of that year.

The American social historians who attempted to explain the rise of that party (and earlier manifestations) began a series of debates that have continued to the present time. Drawing upon Turner's (1896) frontier theory, American theorists of this earlier period (Buck, 1913; 1920; Hicks, 1931) tended to explain populist movements as resulting from regional economic factors. In particular, populism was defined as a regional agrarian response to the increasing scarcity of free land under advanced settlement. As land became more scarce, the farmers and, to a lesser extent, the labourers of the American west became increasingly pressed by the power of monopoly interests, in particular "the manufacturers, the railroads, the moneylenders, the middlemen -- plutocrats all" (Hicks, 1931:405). Farmers at first formed cooperative associations through which to press their political interests. When lobbying alone did not bring about the desired results, these organizations created their own political party, the People's Party.

In Canada, Morton's (1950) study of the Progressive Party and Lipset's (1950) study of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) similarly contended that populist parties resulted from the of uncertainty of regional hinterland economies. Like their American counterparts, Morton and Lipset also were generally positive in their portrayals of populism as egalitarian, democratic, and reformist.

Shortly after Morton's and Lipset's analyses of populism entered the public domain, a negative critique of populism was launched by Hofstadter. While Hofstadter gave perfunctory credit to populism ("There is indeed much that is good and usable in our Populist past" [1955:61]), on the whole, he tended to view the agrarian movements as irrational, regressive, anti-intellectual, and paranoid. According to Hofstadter, the worldview of the populists ultimately was narrow and ethnocentric -- arguments to which he again returned in later texts (1963; 1964).

Work by Leonard and Parmet (1971) and Crapol (1973) suggest, however, that Hofstadter's (1955) analysis may pertain to a particular form of populism: nativism. Nativism is a belief system forged out of the conjunction of nationalism with ethno-cultural, religious, and/or racial prejudice (Palmer, 1982). Nativist attitudes are most likely held by people in social groups that hold the same racial, ethnic, and/or religious characteristics, but not the economic and/or political power, of the dominant

class. Such attitudes emerge most frequently during periods of social, political, and/or economic crisis, the latter form of crisis suggesting that nativism also may be linked to a feeling of "relative deprivation" (Graham and Gurr, 1969; McGuire, 1981). However caused, the crisis nonetheless results in the emergence of a sense of "calling" (Weber, 1920) among the heretofore identified social groups to defend the country against perceived internal threats posed by various minority groups (Leonard and Parmet, 1971).

Until recently, few theorists have applied the notion of nativism to Canadian studies. Berger's (1976) study of nineteenth century Canadian imperialism, Palmer's (1982) application of the concept to an historical examination of prejudice in Alberta, and Robin's (1991) recent examination of extreme right-wing groups in Canada between 1920-1940, provide three exceptions. Notably, however, the concept has not been applied explicitly to populist movements in Canada -- an apparent lacuna given the American experience.

A third stream within theories of populism draws its impetus from Marxism. A few years before Hofstadter's (1955) work appeared, Macpherson (1953) used Marxist class concepts in an effort to explain the rise, in 1935, of the Social Credit Party in Alberta. In particular, Macpherson returned to Marx and Engels' (1848) depiction of the predicament of the petite bourgeoisie under modern capitalism first elaborated upon in The Communist Manifesto.

In that text, Marx and Engels had outlined their theory of class struggle. Under modern capitalism, they said, the essential class struggle is between the proletariat and the owners of the means of production, the bourgeoisie. Caught between these two classes are other classes, most notably a petite bourgeoisie class comprised of small manufacturers, shopkeepers, artisans, and peasants. Although it is destined ultimately to sink into the proletarian class, the petite bourgeoisie nonetheless plays an important role in the larger struggle between capital and labour insofar as it "fight[s] against the bourgeoisie, to save [itself] from extinction." But, warned Marx and Engels, the petite bourgeoisie elements are "not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat" (1848, cited in 1977:229).

This theory of the "reactionary bourgeoisie" was advanced by Lenin (1893-94; 1898) in his empirical study of populism (the Narodist movement) in Russia. In contrast to Marx and Engels, Lenin recognized the positive attempts of Russia's agrarian petite bourgeoisie to create a better, more democratic society (see Conway, 1978). Nonetheless, Lenin, like his Marxist predecessors, viewed Narodism as a movement "based on backward theories," "a romantic and petty bourgeois criticism of capitalism," and "a disregard for the cardinal facts of Russian history and reality." Narodism, said Lenin, wanted to replace capitalist development with "a fiction of the pre-capitalist order," and, as such, stood in opposition to the historical necessity of capitalist development (1898, cited in 1970:98-9). Ultimately, populist movements were unable to transcend their petite bourgeois (i.e., "contradictory") class circumstances with a radical critique of capitalism:

> ... the small producer ... looks with one face to the past ... without knowing or wishing to know anything about the general economic system and about the

> need to reckon with the class that controls it -- and with the other face to the future, adopting a hostile attitude to the capitalism that is ruining him (Lenin, 1893-94, cited in1960:503).

In short, Lenin diagnosed the Russian populism as displaying the (theoretically) "typical" ideology and behaviour of a group occupying what is now commonly termed a "contradictory class position" (Wright, 1982).

Macpherson's (1953) study borrowed heavily from Marx and Engels's and Lenin's view of populism. Macpherson contended that Alberta's class structure was relatively homogeneous, dominated by "independent commodity producers" (i.e., the agrarian petite bourgeoisie) and that the economic circumstances of agrarian life rendered farmers incapable of developing a class consciousness. But his work also was distinctly Canadian, drawing on the staples tradition established by Harold Innis (see Laxer, 1991), in contending that a hinterland-metropolis relationship existed between western farmers and the rest of North America, a relationship that consigned the West to a "quasi -colonial" status. In effect, Macpherson overlaid regional economic factors with Marxist class analysis in diagnosing the causes underlying the rise of Social Credit.

After the 1960s, North American theorists directed their investigations towards countering these negative views of populism. In the United States, Pollack (1967) and Goodwyn (1976) aimed their rebuttals at Hofstadter (1955), whom Pollack (1960) had earlier accused of unempirical and ahistorical revisionism of the populist experience. In Canada, meanwhile, counter-claims were pressed against Macpherson (1953) by Caldarola (1979), Johnson (1979), and Finkel (1986; 1989) who asserted the essentially radical nature of Social Credit policies. Even more severe criticisms were launched against Macpherson's (1953) contention that Social Credit was supported primarily by the agrarian petite bourgeoisie (see Grayson and Grayson, 1974; Flanagan, 1979; Richards and Pratt, 1979; Sinclair, 1979; Conway, 1984). Recent empirical work by Bell (1989; 1990) has strengthened criticisms of Macpherson's (1953) arguments.

By the late 1970s, however, North American debates about populism had reached an impasse. On one side were theorists who, usually relying on regional economic arguments, contended that early populist movements had been moderately left-wing and democratic attempts at redirecting the trajectory of capitalist development through political means. On the other side were those theorists who, using nativist or class arguments, viewed these movements as tending towards right-wing extremism and reactionism. Both sides shared only a common tendency to "historicize" populism. That is, each viewed populist movements as largely an agrarian phenomenon that was disappearing rapidly from North American political life (Sinclair, 1979; see also McCormick, 1991:350).

The civil rights movement and Vietnam protests of the 1960s, however, and the neo-conservative counter-revolution in the late 1970s that eventually led to the election of Ronald Reagan as president in 1980, made apparent that populist politics had reemerged, albeit in an altered form (i.e., urbanized, more "high-tech"). As a result, many theorists returned to an examination of earlier populist movements, hoping that the shedding of greater light on these might illuminate the nature of the new populism. An offshoot of this "return" was the attempt on the part of several theorists to come to terms with the many faces of populism.

Canovan's typology, for example, distinguished between "agrarian" populism, defined by "a particular kind of socioeconomic base (peasants or farmers), liable to arise in particular socio-economic circumstances (especially modernization of one sort or another), and perhaps sharing a particular socioeconomic program (1981:8)"; and "political" populism, defined as a "particular kind of political phenomenon where the tensions between the elite and the grass roots loom large" (1981:9).

Canovan's work is interesting and provocative. The asymmetry of her categories is, however, problematic. The best typologies always consist of implicit comparisons, oppositions, and continuities between the categories. Beside this ideal, Canovan's classification begs the question, "Why not urban populism?" Similarly, the reader is left to ask, "In what sense is agrarian populism not also political?"

In contrast to Canovan's typology, and in direct opposition to her assertion that any attempt "to label populism as either Right or Left is a lost cause" (Canovan, 1981:294), other theorists have presented typologies based on just such a traditional division. In his seminal work on populism, Richards (1981) listed a series of characteristics defining right- and left-wing populist movements in Canada. Richards specifically noted that, historically, left populist movements in Canada tended towards class (farm -labour) alliances; to present a general critique of corporate capitalism; to demand greater state involvement as a countervailing force to the corporate sector; and to spring from rural co-operative organizations. In contrast, right populist movements tended to mobilize along regional rather than class lines; to narrow their critique to the power of banks, the money supply, and credit; to view big government as the primary enemy; and to eschew participatory democracy in favour of plebiscitarianism (pp. 19-20). It is important to note that Richards' work not only describes differences between left and right populist movements but also, at least implicitly, suggests that structural and organizational factors underlie the differences.

Richards' typology was subsequently applied by Finkel (1989:202-03) to his examination of the Social Credit party in Alberta, and expanded by Laycock (1990:19 -22) into four categories: social democratic populism, radical democratic populism, plebiscitarian populism, and crypto-Liberalism. Because of its heuristic value in categorizing a wide array of political ideas and approaches, a right-left typology, based on Richards (1981), Finkel (1989), and Laycock (1990), is also used throughout this thesis.

Despite these recent efforts, an adequate theory of populism remains elusive. Is it possible to construct a theory of populism that is both sensitive to particular empirical detail yet broad enough to illuminate the populist experience in general? Can such a theory, moreover, make sense of the various permutations of populism? I think so. Before describing such a theory, however, I will turn to a brief discussion of the link in historical-sociology between theory and methods.

THEORY AND METHOD IN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

Historical sociology is both an old and a new method of research. History infused the early sociological writings of de Tocqueville (1856) and Marx and Engels (1848). Later, the application of history to sociology was even more vigorously pursued by Weber (1920).

As sociology grew in stature during this century, however, the role of history (and

of historical detail) dimmed in sociological explanation (see Kent, 1992). In North America, particularly, the years immediately following World War II saw theorists of social action constructing increasingly abstract theoretical schemas. The most prominent theorist of this type was, of course, Talcott Parsons (1949; 1951), but Smelser (1962) and Johnson (1966) provide other, more recent, examples. Breathtaking in scope, the theories arising out of this "school" seemed nonetheless to descend too often into a morass of abstractions, devoid of human agency or even meaningful prediction. The texts were also frequently unreadable.

Particularly scathing of sociological theory were historians. By contrast, however, many scholars also pointed out that historical research was not without its problems. These critics contended that historians were engaging (at best) in a kind of tyranny of the particular and (at worst) an intransigent historicism, while failing simultaneously to acknowledge their implicit debt to theoretical concepts (see Skocpol, 1979:35, for a review of this debate; also Hofstadter, 1968; Tilly, 1981; Griffin, 1992).

In response to these twin evils of abstraction and historicism, numerous scholars began to meld the best aspects of historical research methodology with sociological theory construction. The result was a return to historical sociology. In subsequent years, this return was heralded by a host of important and influential books (for example, see Moore, 1966; Skocpol, 1979; Chirot, 1986; and Laxer, 1989).

But what is historical sociology? Unlike standard sociological methodologies, there is no hard and fast way of practising historical sociology. Tilly (1984), Skocpol (1984), and Griffin (1992) detail different strategies or approaches used by various researchers while still operating within an historical sociological framework (see also Kent, 1992). Nonetheless, some general characteristics of historical sociology are ascertainable, each of which has theoretical implications.

A first characteristic of historical sociology is that theory is used less for hypothesis testing than the construction of **general explanations**. Whether interested in causal regularities, general models, or "meaningful interpretations of broad historical patterns" (Skocpol, 1984:368), the intent is to glean from the specific facts at hand a general explanation for the phenomenon. It follows that, in Quadagno and Knapp's (1992:504) words, theory should be used, not as a means of providing "statements to be answered, but with questions." This does not mean that historical sociology is incapable of arriving at testable hypotheses (see Tilly, 1978). Neither does it prevent the use of empirical tests of theory in the course of research, a fact evidenced throughout this thesis. It does mean, however, that such tests of theory as are conducted are not ends in themselves but only a part of the overall research project.

A second characteristic of historical sociology involves the use of **time** (Tilly, 1981; Griffin, 1992; Aminzade, 1992). Because every event studied has occurred in the past, all sociological research could be loosely termed "historical" (Griffin, 1992:404). Historical sociology, however, employs time *as a variable in itself*. As Tilly (1981) has stated, *when* an event occurs is an important aspect of how an event unfolds, and of its later effects.

A third characteristic follows from this: the employment of a **narrative structure** (Griffin, 1992; Abbott, 1992). In the broad sense, a narrative is a "processual, action-based approach... to social reality" (Abbott, 1992:430). As such, a narrative structure runs, at least implicitly, through much sociological work.

Historical sociology, however, makes this narrative explicit. Along the way, "the entire array of explanatory tools typically used in sociological explanation" (Griffin, 1992:421) are employed not as answers in themselves, but as further questions to be addressed in the course of the narrative. In contrast to other methods of sociological research, historal sociology is thus more likely to triangulate several modes or sources of research (see footnote 1.2 re: details of research modes and sources used in this thesis).

A fourth characteristic of historical sociology, as both theory and method, is its tendency to deal (sometimes simultaneously) with events and processes at **different levels**. Tilly describes four historical levels operating within historical sociological research:

> At the **world-historical** level, we are attempting to fix the special properties of an era and to place it in the ebb and flow of human history.... At the **world-systemic** level, we are trying to discern the essential connections and variations within the larger sets of strongly interdependent social structures.... At the **macrohistorical** level, we seek to account for particularly big structures and large processes and to chart their alternate forms. At the **microhistorical** level, we trace the encounters of individuals and groups with those structures and processes, with the hope of explaining how people actually experience them (Tilly, 1984:61, bold printing in original).

In short, historical sociology attempts to bridge the age-old debate between structure and agency through a recognition that people act, but do so in relationship to ideas, events, and influences occurring in real time and space.

Fifth, historical sociology is **comparative**. Sometimes this involves actual comparisons between cases (Skocpol, 1979; Laxer, 1989). In other instances, comparisons may deal with elements of a single case (Lipset, 1950; Pinard, 1971). As in all research, single-case studies, such as that conducted in this thesis, suffer a potential problem of validity if applied to other cases (Skocpol, 1984). This problem can be dealt with, however, by employing concepts at a significantly high level of abstraction so as to extend the relevance of findings.

The characteristics of an historical sociological approach set forth here are embedded in the theory of populism employed in this thesis. I turn now to an elaboration of that theory.

A THEORY OF POPULISM

My theory locates the causes of populist unrest in delegitimation crises and the resultant decomposition of previously existing political alliances. The type of populism that emerges (i.e., right- or left-wing) is a product of the social, political, and ideological elements set adrift by this process and the consequent reconfiguration of alliances designed to resolve the crisis.

The theory begins with Gramsci's (1929-35) concept of "hegemony." Stasiulis (1988:232) recently has defined hegemony as referring "to the use by the dominant class of its political, moral, and intellectual leadership to shape the world view of

subordinate classes in conformance with its own long-term interests." Hegemony refers, in short, to the capacity of a class to construct an overarching concept of reality. This constructed reality neutralizes conflicts over the ownership, distribution, and use of socially produced capital either by reducing such conflicts to simple differences (Laclau, 1977) or, alternatively, displacing the source of antagonisms. Under this resultant illusion of a congruency of interests, a political coalition of social elements (i.e., an "historic bloc" [Gramsci, 1929-35]) is formed that in turn shapes the general contours of society at that historic moment.

Such alliances are particularly necessary in nation states where political decisions are ostensibly decided through electoral politics (see Esping-Andersen, 1985). In capitalist societies, where the fundamental conflict remains between capital and labour, yet where neither class is objectively large enough to form a majority, class interests must necessarily be pressed in an often uneasy alliance with each other or with other classes, groups, and/or fragments of these social elements.

Class alliances are further attenuated by other production, consumption, and distribution influences. Together, these varied influences result in the situating of individuals within social locations of which class is only one constituent part (see Dunleavy and Husband, 1985). Within these social locations, themselves existing in real historical time, ideologies are produced and reproduced, creating habits of mind that guide, though never determine, the possibilities for political action.

The form of hegemonic alliances arising in a given time and place depends upon 1) the relative power of the two fundamental classes as determined by their objective size, subjective consciousness, internal cohesion, and access to resources; 2) the relative power of those in contradictory social locations who, lacking a class consciousness, construct their politics around (ostensibly) non-class issues that may, nonetheless, favour either capital or labour; 3) the historically existing political culture in which decisions are made; and 4) the organizational capacity of the two fundamental classes and their leadership to form coalitions with each other or with the remaining classes.

Political parties, especially the governing party, are both the practical embodiment of these hegemonic alliances and the major instrument for their construction. All members of the existing polity -- that is, the government and contenders for power with routine, low-cost access to political resources (Tilly, 1978) -- tailor their policies and actions to the existing possibilities for alliance construction. Hence, to some extent, even opposition parties reaffirm the legitimacy of the existing hegemony by their participation in the political process.

Hegemony, however, is a dynamic process. This is particularly the case in modern capitalist countries. Marx and Engels (1848, cited in 1977:224) noted that [modern capitalism] "cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society." While crude interpretations of Marx often have limited the meaning of "instruments" to material-economic factors, I would suggest -- and I think a full reading of Marx's writings bear this out -- that he also viewed ideology and politics as essential factors in production. Thus, any significant change in the political, economic, or ideological spheres of society rapidly spreads to other spheres, creating what Gramsci (1929-35) has termed "organic crises" (see Gordon et al., 1982; and Chirot, 1986 for concrete examples).(3) In the midst of such crises, previously submerged, real or imagined conflicts, also of a political, economic, and/or ideological nature, between

various social groups, are likely to reemerge. The system of political alliances that both arose out of, yet simultaneously underpinned, the previous hegemony begin to unravel.

History, particularly since the late 18th century, provides numerous examples of this process of unravelling. The political reforms of 1861 in Russia, conceived by the elite as the first stage in modernizing that country, neither freed the serfs (except in a legalistic way) nor proletarianized them. Instead, the reforms tied the peasantry even more to the land, while making them objectively poorer. Lacking exposure to other social classes and/or an alternative vision of social organization, the Russian peasants fell back during their period of discontent upon traditional solutions; hence, the emergence of a kind of reactionary populism (see Lenin, 1902, and Yatsunsky, 1974; also Gerschenkron, 1962, and Skocpol, 1979; for an alternative analysis, see Canovan, 1981:59-97).

American agrarians of the same period formed associations and alliances with elements of other classes to lobby for government protections against the declining price of wheat, the perceived illegitimate power of railroads and bankers, and, later, the cost of land (see Hicks, 1931; and Buck, 1913; 1920). The result was the rise of a series of populist movements that were, sometimes simultaneously, both reactionary (see Hofstadter, 1955; Crapol, 1973) and progressive (see Pollack, 1967).

A frequent result of an organic crisis is the delegitimation of the existing social order and, as a consequence, the existing polity (see Panitch, 1977; Connolly, 1984) among various social elements. Legitimacy crises are signalled by increased challenges to the ideas and practices of the dominant hegemony. In mild instances, these challenges may appear as political protests lodged on t-shirts, in grafitti, or in jokes. In more prominent cases, such challenges may result in the rise in production and sales of anti-establishment books and tracts, or to radical experimentation in the visual arts and literature. In a more extreme form, legitimation crises may lead to labour, civil, and/or political unrest, as occurred in western Europe during the 1920s and 30s (see Stearns, 1975) and again in the 1960s (Thompson, 1986), and recently in the formerly communist states of eastern Europe. Finally, at its most extreme, the breakdown of political legitimacy may finally result in revolution, as occurred in Russia, Hungary, Germany, and Italy following the First World War.

Particularly vulnerable to the effects of delegitimation are individuals and groups within social locations that have previously remained relatively insulated from dominant ideological messages (Dunleavy and Husband, 1985) and/or those whose political, economic, and/or ideological interests have been abruptly and negatively affected by the organic crisis. While the properties of these "vulnerable" locations are empirically specific and cannot be exactly determined a priori, I would expect, for example, that certain regions (e.g., hinterland areas) or occupations (e.g., those in primary or declining industries), classes (e.g., the petite bourgeoisie or unorganized labour, often in secondary job markets), or previously privileged status groups, will be most susceptible to delegitimation. Members of vulnerable locations subsequently attempt to construct a counter-hegemony.

In this regard, it is analytically useful to distinguish between the peripheral elements of any society -- a group commonly termed "the fringe" -- and these vulnerable elements. Social disorganization theorists, from Durkheim (1893; 1897) to Kornhauser (1959), have insisted upon the centrality of fringe elements to the rise of political movements. While fringe elements may provide, however, the clearest

expression of ideas latent in the society, and may even be found politically useful by those interested in establishing a counter-hegemony, we cannot look to the fringe as the source of organized political discontent. Rather, as Tilly (1978) and McCarthy and Zald (1987) ably demonstrate, successful political movements result from the mobilization by an organized and capable leadership of the growing discontent with the existing polity. In order to understand the rise of populist parties we must look, therefore, to those social elements who are directly threatened by the organic crisis.

Why do these vulnerable elements collectively mobilize in support of an alternative from outside of the existing polity, i.e., a "third party." Why do they not turn to existing political alternatives? In part, the answer lies in a combination of objective political interests and political socialization (see Dunleavy and Husband, 1985) or, more broadly, the historical political culture within which the vulnerable elements construct their view of the crises' cause(s) and solution(s). Thus, the ostensible range of political choices perceived as legitimate by vulnerable elements may, in practice, be quite limited.

In large measure, however, the rise of a third party also results from what might be termed a "political lag" occurring within the existing polity. Like all organizations, political parties can be prone to inertia (see Stinchcombe, 1965). That is, the policies, ideologies, and alliances created by a party in the past may become fetters to adapting to the changed circumstances brought about by an organic crisis. The existing political parties may lack the agility to construct new coalitions able to either re-incorporate or suppress the "freed" social elements. By contrast, the nascent third party (appears) to have no historical obligations. It has only a goal: to preserve and protect "the people" in the moment of the organic crisis.

Despite this appeal to "the people," it is important to keep in mind that populist movements never incorporate all the residents of an area; indeed, the idea of who constitutes the people often is quite circumscribed. Nonetheless, the leadership's appeal to the people is both strategically useful in attempting to recruit other freed elements, or in blunting the appeal of other parties. Moreover, the notion that one represents the people provides a psychological justification for those already recruited members in pursuing future policies and actions.

Whether populist parties are successful depends on a number of factors. The size, strength, and strategic location of individuals and groups cast off from the existing parties determines the "third party's" potential limits of political support. In turn, organizational factors, including the party's leadership and material resources (primarily labour and money), affect the party's capacity to mobilize these freed elements (Tilly, 1978; also McCarthy and Zald, 1987). Finally, the party's success is also affected by the ability of its leadership to construct a counter-ideology that speaks to the freed social elements -- "the people" -- in a language congruent with culturally - and historically-accepted symbols, while stating the causes of the crisis, the injustices it has wrought, and the solutions to be pursued (Laycock, 1990).

Even where all of these factors are in place, the political success of populist parties is not assured. Indeed, their success is in most cases fortuitous. For example, the existing polity, or at least a dominant party within it, might rapidly adapt to the new social and political realities and so construct a new system of alliances that reincorporates the freed elements. Alternatively, the causes of the legitimacy crisis might be satisfactorally resolved before the existing hegemony is irreparably damaged.

Finally, other events (wars, natural catastrophes) might intervene also to once again change the existing political dynamics.

There remains, however, a question: Why do populist parties take on either right-wing or left-wing trajectories? The answer is contingent on the interplay of several factors, the primacy and directional influence of any particular factor being historically specific. Some of these factors are endogenous to the geographic territory in which the party arises. Endogenous factors include the region's historically existing political culture, the class configuration of elements lacking a current political allegiance, the fortuitous timing of economic crises, and the degree of legitimacy of organizations and potential leaders capable of constructing a counter-hegemony. But exogenous, world-historical circumstances also are likely to be important. In particular, the world-historical dominance of either right-wing or left-wing ideology at a given moment likely will influence the contours of debate in specific areas. The factors resulting in the formation of a particular type of populist party thus cannot be determined a priori, but must be located in the concrete historical circumstances in which the party emerges.

The recent rise of the Reform Party of Canada provides an opportunity for applying this general theory and otherwise exploring some of the questions raised by previous studies of populist movements.

THE CASE OF REFORM

Based on the thesis stated above, I contend that the rise of the Reform Party, and the ebb and flow of populism in Canadian history generally, can be explained only as the end product of a series of historically-situated economic, political, and ideological crises. To the extent that these crises result in a fragmentation of the country's hegemonic alliances in general, and its political coalitions in particular, and where these fragmentations are not immediately reversed within the existing polity, the result is the rise of new vehicles of political representation. To substantiate this more general thesis, it is necessary to briefly examine historically how political alliances have risen and fallen in Canada in response to various crises.

For much of this century, beginning with Wilfrid Laurier's ascent to power in 1896, the Liberal party governed Canada. It did so primarily through an alliance of the conservative (and secular) French-speaking elites in Quebec, agrarians in English-speaking Canada, and big business. Along the way, the Liberal party's dominance was maintained through an adept blend of political savvy, such as Mackenzie King displayed in absorbing most of the Progressives in the 1920s, and shere fortuitousness, such as being out of power when both the First World War and the full force of the Depression began (see Careless, 1953; Underhill, 1960; Lower, 1983).

The Depression, and the Second World War that followed, radically transformed Canada's (and other western countries') political and economic order. At the heart of this transformation was "the great compromise" between labour and capital, overseen and supported by the state's administrative apparatuses, resulting in both the creation of the welfare state and, concomitantly, the increased legitimation of the power and authority of the liberal state.

But the war had also transformed Canada in another important way. For years, English-speaking Canadians had struggled to define their own identity in relation to their British colonial past and their powerful neighbour to the south. While the demise of the

British Empire following the war started the final process of Canada's separation from its British roots, the country was drawn even more tightly into the American sphere of influence by continentalist economic policies and the politics and ideology of the Cold War. By the early 1960s, Canada was a typical liberal democracy, confident in its self -proclaimed belief in equal opportunity for all (see Mann, 1970). Among liberal democracies, in general, Canada seemed particularly immune to class voting (Alford, 1963; Lenski and Lenski, 1974). In Laclau's (1977) terms, class, and other potential sources of social and political conflict, had been transformed into insubstantial "differences."

Then, slowly, imperceptably at first, cracks began to appear in "the great compromise," and, hence, liberalism's hegemonic edifice throughout the western world. By the end of the 1950s, some people were already coming to doubt the promises of liberal democracy. Even as the welfare state grew in size and power, social inequalities seemed to grow more entrenched. Statistics Canada figures show, for example, that the percentage of income earned by each quintile of the Canadian population remained virtually static from 1951 to 1985, with the earnings of the lowest 20 percent rising only modestly from 4.4 to 4.7 percent. During this same period, the wealthiest quintile's percentage of income increased slightly from 42.8 percent to 43 percent (quoted in Hunter, 1988). Moreover, and contrary to the "human capital" arguments embedded in liberal economic theory, evidence suggested that differences of income and wealth redounded as much to class of origin, ethnic, gender, and other "collective" attributes as to individual market capacities (see Curtis et al., 1988; Forcese and Richer, 1988).

These results also suggested, however, that traditional class theories alone did not go far enough in explaining the perpetuation of inequalities within modern capitalist societies. Rejecting both totalitarian communism and liberal democratic capitalism, intellectuals during the late 1950s (such as E. P. Thompson) thus began to fashion an alternative vision of politics soon known as "the New Left." During the next few years, the New Left came to embrace other expressions of popular discontent, beginning in the 1950s with the anti-nuclear movement in Britain and the civil rights movement in the United States, the later rise of feminism, and finally the Viet Nam protests and widespread labour unrest of the mid- and late-1960s. The essence of all of these movements was a challenge to the structural inequalities and authority relationships embedded within liberal democratic theory.

Canadians were politicized in a vicarious way by all of these events. At the same time, the rise of a left-wing counter-hegemony was the result of circumstances and events particular to Canada. The structural changes that had been already occurring prior to the Second World War, particularly in eastern Canada, only intensified in the years following that conflict. Like the East, much of the West also was transformed from an agricultural to a manufacturing and service economy (Grabb, 1989). A second major change, begun during the war but accelerated throughout the 1960s, involved the unprecedented entry of large numbers of women into the work force. These structural changes led, among other things, to demands by Canadian workers, women, and other minority groups for an expansion of their democratic rights. These demands often were coupled with increased unionization (Krahn and Lowe, 1988).

The formation in 1961 of the New Democratic Party (NDP) out of an alliance of the CCF and the Canadian Labour Congress brought a further challenge to ideas espoused by

the Liberal party. By the late 1960s, in the wake of the Viet Nam War and the evident problems of the American economy, New Left offshoots of the NDP, such as "the Waffle," began lobbying for active federal government policies to further the goal of economic nationalism (Marchak, 1988; Brym, 1988). In doing so, the NDP introduced a more active and independent approach to Canadian development than had been expressed by the laissez-faire "rentier" mentality of previous Liberal administrations.

Quebec's Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, however, created the major challenge to continued Liberal dominance. The demands of a wide coalition of Quebecers for greater autonomy -- demands bolstered by increased political violence within the province against persons and symbols of the Canadian state -- made the Liberal government under Lester Pearson abandon its traditional policy of symmetrical federalism. Quebec was allowed greater jurisdiction over its own affairs. At the same time, the Liberal government attempted to manufacture a new kind of "pan-Canadian" identity through such controversial policies as the installation of the Maple Leaf flag as Canada's official flag in 1965 (see Fraser, 1967).

In 1968, Pierre Trudeau replaced Pearson as Liberal Prime Minister. Trudeau opposed Quebec nationalism -- indeed, any other form of nationalism -- on the grounds that it was a retrograde identification with collective, rather than individual, rights. He further opposed the recognition of Quebec "exceptionalism" as recently practiced under Pearson. Returning to the previous Laurier policy of provincial equality, Trudeau granted increased political and economic powers to all of the provinces (Stevenson, 1977).

In a further effort to blunt Quebec nationalism, the Liberal government (in 1969) brought in the Official Languages Act which guaranteed Canadian citizens the right to deal with federal institutions in either English of French (see Clarkson and McCall, 1990). These various events and policies, however, had several unintended consequences.

The rise in Quebec nationalism contrasted markedly with the growing sense of lost identity felt by many English-speaking Canadians since the end of the Second World War. In a process that would only increase over the next three decades, the 1960s saw English Canada's cultural homogeneity challenged by the arrival of immigrants from non-Anglo Saxon countries, Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean (Logan, 1991). The installation of the new flag (mentioned above) only added to the growing sense of unease felt by many anglophone Canadians. Designed to create a sense of pan-Canadianism, the new flag was denounced instead by many anglophones as a further attack on their cultural heritage. Likewise, the federal government's implementation of official bilingualism in 1969 and of a policy of multiculturalism in 1971 was viewed by many in English-speaking Canada, particularly in the West, as a needless and expensive intrusion into their lives (see Vallee, 1988; Kallen, 1988). Far from assuaging concerns, federal government policies thus exacerbated the sense of cultural drift felt by many Anglo-Saxon elements (Bibby, 1990; see also Gairdner, 1990).

The federal state, the polity, and Canadians in general failed to construct an over-arching national vision that would take into account both French-speaking Quebecer's legitimate aspirations and English-speaking Canada's equally legitimate fears and concerns. At the same time, this failure was exacerbated by the federal government's granting of greater powers to all of the provincial governments. Combined with the election of aggressive new governments in many of the provinces, particularly in the West and Newfoundland, the result was a further denigration of the symbolic and actual

powers of the federal state while heightening the quasi-nationalist and regionalist identifications of people residing in these areas. In turn, conflicts increased between the federal and provincial levels of power over political, economic, and social jurisdictions (see Richards and Pratt, 1979; Pratt, 1977; 1981).

Increasingly lacking any real political or economic power, stripped of its symbolic role in uniting the nation state, the federal government faced a crisis of legitimacy (Panitch, 1977). Two events, in particular, exposed Canada's federal government as a monarch without clothes.

In 1973, the Yom Kippur War, and the subsequent OPEC oil crisis, brought to a head the long simmering crisis of American capitalism (Laxer, 1986). Over the next few years, a phenomenon occurred throughout the Western industrialized countries that Keynesian economic doctrine had averred was impossible: the simultaneous existence of high inflation *and* high unemployment ("stagflation"). The effect of these political and economic events was the unravelling of the "post-war Keynesian welfare state consensus" (King, 1987:1). More than most western countries, however, Canada's ability to deal with the economic crisis was confounded by several unique internal factors. A high level of foreign (especially American) ownership, particularly in strategic industries, rendered Canadian governments less able than those of other countries to manage the effects of the economic crisis (see Laxer, 1986). The derogation of economic and political power to the provinces further hindered the federal government's ability to manage the economy (Stevenson, 1977). In the end, the Canadian federal state was left with responsibility for the increasing debt-load, caused by the recession, while lacking real control over either expenditures or revenues.

The second event that served to reveal the increasing weakness of the federal Liberal government was the election in 1976 of the Parti Quebecois. Despite real political power in Ottawa and the implementation of bilingualism, and perhaps because of real economic growth, Quebec increasingly was asserting itself as an independent nation state.

For decades, the Liberal party had portrayed itself as the party that could both manage the economy and bridge the country's historic divisions between French and English. It could no longer make these claims. The Liberal party's dominance was ending.

By the late 1970s, however, the New Left was no longer the main challenger to the ruling parties in most liberal democracies. Having promoted the expansion of the welfare state, the left was unable to answer criticisms that the state was increasingly remote, costly, and inefficient. Equally, the left was stung by revelations that many "socialist" models (e.g., the U.S.S.R., east-bloc countries, mainland China) were no more -- and often much less -- democratic and progressive than liberal democracies. Finally, the cohesiveness of the left was shattered by internal conflicts, involving, particularly in the United States, the Viet Nam War, and the challenges of feminism and the civil right's movement to the left's traditionally conservative union constituency. In Canada, the left-wing was further undercut by regionalism (see Stevenson, 1977; Richards and Pratt, 1979; Johnston, 1987), gender, income, and status differences (see Kopinak, 1987; Johnston, 1987), and the failure of political parties and other social organizations (e.g., unions) to transform class, and other objective conditions, into subjective identifications with New Left politics (see Grabb and Lambert, 1982; Johnston and Ornstein, 1985; Pammett, 1987; Brym et al., 1989). The result was that

the left-wing failed to establish during the 1970s and early 1980s a politically -marketable counter-hegemony to the faltering hegemony of post-war liberalism.

Instead, the challenge to liberal democracy came from a coalition of right-wing elements, fearful of the emerging economic crisis and resentful of the gains previously made by the New Left. The name given to this right-wing response was "the New Right," and its ideology "neo-conservatism."

What is neo-conservatism? The literature is fairly consistent in defining it as an amalgam of classical liberal economic and political theory with traditional conservative social and moral doctrine. Specifically, neo-conservatism is said to promote capitalist socio-economic structures and beliefs (i.e., the free-market system, individualism, a minimal state, and the private ownership of property) while espousing a belief in natural inequalities and natural authorities (i.e., the Christian church, the family, and the state) (see Steinfels, 1979; Crawford, 1980; King, 1987; Barry, 1987; Green, 1987; Marchak, 1988).

In practice, however, the term "neo-conservatism" is much less precise. For example, the economic policies of both nominally left-wing governments in Australia and New Zealand and right-wing governments in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany were fiscally conservative. Equally, while the German variant of neo-conservatism seems to involve a romantic return to Hegelian notions of the role of "archaic-natural institutions" in regulating society (Habermas, 1983:82), Thatcher's version, except when she opposes Britain's further integration into Europe, might more accurately be termed "neo-liberal" (see Leys, 1983).

Only in the United States, under Ronald Reagan and, later, George Bush, does the full definition of neo-conservatism as a combination of liberal economic and conservative morality seem somewhat valid. There, throughout the 1980s, tax breaks were given to wealthy individuals and corporations, and non-military government programs slashed, in the belief that increased capital accumulation by the rich would result in heightened investment and economic growth, and, eventually, a "trickling down" of benefits to the poorer segments of society. At the same time, the Reagan/Bush governments also encouraged and supported the "moral entrepreneurship" of conservatives such as Jerry Falwell who demanded a return to law, order, and traditional values.

But do neo-conservatives actually exist? That is, do people actually subscribe to the full theoretical range of neo-conservative tenets as described in the literature? Perhaps some do, but it seems likely that many people believe in only one aspect, say, less government, while rejecting others. Indeed, as Lipset (1988) points out, many so -called neo-conservatives -- including most certainly himself -- were once staunch members of the anti-communist left. Their apparent turn to the right, during the 1980s, in supporting the Republicans resulted from their perception that the Democrats, and the New Left in general, had gone too far in its attacks upon the American political system at home and was otherwise soft on communism abroad (see also Nisbet, 1985). Although expressed more positively, Lipset's description of the roots of neo -conservatism is reminiscent of Peter Glotz' comment that, "Neoconservatism is the net into which the liberal can fall when he begins to fear his own liberalism" (quoted in Habermas, 1983:76).

What, then, are we to make of neo-conservatism? In general, I would suggest that it comprises an uncertain cluster of ideas wrapped in a "tone" of political discourse.

Specifically, I employ heuristically the term "neo-conservatism" throughout this thesis to describe an uneasy coalition of right-wing political interests united in their opposition to modern welfare state liberalism. One measure of how dominant this coalition of interests had become in the United States by the late 1980s was that George Bush's derisive discounting of liberalist discourse as the -- presumably unspeakable -- "'l' word" during that country's 1988 election went virtually unchallenged. Having crushed and dismembered its principal ideological opponent, neo-conservatism became in the United States the ideological basis for the Republican's winning coalition.

Given Canada's geographic proximity, and social and economic links to the United States, it is not surprising that political ideas similar to those brought together by the Republicans should also have arisen in Canada during these years. Provincial governments in Manitoba (1977-81) and British Columbia (1982-86) implemented economic and social policies that returned power to the market and reduced government expenditures, while a host of right-wing organizations rose also to promote the economic and/or social aims of the New Right (see Brimelow, 1986:280; Barrett, 1987; and Stasiulis, 1988:54). Despite this trend, however, neo-conservatism still was only a secondary tributary to the country's hegemonic currents when the Liberal party returned to power in 1980, following the brief interregnum of the (strongly western -influenced) Clark Tories.

By then, the twin threats of Quebec separatism and a declining economy, in particular, convinced Trudeau that the traditional bases of Liberal dominance were untenable. The path to Canada's -- and the party's -- salvation, he believed, lay through a series of constitutional changes that would make the federal government and the courts the guarantor of individual and collective rights, and other policies that would return to the federal government the powers necessary to direct the economy (Clarkson and McCall, 1990:283). Above all, the new Canada would be a bilingual, formally egalitarian, and decidedly centralized state.

This change in Liberal policy was not entirely abrupt. After the OPEC crisis of 1973, the federal government had similarly attempted to claw back its power through a series of economic measures, such as the creation of a national oil company, Petro-Can (Laxer and Laxer, 1977). On these, and various other issues, the Liberals were in continuous combat with many of the provincial governments throughout the 1970s.

Still, the single-mindedness with which Trudeau pursued his objectives after the 1980 election astonished even his most fervent opponents. The patriation of the Constitution in 1982, without Quebec's signature, enraged that province's nationalist element, including most of the provincial Liberal party. Likewise, the implementation of the National Energy Program (NEP) without the agreement of the producing provinces and affecting, primarily, the people of the West where the Liberal party had only won two of seventy-seven seats, led to intense political alienation. The result was a hastening of the final collapse of Liberal dominance and the rise to power in 1984 of the Tories under Brian Mulroney.

That year, Mulroney's Tories drew support throughout Canada in winning the election. At the core of their support, however, were Quebec nationalists, big business, and western Canadian voters, particularly in Alberta and British Columbia.

For years, Canada's right-wing, particularly in the West, had complained of its exclusion from the corridors of power. Throughout these years, the right-wing had waited, confident that the time would come when ideological shifts, and economic and

political crises would once more return it to the centre of Canada's political life. Now, at last, it seemed its time had come.

Yet, within a couple of years, much of the right-wing abandoned Mulroney. Particularly in western Canada, the right-wing faulted Mulroney's government for failing to implement the kind of policies enacted in Britain and, more especially, the United States. Indeed, in the eyes of much of the right-wing, Mulroney's Tories seemed little better than the hated Liberals: cynical and dishonest spendthrifts, catering to the whims of Quebec and assorted other "special interests" (see Brimelow, 1986; Gairdner, 1990). In 1987, the fragmentation of Conservative support in the West resulted in the creation of the Reform Party of Canada.

How can this series of events be explained? And what can the rise of the Reform Party tell us about the rise of populist parties and movements generally? These questions, and others, lie at the heart of the thesis that follows.

What factors, for example, ensured the Reform Party's emergence as a right-wing party? Was a left-wing alternative possible?

What was the influence, in general, of economic factors in creating popular discontent in the West during the 1980s?

What precisely are the ideological roots of the Reform Party? How important is the neo-conservative influence? Similarly, what was/is the (structural, ideological, political) relationship between the fringe parties that sprung up in the West during the early 1980s and the Reformers?

What are the structural locations of Reform Party supporters? Why does the party's support appear to be higher in Alberta and British Columbia than in Saskatchewan and Manitoba? Is the Reform Party supported primarily by the petite bourgeoisie? If so, how do these petite bourgeois elements differ from their historical agrarian counterparts?

Alternatively, are there elements of nativism in the Reform Party? What other social elements underlie Reform Party support?

Finally, what was the role of political-institutional and/or organization factors in the rise of the Reform Party? The thesis that follows deals with these questions.

CONCLUSION

This chapter examined previous North American debates concerning populist movements. It examined also the underlying premises of historical sociology. A theory of populist mobilization was proposed which dealt, first, with the problem of how such movements arise and, second, with the process of how either right-wing or left-wing variants specifically emerge.

Within the context of the proposed theory, the chapter provided also a brief account of political alliances in Canada, particularly the collapse of the Liberal party during the 1970s and 1980s, and its defeat by the Progressive Conservative party under Brian Mulroney in 1984. Finally, the chapter raised important questions related to the subsequent rise of the Reform Party.

The remaining chapters proceed according to the following outline. Chapter two examines the ideological and structural roots of Reform Party support in the West, and some of the people and organizations who were later instrumental in the party's formation. Chapter three examines the causes of western disenchantment with the

Progressive Conservatives following that party's victory in 1984, and how this disenchantment led to the creation of the Reform Party in 1987.

Chapter four deals with Canada's constitutional crisis of 1990 and the recession of 1990-92, and how these (and other) events were used by the Reform Party as a spring -board for it becoming a national party. The chapter particularly examines evidence that the Reform Party possesses strong elements of a peculiarly Anglo-Canadian type of nativism.

Chapter five looks at Reform's influence upon the Canadian political scene and examines changes occurring in the party itself since 1987. Profiled in the chapter are the background and ideological characteristics of Reform's leadership, membership, and supporters. Reform's organizational structure and sources of financial support are also examined, and questions raised about the place of populism within the party. Finally, Reform's future prospects are examined.

Chapter six provides a synopsis of the thesis' findings, while returning to more general questions regarding populism. The limitations of both right-wing and left-wing populism are examined. Finally, some speculative questions are advanced regarding popular democracy, the state, and the current trend towards a global economy.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ROOTS OF REFORM

"... if the Canadian political situation continues to degenerate and if the cause of conservatism continues to suffer and decline ... a whole new political party committed to the social conservative position [will emerge]" (Ernest Manning, 1967:86).

INTRODUCTION

Populist parties arise out of an organic crisis and the resultant delegitimation of the dominant hegemony, in general, and of the existing political parties, in particular. This process of delegitimation, however, does not affect all individuals and groups equally or simultaneously. Rather, it affects certain social elements, or their fragments, in ways and under circumstances which are themselves historically determined. Those social elements that have previously remained relatively insulated from dominant ideological messages and/or whose political, economic, and/or ideological interests have been abruptly and negatively affected by the organic crisis (i.e., "vulnerable" elements) constitute the basis of later populist parties.

The years leading up to the formation of the Reform Party mirror this process of growing alienation by certain social elements from the dominant hegemony and the existing political parties. Particularly alienated were four people whose ideas and long-time efforts would later result in the rise of the Reform Party: Francis Winspear, a Victoria millionaire, and former bagman for the federal Liberal party; Stanley ("Stan") Roberts, a left-of-centre Liberal and former president of the Canada West Foundation; Preston Manning, the technocratic son of a former Alberta Socred premier; and Edward ("Ted") Byfield, the colourful, Toronto-born, owner/editor of a controversial right-wing weekly magazine.

This chapter weaves the biographies of these four individuals into an account of the period from the 1960s until the electoral defeat of the federal Liberal party in 1984. Along the way, I examine the political culture of the western provinces, and the events, characters, organizations and ideas that radicalized many in the region during this period, leading them eventually to seek out a political alternative. The chapter begins, however, with a brief historical account of the political cultures of each of the four western provinces.

THE POLITICAL CULTURES OF THE WEST

Political culture is "the political vehicle which mediates perceptions of the issues at stake and the political-economic options available to deal with them" (Chorney and Hansen, 1985:13). By 1960, the different ideological, economic, and political circumstances of each province's historical development had created in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia distinctive, though not entirely discontinuous, political cultures.

By that time, the radical currents that had carried the Red River Rebellion and Manitoba's entry into Confederation in 1870, and bathed the province in anger during

the early farmer protests and in blood during the Winnipeg Strike of 1919, had been reduced to a slow stream. The development of an increasingly cautious small "l" liberalism was signalled as early as the 1920s when the Manitoba branch of Progressives succumbed to the enticements of Mackenzie King's Liberals (Morton, 1950). For many years thereafter, Manitoba's political outlook was shaped, in particular, by three things: a staple-based economy; a strong union presence; and a business community which was never strongly provincial in its outlook. Until 1959, these three factors resulted in provincial politics constantly being pushed towards the centre. When, in that year, the middle ground finally gave way to a rejuvenated Tory party under Duff Roblin, the effect was to reawaken the left-wing in the province (Chorney and Hansen, 1985).

An NDP government under Ed Schreyer took office in 1969 and held power until 1977 when, in the midst of the recession, the Tories under Sterling Lyon gained power. Lyon's reign, however, was brief. His attempt to introduce certain neo-conservative policies (union and civil service restrictions, cuts in government programs) was opposed massively by the electorate, and (in 1981) he was defeated by the NDP (Chorney and Hansen, 1985).

Like the other western provinces, Manitobans have not been entirely immune to reactionary political expression. The Manitoba Schools Question of 1890, the recent bilingualism debate of 1983, and the substantial vote for the anti-bilingual CoR party in the 1984 federal election attest to this. Nonetheless, the diversified political culture of Manitoba has generally prevented extreme right-wing politics from having an unopposed field.

By contrast, the settlement of Alberta and Saskatchewan in the late 19th century as extensions of the East created very different political cultures. From the start, this quasi-colonial status instilled a deep resentment among the region's inhabitants, an hostility which did not subside with the granting of provincial status to Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905. If anything, a sense of eastern persecution became more ingrained in each province's collective psyche. This sense of persecution was reinforced by some real injustices, such as the federal government's withholding control of their natural resources until 1930. But the West's hinterland economy, exposed to sometimes disastrous cyclical fluctuations in world commodity prices, also kindled imaginary injustices for which the East was blame. By the 1920s, an historically-based sense of alienation from the central government had become part of western consciousness, informing the broader political culture of the West and facilitating the proliferation of anti-establishment parties and movements, notably the Farmer's parties of the 1920s, including the Progressives, and (later) the semi-agrarian Social Credit and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) parties.

The emergence of the latter two populist parties in the 1930s has presented scholars with something of a dilemma ever since. Debate has particularly raged over why two such apparently different populist movements -- the right-wing Social Credit party in Alberta and the left-wing CCF in Saskatchewan -- could have arisen in provinces contiguous in geography and ostensibly similar in their economies and population.

Macpherson's (1953) work suggests that Social Credit in Alberta arose out of its primarily petite bourgeois class structure and a general history of one-party rule. By contrast, Lipset (1950) and Richards (1981) contend that the CCF in Saskatchewan was

the product of a broad-based coalition of agrarians, socialists, and labourites with strong roots in grass-roots, co-operative organizations. Gibbins (1980) and Johnson (1979), however, suggest that notions of a direct break between Alberta and Saskatchewan's political cultures are in fact overstated. In particular, Johnson contends that the failure of Alberta to elect the CCF in that provinces was merely an "accident of history." Similarly, Finkel (1989) has recently contended that, at least initially, both the CCF in Saskatchewan and Social Credit in Alberta were fundamentally left-wing, and that the later divergence accrued primarily to the Social Credit leadership of Ernest Manning.

There is an element of insight in each of these contentions. Despite recent work by Bell (1989; 1990), class differences (and fractures within classes) well may have underlain (and subsequently been reinforced by) the province's different political trajectories. But the role of organization, leadership, and ideology in alliance construction must also be considered. Finally, I would suggest that previous studies have perhaps insufficiently given credit to the role played by Calgary's political and economic elites in shaping the political cultures of both provinces.

Palmer and Palmer (1990:138) note that, around 1905, "[t]he economic and cultural presence of Anglo-Canadian and British ranchers and professionals and the CPR contributed to Calgary's [voting] Conservative." The conservative (and Conservative) strain was to last for years, culminating in Calgary lawyer R. B. Bennett becoming the national Tory leader in 1927 (see also Richards and Pratt, 1979). By this time, however, a new element had been added to Calgary's political mix.

Immigrants from the United States began arriving in southern Alberta, carrying with them populist ideas of direct democracy while simultaneously blunting the anti-Americanism latent in the previous Tory culture. The resultant amalgam of differing ideological impulses led, in subsequent years, to Calgary being the mainspring for such diverse populist movements as The Non-Partisan League, the Progressives, the CCF (which held its founding convention in Calgary in 1932), and Social Credit (William Aberhart's Prophetic Bible Institute was founded in Calgary).

Whatever left-wing tendencies the city's political culture had began to change, however, following the election of Social Credit in 1935. In 1943, Aberhart died and was succeeded by a devout follower, Ernest Manning, who even more fervently preached a linkage between religious fundamentalism and right-wing free enterprise. The oil boom, which occurred shortly thereafter, further reinforced the political acceptability of Manning's ideology. Moreover, the boom also brought to bear upon Alberta's political culture the considerable influence of the largely American-owned oil and gas industry. No more was this the case than in Calgary. Note Palmer and Palmer:

> The relatively few Americans who came to Alberta in the postwar era had a notable social and political impact. In the early years of the boom, a majority of the senior management of the major oil companies ... were from California, Oklahoma, Texas, and Louisiana. From 1955 to 1970, nine of the fifteen presidents of Calgary's exclusive Petroleum club were Americans.... Like their counterparts in the United States, they often held strong right-wing views (1990:306).

In short, the American-owned oil and gas industry held considerable influence in

Calgary.

By the 1970s, Calgary's skyline was dominated by the head offices of the oil and gas sector while the city's political culture was dominated by a strictly free enterprise ethos (see House, 1980). This ethos, and the powerful role increasingly played by Calgary's corporate sector in the economic and political affairs of the province during the repeated oil-crisis years of the 1970s, further reinforced Alberta's right-wing political culture. It is not accidental, therefore, that many of the right-wing think tanks, lobby groups, and parties that formed in the 1970s and 1980s had strong connections to the city of Calgary and its oil and gas industry.

As the years passed, Social Credit's blend of petite bourgeois conservatism (limited government involvement, limited distribution of wealth, and a heavy reliance on the private sector), combined with Manning's particularly severe fundamentalist Christian belief in individual struggle as the root to salvation, became entrenched in Alberta's political culture (Macpherson, 1953; Finkel, 1989; see also Richards and Pratt, 1979). Even after Social Credit was replaced by Peter Lougheed's Tories in 1971, and despite the fact that Alberta's demographic profile was increasingly diverging from its Anglo-Saxon and Protestant roots, the style of political thinking remained a residual haven to which future governments could, and did, return when economic times grew hard in the 1980s (see Finkel, 1989).

During this period, Saskatchewan's political culture took a different turn. In 1944, the CCF gained power. During its next twenty years in power, governing a chronically "have-not" province, the party displayed a remarkable capacity for fiscal management and political savvy. Along the way, it managed also to institute North America's first public health care insurance program and was responsible for some of the most progressive labour legislation in the country, while simultaneously displaying a pragmatism that won approval from the province's electorate (see Lipset, 1950; Conway, 1984).

It would be wrong, however, to suggest that social democratic ideals had free reign in Saskatchewan. Indeed, as Gibbins (1980:131) has remarked, "The CCF period from 1944 to 1964 was marked by frequently intense ideological conflict." Highlighting this conflict was the CCF's controversial implementation of provincial medicare in 1962. Finally, however, in 1964, the CCF/NDP went down to defeat at the hands of the reorganized Liberals led by Ross Thatcher (see Gibbins, 1980:130-32; Lower, 1983:286-87).

Thatcher had once been a CCFer, winning three consecutive elections, beginning in 1945, before leaving the party in 1955. Described by Lower (1983:287) as "primarily a businessman and a 'free enterpriser'," Thatcher subsequently joined the Liberal party and became its leader in 1959. The years of Thatcher's government (1964-71) presaged, in some respects, the style of fiscal conservatism practised by other prairie governments over the next two decades: opposition to the welfare state and unions, combined with an extreme faith in free enterprise.

Despite his rhetoric, however, Thatcher's government made no serious attempt to dismantle the the CCF's social programs (see Gibbins, 1980:130-32). Likewise, the years of Liberal reign did not fundamentally move Saskatchewan's political culture towards outright acceptance of right-wing solutions. In 1971, widespread discontent with Liberal resource and agricultural policies resulted in the NDP's return to power under Allan Blakeney (Conway,1984:189). The NDP remained in power for the next

eleven years until, in the midst of the recession of the early 1980s, the electorate turned to Grant Devine's Tories. Nonetheless, the roots of a kind of "common sensical" left-wing opposition remained deep in the political culture of Saskatchewan, as shown in 1991 by the overwhelming election of an NDP government led by Roy Romanow.

By the 1960s, a very different political culture had formed in British Columbia. From the time British Columbia decided to become a province of Canada in 1871, it was a thriving, very British, colony, economically wealthy but dependent on its natural resources, and isolated geographically from the rest of Canada by the Rocky Mountains. In the years that followed, the almost hermetically-sealed province developed a political culture abandoned by moderation and marked instead by intense social and political conflict, particularly between workers and owners. Political conflict, however, between the left and the right, which had long been like two scorpions trapped inside a glass jar, intensified after 1952.

In that year, B. C.'s Socreds came to power. The party was almost solely created by W. A. C. ("Wacky") Bennett, a prominent Tory during the 1940s as a coalition of the right designed to prevent a victory by the CCF. In the years that followed, Bennett systematically reinforced the already polarized nature of British Columbian politics by regularly warning of the "socialist threat."

Like those of Manning's Socreds, Bennett's policies emphasized balancing the budget and creating a favourable climate for private enterprise, while limiting the powers of labour and resisting any real redistribution of wealth. Unlike Manning and Aberhart, however, Bennett (a devout Presbyterian) and his government (many members of which had equally strong religious views) generally did not confuse religion and politics. In some respects, Bennett may also have been more pragmatic than his more ideological counterparts in Alberta, although too much should not be made of this. In a pinch, both Socred governments showed a willingness to abandon ideological purity, as witnessed by Manning's creation of the Alberta Gas Trunk Line Compnay in 1954 (see Finkel, 1989:195) and Bennett's placing of BC Electric under public ownership in 1961 (see Mitchell, 1983). In at least one respect, however, Bennett and Manning were certainly in agreement. By the 1960s, each had developed a profound dislike of bilingualism and the "socialist" economic policies that they saw emanating from Ottawa.

Bennett's dislike of socialism was not confined to policies on the federal scene. In the midst of the provincial election in 1972, Bennett issued dire warnings that the "socialist hordes" also were at the BC's gates. The warnings failed, however, to sufficiently sway the voters. Bennett's right coalition split, and the NDP led by Dave Barrett, a former social worker, formed BC's first socialist government. But, in 1975, BC's Social Credit rebounded under Bennett's son, Bill Bennett Jr., to win a majority government (Mitchell, 1983). The way was thus paved for the test of neo-conservative policies that would follow in the early 1980s, to which I will later return.

In summary, by 1960, each of the western provinces had developed a unique political culture through which socio-economic-political problems were filtered in search of solutions. While Manitoba and Saskatchewan politics were moderate or even mildly left-wing, eschewing radically ideological formulations, British Columbia's politics had become heavily partisan and dominated by the right-wing. In Alberta, likewise, politics had become dominated by Social Credit's religiously-informed free enterprise ethos, heavily influenced by the largely American-owned oil and gas industry. Moreover, real political discourse in Alberta had all but been replaced by a

tradition of one-party rule.

Even as the right-wing remained dominant, however, in the West's two "have" provinces (Alberta and British Columbia), its ideas became increasingly isolated from the dominant hegemony emerging in Canada after the Second World War. Sensing its increasing weakness, the right-wing began attempts in the 1960s to regain the ideological and political terrain. Not surprisingly, the impetus for these attempts came from the two Socred provinces.

THE MANNINGS AND SOCIAL CONSERVATISM

By the 1960s, both W. A. C. Bennett (see Mitchell, 1983) and Ernest Manning (see Hooke, 1971; Barr, 1974; Finkel, 1989) had become increasingly concerned that Canada was threatened by economic and moral ruin, and that only radical political reform could avert disaster. They were particularly concerned by what they saw were the socialist policies, such as medicare, emanating from Ottawa.

Particularly disheartening for Manning was the fact that, while he was convinced that Social Credit policies could save the nation, the national Social Credit party was itself in disarray. In 1963, the party disintegrated into two factions, one headed by Real Caouette, the Quebec leader, the other led by Robert Thompson from Alberta. In light of the seeming political impotence of the national party, Manning proposed at the 1964 Social Credit convention that there should be a political realignment of the right in order to defeat the forces of "socialism" (see Finkel, 1989). The result of this realignment would be a new political force combining free enterprise with social concern, which Manning termed "social conservatism." In the years that followed, Ernest Manning continued to investigate the possibilities of implementing this idea. In his effort, Manning was helped by his son, Preston.

Ernest Preston Manning was born on June 10, 1942, a year before his father became premier of Alberta. His first few years were spent in the Garneau area of Edmonton, later moving, during his grade six year, to a 900 acre farm northeast of the city. There, looked after by housekeepers and nannies, Preston Manning lived a life sheltered from much of the political atmosphere that went with his father's position. He was raised a devout Baptist, and religion remains an important aspect of his life (Dobbin, 1991; Manning, 1992; Sharpe and Braid, 1992).

After completing high school, Manning returned to Edmonton in 1960 to attend the University of Alberta where he began pursuing a career in physics. During the summer of 1962, however, his father's political contacts secured a job for Preston working for a Californian division of Canadian Bechtel. The experience led Manning to switch from physics to economics, the field from which he eventually graduated with a B. A. in 1964 (Dobbin, 1991; Manning, 1992; Sharpe and Braid, 1992).

In 1965, Manning ran as the federal Social Credit candidate in Edmonton East, finishing second (with 6,752 votes) to the Progressive Conservative candidate, William Skoreyko (13,596 votes) (CEOC, 1965). During the election, Manning came to know David Wilson, a former fundraiser and strategist for the Social Credit Party (Manning, 1992).

Wilson recently had been named director of a newly formed organization known as the National Public Affairs Research Foundation (NPARF). The organization was incorporated by letter patent on March 21, 1966 (Federal Department of Consumer and

Corporate Affairs, 1991). Manning was soon hired as (in his words) a "policy researcher" (Manning, 1992:42).

What was the NPARF? Manning himself has variously described the organization as "a private research foundation engaged in public policy studies" (1991) and as a "foundation ... organized by a number of business people ... interested in developing policy ideas that might be useful to both the Alberta Social Credit Party and the federal Progressive Conservative Party..." (1992:42). A report by columnist Don Sellar in the Calgary Herald in 1967 described the NPARF as a somewhat secretive, staunchly right-wing, lobby group funded by several prominent businessmen, including R. A. Brown, president of Home Oil, Cyrus McLean, chairman of B.C. Telephone, Renault St. Laurent, lawyer and son of the former prime minister, Ronald Clarke, an Edmonton architect, R. J. Burns, a Calgary lawyer, and A. M. Shoults, president of James Lovick Ltd., Toronto, all of whom were close friends of the elder Manning (see also Hooke, 1971:252-55; Finkel, 1989:162-63; Dobbin, 1991:29-30, 34-5).

Working out of the Foundation's small downtown Edmonton office building, Preston Manning was involved with three projects (Manning, 1992). The first involved assisting a friend and university colleague, Erick Schmidt, to put together a White Paper on Human Resources Development for the Socred government (Government of Alberta, 1967). The paper was presented to the legislature in the spring of that year.

Finkel (1989:157) has described the language of the White Paper as "turgid, technocratic, and secular" and its author (Manning) as a "systems-analysis devotee." Manning would likely agree with the latter description (see Manning, 1992:54). Read today, it is equally hard to disagree with the description of the text's writing. What is perhaps most striking about the White Paper, however, is the list of value judgements explicitly stated early on:

> -- Human resources will be treated as being intrinsically more important than physical resources.
> -- Prior consideration will be given to human beings individually (persons), rather than to human beings collectively (society).
> -- Changes and adjustments to changes will be proposed, but these will always be related to fundamental principles.
> -- A free enterprise economy, in which all individuals have maximum opportunity to participate, will be regarded as more desirable than a state regimented economy.
> -- A supporting function, rather than a domineering function, will be ascribed to the state relative to resources development (Government of Alberta,1967:17).

In short, the White Paper advocated a principled but humane society, based on free enterprise, in which individuals were given priority over collectivities and where the role of government was kept to a minimum. As I will show, these same values lie at the heart of Preston Manning's political judgements even today.

Manning's second project with the NPARF was "an investigation of the possibility of putting together the aging Social Credit Party of Alberta ... with the up-and-coming Progressive Conservative Party of Alberta under its new leader, Peter Lougheed" (Manning, 1992:47). Erick Schmidt and Preston Manning met with Lougheed's group,

represented by Joe Clark and Merv Leitch (later energy minister in the Lougheed cabinet) on several occasions, and eventually produced a draft plan for amalgamating the two parties under the banner of the Social Conservative Party. The idea was quickly rejected, however, by officials both within the Manning government and the Lougheed camp (Manning, 1992).

Nonetheless, the idea of a realignment of right-wing forces stayed with the Mannings, and resulted in Preston's third project with the NPARF: assisting his father in writing Political Realignment: A Challenge to Thoughtful Canadians (Manning, 1967). The book, written in the same style as the White Paper, expressed Ernest Manning's contention that real political choice had disappeared from the federal Canadian scene because the parties -- particularly the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives -- were not ideologically distinct. Hence, Ernest Manning proposed that political choice be reestablished through a realignment/polarization of political thinking and organization. The end product of such a political realignment would be social conservatism, an ideology that Manning defined as welding "the humanitarian concerns of those with awakened social consciences to the economic persuasions of those with a firm conviction in the value of freedom of economic activity and enlightened private enterprise" (Manning,1967:63).

And what party could bring about a realignment that would enunciate the social conservatism? After a brief discussion of the limitations of all of the existing parties, Manning hesitantly placed his faith in the Progressive Conservatives party, noting somewhat prophetically, however, that "... if the Canadian political situation continues to degenerate, and if the cause of conservatism continues to suffer and decline ... a whole new political party committed to the social conservative position [will] emerge" (Manning, 1967:86).

Political Realignment was not entirely a set of philosophical musings. In 1967, the federal Conservatives were about to choose a new leader. Ernest Manning was under some pressure from Conservative supporters in the West and Ontario to enter the race (Manning, 1992:49). The book therefore can be seen as a political stratagem employed by Manning who had also let it be known that, although he was not formally entering the race, he was open to a draft by the party delegates.

After Political Realignment appeared, Preston Manning and Erick Schmidt attended both the Progressive Conservative's Thinkers' Conference held in Montmorency, Quebec, in August, and the Conservative Party convention held a month later. Their attendance at these meeting appears to have been designed to test both Ernest's support and support for the more general idea of political realignment (Hooke, 1971; 1991). In the end, however, neither a draft nor realignment came about. The Tories chose Robert Stanfield, former Nova Scotia premier and heir to the woolen dynasty, as leader.

In the fall of 1967, Preston Manning took a leave of absence from the NPARF to work for TRW Systems of Redondo Beach, California, a company "heavily involved in systems development for the U.S. defence and aerospace programs" (Manning, 1992:55). He apparently never returned to the NPARF which continued its work as a research-cum-lobby group until its dissolution on December 4, 1973 (Federal Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs [hereafter, "FCCA"], 1991a).

The following year, Ernest Manning stepped down as premier. The elder Manning's resignation raised the immediate problem of succession. A number of Young Socreds at the University of Alberta, including Owen Anderson and Erick Schmidt, attempted to

persuade Preston Manning to contest the leadership. Despite his obvious youth and inexperience, the younger Manning had several attributes that might have been found attractive by a party increasingly perceived by the public as out of step with the times and hard-pressed by the opposition Tories headed by the youthful Peter Lougheed. In John Barr's words:

> Fair and slight, like his father, on the platform [Preston] was transformed into an even better speaker than his father -- he had the Manning voice and technique of marshalling his arguments, but more forcefulness. More important, he was young ... and a prolific generator of ideas. A brilliant student in high school, he was slightly less conservative than his father ideologically, and brought to his study of politics a real gift for synthesizing ideas and searching out new interfaces between intellectual disciplines (Barr, 1974:170).

As an insider and unofficial chronicler of the Socred dynasty, Barr's positive description of Preston Manning may be somewhat biased. Nonetheless, it is apparent that many people saw in the younger Manning, from an early age, an individual with unique qualities for leadership.

In the end, however, Preston's name was never put before the delegates. Approached by the members of the Young Socreds, the elder Manning suggested that, although Preston had many good qualities, he was still too young and politically inexperienced to control a cabinet. Moreover, Ernest feared the accusation of a Manning "dynasty." Ernest hinted that a better successor would be Harry Strom. Strom won the subsequent leadership convention on the second ballot (Barr, 1974:171).

Strom was a wealthy, fifty-two year old farmer from southern Alberta. His reputation as a religious (Evangelical Free Church) family man had appealed to the older members of the party, while his moderate approach to social issues and receptivity to new ideas had won support from its younger members (Barr, 1974:171-72; Finkel, 1989:180-81). But by then, Social Credit in Alberta, as elsewhere, was a tired party. Unable to adapt its policies and image quickly enough to appeal to an increasingly urbanized Alberta electorate, the Socreds were overthrown in 1971 by Lougheed's resurgent Tories (see Richards and Pratt, 1979; Conway, 1984; Finkel, 1989).

Following the 1971 election, Strom resigned and was replaced as Socred leader by Werner Schmidt, an "educational administrator whose religiosity and reactionary views endeared him to the Manning generation of Social Creditors" (Finkel, 1989:194). The 1975 Alberta election saw the Socreds decimated, taking only 18 percent of the popular vote. Schmidt resigned and was replaced by Bob Clark, a popular and moderate MLA from Olds-Didsbury, but the die was cast. In the subsequent 1979 election, Social Credit won only four of the province's 79 legislative seats. Symbolically, the Camrose radio station, CFCN -- the station where Aberhart had begun broadcasting "The Back to the Bible Hour" in 1925 -- announced in September of the same year that it was dumping the show because of low ratings (AR, 1979a).

As its support declined, Social Credit in Alberta increasingly became a refuge for right-wing "fringe" elements. The party's nadir occurred in 1983 when its provincial vice-president, Jim Keegstra, was found guilty on charges of spreading hatred against Jews.(1) By the early 1980s, Social Credit remained a power only in British

Columbia.

Social conservatism, the refurbished Socred vehicle by which the Mannings had hoped to save Canada, had by then become a seemingly dead issue. By the 1970s, however, another element had reemerged to vie for prominence in the political "mix" of the West: regionalism.

THE REBIRTH OF REGIONALISM

Regional alienation, of course, always has been an underlying thread in the West's political culture (see Gibbins, 1980). From the earliest days, westerners often expressed anger over their perceived colonial status. The push for provincial status in the late part of the last century expressed the desire of westerners to escape colonialism. During the 1930s, regional alienation even resulted in the formation of separatist parties (see Lipset, 1950). Clearly, also, regional alienation underlay many of the grievances expressed by the Progressive (Morton, 1950), Social Credit (Macpherson, 1953), and CCF (Lipset, 1950) parties.

As Brodie (1989) has pointed out, however, regionalism is a social-psychological concept affixed, with varying degrees of intensity, to a concept of region which itself moves over time and space. In the West, by the early 1960s, the concept of region had been replaced by the political concept of provinces while the degree of intensity associated with regional strains had been merged into other sources of conflict. Hence, as Finkel (1989:184) notes, Ernest Manning's opposition to federal policies was based more on ideology than regionalism. Likewise, in Saskatchewan the schizm between Thatcher's Liberals and the Liberal government in Ottawa redounded more to ideological differences and electoral strategy than to regional alienation (Gibbins, 1980:132). In Manitoba, meanwhile, regionalism had been contained, at least in part, by the identification of much of that province's ruling class with its eastern counterparts (Chorney and Hansen, 1985). Perhaps only in British Columbia, isolated by geography, and affluent but economically insecure, was there a strong sense of regional "difference" before 1970. Yet, even here, the political value of regionalism was minor insofar as everyone recognized and accepted the province's "eccentricity."

While regionalist sentiments may lie dormant for a time, however, they do not necessarily disappear. Rather, as Brodie (1989:145) notes, regionalism and regional protests develop out of a cumulative process as "new symbols, forms, and tensions are layered onto older ones." Throughout the 1960s, transformations in western Canada's economic, political, and ideological spheres, combined with increasing conflicts with Ottawa, resulted in a strengthening of regionalist identifications (see Conway, 1984:186). In Alberta, in particular, the coming to power in Alberta of Harry Strom coincided with the demands of that province's rising indigenous bourgeoisie, centred in the oil and gas industry, for a release from the domination of Central Canada (see Finkel, 1989:184; also Richards and Pratt, 1979).

In his opening address to the federal-provincial constitutional conference in 1969, Strom noted approvingly the role of French Quebecers in bringing to public attention their sense of inequality and injustice:

> We welcome the resurgent spirit and consciousness of our French-speaking citizens, and their understandable desire for a new cultural and economic role

in Confederation.

But

> We must recognize the deep feelings of alienation and inequality of treatment that are felt by regional groups in Canada which are neither of French extraction, French-speaking, or resident in the province of Quebec. These feelings may not be cultural in nature, but could prove to be just as dangerous to Confederation as friction between the English and the French cultures (Strom, 1969:5-6).

In short, Strom, no doubt influenced by Alberta's Young Socreds who included Preston Manning, warned the Central Canadian political establishment of becoming too preoccupied with Quebec's needs while forgetting those of the other regions, particularly the West.

If Strom's warning was dismissed, the publication in 1971 of The Unfinished Revolt: Some Views On Western Independence, a collection of essays edited by two prominent Alberta Social Credit supporters, Owen Anderson and John Barr, hammered it home. In lucid and comprehensive fashion, their book put into words the regional resentments and sense of alienation felt by many westerners. But the book also went beyond traditional gripes concerning tariffs, freight rates, and the price of wheat -- although economic arguments remained a big part of it -- to extend its critique to a largely eastern cultural and communications establishment.

As Strom (1969) had noted , the rise of quasi-nationalism in the West had its mirror, and at least some of its impetus, in events transpiring in Quebec. The Quiet Revolution had resulted in a renewed sense of that province's sense of cultural identity, leading to popular demands to Pearson's federal government for a reconfiguration of Canada's political and symbolic structure.

While Quebec continued to "find itself," however, English-speaking Canada remained trapped between its receding British past and the seemingly irresistable force of American assimilation. The efforts of the Pearson and Trudeau governments to create a pan-Canadianism (e.g., through creating of a new flag, implementing bilingualism, etc.) not only failed to win the hearts of Quebecers but angered many English-speaking Canadians, particularly in the West, who were disturbed by the changes in the region's traditional "symbolic order" (Hiller, 1987).

The resultant anger, and demands for recognition/respect of the West's own identity and culture, went hand in hand with the election of new parties to office in Manitoba (1969), Alberta (1971), and Saskatchewan (1971) during this period. These governments increasingly engaged in "province building" policies, through demands for equal political status with the federal government in areas involving foreign trade, and through direct intervention in the economy, particularly in creating growth through mega-projects (see Conway, 1984). They also demanded from the Liberal government increased powers over economic and social programs. Eager to reestablish the equality of all the provinces in the face of Quebec's increasing autonomy, the Liberals acceded to these demands (Stevenson, 1977).

Often, however, there remained an entanglement of federal and provincial jurisdictions, objectives, and economic costs. The result was ongoing conflict between

the federal government and provincial governments. The effects of this conflict were not confined to the political classes, but spilled over into the general public and the western business class, many of whom began to withdraw support from the federal Liberal party. Why did this occur? To a brief discussion of the reasons for this change I now turn.

THE BUSINESS CLASS IN WESTERN CANADA

During the early years of Confederation, the Conservatives were Canada's party of big business and privilege. By contrast, the early Liberals were a mix of agrarian populism and some sections of big business. The Liberal party's ties with big business began to increase, however, during the period of Canada's industrialization, reaching a kind of critical mass with the advent of the Second World War. By this time, Mackenzie King had made what Grant (1970:48) terms his "great discovery:" If the Liberals were a friend of business, they could remain in power indefinitely. Henceforth, the Liberal party, and King's chief lieutenant, C.D. Howe, overtly pursued an expansion of corporate interests through continentalism. In return for political support, the Liberal party offered business in Canada a relatively peaceful and non-interventionist business environment. During the 1960s, however, many businessmen in western Canada began to turn against the federal Liberal party.

Several factors explain their withdrawal of support from the Liberal party. First, the party's pursuit of liberalized trade, particularly with the United States, was not whole-hearted enough for many business people in the West. As an underdeveloped, primary resource region, the West had always relied on external capital and external markets. Tariffs and other policies enacted by the federal government were viewed by western businessmen and politicians as hindering the region's development in the name of protecting the inefficient manufacturing industries of the East. As a result, many western businessmen became increasingly supportive of the province-building efforts of their local governments (see Barr and Anderson, 1971; Richards and Pratt, 1979; Conway, 1984; Chorney and Hansen, 1985).

A second reason for increased western business hostility to the Liberals came more predominantly from the established, largely Anglo-Saxon elites (see Porter, 1965), which viewed with alarm the cultural-political changes occurring in the country. The adoption of a new flag in 1965 and the implementation of official bilingualism, combined with the apparent rise of francophone power in Ottawa, particularly signalled a radical change in Canada's "symbolic order" (Hiller, 1987). Indeed, James Richardson, a millionaire and scion of a prominent Winnipeg family, even resigned from the cabinet in 1976, complaining of the "Gallicization" of the country.

The main concern of many conservative businessmen in the West, however, was the growth of the welfare state and, more generally, what they perceived as socialism. Increasingly, business began to speak its concerns to the political community.

We have already seen some evidence of the links between business and Social Credit through the National Public Affairs Research Foundation (NPARF). Alfred Hooke, a long-time Alberta Socred MLA and personal friend of Ernest Manning, goes on to relate the following story:

> On at least two occasions Mr. Manning told me in his office that he had been approached by several very influential and wealthy Canadians and that they

> wanted him to head up a party of the right with a view to preventing the onslaught of socialism these men could see developing in Canada. They apparently had indicated to him that money was no object and they were prepared to spend any amounts necessary to stop the socialist tide (Hooke, 1971:221).

Manning, of course, declined the offer, opting instead to press for the vision of "political realignment" described in his book (1967) and pushed by his son in discussions with people in the Progressive Conservative party. For his part, Hooke never discovered the names of the "influential and wealthy Canadians," but continued to believe years later that they were associated with the NPARF (Hooke, 1991).

Despite this exception, western businessmen remained generally supportive of the Liberal party throughout the 1950s and 1960s. This began to change, however, with the coming to power of Pierre Elliott Trudeau.

Trudeau came from a "suspicious" background. Many claimed that he was a socialist before joining the party in 1965. His rapid ascention thereafter to the Liberal leadership in 1968 made many long-time Pearson Liberals uneasy, especially as he had previously been a voceriferous opponent of the Liberal party. Nor was the belief that Trudeau was an extreme left-winger particularly assuaged by his appointment to his first cabinet of such strong business supporters as Paul Hellyer, Paul Martin, and John Turner, or (equally) his refusal to appoint Walter Gordon, an economic nationalist, to the same cabinet. This mistrust of Trudeau was seemingly vindicated by 1971 when both Eric Kierans and Paul Hellyer resigned over disputes with Trudeau. (Hellyer's break was particularly dramatic. In 1976, he ran for the leadership of the federal Tories, losing to Joe Clark.)

Despite these harbingers, however, the first few years of Trudeau's reign saw the Liberals continue their traditional support of free enterprise and the business community. Then, two events happened to change this.

The first event was the election of 1972. Though re-elected, the Liberal party had fallen to minority status. The Liberals continuance in power depended upon the support (of at least one) of the other parties. Over the next two years, the NDP under David Lewis supported the Liberal party.

This support, however, was conditional. In return for "propping up" the Liberal government in the House of Commons, the NDP pushed for policies of increased nationalization or, at least, Canadianization of the economy. The result was the creation of the Canada Development Corporation (CDC) and the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA), the first designed to assist Canadianization, the second to ensure that foreign investment benefitted Canadians (Stewart, 1990). Pursuant of similar goals, NDP pressure was also instrumental in the formation of a government-owned oil company, Petro-Canada, and the implementation of a tax on oil exported to the United States (see Laxer, 1983; House, 1980).

In truth, however, the NDP did not have to push some Liberals very hard. Many Liberals, such as Herb Gray, whose report decrying the level of foreign investment in Canada came out in 1972, had already become convinced of the need for a more active role of government in the Canadian economy.

The second event that altered the Liberal government's thinking was the OPEC crisis of 1973. The crisis revealed in dramatic fashion the particular vulnerability of

the Canadian economy to foreign crises. Despite its relatively high standard of living, Canada's economy remained resource dependent, heavily foreign owned, and overly-tied to the American economy (Laxer, 1986; Laxer, 1989). Moreover, since the provinces owned their resources, the federal government was unable to institute a national economic strategy for recovery, as had Germany and Japan after the Second World War. In short, the federal government lacked an effective means of managing the Canadian economy.

In September, 1973, with the rapid rise in world oil prices following the Yom Kippur war, the Liberal government made its first major post-war foray into the economy. As was to frequently prove the case, this intervention involved the oil and gas sector and the economies of the western provinces. The federal Liberals froze the price of Canadian domestic crude at $4 per barrel. Subsequently, the Liberals also announced an export tax on the differential between the domestic and the world price on all oil shipped to the United States so that people in Quebec and Atlantic Canada could have gas at the same price as other Canadians (Laxer, 1983). The moves were immediately denounced by American officials, the premiers of the oil producing provinces (the PC's Lougheed in Alberta and the NDP's Blakeney in Saskatchewan), and the private oil companies.

The Liberal government, however, had widespread support among the consuming public for taking measures that were presumed to ensure protection against future oil crises. Under pressure once more from the NDP, and propelled by nationalists such as Gray within the cabinet, Trudeau announced in December, 1973 the creation of a single Canadian market for oil, completion of an oil pipeline to Montreal, intensified research into oil sands development, and the creation of a publicly owned petroleum company, later to be called Petro-Canada (Laxer, 1983).

Many of these policies, however, including the act establishing the crown company, had not passed when the Liberal government fell in the spring of 1974. Hence, when a few months later Trudeau returned to power with a majority government, it might have been expected that the Liberal government would revert to its pre-1972 stance of minimal intervention in the economy.

Such was not the case. Instead the Liberals implemented wage and price controls in an attempt to control inflation (see Laxer and Laxer, 1977). The implemenation of controls -- which the Liberals had campaigned against during the election -- soured both labour and business against the government. The Liberals also proceeded with their plans to create Petro-Canada (see Laxer, 1983). Then, in an end-of-1975 interview, broadcast on CTV, Trudeau publicly mused that the free market was no longer working and that government might have to take a larger role in managing the economy. His remarks, in McCall-Newman's (1982:169) words, sent "the business community into a mild hysteria and [caused] a flight of investment capital."

The economy continued to fail. In Canada, as elsewhere during the 1970s, the Keynesian consensus fell apart, the victim of a seeming impossibility -- the simultaneous occurrence of both high prices and high unemployment. Economists coined the term "stagflation" to describe the condition, and it rapidly became part of the public vocabulary.

As the economic crisis proceeded, Canada's Liberal welfare state found itself caught between an increasing demand for services and a decreasing capacity to fund them. Then, in 1979, the Iranian Revolution occurred. Once again, the volatility of world oil and gas

prices played havoc with international economies. In Canada, the resource-producing provinces of the West were once more pitted against the industrial heartland of the East. A massive transfer of jobs, capital, and -- ultimately -- political power to the West seemed inevitable.

The costs of cushioning this social dislocation fell to the federal government, which had entered into a series of contractual and moral obligations (e.g., unemployment insurance) since the Second World War. At the same time, the Canadian government had limited means, primarily taxation and tariffs, of increasing its revenues to meet these costs. Jean Chretien (1985:168) who was Minister of Finance from September, 1977 until June, 1979, would later remark: "... so much federal money had to be passed on automatically under the federal-provincial arrangements that Ottawa lost effective control over its deficit."

Chretien's statement, while partially correct, does not entirely absolve successive Liberal governments. It is true that any explanation for the rise in the public debt must consider, among other things, federal commitments, the role of various levels of government, the demands of special interest groups, the destabilizing effect of recurrent recessions, and Canada's economic relations with the outside world, in particular, the United States. Nonetheless, the Liberals also continued to create new public programs and agencies throughout the 1970s, often with apparently little long term regard for the balance sheet.

In 1970, for example, Canada's gross federal debt (GFD), in constant dollars, was $88,791 billion, or 42.5 percent of Canada's gross domestic product (GDP). At that time, the ratio of GFD to GDP had been in decline for several years. And, although it rose again above this level during the period 1971 to 1973, the ratio of GFD to GDP again declined in 1974 to 39.1 percent. Likewise, the next couple of years saw a general continuance in the decline of this ratio. Finally, in 1977, the percentage of gross federal debt to gross domestic product hit the decade low of 35.8 percent ($112,787 billion).

. Thereafter, however, the ratio of GFD to GDP began to rise again. By 1980, the gross federal debt, in constant dollars, had risen to $140,235 billion and was once again consuming 41 percent of Canada's gross national product (Statistics Canada, 1991). Although the economy was still expanding relative to overall expenditures, the Liberals viewed the overall trend of the last few years as ominous.

Rising with the federal debt was apprehension in the business community over how Trudeau Liberals planned to deal with the fiscal crisis. Business people had already been shaken by a series of resignations from the Liberal cabinet of people (notably James Richardson and John Turner) whom they respected. Trudeau's remarks in 1975 concerning the failure of the free market system had only intensified the fears of private business. By the time of the 1980 election, the business community was viewing even more nervously Trudeau's "vigorous speeches promising an industrial strategy and a more interventionist approach to the auto industry, to foreign investment, and, above all, to energy self-sufficiency" (Clarkson and McCall (1990:179). Added to this concern was increased consternation among some in the largely Anglo-Saxon business community with the increased power of francophones in Ottawa. McCall-Newman describes this loss of private business support, as seen through the eyes of John Turner:

> Trudeau had wrecked the Liberals' old alliance with business. The English

> -Canadian ministers who had any serious connections with that world had left his cabinet.... the only businessmen left ... were ... from the small-business world.... [Moreover] Trudeau had alienated the West, ignoring its new economic power, so much so that nobody out there of much stature business-wise would think of becoming a Liberal (McCall-Newman, 1982:309-310).

One of the western businesspeople who withdrew support from the Liberals was Francis Winspear.

Francis G. Winspear was born in Birmingham, England, on May 30, 1903. The family moved to Canada in 1910 and settled in the (now vanished) small town of Namaka, forty miles east of Calgary. The family lived there until 1919. Winspear later attended school in Calgary, then worked in a bank for four years before articling in accountancy with George A. Touche. He subsequently joined Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co., managing their Edmonton office for two years (Winspear, 1988).

In 1930, Winspear started his own accounting firm which eventually expanded to 26 offices across Canada. The same year, he became a sessional instructor at the School of Commerce at the University of Alberta. In 1951, he received an Honorary Doctor of Laws from the same institution, and was Director of the School in 1954 (Winspear, 1988; 1991).

Winspear is past president of both the Edmonton and Canadian Chambers of Commerce, former Chairman of the Rhodes Scholarship Committee of Alberta, and a past member of the Economic Council of Canada. In 1967, he was named an Officer of the Order of Canada. In 1982, the Faculty of Business at the University of Alberta gave him the Canadian Business Leader Award. The same university also named Winspear Professor Emeritus in 1983 (Winspear, 1988; 1991).

He also is a millionaire and a noted philanthropist. Besides his accounting firms, Winspear at various times has owned major interests in such companies as Northwest Industries, Swanson Lumber, Premier Steel, and Gormans Ltd. (Edmonton Journal [hereafter, "EJ"], 1991a). Over the years, he has been generous in giving money to the University of Alberta (over a million dollars) and various arts organizations, such as the Edmonton Symphony.

In short, Winspear is a kind of "elder statesman" among the western business class, a man who could write with ease in 1969 that "[c]apitalism is a modern phenomenon [the] characteristics [of which] are often misunderstood, particularly by those not active in the business world." At the time, he might well have been speaking for many in the business establishment regarding their view of the Liberals in adding that "[t]here are those, *among them politicians*, who lust for power, who speak of predatory, selfish businessmen" (Winspear, 1988:14-15, italics added).

He had, perhaps, not always been as cynical of politicians. A life-long Liberal, he had once even been a (self-admitted) "bag man" for the party under Pearson (Winspear, 1988:186). Even then, however, it seems that disillusionment with that party was setting in, as evidenced by Winspear's remark at the Western Assembly in Vancouver in 1987 (which led to the founding of the Reform Party) that, "This country has not been properly governed since the days of Louis St. Laurent" (AR,1987a:5). But any hopes of a rapprochement between Winspear and the Liberal Party were irrevocably dashed with the coming to power of Trudeau in 1968:

> I thoroughly disliked Pierre Trudeau.... I sized him up immediately as an intellectual snob and a reclusive self-satisfied introvert. He made a series of errors in judgement. He almost wholly ignored the West whilst he blatantly courted Quebec. He centralized the power base in Ottawa whilst ignoring local party officials.... He made a foolish marriage to a much younger woman, invited actresses to the galleries of the House, and pirouetted behind the Queen, thereby offending millions of Canadians. His crowning blunder was the invocation of the War Measures Act for the Province of Quebec. This was worse than the Duplessis Padlock Law... (Winspear, 1988:187).

Francis Winspear was not alone in his estrangement from the Liberal party, a fact reflected in declining financial contributions from the private business community.

Table 2.1

Tory and Liberal Federal Financial Contributions, by Class of Contributors, 1975, 1979, and 1980 (in thousands of dollars and percentages)

	1975		1979		1980	
	PC	Lib	PC	Lib	PC	Lib
Class						
Indiv.	634	1,104	3,183	1,185	3,044	2,278
	(37)	(51)	(38)	(23)	(40)	(37)
Pub. Corp.	529	469	1,733	1,799	1,634	1,729
	(31)	(22)	(21)	(34)	(22)	(28)
Priv. Corp.	445	524	3,287	2,076	2,734	2,002
	(26)	(24)	(39)	(40)	(36)	(32)
Other*	112	51	172	160	152	209
	(6)	(2)	(2)	(3)	(2)	(3)
Total	1,721	2,149	8,376	5,220	7,564	6,218
	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)

Source: CEOC, 1975; 1979a; and 1980b.
**Includes money received from unions, governments, and other social organizations.*

Table 2.1 (above) compares the sources of financial contributions to the Liberals and Conservatives for 1975, the year Petro-Canada was created and Trudeau made his famous remarks about the economy, and the election years of 1979 and 1980. The figures are important on several counts. First, they indicate the increasing importance to both parties of corporate donations, both public and private, during this period. Second, in particular, the figures indicate the increasing importance to the Liberal party of contributions from public corporations -- a fact that may explain, in part, subsequent Tory moves upon coming to power to privatize various crown corporations. Third, although the percentage of total contributions to each party made by private corporations was roughly equivalent during these years, a slight difference is evident for 1980 (36 percent for the Tories vs. 32 percent for the Liberals).

Moreover, an examination of the percentage of total private corporate donations given to the two major parties suggests that the Liberals did, indeed, lose private corporate support during this period. For, while the Liberals received 52.6 percent of all private corporate contributions in 1975, compared with 44.8 percent for the Tories, the percentage of total private corporate contributions to the Liberals dropped to 37.4 percent in 1979, compared with the rise to 59.3 percent for the Tories. The election of 1980, coming so soon on the heals of the previous election, saw overall private corporate funding reduced for both the Liberals and the Tories. Nonetheless, the pattern of support remained more or less the same, with the Liberals and Tories receiving 41.4 percent and 56.5 percent, respectively, of all private corporate contributions.

Unfortunately, no regional breakdown of donors is available. Such a breakdown would suggest whether or not private corporate donations to the Liberals and Conservatives during these two elections reflected the same East-West split that otherwise occurred in the elections of 1979 and 1980. In any case, the available evidence *does* suggest that the allegiance of the private business sector, *in general*, tc the Liberal party had been severely loosened

In short, the federal Liberal party's loss of business support resulted from its social, economic, and political decisions during the 1960s and 1970s, combined with the rise of regionalist affiliations. In a wider sense, however, the general withdrawal of even tacit business support for the liberal welfare state was also connected to the world-wide crisis of capitalism which occurred during the 1970s, in the midst of which arose a new ideology: neo-conservatism. This ideology, in turn, found resonance in Canada, particularly in the historical traditions of the West, and was to play a part in the later rise of the Reform Party.

THE RISE OF NEO-CONSERVATISM IN WESTERN CANADA

In the United States, during the 1980s, the Republican Party successfully forged a political coalition in opposition to the the type of liberalism fashioned by the Democrats since the 1960s. Under the ideological umbrella of neo-conservatism, Ronald Reagan and, later, George Bush won support not only from the Republican's traditional conservative constituency, but from workers, the southern poor, disenchanted liberals, and some blacks as well. Given its historical, cultural, and geographical proximity to the United States, it is not surprising that similar elements also began to mobilize a counter-hegemony to liberalism in Canada.

The 1970s and 1980s saw the rise in Canada of several organizations dedicated to espousing neo-conservative values (Barrett, 1986; Brimelow, 1986:280; Stasiulis, 1988:54). As in the United States, these organizations often displayed a varying emphasis upon either moral conservatism or economic liberalism. Some of these, such as REAL Women (Realistic, Equal, Active for Life), also shared obvious consonance with conservative organizations to the south. Likewise, an Ontario evangelist, Kenneth Campbell, created Renaissance Canada in 1974 as the Canadian counterpart to Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority movement (AR, 1981a). In 1976, the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI) was created as a counterpart to the U. S. Business Roundtable (McQuaig, 1991). The period also saw the formation of such right-wing organizations as Paul Fromm's CFAR (Citizens for Foreign Aid Reform), CAFE (the Canadian

Association for Free Enterprise), and a Libertarian political party (Brimelow, 1986).

Yet other organizations, such as APEC (the Association for the Preservation of English in Canada), were distinctly Canadian. APEC was founded in 1977 by Irene Hilchie, a federal civil servant in Halifax who felt that official bilingualism was discriminating against unilingual anglophones. In 1980, the organization was taken over by Ron and Pauline Leitch of Toronto who have run it ever since (Andrew, 1988:48).

One of APEC's chief supporters has been J. V. ("Jock") Andrew, a former lieutenant commander in the Canadian Navy and author of Bilingualism Today, French Tomorrow. Published in 1977 by BMG Publishing of Richmond Hill, Ontario, a small firm specializing in such titles as Red Maple -- How Canada Became the People's Republic of Canada in 1981, Bilingualism Today was destined to become BMG's biggest seller. Despite its incredulous thesis -- that bilingualism is the first step towards the imposition of a unilingual French state -- Andrew (1988) reports (probably reliably) that Bilingualism Today had sold 120,000 copies by 1988. Andrew has since published two other books, Backdoor Bilingualism (1979) (which the author implies was the victim of, first, a mysterious warehouse fire and, second, systematic neglect by the Canadian media) and Enough (Enough French, Enough Quebec) (1988). Each of Andrew's texts repeats the thesis that there is a conspiracy occurring to have "the French" take over Canada.

Excluding the BCNI, however, most of these individuals and organizations remained on the fringe of political respectability. By contrast, two organizations formed in the 1970s were to have increasing influence in shifting Canada's -- and the West's -- public policies sharply to the right.

The National Citizens' Coalition (NCC) was the creation of Colin Brown, a wealthy London, Ontario entrepreneur with ties to the "old boys network," particularly in Ontario and Quebec (Hughes et al., 1975-76:860). Brown made most of his money as a life insurance agent with London Life, but over the years had also cultivated broader connections within the political and corporate worlds. Brown was a long-time Tory, but by the late-1960s had come to believe that both John Diefenbaker and Robert Stanfield were socialists (Fillmore, 1986). In the wake of the latter's election as leader of the Tories in 1967, Brown formed the NCC.

From its inception, the NCC has fought consistently for smaller government, more restrictive immigration laws, reduced social programs, balanced budgets, the deregulation of businesses, right to work legislation, the privatization of health care, and an end to public insurance, bilingualism, and multiculturalism (Fillmore, 1986; Barrett, 1987; EJ, 1991b).

In 1975, Brown transformed the NCC into a non-profit organization (FCCA, 1991b) secretly funded by private corporate donors (Fillmore, 1986), many of them in the oil and gas industry (Barrett, 1986). Like many other right-wing organizations in Canada, the NCC was modelled on American organizations, in this case, the Conservative Opportunities Society and the Heritage Foundation. The first board of the NCC included several high-ranking Tories and Socreds, including Ernest Manning and Robert Thompson (see Fillmore, 1986; Barrett, 1987; EJ, 1991b).

In the late 1970s, Colin Brown read Trudeau Revealed, an "expose" of Pierre Trudeau's socialist inclinations written by a former Toronto Sun reporter, David Somerville. Somerville (b. 1951), the son of a Toronto lawyer, received his education

at St. Andrews College in Aurora, Ontario, Switzerland, and the University of Toronto (Somerville, 1978). Trudeau Revealed was published in 1978 (by, again, BMG Publishing) and eventually sold 27,000 copies (Brimelow, 1986:64). Brown was so impressed with Somerville's dissection of Trudeau's "secret agenda" that he offered Somerville a job as vice-president and chief spokesperson for the NCC (Fillmore, 1986). Somerville soon became a major figure in the organization, orchestrating the many legal battles of the 1980s which propelled the Coalition to its current fame. Nonetheless, the NCC was still a minor force in 1980. Rising much more quickly was another right-wing organization, the Fraser Institute.

The Fraser Institute was founded in British Columbia in November, 1974 by Michael Walker, the son of a Newfoundland miner. Walker, holder of a doctorate in economics from the University of Western Ontario started-up the Institute with the monetary support of B.C.'s business community which was still reeling from the NDP's election in 1972. By 1984, the Institute was operating on an annual budget of $900,000 (Garr, 1985:91). Palmer (1987:20) states that this "funding comes from some of the largest business interests in the country and its governing Board of Trustees represents no less than 157 corporate directorships," among them Sam Belzberg of First City Trust, Sonja Bata of Bata Limited, A. J. Grandpre of Bell Canada, and Lorne Lodge of IBM Canada (Garr, 1985:91).

The Fraser Institute also boasts impressive conservative credentials. The Institute's authors include Milton Friedman and Herbert Grubel, while its editorial board includes Sir Alan Walters, former personal economic adviser to Margaret Thatcher. Finally, William F. Buckley, Jr., brother-in-law of BC Socred bagman Austin Taylor, is a favourite guest speaker of the Institute (Garr, 1985:91-2).

In short, the Fraser Institute is a well-paid conservative lobbyist for the corporate sector. Like the National Citizens' Coalition, the Fraser Institute has steadfastly used its position to advance the neo-conservative agenda, an agenda liberally sprinkled with such Reaganite buzzwords as fiscal restraint, downsizing, and privatization (see Magusson et al., 1984; Garr, 1985; Persky, 1989).

While these various organizations gained in stature throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, their views were not immediately accessible to the general public. At about this time, however, a magazine emerged in western Canada which fulfilled the role as chief disseminator of neo-conservative ideology: Alberta Report.

Alberta Report is the creation of Edward ("Ted") Byfield. Byfield was born in Toronto in 1928. His father was a reporter with the Toronto Star. Ted received most of his education in Ontario, but later attended George Washington University in Washington, D. C. In 1946, he joined first the Washington Post as copy boy, then later became a reporter for the Ottawa Journal. In 1952, following stints as editor of the Timmins Daily Press and the Sudbury Star, Byfield moved west to join the Winnipeg Free Press. In 1957, he won the National Newspaper Award for political reporting (Byfield, 1991a).

In the late 1950s, Byfield and a group of other laymen at St. John's Cathedral in Winnipeg formed St. John's Cathedral Boys' School in Selkirk, Manitoba. Conservative in orientation, the private school's curriculum emphasized firm discipline, including the use of corporal punishment. In 1962, Byfield left the newspaper business to become a teacher at the school. In 1968, he oversaw the establishment of a second St. John's School in Genesee, Alberta. (A third school has since opened at Claremont, Ontario.)

In response to Pierre Berton's The Comfortable Pew (1965), a book which attacked the failure of mainstream Christianity to address social issues, Byfield wrote Just Think, Mr. Berton (1965). The book defended traditional religious morality and practice and denounced the increasing attempts of Christian churches to become socially "relevent." This foray into journalism reawakened Byfield's appetite for the news business and, in 1973, he convinced the other members of the Genesee board to begin publishing a weekly newsmagazine, St. John's Edmonton Report.

Edmonton Report was followed into production four years later by St. John's Calgary Report. In 1979, both magazines were merged into Alberta Report (AR, 1983a). By 1986, an identical but renamed version of Alberta Report, the Western Report, was produced for sale in the three remaining western provinces. This was followed, in 1989, by the creation of a somewhat distinctive version, BC Report.

Circulation of the three magazines varies. In June, 1991, BC Report had a paid circulation of 21,000, Alberta Report approximately 40,000, and Western Report about 1500 (Byfield, 1991b). The magazine is a typical family business. Since 1981, it has been owned by Ted Byfield and his brother, Dr. John Byfield of San Diego, California. Besides Ted, his wife, daughter (Virginia) and two sons (Link and Michael) also work for the magazine.

From the beginning, Alberta Report has been western Canada's most prominent and consistent organ for the dissemination of conservative values. In articles and, more especially, editorials and columns (written by Ted and, in recent years, his son Link and other guest writers), the magazine has stood firmly for corporal and capital punishment, the teaching of fundamentalist Christian religion in schools, the rights of the family (i.e., the parents), and free enterprise, while espousing an often virulent hatred of metrification, pro-choice advocates, feminism in general, public school curriculums and methods of discipline, divorce, human rights commissions, "mainstream" Christianity, homosexuality, penal reform, sex education, unions, public ownership, teacher's associations, and rock music.

During their existence, the various Reports have reserved particular scorn for government agencies or programs such as ("the eastern based") CBC (and most other media), multiculturalism, bilingualism, the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA), and the National Energy Program (NEP). Indeed, Alberta Report's view of the role of government can be summed up in the headline of one Ted Byfield editorial: "Legislate morality? Yes, and that's all we should legislate" (AR, 1981b). (Despite its extolling of high moral values, however, Alberta Report has often been taken to task by readers dismayed at its apparently prurient interest in news stories, usually accompanied by pictures, concerning beauty pageants, nudist colonies, porn-shops, and prostitution [see AR, 1983b; AR, 1983c.])

Along the way, Byfield has expressed an intense dislike and mistrust of Canadian nationalism, opposing it to what he sees as the "true" (i.e., right-wing) values of the western region:

> ... the clear goal of the Toronto media propagandist is to reshape what we are, into something we are not. Everyone of the values out of which the country has emerged he repudiates. He debunks our religion and undermines our families. He tells our women that raising children is contemptible, and aborting them an act of heroism. He plumps and pleads every cause from

> state day care to pansy parsons. He lets the killer stalk the streets while jailing parents who spank their children, and he has helped create governments so bloated and beyond control that more than 50 cents of every dollar we earn is required to feed and pamper them (AR, 1986b).

In short, Byfield's worldview highlights the increasing links, occurring in the early 1980s, between conservative ideology and western regionalism.

Despite its increased media prominence, corporate support, and general social respectability, neo-conservative ideology began the 1980s lacking direct access into federal decision making. Shortly thereafter, however, it did begin to make inroads into provincial politics. Not unexpectedly, the two provinces where this occurred were Alberta and British Columbia, whose political cultures contained the two essential elements underlying neo-conservatism: free enterprise combined with traditional morality.

By 1975, B.C.'s right-wing had once more coalesced, this time under W.A.C. Bennett's forty-four year old son, Bill Bennett. Barrett's NDP was defeated by the Socreds. In 1979, the Socreds won again -- just as the recession began. As Socred fortunes began to wane, Bennett's political advisors decided upon a marketing strategy that would present Bill Bennett as the "tough guy" who would straighten out BC's economic problems. The result was his announcement, in 1982, of a curb on public sector wages and a freeze on government spending. The economy, however, continued to crumble (Garr, 1985; see also Persky, 1989). An election was set for May 5, 1983, during which Bennett promised that, if elected, he would continue the policies of moderate restraint practiced in 1982. On election night, Bennett's Social Credit party took 35 seats (49.8 percent of the vote) to the NDP's 22 seats (44.9 percent of the vote).

Before the opening of the new legislature, the Socred cabinet was advised by the Fraser Institute's Michael Walker of the policies it should take to turn the economy around. Guided by Walker's advice, the Socreds set about making British Columbia the "testing ground for neo-conservative ideology" (Garr, 1985:1; see also Magnusson et al., 1984; Palmer, 1987; Persky, 1989).

On July 7, 1983, Bennett's government introduced both a budget and an astonishing twenty-six bills. Among other things, the bills' removed government employees' rights to negotiate job security, promotion, job reclassification, transfer, work hours and other working conditions; enabled public sector employers to fire employees without cause; extended public sector wage controls; repealed the Human Rights Code; abolished the Human Rights Branch and Commission, the Rentalsman's Office, and rent controls; enabled doctors to opt out of medicare; removed the right of school boards to levy certain taxes; and dissolved the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Commission (see Magnusson et al., 1984:281-85 for a full summary).

Public reaction was immediate. As Magnusson et al. (1984:12) relate, "It was remarkable how many different groups the government managed to offend at once." Only four days after the budget announcement, a coalition of these disparate groups was formed to fight against the legislation.

Operation Solidarity, as the coalition was called, organized mass demonstrations throughout the summer, ending with a rally of 40,000 on August 10 at Empire Stadium in Vancouver. The fall sitting of the legislature deteriorated into mayhem as the Socreds

forced through legislation. On October 15, an angry crowd estimated at between 50,000 and 60,000 marched on the Hotel Vancouver where the Socreds were holding their convention (see Magnusson et al., 1984; Garr, 1985; Mason and Baldrey, 1989). Following adjournment of the legislature on October 20, Operation Solidarity began a series of escalating strikes, starting with government employees on November 1. This strike was followed within days by strikes in other sectors. A general strike seemed imminent. The strike was only narrowly averted by an agreement between Jack Monro, regional president of International Woodworkers of America and Bennett on November 13 which protected public sector workers from some of the more onerous aspects entailed in the government bills (Magnusson et al., 1984).

The settlement between the government and the union, combined with crumbling public support for the strikers, eroded the wider coalition of left-wing elements (see Palmer, 1987). Largely unopposed, Bennett pressed ahead with the agenda set out by the Fraser Institute. In 1984, more bills were passed that severely restricted union powers and otherwise shifted power away from the socially disadvantaged. By the time he stepped down in 1986, Bennett was disliked by many British Columbians, in large measure because of the cold aloofness with which he had pursued his agenda. Nonetheless, many voters also viewed him as a hero who had put unions, social activists, and government workers in their place.

Indeed, Bennett's conservative measures, while pursued with extreme gusto, were not entirely unique in the recession-torn Canada of the 1980s. Faced with declining revenues, governments of all political stripes resorted to policies of fiscal restraint. As previously mentioned, Sterling Lyon's Conservative party attempted to institute a fiscally-conservative agenda in Manitoba after 1977 (Chorney and Hansen, 1985). In 1982, the federal Liberals, in the same spirit as their restraint program of 1975, limited by decree public sector wage increases. Ontario's Conservative government passed similar legislation during the same period. Likewise, the recession saw Quebec's left-leaning Parti Quebecois and Saskatchewan's NDP face bitter public strikes in 1982 -83 over fiscal restraint. In 1985, Alberta, never known for its progressive labour legislation, introduced compulsory arbitration and severely limited the rights of some workers to strike (Palmer, 1987; see also Nikiforuk et al., 1987). And, in 1987, Bill Bennett's successor in BC, Bill Vander Zalm, introduced an anti-labour bill that, in a half-hearted sequel to Solidarity, saw 250,000 workers stage a one day strike (Mason and Baldrey, 1989).

Finally, although the events in BC in 1982-84 highlight, in particularly dramatic fashion, both the growing influence of fiscal conservatism in the West and the uncompromising limits to which its adherents would go in waging a kind of Hobbesian war against other ideas and people, it is important to keep in mind that the possibility of creating a neo-conservative counter-hegemony in Canada still seemed remote as the 1980s began. The elections of 1979 and 1980, and their aftermath, however, set the stage for greater right-wing influence through a linkage with regional discontent.

THE ELECTIONS OF 1979 AND 1980 AND THEIR AFTERMATH

The elections of 1979 and 1980 brought to a head federal-provincial conflicts that had been brewing for nearly a decade. As we have seen, the rise of regionalism in the West had been buttressed by the election of strong provincialist governments in the late

1960s and early 1970s. No more so was this the case than in Alberta where, encouraged by the province's urban business elites, Lougheed's Tory government actively involved itself in capital investment and public ownership in the province -- even as government officials paid lip service to free enterprise -- and expanded government services. The Tories' efforts at "province building" were assisted by a rise in oil and gas revenues following the OPEC crisis of 1973.

Immediately, however, the OPEC crisis resulted in increased federal-provincial conflict. The source of this conflict lies in the provisions of the Canadian Constitution. Under the Constitution, producing provinces have exclusive ownership of natural resources, but the federal government controls their sale price when they move across provincial or international borders. (Either level of government also can levy taxes on the resource.)

The federal Liberals' response to the crisis was to implement wage and price controls and create Petro-Canada, much to the displeasure of the producing provinces, particularly Alberta. This conflict was repeated in 1979 with the occurrence of the Iranian Revolution. Once again, the price of a barrel of oil jumped dramatically, going from US$14.82 in January, 1979, to US$34.50 by January, 1980. Armand Hammer, the president of Occidental Petroleum, predicted that the price of oil would be US$100 per barrel by 1990 (Lalonde, 1990). Such a scenario, if it occurred, would see a massive transfer of economic and political power from eastern Canada to the West, particularly Alberta. For Albertans, long accustomed to having a "boom or bust" economy, it seemed that their time in the sun had arrived at last.

In the midst of these events, Alberta officials and the federal Liberals attempted throughout 1978-79 to negotiate a new pricing agreement on oil and gas. Understandably, both sides wanted to maximize their economic rents. Beset by an increasing federal deficit, and concerned that Alberta's growing wealth might "unbalance" Confederation, the Liberals proved to be tough bargainers.

With some elation, therefore, the Alberta government greeted the election in 1979 of a Tory government headed by a fellow-Albertan, High River-born Joe Clark. Lougheed's hopes that a better agreement might be reached with the Tories than the Liberals proved to be justified. In the months that followed, an oil pricing agreement was arrived at which would have allowed for a $4 per barrel increase in 1980, $4.50 per barrel increase each ensuing year of the agreement, as well as price adjustments in the last two years of the four-and-a half year agreement (AR, 1979b). Clark's government, however, lost a budget vote dealing with the agreement, and his government fell.

The subsequent election polarized Canadian politics. Despite the impending Quebec referendum on sovereignty (scheduled for May 20, 1980), the budget quickly became the central issue of the campaign, openly pitting the oil producing provinces against the manufacturing heartland of (particularly) Ontario. In Alberta, which had been denied ownership of its own resources until 1930, the conflict rekindled historical regional grievances. It seemed for many Albertans in 1980 that the federal Liberals were prepared to seize the province's resources in a bid to redistribute Alberta's new-found wealth to the more populated region of central Canada. Many Albertans felt that their future prosperity was being robbed to protect the less efficient industries of the East.

Conversely, many easterners viewed as a threat the massive shift of economic and political power to the West entailed by the sudden rise in world oil prices. Prior to the

OPEC crisis of 1973, Ontario had subsidized western oil producers through a guaranteed market. Up to this point, the price of Canadian crude had historically been slightly higher than the world price (see Laxer, 1983). Having sustained the western industry until it was viable, Ontario was now being asked to accept the higher world price -- a price, moreover, dictated by a foreign cartel that would likely make uncompetitive that province's manufacturing industries. Some nationalists were further concerned that windfall returns to the largely foreign-owned oil industry would be used to buy up other key sectors of the economy or would flee the country altogether.

The federal Liberal party, increasingly bent on a political strategy that required government intervention in the economy, appeared to side with central Canada -- much to the anger of westerners, particularly Albertans. In contrast, the federal Tory party was strongly influenced by its western members, particularly its strong Alberta caucus, many of whose members had strong ties to the oil and gas industry. (The Tories had not lost a federal seat in Alberta since 1972, taking all twenty-one in 1979.) In contrast to the interventionist role for government espoused by the Liberals and NDP, the Tories had become increasingly supportive of market-driven economics.

The battle lines were starkly, if rather simplistically, drawn. When they appeared on stage for the election of 1980, the Tories were cast in the role of defenders of western-provincialist and "free enterprise" interests, the Liberals as protectors of the eastern-centralist and "socialist" interests. In the end, although the actual issues were more complex than this, dealing with, among other things, national and regional development, resource ownership, and distributive justice, the 1980 election results, based on a first-passed-the post electoral system, seemed to reflect, and even add to the mythology, of a simple-minded polarization of regional political interests.

In 1979, the Progressive Conservatives had won election primarily on the basis of an Ontario-West axis, taking fifty-seven (of ninety-five) seats in the former and fifty-seven (of seventy-seven) seats in the latter. In 1980, by contrast, the Tories lost seats in every province except Alberta. Tory losses were particularly high in Ontario, where the oil pricing issue was foremost in voter's minds. In 1980, the Tories took only thirty-eight seats, a loss of nineteen from the previous election. The loss of seats reflected a drop in electoral support from 41percent in 1979 to 35 percent in 1980 (CEOC, 1979b; 1980b).

As for the Liberals, they were virtually shutout in the West in both elections, taking only three seats in the 1979 election and two seats (both in Manitoba) in 1980, but the 126 seats they took in Quebec and Ontario in 1980 ensured the Liberals of victory. In the end, the elections of 1979 and 1980 revealed and accentuated Canada'sregional cleavages in a particularly dramatic way. Highlighted against the rise and fall of the abbreviated Tory reign, the 1980 election aroused immediate anger and concern in the West.

In Alberta, a sixty year old Edmonton millionaire and car dealer, Elmer Knutson, sent an angry letter to the Edmonton Journal the day after the election. In the letter, which has since acquired an almost mythic stature in western separatist folklore (see Harrington, 1981; Bell, 1983), Knutson adumbrated a series of themes which were to be the staples of western separatists and other right-wing elements in subsequent years. The letter especially complained of a French-dominated Ottawa, as exemplified in such policies as bilingualism, and the fear that Trudeau's majority Liberal government would now proceed with constitutional reforms which would reinforce French domination of the

rest of Canada. Knutson's solution to this perceived threat was simple: Quebec must be made to leave Canada (EJ, 1980).

Knutson was not a stranger to political matters. In the late 1970s he had been co -chair of the One Canada Association, an organization "committed to increasing police powers, ending bilingualism, and tightening immigration policies" (Harrington, 1981:25). Then, in December, 1979, Knutson lost the Edmonton South Tory nomination to incumbent Douglas Roche whom Knutson once described as "a socialist masquerading as a conservative" (AR, 1980a:11). But the response to his Journal letter -- "One lousy little letter," in Knutson's words (Harrington, 1981) -- astonished even him. In one month, Knutson received 3,800 replies, most of them positive (AR, 1980b). As a result of this public response, Knutson formed the Western Canada Federation (West-Fed) in March of 1980 (Bell, 1983:22).

At almost the same time, the results of the federal election breathed new life into the faltering political career of a thirty-four year old Victoria lawyer, Doug Christie. Christie, a Manitoba-born monarchist who is reported to have climbed to the roof of the Winnipeg college he was attending to hoist a nine-foot Red Ensign when the Canadian flag was first raised in 1965, had been a committed separatist since at least 1975 (AR, 1980c). Like Knutson, Christie had once tried to win candidacy for the Conservative party. Following this failure, he formed the openly separatist Committee for Western Independence (CWI) in 1976, an association which gained some notoriety by attracting prominent lawyer Milt Harradance to its fold (AR, 1980d).

For a time, the CWI was joined by the Independent Alberta Association (IAA), an organization formed in the early 1970s by John C. Rudolph, a Calgary oilman, "to examine the feasibility of, and if necessary to promote the formation of, an independent Alberta state" (Gibbins, 1980:161). The result was a study produced in 1973 by University of Calgary economist Warren Blackman (later a supporter of West-Fed) and four colleagues. The study contended that an independent Alberta would not only survive but would be economically better off (AR, 1981c). By 1979, however, Christie had formed another party. the Western Independence Party (WIP). In the provincial election of that year, he contested the Esquimalt-Port Renfrew riding, receiving 280 votes compared to the winner's 24,1456 votes (Harrington, 1981; Bell, 1983).

Six days after the federal election of 1979, Christie and fifty followers of the CWI created the Western National Association (WNA). Within a few months, however, internal bickering among the Association members resulted in Christie leaving. His political career seemed to have reached a dead end -- until the 1980 election occurred. The re-election of Trudeau and the backlash it created in the West led to Christie founding yet another separatist party, Western Canada Concept, in June of 1980.

Meanwhile, in March, 1980, the former leader of Saskatchewan's Progressive Conservative party, Dick Collver, resigned to sit as an independent with the intent of working towards western Canada's annexation by the United States (AR, 1980e). Said Collver: "The people are ready to express their dissatisfaction with compulsory bilingualism and all of the other centralist dogma which is being perpetrated on our region" (AR, 1980f:6). Collver was soon joined in his protest by a fellow PC MLA, Dennis Ham. Together they formed the short-lived Unionest Party. The party never got off the ground, however, and in a final act of personal annexation, Collver moved to the United States.

The emergence of these various right-wing parties and organizations was the most

glaring symptom of political discontent arising out of the election, but there were other signs as well. The day after the election, for example, Vancouver radio hot-line host Jack Webster was deluged with phone calls, the majority (67 out of 109) saying they were in favour of the West separating. At nearly the same time, the Canada West Foundation, a regional think-tank, received almost 150 calls from people who assumed that the purpose of the foundation was to promote separatism (AR, 1980g). "But," said Stan Roberts, president of the Foundation, "most of our callers have been really concerned about one question: who will speak for the West in Ottawa" (AR, 1980h:10).

Negative reaction to the election results might have disappeared in time except that major decisions and policies were in the offing and could not wait. The impending Quebec referendum would require a new Constitutional arrangement, no matter what the outcome. And there was the necessary oil pricing agreement.

In the days and months following the 1980 election, the Alberta government waited to see what Ottawa would do regarding an oil-pricing agreement. By the fall of 1980, Premier Lougheed thought he knew, and proceeded to warn Albertans of the impending rape of their resources by the federal government acting on behalf of eastern, primarily Ontario, interests (see McKinsey, 1981).

On October 28, 1980, Finance Minister Allan MacEachen brought down his first budget. The budget's major announcement, however, was the creation of the National Energy Program (NEP), a program described by Laxer (1983:73-4) as "the most significant act of government intervention in the Canadian economy since the Second World War."

The NEP and its companion legislation (the Petroleum Incentives Program [PIP], the Natural Gas Export Tax [NGET], and the Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax [PGRT]), aimed at increasing Canadianization of the petroleum industry through both public and private sector strategies. The programs also aimed at increasing the federal share of petroleum rents, necessarily at the expense of the producing provinces and/or the petroleum companies. Specifically, the NEP also set the rise in the price of oil at $1 per barrel every six months beginning in January, 1981 until the end of 1983. After that, until the end of 1985, the price would rise at $2.25 per barrel every six months. After January, 1986, the price of oil would rise at $3.50 per barrel every six months (see Laxer, 1983:79).

The Alberta government's reaction was immediate. Premier Lougheed went on television to announce his strong disagreement with the legislation as an interference in provincial jurisdiction. He further rejected the pricing schedule as too low. As a result, said Lougheed, Alberta would cut back on oil production. The province would also put on hold decisions concerning the development of the oil sands.

The NEP was also attacked, of course, by the large multinationals. They were aided in their attack by the election, a week after the budget announcement, of Ronald Reagan as president of the United States. The intervention of the White House was lauded by Ted Byfield:

> In the course of the conflict between the Reagan administration and Ottawa, we Albertans are expected as loyal Canadians to cheer for the victory of Mr. Trudeau and his thug government. Some of us will find this very hard. We will wave the flag, of course. But deep in our hearts we will be hoping that the Americans whip the hell out of him (AR, 1982a:52).

In the months and years that followed, Byfield's Alberta Report continued to mythologize the intent and the impact of the NEP. The NEP was opposed, of course, not only by the right-wing. At least some on the left, particularly in western Canada, saw the NEP as politically and economically unfair, a tax imposed upon the West (particularly Alberta, but also Saskatchewan) in order to protect the slow-to-adapt manufacturing industries of the East. As such, the NEP was not a truly "national" policy, but rather a short-sighted political strategem that neglected Canada's real long-term political and economic interests. The most virulent and public attacks upon the NEP, however, were launched by Alberta's Conservative government and the western right -wing, particularly those in the private oil and gas industry.

The most outspoken of these critics was Carl Nickle, a prominent oil-field executive and former Tory MP, who publically condemned the entire budget outright as discriminatory and repressive. "I believe short term political gain for central Canada will foster more alienation, possible [sic] even lead to splitting the nation apart," he said (Oilweek, 1980a:76). (A while later, Nickel declared his support for western separatism.) Federal Tories, such as John Crosbie and Calgary Centre MP Harvie Andre, concurred with Nickle's assessment.

To the extent that popular culture reflects reality, the numerous anti-Liberal, anti-Trudeau, and anti-Eastern bumper stickers, lapel pins, t-shirts, and other paraphernalia that deluged western Canada, particular Alberta, during this period provide additional evidence that many people were angry (see Hiller, 1983; 1984 on this point). Nor is it a coincidence that John Ballem, a corporate lawyer with strong ties to the oil and gas industry, and former law partner of Peter Lougheed (Clarkson and McCall, 1990:301), should write (in 1981) Alberta Alone, a fictitious novel which revolves around Alberta's separation from Confederation.

In short, the NEP was a red flag for nascent separatists, private business, and assorted right-wingers in western Canada. Its impact in heightening fear and anger among these elements was accentuated by Trudeau's announcement only a month earlier that his government would proceed unilaterally with patriation of the Constitution.

By 1980, the goal of constitutional renewal had become for some Canadian academics and politicians almost a Holy Grail: by equal parts both compelling and unobtainable. Canada's constitutional existence was a product of the British North America Act of 1867. The new country, however, was not entirely sovereign, as the British government withheld authority over foreign affairs, judicial appeals, and constitutional amendments. The Statute of Westminster (1931) proclaimed Canada (as well as Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa) sovereign and equal to Great Britain, but Canada declined to take back control over its own Constitution because the federal and provincial governments could not decide on an amending formula. Although many Canadian civil servants and politicians thereafter pressed for complete patriation of the Constitution, the lone result was the establishment (in 1950) of the Supreme Court of Canada as the final court of appeal instead of the British Privy Council (Clarkson and McCall, 1990; Cairns, 1988).

It is an irony of his political life that Trudeau should have been the one to finally pursue the goal of patriating and amending the Constitution. Prior to the late 1960s, he had been antipathetic to constitutional change, believing instead that Quebec (and, for that matter, the other provinces) had sufficient powers and lacked only the will to make

Confederation work. By the time of the Victoria federal-provincial conference in 1971, Trudeau had begun to change his mind.

That meeting saw the various premiers, including Robert Bourassa of Quebec, decide upon a new Constitution. Faced, however, with strong opposition by Quebec nationalists, trade unionists, business groups, and the media who viewed the deal as centralizing Canadian authority and otherwise reducing Quebec to the status of the other provinces, Bourassa later withdrew his support for the deal. Now, after an hiatus of nearly a decade, Trudeau returned to the Constitutional question as a means of reconstituting Canadian federalism. The immediate impetus for his return was the Quebec referendum of May 20, 1980.

Prior to its election in 1976, the Parti Quebecois led by Rene Levesque had stated that, if elected, it would hold a referendum on sovereignty association sometime during its mandate. In November, 1979, following Trudeau's announcement that he was retiring as leader of the Liberal party, Levesque announced that the sovereignty referendum would be held on May 20, 1980. Levesque's timing was quite intentional: he believed that his old nemesis would now be ineffectual in the debate to follow. Levesque's announcement backfired, however, as it rekindled Trudeau's political desires and played a major part in his decision to lead the Liberal party into the 1980 election (see Clarkson and McCall, 1990).

When the referendum campaign began the following spring, the pro-sovereigntists appeared certain of victory. In the weeks preceding the vote, however, pro-federalists returned to traditional arguments that a vote for sovereignty would result in Quebec's economic ruin since no one could ensure that economic association with the rest of Canada would necessarily follow. At the same time, various federal politicians, including Trudeau, suggested that a "no" vote would be followed by constitutional changes that would meet Quebec's demands within Confederation. The federalist arguments won out. The "no" side received 60 percent of the vote, although, significantly, the vote among francophone Quebecers was split 50-50. The day following the referendum vote, Trudeau announced his plans to patriate the Constitution (see Cairns, 1988; Clarkson and McCall, 1990; also Cohen, 1990).

A draft resolution of the federal government's constitutional position was unveiled in September, but the federal-provincial conference held later that month ended in heated argument and constitutional deadlock over the issue of an amending formula, among other things. It was then that Trudeau announced his government would move unilaterally to patriate the Constitution.

Shortly thereafter, a draft resolution of the Constitution's proposed Charter of Rights and Freedoms went to a joint Commons-Senate committee. The committee held hearings throughout November and December, and received briefs or heard testimony from 914 individuals and 294 groups. The committee also accepted over half of 123 proposed amendments. The Charter was then returned to the House of Commons for further debate (Cohen, 1990:61).

Meanwhile, the legality of the federal government unilaterally patriating the Constitution was challenged before the Supreme Court by Quebec, Newfoundland, and Manitoba. In September, 1981, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government had the legal right to patriate the constitution, but that convention suggested that it required the consent of the majority of the provinces. The decision was the Supreme Court's polite way of telling Trudeau that he should return to discussions with the

provinces.

Many of the premiers, particularly Manitoba Premier Sterling Lyon, strongly opposed certain elements of the federal package. In particular, they disliked the proposed Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which they viewed as increasing the powers of the judiciary at the expense of the provincial legislatures. At an earlier meeting in April, 1981, Premier Levesque had made an important concession, agreeing to surrender Quebec's traditional veto over constitutional matters. Now, at a meeting held in November of the same year, Levesque agreed to Trudeau's proposal to hold a national referendum on the Charter. The solidarity of the opposing premiers dissipated. They had no wish to fight the Charter that they knew had wide support across the country, including in Quebec. All of the premiers, except Levesque, agreed to the new constitutional arrangement. The meeting broke up.

On the basis of presentations made by groups representing women and aboriginals, some modifications to the deal were made by federal and provincial government officials during subsequent days. Essentially, however, the new Constitution had been formulated. An angry Levesque, still complaining that he had been betrayed by the other premiers, announced that Quebec would neither sign the Constitution nor would it take part in future constitutional meetings. Quebec nationalists received another blow to their aspirations in December, 1982, when the Supreme Court announced its unanimous decision that Quebec had no constitutional veto. The deal was done. A few months later -- April 17, 1982 -- the Queen proclaimed Canada's new Constitution.

Trudeau had what he had long wanted, a patriated Constitution with a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, although the latter included a "notwithstanding clause" that the western premiers, particularly Lyon and Blakeney, had forced upon him. The clause -- Section 33 -- allows both provincial and federal legislatures to override court decisions based on certain sections of the Charter. Although Trudeau feared that the clause had opened the door for provincial premiers to over-ride individual protections, it seemed to be a necessary compromise. And -- after all -- half of a Charter was better than no Charter. On balance, there seemed less of a chance subsequently that a patchwork quilt of individual rights would emerge across the country.

The deal, however, was not entirely one-sided in favour of the federal government, nor did it exclude or offer nothing to Quebec. An amending formula had at last been arrived at that could pave the way to future constitutional changes. Moreover, although they had agreed to the inclusion of the Charter in the constitution, the provinces felt they had limited its effect through the "notwithstanding clause" (see Clarkson and McCall, 1990; Cohen, 1990).

What did Canadians think of the new Constitution? Quebec nationalists were not to be placated. But would Levesque's PQ government have signed any deal, short of one that granted Quebec sovereignty association? Likely not. Certainly, Trudeau, the provincial premiers, and a Tory leadership hopeful named Brian Mulroney took this view (Cohen, 1990). Women and natives remained displeased that the Constitution did not go far enough in ensuring their rights. Others denounced the process by which the Constitution had been created (Resnick, 1984).

On the whole, however, the new Constitution was well received throughout Canada. A Gallup poll conducted in early May, 1982 asked the question: "The Canadian constitution was proclaimed in Ottawa on April 17, 1982. In the long run, do you think this will be a good thing or not a good thing for Canada?" The results? Nationally, 57

percent of Canadians thought it would be a good thing; 14 percent thought it would be a bad thing; 30 percent didn't know. Regionally, greatest support for the new Constitution was found in Ontario (65 percent). The least support was in Quebec, at 49 percent, though only 16 percent thought it was a bad thing. Significantly, however, the most polarized results were found on the prairies, with 53 percent of respondents viewing the new Constitution as a good thing compared with 21 percent who viewed it as bad (Gallup, 1982).

It is unclear which elements in the West comprised this 21 percent. Certainly, however, the extreme right-wing in western Canada opposed the new Constitution. An advertisement placed in the Alberta Report by the Alberta Branch of the Canadian League of Rights in May, 1981 asked readers to consider that "[t]he Trudeau 'constitutional' scheme and so-called 'charter of rights': fails to safeguard individual property rights; and takes effective control of natural resources away from the provinces." The reasons for Trudeau's actions, stated the advertisement, could be found by purchasing a tract put out by the League, Trudeau's Master Plan for the Betrayal of Canada. The information in this tract, informed the advertisement, was "absolutely essential to the defence of our Christian heritage" (AR, 1981d:21).

Combined with the enactment of the NEP, the proposed Constitution confirmed for many right-wing separatist elements in the West the notion that the Trudeau Liberals were attempting to create a centralized, socialist, and francophone state. In retrospect, this belief may appear absurd. It should be remembered, however, that this belief was held and reinforced by the Alberta Report, as well as many prominent members of the western business and political establishment, such as Carl Nickle.

The response during this period of many people in the western business community to the Liberals' economic and political initiatives provide telling evidence of just how completely it had abandoned the Liberal party. A comparison of two conferences held by the influential Canada West Foundation (CWF) in 1978 and 1980 is particularly instructive of the collapse of business support for the Liberal party in western Canada. Moreover, it provides a glimpse into one of the organizations through which the future founders of the Reform Party were linked.

THE CANADA WEST FOUNDATION

The CWF was created in 1971, funded by individual memberships, and corporate, institutional, and provincial/territorial grants, to conduct research into the economic and social characteristics of the West and the North, and to make proposals regarding the region's development. From its inception, the Foundation has cultivated important political and business connections. Duff Roblin, former Tory premier of Manitoba, and the aforementioned Liberal MP James Richardson were early members of the Foundation's council (AR, 1980i; also Newman, 1982). Other prominant members in later years have included Izzy Asper and Gordon Gibson, former provincial Liberal leaders in Manitoba and British Columbia, respectively; Edward Schreyer, former Manitoba NDP premier and former Canadian Governor General; and Jim Gray, vice president of Canadian Hunter Exploration. The Foundation's first and only chairman is Arthur Child.

Child was born in England in 1910, the son of a steel worker. The family soon moved to Canada and settled in Ontario. After completing a BA in languages at Queens

University, Child eventually got a job with Canada Packers. He rose to the position of vice-president, before leaving to complete both a Masters and PhD. In the mid 1960s, he took over as president of Burns Foods Ltd. (AR, 1980i). By 1971, Child was a millionaire and, according to Newman (1982:368), a member of Calgary's "nouveaux riche," a club which also included R. A. Brown, founder of the NPARF.

In the climate of the 1970s, the Foundation soon found itself increasingly involved in the Constitutional debates occurring in the country. These debates became particularly intense following the election in Quebec of the Parti Quebecois under Rene Levesque in 1976. In response to the PQ's election, the federal Liberals commissioned the Task Force On National Unity headed by former Liberal cabinet minister Marcel Pepin and former Ontario premier John Robarts. The announcement of the commission set off a spate of similar hearings throughout the country. In the West, these hearings were spearheaded by the Canada West Foundation and its high-profile president, Stan Roberts.

Roberts was born in Winnipeg on January 17, 1927, but raised in the bilingual community of St. Adolphe in the Red River Valley, where his father owned a grain farm and established a nation-wide reputation as a breeder of Percheron draft horses. Stan Roberts later received post-secondary education at the University of Manitoba (Agricultural Economics) and the University of Western Ontario (Business Administration) (Roberts, undated; Montreal Gazette, 1980).

After a trip to Europe in the early 1950s, during which he met (and soon married) his wife, Pia, Roberts returned to Canada and got a job with Canada Packers. In 1954, the Roberts family returned to St. Adolphe to manage the family's 2,000 acre farm (Financial Post, 1980).

In 1958, Roberts entered politics and was elected as Liberal MLA for La Verendrye. Young, vigorous, and bilingual, he soon got a reputation for getting under the skin of Duff Roblin's Tory government (AR, 1980i). Roberts resigned his seat in 1963 but retained important contacts with the Liberal party. He was Manitoba advisor to Prime Minister Pearson, a man whom he respected, until 1968. Roberts then became president and acting leader of the Manitoba party (1969-70) (Financial Post, 1980).

This was a difficult time for Liberals in the West. The middle ground had disappeared from Manitoba politics with the Tory victory of 1959 and the later resurgence of the left-wing NDP which won election in 1969. Federally, although Trudeau was elected Prime Minister in 1968; and even took 27 seats in the West, party support nonetheless remained fragile in the region. Some notes scribbled by Roberts, likely in 1970, describe why he remained a Liberal, both federally and provincially, even during this difficult period. The same notes provide some insight also into his concept of liberalism.

On the federal situation:

> If NDP had been elected two years ago -- inflation. If PCs had been elected two years ago -- 2 countries.

On the provincial scene:

> We have Rightwing protectionist Conservatives, championing free enterprise -- with no interest in social reform. We have Leftwing socialism trying to

> build reform. There is a large intelligent mass at the centre that is demanding a more enlightened approach -- Fiscal responsibility + social reform. Free to own, free to achieve, free to grow and to change but who want their government to take responsibility for stimulating growth.... Only thru liberalism can we have both a free society and a quality of life (above quotes from Roberts, 1970).

In short, Roberts favoured neither unfettered capitalism nor centralized socialism, advocating instead, what might be termed, "responsible capitalism with a human face."

During this period, Roberts was an executive officer of McCabe Grain Co. Ltd., later National Grain Co. Ltd. He quit this post in 1971, however, to move to British Columbia where he became vice-president of Simon Fraser University.

In 1976, Roberts left the university to take a position as the Canada West Foundation's first president following the illness of the Foundation's executive director, Leroy ("Chick") Thorssen. Under Thorseen, the Foundation had maintained a generally low public profile. As president, however, Roberts immediately set about changing this. By 1978, he had become convinced that western Canada had to become more involved in the Constitutional process. In Roberts's own words: "What has happened in Quebec may have precipitated the crisis, but it's not an Ontario-Quebec debate. It's a Canadian debate and we in the west have a part in it" [Calgary Herald, 1978:22]).

In truth, signs that the Foundation was considering a more directly political role were evidenced two years earlier. At that time, it had commissioned a report by M & M Systems Research Ltd. of Edmonton examining how a new balance of national and regional interests and aspirations could be achieved within Canada, "while maintaining the unity and integrity of Canadian Confederation" (Roberts and Elton, 1978:1).

M & M was owned and managed by Ernest and Preston Manning. They had founded the company (later Manning Consultants Limited) in 1969, a year after the elder Manning's resignation as Alberta premier. In subsequent years, neither of the Mannings had been far from the political arena. Preston Manning had met frequently with Joe Clark whom he had known since university. Clark even attempted to convince Manning to run as a Conservative in the 1972 election, but the latter refused in part because of "reservations" about the Tory party and Canada's political system in general, and in part because of his commitments to his company (Manning, 1992).

During the same period, the Mannings had also secured their already substantial contacts with the business establishment. Even before the creation of the NPARF, Ernest Manning had cultivated his relationship with big business (Finkel, 1989). Shortly after his retirement as premier in 1968, and much to the astonishment of his loyal followers (Hooke, 1971; Hooke, 1991), Manning had even taken a seat on the board of directors of the Imperial Bank of Commerce. Later, he also joined the board of the pro-business right-wing lobby group, the National Citizens' Coalition.

In 1970, M & M produced its first paper, entitled Requests for Proposals and Social Contracts. Based on the system of contracting used by such American agencies as NASA (see Manning, 1992:55-56), and written in the now familiar language of systems theory, the paper advocated the provision of social programs by private industry and commerce. The ideas thus anticipated by nearly a decade neo-conservative solutions to the increasing fiscal problems of the liberal welfare state.

Over the next few years, the Mannings continued to expand their business contacts.

In 1977, the Mannings obtained money from the newly formed Business Council on National Issues "to finance the drafting and promotion of a property rights clause for possible inclusion in the Canadian constitution" (Manning, 1992:80-81). The same year, M & M released the report commissioned by the Canada West Foundation.

Entitled A Realistic Perspective of Canadian Confederation, the paper argued that Confederation is an ongoing "deal" struck between provinces and the federal government. Reflecting Preston Manning's dual interests in history and the application of technical reasoning to problem solving, the study recommended use of a matrix ("the National Unity Matrix") to systematically update Confederation's success in addressing regional concerns and aspirations (Canada West Foundation, 1977; summarized in Roberts, 1978:3).

The Mannings' paper was used as the basis for discussions held at public meetings throughout western Canada, the Yukon, and the Northwest Territories during September and October of 1977. Then, in December, 1977, the Foundation commissioned three reputable academics -- Dr. Fred Engelmann (Political Science, University of Alberta), and Dr. David Elton and Dr. Peter McCormick (Economics and Political Science, respectively, University of Lethbridge) -- to study federal systems of government existing elsewhere in the world.

Their study, entitled Alternatives: Towards The Development Of An Effective Federal System For Canada, came out in February, 1978, and made several specific proposals, notably that the Senate be replaced by a House of Provinces consisting of delegates from the provincial governments. The intent of this proposal was to bring the regions into the federal decision-making process, while not fundamentally weakening or decentralizing federal authority. The study also made clear where the authors stood on the Parti Quebecois' proposal of sovereignty-association:

> There is no question but that French Canadians have legitimate grievances.... However, [t]he fuzziness of political independence and economic association would generate feelings of exploitation of [sic] both sides of the new divide.... Quebec would [succeed] in creating in political reality that which until now has seldom existed outside her nightmares --a politically unified English Canada facing an isolated Quebec (Elton et al., 1978:5-6; see also Elton's speech to the conference, March 29, 1978).

Elton et al.'s study subsequently became a discussion paper at the CWF's Alternatives Conference held in Banff, Alberta on March 27-29, 1978.

Among the many funders of that conference was the Winspear Foundation, named after Francis Winspear, the disenchanted former Liberal. The conference attracted 300 delegates from across the country, including 50 from Quebec, and several high-profile speakers, including Flora MacDonald, the federal Tory's critic for federal-provincial relations, Alberta premier Peter Lougheed, and Saskatchewan premier Allan Blakeney. In the end, Elton et al.'s proposals were generally endorsed by the delegates. Noted Stan Roberts (1978:8), "[w]ith a clear consensus the delegates supported the concept of a strong central government."

The conference received wide public praise at the time for its moderate tone and success in bringing Canadians together. An editorial in the Financial Post of April 8, 1978 read: "Mighty good sounds out of the West." Richard Gwyn, writing for the

Montreal Star, wrote an article titled: "Western conference generates some fresh perceptions." And the Vancouver Province ran an article headed: "Banff was valuable first step." Other newspapers (the Edmonton Journal, Calgary Herald) were similarly positive in their reviews.

In short, the Foundation presented during its 1978 Banff conference as a moderate voice within the business community. There was no inference of regionalist or separatist leanings, nor was there a discernible anti-French sentiment. (Indeed, the bilingual Roberts had frequently suggested that, while he opposed Quebec separatism, the election of the Parti Quebecois had provided a service by forcing a much needed rewriting of the Constitution for the betterment of all Canada.)

In June, 1978, the federal government introduced Bill C-60, a bill to amend the Canadian Constitution (Roberts and Elton, 1978). In January, 1979, the Pepin -Robarts Report was revealed to the public. It called for a more decentralized and flexible federation (Canada, 1979). Trudeau immediately dismissed the report, however, suggesting that its recommendations would lead to disunity, fragmentation, and the eventual disintegration of the country. But if not Pepin-Robarts, what was the alternative?

As we have seen, Canada's political system was in particular crisis by 1980. Joe Clark had won and then lost election to a tired Liberal party, headed once more by Pierre Trudeau. Meanwhile, the governing Parti Quebecois had announced that a referendum on sovereignty would be held on May 20, 1980. It was widely believed that the "yes" side would win the vote.

In the midst of these events, Francis Winspear held a series of meetings at his Victoria home to discuss the current political situation. Present at these meetings were the late Dr. Douglas Ross, of Sidney, B.C., a " country physician and surgeon, ... a musician, an amateur astronomer, and a well-read philosopher" (Winspear, 1988:18), Trevor Davis, the former mayor of North Saanich, B.C., and Dr. Andrew Stewart, former president of the University of Alberta and retired economic consultant of the WCF.

Out of these meetings a paper was prepared dealing with the current political crisis. Winspear subsequently presented the paper to several members of the Foundation, including Ernest Manning and Stan Roberts. The key points of Winspear's paper were as follows:

> a. The Senate of Canada ... should be elected and have equal representation ....
> b. All provinces and peoples in Canada should be treated equally.
> c. We concurred on bilingualism and equality between the two founding races, but we could not agree with unilingualism in Quebec and bilingualism in the rest of Canada.
> d. Part of the checks and balances of the constitutional monarchist parliamentary form of government had been destroyed ....
> e. The national budget should be balanced and the debt reduced.
> f. Members of parliament should be in closer touch with their constituents (Winspear, 1988:185-86).

Ernest Manning listened, apparently unimpressed. Roberts, however, was much more interested. According to Winspear, Roberts' response to the paper was to call

> a series of study group meetings throughout the four western provinces, culminating in a massive meeting at the Banff School which was attended by many Quebec citizens and a goodly number from other eastern provinces. We felt that the conference did its bit to assure a favourable outcome of the plebiscite (Winspear, 1988:186).

Since neither Roberts nor the Canada West Foundation were strangers to setting up conferences, Winspear may be overstating his role in instigating the conference. Nonetheless, it is true that Winspear was an ardent financial supporter of both the previous Alternatives Conference in 1978 and again in 1980.

In any case, in December, 1980, after Trudeau's declaration that his government would unilaterally patriate the Constitution and shortly after MacEachen's budget announcing the NEP, the Canada West Foundation's Alternative's Conference took place again at Banff. The key-note address for the conference was made by the Foundation's chairman, Arthur Child. Standing before the conference delegates, many of whom were federal Liberals, Child declared, among other things, that the budget was a "non-budget" and "irresponsible," that central Canadians who had voted for the Liberal party had been rewarded with cheap oil, and that the federal government's discriminatory policies had reduced Canada to a "banana republic."

Child went on to state that the proposed Charter of Rights and Freedoms should not be entrenched in the Constitution as it favoured the principle of the Napoleonic code that citizens have no rights except those granted by the state. Equally, westerners were opposed to the entrenchment of language rights in the Constitution. Finally, Child stated that Westerners did not elect Liberals federally because the former believe that the Liberal party is Quebec-based and generally insensitive to western concerns (reviewed in AR, 1980i).

Child's blunt evaluation of Ottawa's, or at least the Liberal party's, treatment of the West had been increasingly shared by Stan Roberts. For several months leading up to the October federal budget, Roberts had travelled the country warning of separatism. Noted the Alberta Report of December 12, 1980, however: "... the warnings had become so strong and so eloquent, they were almost making separatism look attractive." Some of Roberts's friends and colleagues with the Foundation even began to refer to him as "the separatist."

Many supporters of the Foundation were put off, however, by Child's and Roberts's statements. Like the country, the Foundation appeared to be in danger of splitting up. Two days before Child's speech, Roberts announced he was resigning as president of the Foundation. David Elton replaced him and immediately promised to reestablish the Foundation's reputation for political neutrality. Child, meanwhile, returned to a lower profile (AR, 1980i). Nonetheless, the series of incidents reveals in stark fashion the way in which the actions of the federal Liberal party had radicalized a prominant voice of business in the West.

In summary, the political/business class in western Canada -- even some of its most moderate representatives -- had become increasingly radicalized during the 1970s and 1980s by the policies of the Trudeau Liberals. The decline of business and institutional support for the Liberal party, combined with increased regional, political, and ideological alienation from central Canadian political life, resulted over the next two years in a revival of right-wing extremism in the West.

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE RIGHT "FRINGE"

The days and weeks following the announcement of the NEP saw a resurgence of support for the right-wing "fringe" parties that had been born the previous election day. Advocating an independent western Canada defined by, among other things, one official language, the protection of property rights, the use of citizens' referendums, and free enterprise, Doug Christie's Western Canada Concept (WCC) attracted an estimated 2,500 people to a meeting held at Edmonton's Jubilee Auditorium on November 20, 1980 (AR, 1980j). In December, a similar WCC rally in Calgary drew over a thousand people.

By the end of that month, the party boasted 2,500 members (McKinsey, 1981:212), including a fifty-one year old Edmonton realtor, Allan R. Maygard, who became the party's first Alberta leader. Other followers included Gordon Kesler, a 34 -year old oil scout and rodeo rider; Hilton ("Wes") Westmore, a Calgary geologist who subsquently became president of the party (AR, 1985a:8); and James Garfield Peever (b. 1919) "a one time farm boy from Acme, northeast of Calgary and one-time assessment officer" (AR, 1982b:7). Both Westmore and Peever had belonged previously to another separatist organization, Rudolph's Independent Alberta Association (IAA). The idea of creating an independent, right-wing western state was suddenly becoming respectable.

During this same period, WCC's counterpart, West-Fed, was also on the rise, particularly in Alberta's rural areas. Unlike WCC, West-Fed did not advocate separation; nor did it consider itself a party, but rather a lobby group. Nonetheless, West-Fed's platform was virtually identical to that of the WCC, opposing bilingualism and metrification, while decrying what it viewed as the systematic degrading of traditional British values and symbols, and the replacement of free enterprise with socialism (AR, 1980c).

In early October, 1980, West-Fed attracted 400 people to a meeting in Red Deer. In November, a crowd of over 425 people in Airdrie heard University of Calgary economist Warren Blackman attack Trudeau's "centralist socialism" as incompatible with the West's "free enterprise zeal" (AR, 1980j:3). A similar West-Fed rally held at Henry Wise Wood High School in Calgary attracted nearly 1,500 people (AR, 1981e).

West-Fed's biggest coup, however, came the same month during a luncheon speech given in Calgary by prominent Calgary oilman, Carl Nickle. Nickle, a former Tory MP, told the assembled crowd of 800: "No matter what the federal government does now, I am a confirmed separatist" (AR, 1980k:4). During the following weeks, West-Fed twice obtained crowds of over 1,000 people in Calgary, and continued to receive support in the smaller communities. By December, West-Fed claimed an estimated membership of about 25,000.

Any suggestion that separatism had peaked was quashed in early February when 1,000 people showed up at Edmonton's Jubilee auditorium to hear Knutson, Blackman, and British-born Edmonton architect Peter Hemingway denounce the centralist and socialist policies of the Trudeau government. Notably, the meeting was also marred by several nasty verbal confrontations between the crowd and a few hecklers. One particularly nasty episode saw a Canadian of East Indian descent told by some in the crowd to "Go back to Pakistan" (AR, 1981f:6).

More separatist rallies occurred throughout the province, and elsewhere, in the weeks and months that followed. A WCC rally in Rimbey, 64 kilometers from Red Deer attracted 600 people to listen to a debate between Christie and former Liberal MP Jack Horner (AR, 1981g). Knutson, meanwhile, took his crusade to Manitoba where, on Feb. 26, he spoke to a crowd of 600 in Brandon. The meeting proved to be a public-relations disaster.

The following day, the CBC national news reported that Knutson's speech went beyond dealing with western alienation to instead attack federal immigration policies (which he said favoured "Wops and Chinks"), metrification, the human rights commission, and "francophone power" (AR, 1981h:4). By this time, internal dissent was brewing within West-Fed over Knutson's leadership. In early March, Knutson failed to appear at a fundraising dinner, apparently in response to the cancellation of "Jock" Andrew's appearance as guest speaker. The cancellation had been precipitated by recently elected West-Fed president, Calgarian Fred Noyes, after he read Andrew's Bilingualism Today, French Tomorrow (1977). A short while later, West-Fed's executive, including Noyes, resigned, as did the organization's communications director, Michael Byfield (AR, 1981h), son of Ted Byfield. The low-estate to which West-Fed had fallen was reinforced in early April when a meeting at Henry Wise Wood High School in Calgary, site of a major rally only months earlier, attracted only two dozen people (AR, 1981e).

There remained, however, many deep feelings of alienation in Alberta over the implementation of the NEP, as shown by a poll released by the Canada West Foundation in May, 1981. The poll showed that 15 percent of Albertans were in favour of a separate country. Even more revealing, however, was that 49 percent agreed with the statement that "Western Canadians get so few benefits from being part of Canada that they might as well go it on their own" (AR, 1981i:6).

West-Fed, however, was unable to mobilize this discontent. On May 21, the night after the Canada West Foundation report was released, only 200 people showed up at a West-Fed fund raising barbeque in Calgary. Guest-speakers at the barbeque were Andrew and former Conservative MP Stan Shumacher. Shumacher, who had recently joined West-Fed, urged people to support Peter Lougheed (AR, 1981i).

West-Fed was in decline. Under increased attack from his supporters, Knutson decided in March, 1982 to dissolve West-Fed, encouraging his followers to instead join WCC and pursue western independence (AR, 1982c). By this time, however, Knutson's admonition to his followers was largely redundant: perhaps as many as 80 percent of West-Fed members were simultaneously members of WCC (AR, 1986c:10).

As it happened, many of the same problems that dogged West-Fed were also beginning to beset WCC. A series of speeches by Christie to audiences in rural Alberta were condemned by supporters for their arrogant and dictatorial manner (AR, 1981j). In October 1981, Maygard and Westmore ousted Christie as leader, ultimately denying him a membership in the Alberta branch of WCC. They were joined on the party executive by Kesler and Howard Thompson. Thompson, a 61-year old Innisfail grain farmer and brother of former national Social Credit leader, Robert Thompson, promptly reorganized the party and turned its policies away from separatism towards proposals for constitutional reform (AR, 1986d).

Under the leadership of Maygard, Westmore, Kesler, and Thompson, WCC became better organized while stepping up its attack on the NEP. Alberta was then entering a

recession which the WCC and other right-wing elements blamed upon the hated policy. As evidence, they pointed to the number of drilling rigs that had fled the province since the program's inception. On October 30, 1979, 306 rigs were drilling in Alberta. On October 21, 1980, just before the budget announcement and still at the time of the oil -pricing boom, 372 rigs were operating in the province (Oilweek, 1980b:1). A year later, October 27, 1981, only 233 rigs were drilling (Oilweek, 1981:1). Most of these rigs fled to the United States or were shut down indefinitely.

Lougheed and Trudeau had signed a pricing agreement in September, 1981, a month before Maygard and company took over WCC. The Liberals reduced their export tax to zero in return for Lougheed agreeing to a two-price system on new and existing oil that, in any case, provided the province with an immensely better deal than that previously offered by Clark's Tories (see Laxer, 1983:147-151). A camerman captured the moment: Lougheed and Trudeau toasting, with champagne, the long-awaited agreement (AR, 1981k).

Unfortunately, for both Alberta and the federal Liberals, the agreement had come too late. The members of the OPEC cartel were already cheating on each other, undercutting the world oil price (Laxer, 1983). Moreover, in the face of high energy costs, the economies of the western industrialized world (and much of the Third World) had been strangled, resulting in a major recession and a drop in the demand for oil. Finally, the price of oil also fueled the renewed efforts of various countries to change to alternative energy sources. All of these factors led to the price of oil dropping to $15 per barrel. Alberta's day in the sun suffered an eclipse.

In the weeks and months following the Ottawa-Alberta oil pricing agreement, and in the midst of a mounting recession, WCC shifted its criticisms away from federal politics to Peter Lougheed's handling of the Alberta economy. Many in the oilpatch viewed the provincial Conservatives as having sold them out. The photograph of a smiling Lougheed toasting champagne with Trudeau after signing the oil pricing agreement now came back to haunt the Conservative leader -- WCC reported that it was attracting its largest crowds in those rural areas of Alberta hardest hit by layoffs resulting from the drop in oilfield work (AR, 1982d). There were also increasing complaints that Lougheed's government was preaching, but not practising, free-enterprise (see Nikiforuk et al., 1987).

To this point, the right-wing fringe had been denied the possibility of expressing itself in an election. In June, 1981, however, Social Credit MLA Bob Clark, former leader of the provincial party, announced that he would be resigning his seat in Olds -Didsbury later in the year. Two days after this announcement, WCC became registered as a political party in the province, thereby making it eligible to contest the expected by -election.

When the by-election finally occurred in February, 1982, Kesler won resoundingly, receiving 4,015 votes compared with the Social Credit candidate Lloyd Quantz who took 2,669 votes and the Tory candidate Stephen Stiles who took 2,346 votes. By-elections are, of course, notorious as opportunities for people to vent anger at ruling parties. Popular opinion in the case of Olds-Didsbury attributed Kesler's victory to "simmering western rage over the NEP and the September 1981 Alberta-Ottawa energy agreement" (AR, 1985a:8). The party claimed (unconfirmed) 12,000 members (AR, 1986d:12) that year, most of them in Alberta. WCC, and the western right-wing in general, appeared to be on the move.

In April, the party's executive issued a Statement of Independence outlining the party's intentions should it win a forthcoming provincial election. The party intended, said the Statement, to "prepare for independence in a peaceful and democratic manner" and to otherwise pursue policies of unilingualism, fixed electoral terms, the protection of property rights, the right of referendum, a simplified tax system, the rescinding of the NEP, and the elimination of marketing boards. Elsewhere, in British Columbia, WCC appeared to be gaining strength as indicated by a rally in Abbotsford which attracted 1,700 people (AR, 1982e).

In April, however, rumours emerged of dissension between Kesler and Maygard. A while later, Maygard was thrown out as president. Maygard and Westmore left the party, charging that WCC had been taken over by Mormons, led by Kesler (AR, 1982f), and that Kesler and Howard Thompson were not committed separatists.

The party was soon rift with other petty scandals. A leadership convention in August, 1982 revealed further splits within the party. When the provincial election was held on November 2nd, WCC was not prepared for the challenge. Lougheed's Tories won 75 seats with 62.28 percent of the votes cast, while Kesler (and all the other WCC candidates) lost. Nonetheless, WCC received 111,131 votes, or 11.8 percent of the total vote, indicating a solid base of support for the party's policies (results provided in the Chief Electoral Officer of Alberta, 1989).

Both Kesler and Howard Thompson resigned from the party shortly after the election. Kesler was replaced as leader by a committed separatist, Jack Ramsay, a former RCMP officer, while Dr. Fred Marshall, an Edmonton urologist, became president. The right-wing separatist (or semi-separatist) western parties, however, were in decline. Though many of the parties' members would remain on the political scene, the right-wing fringe parties had virtually disappeared by 1983.

One significant exception to this pattern of decline occurred in Manitoba in 1984. Manitoba has a long history of language disputes, dating back to the late part of the last century. The Manitoba Act of 1870 had ensured the rights of French-speaking Roman Catholics in that province. In 1890, however, the provincial Liberal party, encouraged by the English-speaking majority, passed legislation making English the only official language. The resultant political conflict destroyed Macdonald's federal Conservative party, while strengthening Laurier's Liberal party that deferred to provincial jurisdiction in the matter. The dispute between the English-speaking majority and the French-speaking minority continued to fester over the years, even as the percentage of francophones in the province declined (Lower, 1983).

In 1979, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that Manitoba's legislation denying bilingualism was unconstitutional. The practical result of this ruling was that Manitoba was faced with translating into French all laws passed since 1890 (Lower, 1983). The Tory government of the day, under Sterling Lyon, backed by older, wealthy, and rural elements who tended to be opposed to bilingualism, was reluctant to act on the Supreme Court's decision.

Upon its election in 1983, however, Howard Pawley's NDP decided to meet the Court's stipulations. During 1984-85, the government pressed forward with legislation to extend French language services in the province, despite wide opposition led by the Tories under their new leader, Gary Filmon. Much to the displeasure of Tory leader Brian Mulroney, who denounced opposition to the extension of rights as based in prejudice, Filmon fought vehemently against the legislation. The debate was extremely

divisive and frequently racist. When the Tories shut down the legislature by ringing the bell to order, then not attending session, the NDP was trapped. Reluctant to force passage of the legislation, the NDP withdrew it altogether.

The debate was still ongoing, however, when the federal election was held in 1984. In August of that year, Elmer Knutson had finally bowed to pressures from former WCC and West-Fed members in founding and registering a new political party, the Confederation of Regions party (CoR). In the election which followed, the CoR party was able to parlay anti-French sentiment into 34,384 votes (6.7 percent of all votes cast) in the province of Manitoba, most of this vote occurring in the southwestern, rural part of the province.

Among CoR's more esteemed converts was an aging Douglas Campbell, the last Liberal premier of Manitoba (1948-58) (AR, 1987b). Another notable CoR supporter was Fred Debrecen. During the 1986 provincial election, Debrecen founded a Winnipeg -based group called One Nation, One Language Inc. (ONOLI), a kind of Manitoba equivalent to APEC, which circulated petitions calling for a unilingual (English) Canada. The organization eventually folded amidst internal bickering "over who had the key to the organization's mail box" (Smith, 1987-88:4; see also AR, 1986e).

A second exception to the general demise of the fringe parties occurred in the February, 1985, Spirit River-Fairview provincial by-election in Alberta. The by -election was called following the untimely death of NDP MLA and leader Grant Notley. The NDP candidate subsequently won the by-election, taking 2,511 votes, but four right -wing fringe parties contesting the election (WCC, CoR, Social Credit, and the Heritage Party) together received 2,146 votes.(2)

As a consequence of these election results, Dr. Marshall, president of WCC met the next day with interim Social Credit leader, Martin Hattersley, to discuss a political merger (AR, 1985a). (During this same period, the need for a right-wing coalition was also stated by Heritage Party spokesperson, Michael Pawlus [AR, 1985b].) In October, Marshall announced that an amalgamation had occurred and that henceforth WCC and Alberta Social Credit would be called the Alberta Political Alliance (AR, 1985a). The new party, said leader Jack Ramsay, would abandon separatism in favour of fighting for a Triple E (equal, elected, and effective) Senate, honesty in government, and free enterprise (AR, 1985c). In January, 1986, Howard Thompson, now interim vice -president of the APA formally registered the party, stating that it would "pull the splinter parties together" (AR, 1986d:12).

It didn't. Indeed, the subsequent 1986 Alberta provincial election witnessed a plethora of right-wing parties contesting the 81 seats, including WCC, the APA, CoR, the Heritage Party of Alberta, and the Representative Party of Alberta.(3)

In October, 1986, in the midst of Alberta's recession, and following WCC's poor showing in the provincial election of that year, Jack Ramsay announced that the party would return to its separatist platform. It was too late. By then, support for WCC had dwindled to between "700 and 1,000" members. Said former executive Thompson, "The WCC had great potential, but personalities got in the way" (AR, 1986d:12).

The right-wing fringe parties would continue through several manifestations in the years to come, gradually moving eastward in the process. It is useful at this point, however, to summarize some features of their membership and otherwise to discuss some of the principle reasons why they failed to reap the full rewards of the discontent evident in western Canada during the early 1980s.

From all available evidence, the leadership and general membership of WCC/West Fed/CoR consisted almost exclusively of older, English-speaking, males of northern European, often Anglo-Saxon, descent. With the exception of Calgary, rural membership in these parties was generally higher than urban membership, with particular clusters found in the south-central regions (the "Bible Belt") and Grande Prairie-Peace River district of Alberta, and southwestern Manitoba. In keeping with this finding, the primary occupations of these parties' supporters were farmers, retired people, and independent businessmen, the latter particularly engaged in primary or support services to the oil industry.

The failure of these parties to expand beyond the fringe can be attributed to several factors, many of which were internal to their organizations. The leadership of Christie, Knutson, and others was often erratic, their parties' platforms almost uniformly negative, ill thought out, and sparse. The result was a failure by the parties' leadership to enunciate a credible alternative vision to the discontented western masses. Even when they were able to tap into the "system of narration" (Laycock, 1990) underlying westerner's grievances, Christie's and Knutson's paranoid extremism and rampant racism soon ripped apart their thin connection to their audience.

These internal problems had serious implications upon the amount of tangible support the fringe parties received. While many business leaders were sympathetic to at least some of Knutson's and Christie's ideas and sentiments, most were loath to attach themselves to parties that seemed doomed, from the start, to obscurity. The right-wing fringe parties were thus generally starved of the respect, resources (i.e., money and labour), and prestige that outright support from the business community might have brought them.

Even had the fringe parties received this support, however, the time may not have been propitious for their success. Neither the West, nor any province within it, constitutes a perfectly homogeneous political entity. In the early 1980s, the West was neither a political wasteland for moderate left-wing views, nor a sacrosanct precinct for the kind of extreme right-wing orthodoxy preached by the fringe element. Proof of this can be found in both the percentages of votes received by the Liberal and NDP parties in the West during the 1980s, and the results of polls that showed significant western support for such Liberal policies as the new Constitution, bilingualism, and the NEP (see AR, 1981l; Laxer, 1983). Hence, there was (and remains) a natural, though not impermeable, limit to the growth of any party in the region. The right-wing fringe parties' internal problems and lack of business support simply meant that they fell short even of this limit, and did so more quickly than might otherwise have been the case.

Finally, the rise of the right-wing fringe parties was also stemmed by the fact that an acceptable political alternative -- the federal Tories -- was available and waiting in the wings. For many right-wing elements in the region, it seemed absurd to splinter their electoral strength just when victory seemed at hand.

Nonetheless, the right-wing fringe parties were a genuine, albeit extreme, reflection of political and ideological changes occurring in the West during the early 1980s. To the extent that extremism is succinct and clear, these parties provide a useful analytical prelude to the later rise of the Reform Party.

CONCLUSION

The rise of populist parties and movements is presaged by a series of political, economic, and ideological crises that delegitimize the dominant hegemony and the existing political parties. By the late 1970s, a series of economic and political crises had resulted in the West, as a whole, and its two wealthiest provinces, Alberta and British Columbia, in particular, becoming estranged from the federal Liberal party. While the resultant political "gap" was filled to some extent by the left-wing NDP, the major beneficiaries of the Liberal collapse in the West was the federal Progressive Conservative party and the various provincial governments which increasingly became seen by their constituents as the "true" protectors of their interests.

The sense of separateness felt by many in the West was reinforced in the late 1970s by the world-historical rise of neo-conservatism, notably in the United States. Neo-conservatism in that country found particular resonance with the traditional political cultures of Alberta and British Columbia. This resonance, in turn, revitalized potential ideological and political alliances within these provinces in opposition to the form of liberalism espoused by the federal state and Trudeau's Liberal party.

The 1979 and 1980 elections revealed in a particularly striking fashion Canada's regional and ideological cleavages and reinforced political alienation throughout the West, particularly in Alberta. Many people felt excluded from representation within the central government. The constitutional process of 1980-82 and the implementation of the NEP solidified an alliance of right-wing ideology and regional alienation, resulting in the rise of several right-wing fringe parties. Despite the fact that these parties failed to thrive, they nonetheless reflected genuine political discontent among many people in the West.

The recession continued throughout 1981-82. The bitterness left by it, and by the hated NEP, remained within Albertans long after the oil rigs had begun drilling again. Ironically, the Liberals, a party with no real stomach for fighting either the Americans or the corporate sector, quickly retreated from its minimalist nationalist goals. In the end, any hopes that the NEP and its associated policies might develop into a wider industrial strategy had disappeared by 1981 (see Laxer, 1983; Clarkson, 1985; also McQuaig, 1991; and Chodos et al., 1991).

By 1984, a substantial number of westerners, from all areas of the political spectrum, were ready for a change. They were tired of the seemingly endless political wrangling of the last few years and the scandals and patronage of the Trudeau Liberals. They were increasingly concerned about the economic situation. Many felt alienated from the political process. Brian Mulroney's Tories -- Canada's "natural government -in-waiting" for much of the century -- seemed to offer a positive alternative. Somewhat cautiously, somewhat skeptically, right-wing adherents in the West licked their chops, believing that, perhaps at last, their time had come.

CHAPTER THREE

THE RISE OF THE REFORM PARTY

"What we need is a credible western party" (Ted Byfield, AR, 1986f:52).

INTRODUCTION

Neither an organic crisis nor the resultant delegitimation of the dominant hegemony and/or the existing political parties is sufficient to result in a populist party. New populist parties do not arise as long as there exists a legitimate political contender capable of reincorporating the elements "freed" by the crisis. This inherent conservatism, combined with the possible resolution of the precipitating organic crisis, thus renders the rise of populist parties an uncommon occurrence. Occasionally, however, the organic crisis continues unabated while the succession of political contenders either fail in their task of reincorporation or succeed in exacerbating the crisis of legitimation. Then emerges the possibility for a new political party, espousing the interests of the alienated social elements.

In 1984, Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservatives received one of the largest electoral mandates ever obtained in Canada in decisively putting to an end over twenty-years of Liberal dominance. Among those voting for the Tories -- for the first time -- was the estranged Liberal, Francis Winspear. "I believed the representations of the Conservatives that they would be receptive and prepared to ameliorate the grievances of the West; so I voted Conservative for the first time in my life" (Winspear, 1988:187). By the spring of 1987, however, a frustrated Winspear sat in his Ardmore Drive home in Victoria, feeling once more betrayed:

> Once again, I found that the West had been sold down the river. Admittedly, the controls on petroleum and natural gas have been removed, but in the meantime world prices had declined, so this was not much help. The Meech Lake Agreement was most distasteful. Why should the Quebec French be recognized as a special group (sic). A Canadian is a Canadian (Winspear, 1988:188).

In Vancouver, a few weeks later, Winspear, along with Stan Roberts, Preston Manning, and Ted Byfield, took the first step in creating an alternative right-wing party.

This chapter examines, by way of example, the problems facing a "successor" party during a period of organic crises and hegemonic shifts. In particular, I examine the Tories' winning electoral coalition in 1984; the events that subsequently began the disintegration of this coalition; and the people, events, and organizational processes that led, in 1987, to the formation of the Reform Party of Canada, and its astonishing success in the "Free Trade" election of 1988.

THE TORIES' WINNING COALITION OF 1984

The Tories won the election of 1984 in a manner rarely achieved by any party in a liberal democracy. The party received 6,278,697 votes (50.03 percent) in taking 211

of 282 seats. By contrast, the Liberals received 3,516,486 votes (28.02 percent) and the NDP 2,359,915 votes (18.81 percent). In the West, a traditionally strong region of Tory support, Mulroney's party took 58 of 77 seats (CEOC, 1984a). Astonishingly, the man who led the Tories to their massive victory had first won political office only the year previous -- in a Nova Scotian by-election.

Brian Mulroney was born in Baie Comeau, Quebec, in 1939, the son of an electrician. He later attended St. Francis Xavier University where he received a B.A. in political science. He later briefly attended Dalhousie and, then, Laval, where he gained a law degree.

His university career was generally uneventful. Nonetheless, Mulroney soon began to make the contacts that would later forge his political career. Mulroney became increasingly active in the Quebec political scene during the early 1960s, reportedly campaigning to dump John Diefenbaker as leader of the Progressive Conservatives in the late 1960s. In the years following Robert Stanfield's succession (in 1967) to the leadership, Mulroney continued to strengthen his position within the small Quebec Tory establishment.

His political prominence was raised during 1974-75 as one of three commissioners on Quebec's Cliche Commission enquiry into violence and corruption in the province's construction industry. This enlarged public profile, coupled with his political contacts within the Quebec political establishment, led Mulroney in 1976 to try for the leadership of the federal Progressive Conservative party. The leadership contest was brutal as Quebec delegates divided their support between native sons Mulroney and Claude Wagner (see Hoy, 1987; Clarkson and McCall, 1990). Many delegates were concerned by Mulroney's ties to big business (Hoy, 1987) and his lack of real political experience. In the end, another political unknown, Joe Clark, was elected leader.

Mulroney was apparently devastated by the defeat (Hoy, 1987; Sawatsky, 1991). The Iron Ore Company of Canada, however, a branch plant for an American conglomerate based in Cleveland, hired Mulroney as president. He would subsequently oversee the closing down of the company's Shefferville operations. During this time, however, Mulroney was never far from the political scene.

After the Tory's 1980 election defeat, he began to work behind the scenes to undermine Joe Clark's leadership. When Clark narrowly failed to receive two-thirds membership support at the 1981 Tory general meeting, the door opened for a leadership convention. At that convention in 1983, Mulroney defeated a host of candidates, including the colourful right-wing businessman, Peter Pocklington, and Clark. Slightly more than a year later, Mulroney was prime minister.

Although the Tories drew widespread support throughout Canada in 1984, their victory was secured by the support they received from Quebec nationalists, big business, and conservative elements in Ontario and the West, particularly Alberta. Support from the first two elements of this troika flowed from Mulroney being both a Quebecer, with strong connections to that province's nationalist elite, and a businessperson with equally strong connections to Canada's corporate elite (see Hoy, 1987; Sawatsky, 1991). Support for the Tories in the West redounded, meanwhile, to long-entrenched ideological pre-dispositions combined with a certain political habituation dating to the Diefenbaker sweep of 1958.

Hence, the election of 1984 saw the Tories take 58 of Quebec's 75 seats. In order

to fully understand the magnitude of this result, consider the following: In 1980, the Liberals had taken 74 of 75 seats! The 1984 results were even more astonishing if one considers that the Tory machine in the province was almost non-existent. The party's organizational deficiencies, and some of the political problems flowing from them, are stated by Lysiane Gagnon, a Quebec columnist:

> Politics is about power, and powerless parties ... do not attract powerful figures. Up until the unexpected victory of September, 1984, the so-called Quebec Conservative Party was an empty shell ... with little credibility and few prominent public figures.... The first batch of Tory MPs was made apart from a handful of very good cabinet material, of inexperienced or under qualified politicians.... At the bottom of the barrel were a few unsavory characters (Globe & Mail [hereafter, "G&M"], 1991a:D3).

In short, the Conservative party in Quebec was relatively inexperienced as the 1984 election began.

Yet, despite the party's inadaquacies, the Tories achieved success in Quebec in 1984. The reasons for this success in a province historically hostile to the party can be attributed to Mulroney's personal appeal to Quebecers in general and to Quebec nationalists in particular.

Still bitter over their referendum defeat in 1980 and the subsequent Constitution of 1982, Quebec nationalists saw in Mulroney an ally who would promote a greater decentralization of federal powers and the strengthening of the Quebec state. Many supporters of Parti Quebecois leader and premier Rene Levesque worked actively for Mulroney's Tories. Moreover, many of the Tory candidates in 1984 had actively worked for the "yes" side in the 1980 referendum. Mulroney even received support from the luke-warm federalist Liberal leader, Robert Bourassa, who believed that his provincialist ambitions would be better met by Mulroney than John Turner (Goar, 1984).

Mulroney's Tories also received massive support from business. From his earliest university days to his time as president of the Iron Ore Company, Mulroney had cultivated contacts in the business community. These contacts allowed Mulroney to spend over $500,000 on his aborted drive for the leadership in 1976 (Hoy, 1987:45), far more than that spent by the other contenders. Much of the money for Mulroney's campaign came from large businesses, such as Power Corporation. Mulroney received similar support in finally gaining the Tory leadership in 1983. Then came the 1984 federal election.

As discussed in chapter two, big business had gradually begun to withdraw its support for the Liberal party following Trudeau's ascent to power in 1968. This support continued to decline throughout the 1970s and culminated in severe criticism of the Liberal party policies, particularly in the West, during the recession of the early 1980s. By 1984, big business almost wholly supported the Tories.

That year, contributions to the Progressive Conservative party from the business and commerical sector totalled $11 million. By contrast, the Liberal party received just over $5 million and the NDP $51 thousand from the private corporate sector. (The NDP's shortfall in corporate donations was partially made up by just over $2million received from labour [all figures from the CEOC, 1984b].)

The Progressive Conservatives indirectly received additional corporate support in 1984. In July of that year, an Alberta court upheld an application by the right-wing National Citizens Coalition against the federal government's Bill C-169 which prevented political lobbyists from political advertising during elections.(1) The NCC immediately used the court decision to intervene massively in the 1984 election, spending $700,000 fighting the Liberals, in particular the NEP (EJ, 1991b), and $100,000 denouncing the NDP (Lee, 1989).

The third major element of the Tories' winning coalition included both fiscal and moral conservatives. Bercuson et al. (1986:5) specifically have described this group as "anti-abortion, anti-metric, pro capital punishment, pro balanced budgets, pro defence spending, and anti-universality in social programs...." They were -- and are -- also fiercely opposed to official bilingualism. In Ontario, petite bourgeoise supporters, the organizational efficiency of premier William Davis's "Big Blue Machine," and big business support resulted in the federal Tories taking 67 of 95 seats. Meanwhile, in the West, where the right-wing had faithfully supported the Tories since the Diefenbaker sweep of 1958, the party also took all twenty-one seats in Alberta and nineteen of 28 in British Columbia.

Altogether, Mulroney's Tories were able to reconstitute in Tory terms the Liberal alliance first created by Laurier, between French and English Canada (including the West) and later refurbished by Mackenzie King (via C. D. Howe) through an alliance with big business (see Miller, 1984; Goar, 1984). A measure of the Tories alliance with big business has been given previously. Regarding the former, however, it is worth noting that 53 percent and 48 percent of those of British and French origin, respectively, supported the Tories. By contrast, the Tories were supported by only 36 percent of voters from other ethnic groups (all figures from CIPO press release, September 17, 1984, reported in Adams, 1991:3).

Perhaps because the Tories had reconstituted the traditional Liberal alliance, few Canadians expected that politics or policies in Canada would substantially change. Indeed, in both his book, Where I Stand (1983), and subsequent speeches before and during the election, Mulroney had promised, if anything, a more progressive, workable form of Liberal-style government.

No more would partisanship mar the political landscape. Gone would be federal-provincial conflict, replaced instead by mutual respect and cooperation. The same would be true of labour-management relations. The new Tory Canada, he stated, would be more prosperous. A Tory government would create hundreds of thousands of new jobs during its first year in office. A Tory Canada would also see increased fairness in the treatment of visible minorities and women. Above all, it would be more politically responsive.

At the same time, Mulroney also promised to retain those features that distinguished Canada from the United States. For example, social programs would be protected by any Conservative government; they were "a sacred trust" (Bercuson et al., 1986). As for free trade with the United States, long a pursuit of certain elements of big business and the Tory's constituency in the West, Mulroney's answer was even more blunt. "This country could not survive with a policy of unfettered free trade.... It affects Canadian sovereignty and we will have none of it, not during the leadership campaign or at any other time" (Mulroney, 1983).

Examining these policy statements and the results of the election, most political observers believed that, despite their margin of victory, the Tories had not won a

mandate for radical change. The Toronto Star, a liberal newspaper, commented: "What we have witnessed is not so much a change in the basic political thinking of Canadians as a change in the political positioning of our parties" (Toronto Star, 1984:A24). Journalist Robert Miller (1984:11) similarly stated: "... the Mulroney majority does not reflect a fundamental shift to the right by Canadians. Instead, it is in the tradition of Laurier's Liberal alliance ...."

Although many in the Tory leadership agreed, albeit reluctantly, with these assessments, the core elements of Tory support -- Quebec nationalists, big business, liberal free traders, and traditional conservatives -- were determined that radical changes should occur in Canada's economic, political, and ideological structures. The often conflicting expectations of these elements, combined with the predictable problems of any government newly elected to power, soon resulted in an unravelling of support for the Tory government.

THE BEGINNINGS OF DISILLUSIONMENT

The Tories came into office carrying enormous expectations and political debts. This baggage alone might well have spelled trouble for the party. Added to this, however, was the low public esteem to which the party, and Mulroney in particular, soon fell as the result of a series of patronage scandals.

Patronage was already a politically loaded issue when the Tories came to office in 1984. Indeed, throughout 1983, they had made much of Liberal patronage. The issue was magnified during Trudeau's last month in office when he named friends and associates to 225 posts. Public anger grew when, shortly after taking over as Liberal leader and prime minister, John Turner appointed eighteen more Liberals to various posts under a secret agreement previously made with Trudeau (Hoy, 1987). The public's outrage was only equalled by the Tory's glee at having been given yet another political whip with which to flay the Liberals.

Indeed, the most memorable moment of the ensuing election came during a televised election debate when Mulroney, his finger pointing accusedly at Turner, challenged the then prime minister to apologize for having made the appointments. Turner offered a lame excuse: "I had no option." Mulroney countered: "You had an option, sir." The incident was the telling moment in the election and effectively ended any hopes that Turner had of winning (recounted in Hoy, 1987; see also Bercuson et al., 1986).

Mulroney was thus well aware of the public's attitude towards patronage. He even made promises to clean up the system of government appointments. But Mulroney was also aware that one of the frequent criticisms made by Tories of Joe Clark's brief tenure in 1979 was that he had failed to bestow sufficient patronage "goodies" upon party loyalists (Simpson, 1980). Given the "option," Mulroney decided after the election to carry on business as usual.

Within three weeks in late January, 1985, the Tories made 71 patronage appointments. In March, the Tories fired the entire Air Canada board and replaced it with loyal members of the party. Similar treatment was soon accorded to the boards of Via Rail, Petro-Canada, Canadian National, and Ports Canada (Hoy, 1987; also Bercuson et al., 1986; Lee, 1989).

Favours, and rumours of favours, for friends did not end, however, with public appointments. Soon there were stories of friends and relatives of Tory cabinet ministers

being given untendered contracts to do government work.

The effect of this apparent orgy of patronage and indiscriminate spending upon the Canadian public cannot be underestimated. Many Canadians, among them previously loyal Liberals, had voted for the Tories believing that morality, ethics, and fiscal responsibility would be returned to political life. Instead they were treated within months of the Tory's taking office by what many viewed as a continuation of the same cynicism, arrogance, and waste previously displayed by the Liberals.

About this same time, the government was also beset by a series of cabinet resignations. Between 1985 and 1987, fisheries minister John Fraser, defence minister Robert Coates, environment (later junior transport) minister Suzanne Blais-Grenier, Roch LaSalle, Andre Bissonnette, Marcel Masse, Michel Cote, Sinclair Stevens, and Michel Gravel all resigned from cabinet or parliament for reasons ranging from poor judgement to criminal action (Bercuson et al., 1986; Hoy, 1987; Lee, 1989).

For much of the Canadian public, these scandals confirmed a growing sense of Tory incompetence and dishonesty. Moreover, the fact that so many of the allegations and resignations involved ministers from Quebec confirmed an unconscious -- and often conscious -- perception held by many in English Canada that Quebec politicians were a particularly venal and untrustworthy bunch (see Sharpe and Braid, 1992:158 re: Preston Manning's view of Quebec politics). Finally, the manner in which the allegations were handled by Mulroney did little to inspire public confidence. Rather than admit folly or wrongdoing, Mulroney repeatedly went on the offensive in defending his ministers, even in the face of incontrovertable evidence of ministerial wrong-doing. The result was increased hostility and partisanship in the House of Commons. The public was not amused.

The public also became increasingly concerned about the Tories' handling of the economy. Shortly after taking office, the Tories produced a paper, A New Direction for Canada: An Agenda for Economic Renewal. McQuaig (1991) notes that the paper was almost identical to one written by the Business Council of National Issues only weeks before. Both papers raised public debate over Canada's burgeoning gross national debt, which, when the Tories took office in 1984, was over $181 billion. More importantly, government figures showed that the gross national debt now constituted 52.3 percent of Canada's annual gross domestic product (Statistics Canada, 1991). Clearly, something had to be done about the deficit. But what? Over the next few years, the Tories proposed solutions -- cutting and/or reducing government programs, shifting taxes from corporations to individuals, replacing the Manufacturer's Sales Tax (MST) with a Goods and Services Tax (GST) -- would erode public support for the government. The increasing fiscal crisis of the Canadian state, brought about by declining revenues and increasing social expenditures, also would exacerbate federal-provincial conflicts, creating additional problems for the Tories' nascent political coalition.

With some accuracy, the potential effect of the fiscal crisis upon the Tory government was predicted, only days after the 1984 election, by Quebec P.Q. cabinet minister Gerald Godin:

> [T]he Liberals ... tried to buy Quebeckers with cheap energy from Alberta. One way or another, those chickens will come home to roost.... , the alienation of Western Canada, the Maritimes and Quebec are all [represented] together in the same caucus, along with the unfulfilled expectations that were

built up over the Trudeau years. And the Ottawa coffers are bare (G &M, 1984:A5).

In 1985, however, "profitable federalism" still remained a tactic available to the Tories (EJ, 1990a). Despite preaching fiscal austerity, the Tories continued the Liberal practice of dispensing financial largesse to those regions and areas that had voted for them, in particular, the politically important province of Quebec.

For years Mulroney had worked at bringing Quebec into the Tory fold, viewing that province as the key to any Tory victory (Hoy, 1987). After the election of 1984, he set about proving to Quebecers that the Tories were as able to dispense public largesse to their region as were the Liberals. By the summer of 1985, millions of dollars were pouring directly from Ottawa into Quebec. A report from the Department of Regional Expansion (DRIE) showed that between the time the Tories took power and March, 1985, Alberta had received $16 million in DRIE money, Saskatchewan $18 million, Manitoba $30 million, and British Columbia $47 million (total=$111 million). By comparison, the same period saw Quebec, with less population than the western region, receive $430 million (AR, 1986g), much of this (almost $195 million) going to pay for roads, ports, airports, and a new federal prison (that both federal officials and prisoner's families opposed) in Mulroney's own riding of Manitouwagan (see Bercuson et al., 1986; Hoy, 1987; Lee, 1989). The flow of capital into Quebec was further indirectly influenced by federal policies as occurred, for example, in 1985, when Hyundai, the Korean automaker, decided to situate a $300 million plant in Quebec over the bids of three other provinces due to federal decisions regarding subsidies and duty remissions (Bercuson et al., 1986).

Not all federal spending, however, carries equal political weight. Hence, despite previous Mulroney's declarations that universality was "a sacred trust not to be tampered with" and that he would "preserve social programmes," the Tories began attacking social programs almost immediately after the election. When Michael Wilson's first budget, however, threatened to de-index old age pensions, Mulroney was accosted outside the House of Commons by a sixty-three year old woman, Solange Denis, who shouted at him "You lied to us!" (Gray, 1991:11; also Bercuson et al., 1986; Lee, 1989). The scene, captured by national television, embarrassed the government and it backed down. The retreat would be only temporary.

The financial cuts and other changes in Canada's infrastructure did not end, however, with social programs. Over the next few years, the Tories would privatize Air Canada, cut the CBC's budget, and effectively eliminate train travel throughout Canada. Despite continuing widespread public support for Petro-Canada, they would also move to privatize that company. The economic, political, and emotional ties that many viewed as binding Canada -- and Canadians -- together would be severed in the name of cost-cutting and competitiveness.

The attack on government programs was supplemented by changes in tax laws similarly designed to increase the capital accumulation function of corporations and the wealthy. Ignoring his own promises to make the tax system fairer and to shift "more of the tax burden from individuals to corporations," finance minister Michael Wilson enacted multiple tax breaks for both corporations and the individually rich. Benefits for the latter included increases in the purchasable amount of RSPs, an allowance of indefinite deferment on inheritance taxes, and elimination of capital gains taxes below a

set ceiling (Statistics Canada data given analysis in EJ, 1991c; see also McQuaig, 1991; Gray, 1991).

There were, of course, public protests against these Tory policies by labour unions, cultural interests, and womens groups. At the directly political level, the Liberals and NDP also attempted to wage attacks against the Tory agenda. For much of the period between the 1984 and 1988 elections, however, the Liberals were in disarray. Unaccustomed to being in opposition, facing a government that in many ways was only a slightly more right-wing version of itself, and saddled with a leader who was neither liberal by inclination nor accepted by many of the party's supporters and MPs, Liberal attacks on the Tory government often dissipated in unfocused, partisan carping and hopes that the Tories would self-destruct.

The NDP was in better shape. It had survived the 1984 election with its core support in tact. Its leader, Ed Broadbent, continued to be widely liked and respected by an electorate that viewed the party as credible and honest, particularly on social issues.

The public remained skeptical, however, of the NDP's economic policies, a critical failing at a time when the federal deficit was gaining salience as a political concern and when neo-conservative solutions to the problems of the welfare state were gaining support. Moreover, the NDP had never been in power federally; indeed, in 1985 it had governed in only three provinces (BC, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan). In short, the NDP had not yet entered widespread public consciousness as a "real" contender.

In the end, external political opposition to the Tories was largely sporadic and ineffectual. More serious to the party were attacks from within. Some of the party's supporters, including several long-time MPs, became increasingly disturbed and embarrassed by the seemingly endless scandals and resignations. Others, while praising the party's economic policies on taxation and investment, believed that the Tories were not going far enough, fast enough, to the right in attacking the deficit or reversing liberal policies on such issues as abortion and capital punishment (see both AR, 1986h; and AR, 1986i). Some Tory supporters in English Canada, particularly the West, denounced the continuance of federal monies pouring into Quebec. Yet others worried that the public's dislike of Mulroney, combined with the government's generally perceived incompetence, was opening the door for the Liberals or -- worse! -- the NDP. All in all, a growing sense of disillusionment began to sweep through many Tory supporters. Typical of those feeling disillusioned was a bright, young economist, Stephen Harper.

Harper, who would later become chief policy officer for the Reform Party, was born (1958) and raised in Toronto. During the late 1970s he had moved to Alberta to work in the oil industry. His formative experiences there coincided with the recession of the early 1980s and the implementation of the NEP, events which increased Harper's conservative leanings (Harper, 1991).

In 1981, while still working for Imperial Oil, Harper enrolled at the University of Calgary where, in 1985, he completed a Bachelor's degree in economics. By this time, Joe Clark had been defeated as Conservative leader by Brian Mulroney. Harper hated Joe Clark, a man whom Harper had believed, during the 1980 election, would merely appease the Quebec separatists. Hence, the change to Mulroney was applauded by Harper who subsequently took a job working in Calgary Tory MP Jim Hawkes's Ottawa office (Harper, 1991).

In short order, however, Harper came to view the Tories as unable to make the

tough economic decisions that he felt were necessary to deal with the federal deficit. Moreover, he was shocked by what he viewed as the Quebec separatist MPs, ideological left-wingers, and policy manipulators within the Tory party. Disillusioned, Harper left Hawkes's office in 1986 to begin his Master's program at the University of Calgary, believing that his active involvement in politics was over (Harper, 1991).

Harper was not alone in his disillusionment. By 1986, many on the right viewed Mulroney as "not a real Tory" (see Bercuson et al., 1986; Gairdner, 1991). In that year, these disgruntled elements found a voice in a book written by Peter Brimelow.

BRIMELOW AND THE GHOST OF GOLDWIN SMITH

If Ernest Manning's Political Realignment (1967) is thoughtful but bland, and Andrew's Bilingual Today, French Tomorrow (1977) paranoid and extreme, Brimelow's The Patriot Game is the *piece de resistance* of the right-wing's articulation of Canada's political problems. Brimelow opens the text with the declaration that he is "a wandering WASP," a British-born journalist educated at both the University of Sussex in England and the Stanford University Graduate School of Business. He wrote the book as a "modest attempt at presenting a General Theory of Canada" (1986:1). This "theory" can be summarized as follows.

Canada is legally a nation-state, but not a nation. It is made up instead of at least two sub-nations (English and French) and perhaps several others based on regional differences. Of these sub-nations, only "Quebec is emerging as a genuine nation-state" (p.6). English Canada lacks a real identity because it has suppressed its true nature both in trying to pacify the demands of Quebec's francophone population and in a futile attempt to deny its cultural similarity to the United States. In an equally futile effort to make Canada work, a "large and powerful public class" has developed, associated primarily with the Liberal party, which has attempted to mediate differences between regions and ethnic groups (p.7). In typically oligarchic fashion, this public class has, according to Brimelow, acted mainly to enhance its own position through such policies as bilingualism, the National Energy Program, and Canadian nationalism, which Brimelow views as a sham and hypocrisy.

Brimelow ends his book with a series of prognostications:

1. Canada's fundamental contradictions cannot be resolved in the present Confederation. In the long run, Confederation must be reformed or even dissolved.
2. Quebec is emerging as a nation.
3. English Canada will -- sooner or later -- recover from its post-Imperial hangover, and will increasingly assert its North American identity.... Eventually, Anglophones will question the value of the Quebec connection. *The Quebec issue in Canadian politics may become not whether Quebec will secede -- but whether it should be expelled* (italics added).
4. The sectional divisions within English Canada will be a continuing problem.
5. Brian Mulroney will almost certainly fail to create a Tory electoral coalition. But the Liberals won't find it easy to recreate theirs either.... *New splinter parties may emerge* (italics added).
6. Federal elections are a Canadian version of Russian roulette. One day,

> Confederation may get shot. In every Canadian election, there is a small but distinct chance ... of ... linguistic polarization.... *A ... quite real danger is that a sectional party, probably from Quebec but possibly from the West, could hold the balance of power in the House and demand radical reforms* (Brimelow, 1986:287-89, italics added).

In light of subsequent events, Brimelow's observations appear to be remarkably prescient. Certainly, they struck a responsive chord with many on Canada's emerging right-wing. Yet Brimelow's thesis is also not particularly new. In fact, it owes a considerable debt -- one even larger perhaps than Brimelow admits in his introduction -- to a text written nearly a hundred years earlier.

In 1891, an English journalist and quasi-historian, Goldwin Smith (1823-1910), published Canada and the Canadian Question. Smith was the son of a wealthy physician, educated at Eton and Oxford. Cold and aloof, Smith was a typical nineteenth-century English liberal: opposed to hereditary and aristocratic privileges, yet excessively proud of his Anglo-Saxon heritage, Smith was a firm believer in free enterprise, individualism, and the idea of progress. In the late 1860s, he moved to North America, finally settling in Toronto in 1871 (see Berger, 1971). Smith soon became a continentalist, and throughout a series of articles published in newspapers espoused the belief that French and English Canada were incompatible, and that the latter should follow its natural bent by joining the United States. Canada and the Canadian Question is Smith's magnum opus, elaborating upon and justifying this thesis through a selective reading of history. Like all economic liberals, Smith viewed the question of nationhood as something which can be answered on strictly rational grounds. And this, essentially, is the argument put forward by Brimelow.

It is remarkable to read and compare Smith's text with Brimelow's. The format, subjects discussed, and conclusions drawn are almost identical. The question arises: Are the similarities between Smith's and Brimelow's texts reflective of the fact that the Canada Question has not fundamentally altered in over a hundred years? Or has Brimelow, like Smith, "forced" the evidence of divisions within the country to fit a preconceived notion of the natural state?

For Canada's right-wing in 1986, the answer was increasingly obvious. The old French-English, core-periphery divisions within the country remained. Liberal -- and now Tory -- governments had only made the divisions worse. Canada was not working. Nowhere was disillusionment with Canadian politics greater than in the West, a region beset, moreover, by the continuing instability of its staple-based economies.

THE ECONOMICS OF WESTERN DISCONTENT

In 1984, the West was only just recovering from the recession of 1981-82. That recession had seen the final devastation of Saskatchewan's potash industry, the continuing decline of BC's lumber industry, the loss of thousands of jobs in Alberta's oil and gas industry, and the ongoing struggle in general of the West's agricultural sector. Along the way, many of the West's financial institutions had also been devastated, beginning with the collapse of Dial Mortgage Corporation (1981), Fidelity Trust (1983), and Pioneer Trust (1984). Believing that many of their economic problems resulted from the actions of the federal Liberals, and wanting to believe as much in

Mulroney's promises to create 200,000 new jobs if elected (Nikiforuk et al., 1987:63), many people in the West -- both former Tories and not -- voted for the Progressive Conservatives in 1984.

It is important to emphasize, however, that many of these same voters were not entirely enamoured with Mulroney himself. As we have seen, Quebecers in general voted for Mulroney because he was the "home-town boy," nationalists, in particular, because they were swayed by his promises to give Quebec more power and autonomy. Similarly, big business supported Mulroney because of, first, a belief that he was one of them and, second, a continuing antipathy toward the Liberals.

By contrast, Mulroney had no immediate connection with westerners. Indeed, as Braid and Sharpe (1990:76) note, Mulroney's "personal style and rhetoric are profoundly at odds with western expectations of a prime minister." What are the elements of Mulroney's style that so grate upon westerners? This is not entirely clear. If asked, many westerners would likely describe Mulroney as verbose, blustering, and arrogant. Yet many -- if not all -- of these qualities could have been equally attributed to Diefenbaker, W. A. C. Bennett, Sterling Lyon, and Dave Barrett. Nonetheless, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that many westerners voted for the Progressive Conservatives in 1984 in spite of Mulroney, motivated both by a hatred of the Liberals and a longstanding habituation to voting for the Tories.

By then, however, many westerners had come to feel that the dynamics of Canada's political system, in particular the overwhelming power of Ontario and Quebec, mitigated against the genuine interests of the hinterland regions. This growing sense of skepticism was voiced by Ted Byfield in a series of Alberta Report editorials leading up to the 1984 election. While still favouring the Tories over the despised Liberals and the NDP, Byfield expressed the widely-held fear of westerners that, in any case, the electoral system would result in politics as usual (i.e., controlled by Central Canada). Hence, in an editorial written in August of that year, Byfield referred to the election as "futile" and "as irrelevent to the West as the West is to the election" (AR, 1984a:54). He followed this on August 27 with an editorial entitled "The best result for Alberta: 16 Tories, 4 COR & one Liberal" (AR, 1984b:44). His reasons behind this formula? "That way, somebody down there [Ottawa] will hear us."

The Alberta Report's front page following the Tory win continued in this vein: "Who Will Save Us Now?" The same issue's story covering the election referred to "The West's perilous day: As feared, the Tory caucus is flooded from the East" (AR, 1984c). In short, the regional alienation felt by many in the West was not diminished -- indeed, was exacerbated -- by the provincial results underlying the Tory's victory.

That the West's right-wing was particularly anxious that policies it favoured should be adopted -- and fearful that they would not -- was shown in another Alberta Report story shortly after the election:

> Alarmed over statist policies of both federal and provincial governments, a group of disaffected Progressive Conservatives in southern Alberta is looking for a new political party of the right to form or join, having taken comfort in neither the election of Brian Mulroney as prime minister, nor in this summer's provincial White Paper on Industrial and Science Strategy (AR, 1984d:8).

The article, entitled "Calgary's new right-wing cabal," went on to describe how the group, consisting of "50 wealthy high rollers" regularly met at the prestigious Ranchman's Club in Calgary.(2) One of the leaders of the Ranchman's group was Marshall Copithorne, a wealthy rancher from Cochrane, Alberta, who (along with several members of his family) would later become a prominent member of the Reform Party (AR, 1984d).

According to Alberta Report, the Ranchman's group was enlisting the support of the National Citizens' Coalition and the Fraser Institute to further its demands for a radical change in Canada's political-economy. For such right-wing groups, however, there was the further problem of which political party could (or would) bring about these desired changes. There remained, in 1984, no immediate alternative to the Tories:

> None of the current crop of right-wing splinter groups is regarded as a credible vehicle, some because they are too shrill, fractious, and devoted to peripheral issues, and others like the Alternative Government Movement, because they lack a leader.... But [the Ranchman's Group] hope the various groups can coalesce into a credible conservative alternative to the Tories, which can then be bankrolled (AR, 1984d:9).

Alberta's right-wing was willing to give the Tories a chance. Ominously, however, a spokesperson for the Ranchman's group, R. Campbell Todd, president of Prairie Pacific Energy Corporation, said that Mulroney had "just six months to set the course or his mandate will begin to drift" (AR, 1984d:9).

The report highlights an increasing rift not only between the corporate sector and any federal government, but also with the provincial Conservatives who, under Lougheed, had been far more interventionist in the economy than the previous Socred government. Indeed, as we have seen (chapter two), many on the right fringe, and in the oil and gas industry, had come to blame Lougheed as much as Trudeau for the debacle of the NEP (Nikiforuk et al., 1987).

In 1984, the National Energy Program remained a flashpoint for Albertan discontent. Despite the fact that the "guts" of the program had been cut out by the agreement of 1981 (see Laxer, 1983), many Albertans, particularly in the oil and gas industry, continued to view the NEP as having robbed Alberta of its "place in the sun." Hence, despite comments from prominant Tory MP Sinclair Stevens, just prior to the election, that a Tory government would continue to control foreign investment in the energy industry (AR, 1984e), an immediate expectation of westerners was that the NEP, and its companion programs, would be abolished. As the months went by, however, these programs remained in effect.

The failure of the federal Tories to end immediately the NEP was only one of several actions, or inactions, that soon came to bother the western right-wing. In addition, the Tories soon also showed themselves reluctant to sell off the still popular Petro-Canada. Likewise, some members of the right-wing, such as Brimelow (1986), saw the renaming of the Foreign Investment Review Agency into Investment Canada as being merely window dressing. In short, the western right-wing was chagrined that the federal Tories had not taken government shackles off free enterprise. Six months into office -- R. C. Todd's deadline -- Tory economic policies seemed little different than the Liberal's. At the same time, the political scandals continued to mount.

By the spring of 1985, Alberta's economy was about to enter its second recession in five years. It was signalled, as in 1981, by the collapse of a major financial institution, the Canadian Commerical Bank (CCB). For political and economic reasons, the Tories tried at first to bail out the corporation. In April, 1985, a conglomerate of the Alberta and British Columbia provincial governments, the Federal government, the Royal Bank, Bank of Montreal, CIBC, Bank of Nova Scotia, National Bank of Canada, and Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation underwrote the bank's debts. Wary investors, however, stung by the previous collapse of financial institutions in the West, continued to withdraw their funds. The hemmorhaging of capital from the CCB continued unabated. Finally, a few weeks after the attempted bailout, the company was allowed to sink into bankruptcy (see Nikiforuk et al., 1987:152).

The collapse of CCB was only the beginning. A while later, Calgary's Northlands Bank suffered the same fate. In February, 1987, the Alberta government merged the assets of North West Trust and Heritage Savings and Trust in order to save them. In June of the same year, the assets of two subsidiaries of the Principal Group of Companies (First Investors Corporation and Associated Investors of Canada) also were seized by the government. Then, in August, the entire Principal empire collapsed, fueled by rumours, as well as considerable evidence, of questionable financial transactions by its management.

The failure of many of western Canada's financial institutions was repeated in other sectors of the region's economy. 1985 saw the beginning of a subsidy war between European and American grain producers. Combined with increased competition from Third World producers, the result was a sudden and drastic decline in the prairie grain industry. By the end of 1986, federal economists were predicting a decline in Alberta's farm income for that year of 60 percent, with similar severe declines in Manitoba (50 percent) and Saskatchewan (40 percent) (AR, 1986g).

Heavily dependent upon its oil and gas industry, the province of Alberta was hardest hit. The situation was not without irony. As we have seen, the Alberta government and the oil and gas industry had long sought the removal of the NEP. The lobbying continued in earnest after the Tories took office in 1984. They were partially rewarded in November of 1984 when Michael Wilson's "mini-budget" brought in cuts in government programs and a reduction in the Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax (PGRT) paid by oil and gas producers. When the NEP was ended finally, in March, 1985, Alberta government officials, Calgary's oil executives, and conservative ideologues in general toasted the event, predicting rapid growth and wealth to come. Oil rigs, they said, soon would be drilling across the province. The oil industry had wanted to be free to compete in the marketplace. Now, it had gotten its wish.

There is an old saying that people should not wish too hard for anything lest they get it. In the fall of 1985, the OPEC cartel failed to agree upon a world oil price. The result was a global free-for-all among producing nations. Canada's oil and gas producers were caught in between. Having recently gained freedom from the chains of the NEP, Canada's oil and gas industry was also not protected as the price of oil fell from $27 US per barrel in the fall of 1985 to $8 per barrel by August, 1986. Many of Alberta's smaller (and some larger) companies were wiped out. Along with them, 45,000 oil workers lost their jobs (Nikiforuk et al., 1987:36).

The effects of the recession of 1985-86 upon Alberta can be examined best in relation to what occurred in the other western provinces and Canada in general during

this period, a discussion which leads me to a brief theoretical digression into what is known as "relative deprivation theory."

Relative deprivation theory has a long and illustrious pedigree, dating back at least as far as Marx and de Tocqueville in the last century. Briefly, the theory posits the notion "that people compare their current economic situation with the (real or imagined) situation of others, or with their own previous or anticipated future situation" (Krahn and Harrison, 1991:1; see also Krahn and Harrison, 1992). The resultant discrepant comparisons provide the basis for a variety of responses, including social withdrawal, social activism, violence, or revolution (Graham and Gurr, 1969; see also Brinton, 1938; Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970). While the theory's reliability in predicting *which* response will occur has been criticized (see Orum, 1989:349), it remains a useful -- and frequently used -- concept. McGuire's (1981) findings and elaborations on the theory are particularly appropriate here.

Studying fourteen northern U.S. states between 1866 and 1909, McGuire found a statistical relationship between economic instability and agrarian unrest. McGuire concluded that agrarian unrest resulted from economic uncertainty or risk, a concept that he defined as the standard deviation from the mean; that is, the larger the standard deviation, the greater the uncertainty, hence, the greater the political unrest.

Uncertainty may, of course, arise also out of political and/or ideological challenges to the traditional order. Nonetheless, the concept of relative deprivation possesses a commonsense logic (i.e., hard times = political unrest). Moreover, economic variables also have the laudible advantage of being easily measured. How, then, does the notion of economic uncertainty "fit" the situation of the western provinces during the 1980s?

From the myriad indices that might be used to indicate economic uncertainty (i.e., bankruptcy rates, commodity prices), I have examined two: 1) per capita gross domestic product as a percentage of national GDP; and 2) unemployment rates. I have chosen the first because GDP is the measure most frequently used to indicate a country's or region's economic health. I have chosen the second because it involves the human aspect of recessions, and it is human beings who ultimately bring about political pressures. Finally, because the notion of relative deprivation is inherently comparative, I have examined western rates for both indices in relation to the Canadian average during the same years.

During the period 1980-89, Alberta's per capita GDP was higher than that of the other western provinces, averaging 136 percent of the Canadian average, to BC's 103 percent, Saskatchewan's 90 percent, and Manitoba's 87 percent. As argued by Mansell and Percy (1990), however, and shown in Table 3.1 (below), Alberta's apparent economic prosperity concealed an otherwise uncertain pattern of productivity. The volatile nature of Alberta's economy, relative to that of the other western provinces, is made apparent by comparing the standard deviations of each province's per capita GDP during the 1980s. While the standard deviations in per capita GDP for British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba were relatively low (.053; .09, and .016, respectively), Alberta's standard deviation (.174) indicates far greater economic volatility.

Graph 3.1

Ratio of Per Capita GDP, the Western Provinces to Canadian Average, 1980-1989
(Canadian Average=1)



Source: Calculated from population figures from the Alberta Bureau of Statistics (1989a; 1991) and GDP figures from Statistics Canada (1990a:102).

Graph 3.2

Unemployment Rates, Canada and the Four Western Provinces, 1980-1989



Source: Alberta Statistical Review (1987:24; 1988:22; 1989b:16; 1990:16).

Unemployment rates during 1980-89 reveal a similar pattern. Traditionally, British Columbia has had a higher rate of unemployment than the Canadian average, and

this pattern continued during this period (11.2 percent compared to the national average of 9.3 percent). Both of these average rates were high compared to the mean unemployment rates for Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba (8.1, 6.9, and 7.6 percent, respectively) which tend historically to have higher out-migration than British Columbia. As shown in Graph 3.2 (above), however, the unemployment rates for British Columbia and Alberta were much less stable than those of Manitoba and Saskatchewan.

The standard deviations for unemployment rates in the two western-most provinces reveal their greater instability. While Saskatchewan's and Manitoba's standard deviations for unemployment (1.33 and 1.17, respectively) remained far lower than that of Canada (1.71), British Columbia's (2.89) and Alberta's (2.64) standard deviations show a high degree of instability in the work force.

In short, both gross domestic product and unemployment rates for Alberta and unemployment rates for British Columbia during the 1980s reveal a high degree of economic uncertainty (see Mansell and Percy, 1990, for a fuller exposition of the Alberta situation). By contrast, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, though less prosperous than their neighbours, had somewhat stable economies. Following McGuire (1981), and other relative deprivation theorists (Graham and Gurr, 1969), we would expect Alberta (followed by British Columbia) to exhibit greater political instability during this period than either Manitoba or Saskatchewan; and indeed, that was the case, both in the early 1980s and, again, after 1985.

As Alberta's economy went into relative decline in the mid-1980s, Alberta's social structure similarly decayed. The result was a proliferation of food banks and labour violence, culminating in 1986 in the infamous Gainers strike in Edmonton, and similar strikes at Fort McMurray (Suncor), Slave Lake (Zeidler Forest Products), and Red Deer (Fletcher's Fine Foods) [Nikiforuk et al., 1987:137]).

Increasingly, however, the federal Tories were viewed by at least some of their western supporters as oblivious to the West's, particularly Alberta's, plight (see Palmer and Palmer, 1990:361; also Braid and Sharpe, 1990:75-100). Tory supporters, including many of the party's Alberta MPs, were particularly annoyed when Michael Wilson's March, 1986 budget withdrew funding for western programs, particularly for agriculture, and failed to guarantee support for either the Husky Oil Upgrader at Lloydminster or the expansion of the Syncrude plant in Fort McMurray (AR, 1986j). Although a federal bail-out of farmers occurred shortly thereafter -- in time for Mulroney to assist fellow-Tory Grant Devine's re-election bid in Saskatchewan -- the cuts only highlighted bitterly the stories of federal largesse pouring into Quebec.

Some western Tory MPs began to voice their discontent with the government's economic and other policies. In March, 1986, Alex Kindy, an extreme right-wing Tory MP from Calgary East, attacked Justice Minister John Crosbie's proposal to ban discrimination against homosexuals and women (AR, 1986k). In 1987, Kindy called his own energy minister, Marcel Masse, "stupid" for his handling of energy negotiations with the Alberta government (AR, 1987c). During this period, another Alberta MP, David Kilgour, the brother-in-law of Liberal leader John Turner, began also to complain loudly of his party's treatment of the West.

Despite these exceptions, however, and growing public anger, Tory MPs in the West and elsewhere by and large remained loyal to the party. In part, this commitment was the result of their loyalty to Mulroney, the man who had brought the Tories out of

the political wilderness. Many, no doubt, also were aware that internal dissention during the Diefenbaker years had ripped the Tory's apart, resulting in their subsequent banishment for nearly a quarter century to the political wilderness. Nonetheless, the perceived refusal of western Tory MPs to stand up for their constituents against the policies of the party led Tory supporters to begin a search for alternative means of political representation.

Traditionally, provincial governments in Canada have represented the counterbalance to federal authority (see Cairns, 1988). During the Trudeau years, normal federal-provincial conflict had been exacerbated by the existence of non-Liberal governments in the four western provinces. With, however, the coming to power of the Tories in Ottawa, the conflict did not end. Hence, in the midst of Alberta's recession of 1985-86, for which the provincial Tories did not wish their policies blamed, and who also wished to remain on the side of their vocal right-wing supporters in the oil and gas industry, Tory premier Don Getty exclaimed:

> I feel in Alberta a frustration that we don't have the kind of policies coming out of Ottawa we hoped we would have. Once we thought it's because we're not supporting the Liberal government. But now we've supported the Conservative government, and there's still this sense of frustration (quoted in AR,1986l:6).

As if to put an exclamation point on his frustration, Getty subsequently refused to campaign for the federal Tories in the Pembina by-election in 1986. The seat, won by the Tories in 1984 with a margin of over 34,000 votes, was retained by PC Walter Van De Walle who defeated his nearest rival, NDP candidate -- and former mayor of Edmonton -- Ivor Dent by a slim 232 votes.

As in the past, however, westerner's search for a means of ameliorating what they viewed as systematic political injustice did not end at the party or provincial level. Rather, they began to seek out institutional solutions for bringing western influence to bear at the national level. The most proffered solution involved senate reform.

The idea of senate reform was not new. Indeed, it had been spoken of, off and on, for several decades. Spurred by the support of the Canada West Foundation, and the Constitutional and energy wrangles, the idea of senate reform had received a major boost in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Support for senate reform, which had peaked in 1983 (at 43 percent), declined in 1984 (37 percent) following the election of the Tories (AR, 1985c). Now, in the midst of growing political discontent, the idea was once more finding favour, among the public and business leaders (see AR, 1985e, re: the support of Edmonton's and Calgary's Chambers of Commerce for Senate reform). In particular, the idea of a "Triple-E Senate" -- equal, elected, and effective -- began to gain currency.

As often was the case, however, Ted Byfield led the charge for senate reform. In his "Letter From The Publisher," of March 18, 1985, Byfield wrote:

> We were satisfied in the past to blame the NEP on the Liberal government. It was, we said, their payoff to Ontario for putting Trudeau back in power in 1980. But now we have had a Tory government in office for six months and the NEP remains fully in effect in every major particular.... We need

> therefore fundamental constitutional change. We need, in short, the Triple-E Senate (AR, 1985f:52).

Byfield's demand was echoed elsewhere. The same month, an Alberta provincial Tory committee further recommended the Triple-E Senate. The committee's recommendation gained wide provincial support, including from the Western Canada Concept whose president, Dr. Fred Marshall, had made a brief to the committee in August of 1984. In May, 1985, the Alberta legislature passed a motion approving of the committee's report.

The following April, Byfield wrote dolefully of the Canadian political situation and again of the need for senate reform:

> ... we must conclude that the conventionality of the present Canadian political system cannot work for us. If a government with an enormous majority, almost unanimously elected across the West, cannot shape policies that defend the West against international conditions we cannot control or contend with, if it cannot do this in an era when economic conditions in the centre are affluent and bouyant, if it cannot do this purely because the political price is too high, then no Canadian government regardless of its political stripe, can ever properly serve us. Hence, what we require is not a change of party, not a change of government, but a change of constitution.... We need the Triple-E Senate... (AR, 1986m:52).

In short, by 1986 senate reform had come to be viewed by Byfield, and many others in the West, as a means of solving the recurrent economic and political problems of the region.

By this time, however, many had also come to believe that fundamental change in Canada's political structures could be achieved only through the vehicle of a new political party. Hence, in August of 1986, Byfield also began to argue in favour of a new political party:

> Elections are won and lost in Ontario and Quebec. Hence, all three parties are the same.... The system doesn't work.... What we need is a credible western party. Not separatist. Not dedicated to some strange Balkanization of the whole estate. Not particularly right wing, not particularly left. Well, what then. It requires another column to explain (AR, 1986f:52).

Byfield followed that column on August 25 with a description of what the "new party" should stand for:

1) Fair deal for hinterlands, not just the prairies, but the Atlantic provinces, also.
2) A Triple-E Senate.
3) Changes to the bank act to make it possible for regional banks to survive.
4) Changes to tariff structures to reopen commodity markets.
5) Strong initiatives by Ottawa to create access for western commodities to the United States.
6) Removal of Canadian National head office from Montreal to the west.

7) Changes in the CBC to move production facilities to Vancouver, Winnipeg, and Halifax.
8) Tax incentives for industries to locate in the west.
9) Ottawa programs to offset provincial subsidies on such programs as hog production, thereby keeping them in grain growing areas (AR, 1986n:52).

Three weeks later, Ted Byfield's editorial spelled-out five additional conditions that a western party should meet:

1) Be populist, consisting "largely of people with no previous political identity."
2) Have trouble finding a leader because of their humility.
3) The leader should not be from Alberta, and should be from a minority group, preferably Jewish as this "would discourage the weirdo element that seems inevitably to attach itself to such movements in Alberta. The James Keegstras of the province would not feel impelled to join."
4) At least initially, should only run federally.
5) "Finally, I do not conceive of such a party as having permanence. Its mission would be to change the system. When the system has changed, it should fade into history, its work done" (AR, 1986o:52).

Byfield's call for a new political party came at a time when the polls were saying what everyone was already sensing: Mulroney's Tories were in trouble.

After a brief "honeymoon period," the Tory slide had begun in the spring of 1985. A June Gallup poll gave the PC's 44 percent national support. By September, support for the Tories had slipped to 37 percent (see Gallup, 1985). The following March, 1986, it had rebounded to 41 percent, but fell again to 32 percent in June, and was at 31 percent in October (see Gallup, 1986a). It was around this time that an incident happened that more than anything solidifed western opposition to Mulroney's government and led to the formation of the Reform Party.

In the fall of 1986, the federal government announced a decision to give a CF-18 contract to Canadair-CAE Ltd. of Montreal over Bristol Aerospace Ltd. of Winnipeg, despite federal civil service evaluations which recommended acceptance of Winnipeg's lower bid. The politically motivated decision caused an immediate furor. Manitoba premier Howard Pawley denounced the decision. Tory provincial opposition leader, Gary Filmon, in an act of political self-defence, distanced himself from the federal party, while the secretary of the Winnipeg Assiniboine PC Association quit his post in disgust. Manitoba Tory MPs were more acquiescent, although some mumbled their disagreement with the CF-18 decision.

In the days and weeks that followed, however, anger with the political decision was not confined to Manitoba. Rather, the incident provided a rare symbol of alienation with which all westerners could identify, in the end taking on the same symbolic resonance as had the NEP. (The incident was replayed in early 1987 when a bid for construction of icebreakers went to the Montreal company, Lavalin Inc., over two western Canadian consortia out of Calgary and Vancouver.)

After the CF-18 incident, support for the federal Tories steadily eroded. A

December, 1986, Gallup poll, conducted shortly after the announcement of the CF-18 decision, showed that Tory support had slumped to 30 percent (Gallup, 1986b). Much of this slide in support had occurred in the West where key elements of Tory support began to break free from their political orbit.

The anti-Quebec, anti-French element, provided with fresh evidence of domination by Quebec, began to search out (or return to) some of the fringe parties, such as Elmer Knutson's Confederation of Regions Party (CoR). Likewise, businesspeople, such as James Gray (Canadian Hunter Exploration) and Richard Elenko (Mannville Oil and Gas) began also to withdraw support from the Tories. (In their pandering to Quebec and Ontario, said Elenko, Mulroney's Tories were "just as bad as the Liberals" [AR, 1986p:10]).

In the midst of the increasing crisis in agriculture, the farm community also began to drift from the Tory fold. In Lethbridge, Alberta, a group formed the Agricultural Stability Action Committee to lobby for more farm aid. Co-chairman of the Committee, and a former president of the Cardston Progressive Conservative Association, Robert ("Bob") Grbavac announced that he would no longer support the Tories financially (AR, 1986p).

The new year did not bring happier tidings. Throughout 1987, national support for the Tories hovered in the mid-twenties. Particularly worrisome for the right-wing in Canada, were several national polls giving the NDP the lead -- an event previously replicated only by the gains of the CCF during the Second World War (see Gallup, 1987a).

Nor was the rise of the left curtailed in the West. Indeed, support for the NDP in the West continued to rise into early 1988. A Gallup poll in March of that year gave the NDP 33 percent nationally, compared with 37 and 28 percent for the Liberals and PCs, respectively. In the western region, support for the NDP was at 40 percent, the Liberals 27 percent, and the Tories 31 percent (Gallup, 1988a).

In summary, by the fall of 1986, a Tory government had been in office in Ottawa for two years, yet things did not seem to be better than they had been under the previous regime of the hated Trudeau Liberals. To be sure, Mulroney's Tories had finally gotten rid of the NEP and FIRA, and generally supported deregulation, but their slowness in doing so led many in the West to believe that they had been reluctant. (Indeed, the Tories appeared, at least for a time, to still be committed to Canadianization.) Moreover, many in Alberta blamed the Tory's slowness in dismantling the NEP for the impact (if not the cause) of the recession that hit the province in 1985-86.

Indeed, in many ways, the Mulroney Tories seemed perhaps even a worse alternative than the Liberals. Unfairly or not, many who had supported the Tories in 1984 viewed "big government" and its deficits as growing ever larger. To many, also, Mulroney's government seemed even more corrupt and partisan than the previous Liberal regime. Moreover, the fact that so many of the government scandals involved members of the Quebec caucus only confirmed the perception of many westerners of the particular venality and corruption of that region's political elite.

For many westerners, however, the CF-18 incident had been the last straw. The incident revived long-standing antagonisms over government spending, regional exploitation, and ethnic divisions within the country. In doing so, the CF-18 fiasco provided a powerful symbol to westerners of the perceived injustice of the current political system.

While these feelings cut across party and ideological lines, the West's right-wing was particularly angered by all of these incidents. Its avowed saviour, the Progressive Conservative party, had displayed feet of clay. To whom could the right-wing now turn for redemption? The predicament of the right was only made worse by the fact that the Tory's faltering was accompanied by a real possibility that the left-wing New Democrats might ascend to federal power.(3) What was to be done?

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE REFORM PARTY

In April, 1987, Winspear telephoned Stan Roberts about holding a large conference in Vancouver, similar to the Canada West Foundation Conference organized by Roberts in 1980, to discuss western grievances and to consider the creation of a new political party. Since leaving the CWF, Roberts had briefly been president of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Canada's largest business group, but had left that position in 1982 under pressure from CCC board members who feared that Roberts's very public attacks on Liberal policies were closing Ottawa's doors to the Chamber (Financial Times, 1982). (Roberts, himself, seems to have felt that certain officials in the Liberal hierarchy were trying to undermine him [Roberts, 1991].) Roberts had then returned to British Columbia, where he was president of both Fraser Resources ("a family-owned multi-interest company") and The Roberts Group ("consultants specializing in international marketing and government relations" [Roberts, undated]). But Roberts was never far from politics.

Indeed, Trudeau's resignation in the Spring of 1984 rekindled rumours that Roberts might be a possible replacement for Trudeau. Publicly, Roberts scoffed at these reports, but privately began to ponder the possibilities of his own candidacy. He retained important contacts in the West from his days at Simon Fraser University and the Canada West Foundation, and also had strong connections in Quebec as a result of his recent work with the Chamber. Although he likely would not have won the Liberal leadership, Roberts believed that his candidacy might establish him as a regional "lieutenant" and begin the process of broadening the base of Liberal support (Roberts, 1991).

Turner's candidacy and subsequent elevation to leader ended this speculation. Roberts was disappointed, viewing the choice of Turner as an opportunistic move choreographed by insiders within the Liberal party. Nonetheless, he chose to run for the Liberal party in Lachine, Quebec during the subsequent election, coming second with 15,156 votes (32.2 percent) to Tory candidate Bob Layton (24,301 votes, 51.6 percent) (CEOC, 1984a).

Like Winspear, the continued malaise of the post-Trudeau Liberals, combined with disgruntlement over the Mulroney government, had intensified Roberts' political concerns. As early as 1985, Winspear and Roberts spoke of forming a new political party. Gordon Gibson, former leader of the B.C. Liberal party, remembers attending a meeting in Vancouver that year, attended by Winspear, Roberts, and David Somerville (of the National Citizens' Coalition) (among others) at which such a possibility was discussed (Gibson, 1991). Winspear's call to Roberts in the spring of 1987 was therefore not unusual.

At about this same time, Winspear and Roberts learned through their connections with the Western Canada Foundation that several influential people in Alberta also were

pondering the creation of a new political party. During 1986, groups opposed to the Mulroney Tories had sprung up throughout Alberta. In the south of the province, a group headed by Bob Grbavac (the former Tory riding president from Raymond Alberta) and Ken Copithorne (of the Copithorne ranching family) had emerged. In Edmonton, another group had formed around Preston Manning, and included Cliff Breitkreuz (a municipal councillor from Onoway), Robert Chapman (of Chapman-Weber Motors), John Poole (Poole Construction), Ray Speaker (former Socred and Tory MLA, and long-time friend of Manning), and Dick Shuhany.

Even more than Roberts, Manning in recent years had been on the political periphery. During the constitutional wrangling of 1977-78, Manning had created the "The Movement for National Political Change." (Manning [1992:91] describes the MNPC as a study group, consisting of "interested friends and acquaintances" who "met once a month of so" "to discuss the lessons to be learned from the political reform movements of the past and to discuss the knowledge and skill needed to participate in contemporary federal politics." In contrast, Dobbin [1991:67] describes it as a "very private, if not secret, organization" with extensive political and business contacts, particularly within the oil industry. The reality probably lies some place between these two assertions.) The election of the Clark government in 1979, however, undercut any chances that the MNPC might get off the ground. For the next few years, Manning's political forays were limited to occasional speechmaking.

Following Kesler's by-election victory in Olds-Didsbury in 1982 (see chapter two), for example, Manning spoke to a small gathering of separatists. But, disagreeing with their "tactics and avowed objective" (Manning, 1992:92) -- and probably (correctly) viewing their movement as not going anywhere -- Manning ended any further dealings with them. In 1984, Manning (along with his father) also made a presentation in Calgary to the Marigold Foundation, a charitable organization, discussing "the possibility of the West producing yet another populist party and the lessons to be learned from its predecessors" (Manning, 1992:92). By and large, however, Preston Manning remained on the political margin until 1986. Even in the spring of 1987, Manning remained a small business consultant, quietly living in St. Albert, a satellite community of Edmonton.

In Calgary, meanwhile, another group had formed that later would have even greater impact upon Reform's political direction. The Calgary group featured prominent oilman Jack MacKenzie, Bob Muir (a longtime Calgary lawyer for Dome Petroleum), Jim Gray (co-founder and vice-president of Hunter Oil), David Elton (president of the Canada West Foundation), Diane Ablonczy (an oilpatch lawyer), and Cliff Fryers (a Calgary tax lawyer [see Pearson, 1990; Manning, 1992; Byfield, 1991b; Grbavac, 1991]).

Fryers, who would later become "chief bagman" for the Reform Party, was born in Winnipeg in 1947, the son of a brakeman with the CPR. Following a series of moves, the family settled in Moose Jaw where Fryers's father's promotion to superintendent placed the family "in the upper strata of what was then a town of 26,000." Cliff Fryers later attended the University of Saskatchewan, in Saskatoon. Apparently unimpressed with student radicalism ("I was somewhat turned off by their thinking."), Fryers graduated with a degree in commerce and law. In 1977, he moved to Calgary where he got a job as general tax counsel to Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. In 1980, Fryers joined a law firm that subsequently became (through a merger) Milner Fenerty (information and quotes taken

from McNellis, 1991).

By 1986, Cliff Fryers was a very successful tax lawyer, living in the expensive Mount Royal district of Calgary, belonging to the prestigious Ranchmen's Club, and acting in the role of governor of the Canadian Tax Foundation. Also, he had formerly been a supporter of the Liberal party, before switching to Mulroney's Tories, in part because of what he viewed as the discriminatory aspects of bilingualism (McNellis, 1991). In 1984, Fryers even helped PC MP Bobbie Sparrow in her 1984 campaign (AR, 1991a). Later, Fryers would say of his change from the Liberals to the Conservatives: "I switched because, as a Westerner, I thought we would see some real changes, like getting rid of the PGRT [Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax]" (McNellis, 1991:23). Now, like so many others in the western, particularly Alberta, establishment, Fryers was seeking a new political home.

By the time Winspear and Roberts contacted Fryers and the other discontented individuals in Alberta, the latter already had begun to cohere around the leadership of Manning. On October 17, 1986, a meeting took place in Jim Gray's boardroom, attended by David Elton, Bob Muir, Doug Hilland, an oil company executive, and Manning. This meeting was followed on November 13, 1986 with Manning making a presentation to some prominent members of the oilpatch entitled "Proposal for the Creation of a Western-Based Political Party to Run Candidates in the 1988 Federal Election" (Manning, 1992).

Nonetheless, the formation of a new party seemed far off in the early spring of 1987. At that time, therefore, Winspear (and, according to Pearson [1990:42], Poole) arranged to bring together the various disenchanted factions for a coordinating meeting. A dozen or so businesspeople, including Winspear, Manning, Muir, Chapman, Roberts, Poole, Shuhany, and Grbavac, held a luncheon meeting in Edmonton. Chapman suggested that Manning and Roberts should head up an association, which the group decided to name the Reform Association of Canada. Manning and Roberts accepted. The group then decided to organize a convention to be held almost immediately in Vancouver at which the decision would be made whether or not to form a new political party (Winspear, 1991; Grbavac, 1991).

James Partridge, a long-time friend of Winspear's, later recounted some particulars of this luncheon meeting, garnered from Winspear. Partridge further noted that, following the meeting, "Messrs. Winspear and Roberts travelled to Toronto and endeavoured, unsuccessfully, to interest a society dedicated to influencing the government without formal political action" (AR, 1991b:3).

That society was the National Citizens' Coalition. Winspear's firm is a contributor to the NCC and, as we have seen, the meeting was not the first between the various parties. In the spring of 1987, however, Colin Brown, the founder of the NCC, was seriously ill with cancer. As a result, Roberts met with Somerville alone. Recalling the results of this meeting, Winspear later stated that "ultimately the two groups couldn't agree on methods" [for influencing the political system]. "The NCC wanted us to remain non-political, and we wanted them to join us" (Winspear, 1991). The Vancouver Assembly went ahead. A couple of months later, in July, 1987, Brown died. David Somerville, whose role within the organization had been ascendent for some time, replaced Brown as head of the NCC.

Meanwhile, Ted Byfield, who had attended some of the formative meetings of the Reform Association, and whose articles had heralded the need for a new political party,

agreed to arrange publicity for the Vancouver meeting through his various magazines. For their parts, Manning helped set the Assembly's agenda and recruit speakers, while Roberts used $50,000 and a letter of credit for an additional $40,000 -- all provided by Winspear -- to establish an Association office in Vancouver and to reserve the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Vancouver for the "Western Assembly on Canada's Economic and Political Future" -- its formal name -- to be held from May 29 to 31 (Winspear, 1991; Manning, 1991; Byfield, 1991).

In short, the proposed new political party primarily was the offspring of four men: Winspear, Roberts, Manning, and Byfield. Despite some differences between them -- Roberts was a slightly left-of-centre liberal, Byfield an extreme right-wing fiscal and moral conservative -- each nonetheless brought something of value to the relationship. Winspear, of course, had money. Roberts was a skilled and experienced organizer with previous political experience, as was Manning. Manning, moreover, had the political "name," while Byfield possessed the means of disseminating the ideology of the new party. The results of this partnership were evident only a few weeks later.

THE WESTERN ASSEMBLY AND THE ROAD TO WINNIPEG

The Western Assembly attracted nearly 300 delegates. They were treated to an impressive array of speakers, including John Richards, a former NDP member of the Saskatchewan legislature and currently professor of business administration at Simon Fraser University, whose own work on populism features prominently in this thesis. Also attending was Alan Beachell, Reeve of a Manitoba municipality who had run as a provincial Liberal candidate in 1973 (Western Assembly, 1987). Beachell's other claim to fame had come a year earlier when, as president of the Union of Manitoba Municipalities, he had allowed that organization to mail its 160 members a petition, distributed by One Nation One Language Inc. (see chapter two), which called for the elimination of official bilingualism (AR, 1986e).

Beachell was not the only prominent former Liberal in attendance. Jo Anne Hillier, editor-publisher of a Manitoba newspaper, a former member of the Canada West Council, and a long-time member of the Liberal party was also a delegate, as was Jane Heffeilinger, a Vancouver marketing consultant who had been a federal Liberal candidate in 1984. A number of prominent Tories also took part in the Assembly, including Larry Birkbeck, former Saskatchewan PC MLA (1975-1986), Walter Nelson, founder of what is now the Western Canadian Wheat Growers Association and a member of the Tory's Saskatchewan executive, and Bob Grbavac (Western Assembly, 1987).

There were also many speakers at the Assembly who did not have their political affiliations sewn to their chests, including Bert Brown, a prominent Albertan farmer and founder-chairman of the Canadian Committee for a Triple E Senate; Dr. David Elton, Professor of Political Science at the University of Lethbridge and president of the Canada West Foundation; Gordon Engblom, a Calgary energy consultant; Dr. Gerald Gall, a Professor of Law at the University of Alberta; Dr. Peter McCormick, Chairman of the Political Science Department at the University of Lethbridge; Dr. Brian Scarfe, Professor and Chairman of the Economics Department of the University of Alberta; Melvin Smith, Q. C., Director of the Canada West Foundation; Dr. Charles Stewart, an agricultural engineer; and Bob Muir (Western Assembly, 1987). There were also a number of non-participating observers, including David Somerville of the National

Citizens' Coalition and a young economist from the University of Calgary, Stephen Harper.

After leaving Tory MP Jim Hawkes' office in 1986, Harper had enrolled in the University of Calgary's Master's Program. During the same time, he had continued to "network" with some of the conservative think-tanks, such as the National Citizens' Coalition and the Fraser Institute, trying "to mobilize some of the conservative resources," and also helped to establish a right-wing organization, the Northern Foundation. Nonetheless, he believed that his days in direct politics were at an end. In the spring of 1987, however, he was asked by his University supervisor, Dr. Robert Mansell, to go out to the Western Assembly for him (Harper, 1991; see also Manning, 1992).(4) Harper would later recall that he was "very impressed with Mr. Manning and his ideas, although I didn't think at the time that the party was going to go anywhere [because] it didn't have a clear agenda, and it was very small" (Harper, 1991).

On the first evening, Harper and the delegates heard Ted Byfield give the key-note address. Then, on Saturday afternoon, Preston Manning delivered his major speech, making clear his preference regarding the decision whether or not to form a new political party:

> Let me make clear from the outset that when we refer to the possibility of creating a new political party to represent the West, we are not talking about another splinter party of the strange and extreme. The West has produced too many of these in the past years, and there is no need for another.
>
> Rather, ... we should be thinking about the creation of a new vehicle to represent the great political "reform tradition" which runs like a broad and undulating stream through the length and breadth of Canadian politics but which finds no suitable expression in any of the traditional federal parties (Manning, 1987a:1).

Why were the existing political parties not appropriate vehicles for resolving the West's economic and political difficulties? The "Progressive Conservative Party at the federal level has a congenital inability to govern"; "the professional Liberal politician is still defined as 'a politician who puts party and patronage ahead of principles and province'"; and the federal NDP advocates and supports "the centralization of power in the hands of government," "the welfare state," the re-distribution rather than the creation of wealth, and the interests of class over region (Manning, 1987a:3-5). Therefore, said Manning, a new political party must be created possessing the following "general specifications:"

1. A new federal political party representing the West should have a positive orientation and vision.
2. A new federal party representing the West should have standards of performance, policy, and people that exceed those of the existing political parties.
3. A new federal political party representing the West should be ideologically balanced. (In order to ... draw support from ... the Liberals and the NDP as well as the Conservatives....)

4. A new federal political party representing the West should be committed to preserving and strengthening Canada through the institution of needed reforms.
5. A new federal political party representing the West should have "room to grow" into a truly national party (Manning, 1987a:10).

In short, Manning made a broad populist appeal for support. (This call for a bringing together of Canadians had been reinforced by Roberts who had pointedly announced, as the Assembly began, that an interpreter was available for anyone wanting to speak in French [G&M, 1987a:A7]. It is not known whether anyone availed themselves of this opportunity.)

Manning's speech continued on that Saturday until 5:30 p.m. The assembled delegates were duly impressed. They then broke to attend the Saturday reception and dinner, and to hear the guest speaker of the evening -- author Peter Brimelow -- diagnose Canada's "problem." The following day, the assembled delegates held a straw vote on the issue of forming a new party. The result was a foregone conclusion. By a wide margin (76.7 percent), the delegates voted in favour of forming a new party.

Not everyone, however, would be going to the founding convention to be held in Winnipeg. Despite Manning's call for ideological balance, the ideological mix of the new party had already begun to congeal around certain right-wing principles, in particular the principle of free enterprise. Looking back on his own experiences at the Assembly, John Richards would later remark that "My participation in the founding convention ... says nothing about the ideological direction of the Reform Party." As for the delegates' response to his speech (an unapologetic defence of social democratic principles, and a warning to the Assembly against reverting to conservative solutions to deal with western Canada's problems), Richards later commented : "I received a smattering of boos but most of the crowd heard me out as a minor off-key player in their orchestra" (Richards, 1991).

It would be overstating the point to suggest that most of the Assembly's delegates were as extreme as June Lenihan, a Vancouver anti-abortion lobbyist who somewhat imprudently remarked: "I'm one of the people in this room willing to admit that I'm an evangelical right-wing red-neck, anti-socialist, ultra-conservative, fundamentalist Christian" (AR, 1987a:8). Nonetheless, it seems clear that the majority of delegates were committed right-wingers, a belief held by several observers. John Cruickshank, a reporter with the Globe and Mail wrote: "While Mr. Manning and Mr. Roberts spoke ceaselessly about creating 'a broadly based party,' their delegates were almost uniformly social and economic conservatives" (G&M, 1987b:A2). Similarly, reporter Don Wanagas remarked:

> In spite of Preston Manning's efforts to present the "new" organization as something else altogether, it was all too clear that it was dominated by old-time Socreds dying for another kick at the political cat.... [T]he "Assembly" will be identified as just another Alberta-based "fringe group." Which I regret to say, is all it ever was (Nikiforuk et al., 1987:85).

Cruickshank's and Wanagas's impressions were shared by Bob Grbavac.

Grbavac, who describes himself as slightly left-of-centre politically, viewed the

delegates to the Assembly as primarily a bunch of "neo-conservatives," "right-wingers," and "former Social Crediters." (The recurrent charge that many supporters were ex-Socreds has some validity. Prominent at the Western Assembly, and early members of the new party, were Werner Schmidt, the sternly religious former Socred leader in Alberta, and a colleague and long-time friend of Preston Manning, Ray Speaker, an Alberta MLA.) Finally, Grbavac also felt uneasy that the finances of one individual -- Winspear -- had dominated the meeting. As a result, Grbavac shortly thereafter left the nascent movement to join the Liberal party (Grbavac, 1991).

Nonetheless, the Reform Association began preparing for the upcoming Winnipeg convention. As before, Roberts took care of the organizational aspects, while Manning, and his Calgary supporters, were in charge of delegate selection. As well, an interim executive, headed by Association president Jo Anne Hillier, a former member of the Canada West Foundation and (later) a supporter of Roberts' leadership bid, and Roberts and Manning, set about raising money and forming party organizations in the West's 88 ridings.

The following months provided Manning with the opportunity to further his leadership hopes, and to otherwise put his stamp upon the emerging party, through a series of speeches to potential delegates and supporters. One of these speeches occurred on August 10, 1987, at the Marlborough Inn in Calgary.

The new federal political party should be built, he said, upon the following foundations:

> 1. Draw upon our Western conservative tradition with respect to the value of the individual, the energizing and direction of the economy, the proper role of government, and sources of moral and ethical guidance. That means commitment to individual freedom, responsible private enterprise, modest government, and respect for traditional Judeo-Christian values.
>
> 2. But I say at the same time, break new ground on broadening the base of the private enterprise system, in the area of labour-management relations, in relations to the environment and science, in the area of social policy and constitutional change (Manning, 1987b:8).

Manning's speech, an updated version of his father's social conservatism, was long on generalities and short on specifics. The only concrete proposal was that the Constitution should be amended to provide for a Triple E Senate. Regarding the Meech Lake Accord, which had been formally signed two days after the Western Assembly, Manning's only criticism was that it made "meaningful Senate reform a virtual impossibility" (1987b:8).

In his public speeches, Manning espoused the end of traditional left-right politics, and called for a broad-based party. In private, however, Manning appears to have reverted to some of the "scare tactics" used successfully by his father nearly a quarter of a century before (see Finkel, 1989), as evidenced in a couple of fundraising letters he wrote during this period:

> ... the federal Conservatives already have lost the West and will probably lose

> Quebec as well. The task now ... is to provide some constructive alternative for Western Canadians in the absence of which many will decline to vote, or will vote NDP or even separatist, by default (Manning, 1987c).

And again, to the same prospective contributor:

> ... it would be extremely unfortunate if Canada were handed over to the socialists.... If the PC's cannot be revived, then there is a great danger that up to 50 % of *our people* will not vote.... In this event, the NDP will elect members by default (Manning, 1987d, italics added).

As we have already seen, Manning's fears were well founded.

Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that the formation of the Reform Party was, from the start, as much a defensive reaction to the perceived gains of the left as it was an attempt to institute a new political regime. The continued de-alignment and disintegration of the Tory alliance realistically threatened many on the right with the possibility that their worst nightmare -- a social democratic government in Ottawa -- might come true. The creation of a new right-wing party was thus intended, at least in part, as a solution to a potential problem. In the days that followed the Assembly, some members of the West's political and business establishment showed that they welcomed the solution, as former western premiers Douglas Campbell (Manitoba) and Ernest Manning, and businessmen James Richardson, the former Liberal cabinet minister, and Jack Gallagher, founder of Dome Petroleum endorced the new party (AR, 1987d:52).

THE PARTY IS BORN

The Reform Party of Canada was born on the weekend of October 30-November 1, 1987. The event was attended by three hundred and six delegates. Of these, 140 came from Alberta, 91 from British Columbia, 65 from Manitoba, and 10 from Saskatchewan (AR, 1987e). The delegates faced three tasks as they met that weekend: to decide upon a name for the party, to devise a constitution, and to pick a leader. The delegates chose the party's name -- the Reform Party of Canada -- the first day.

How many Reformers knew at the time of the resonance that name had in Canadian history, we cannot tell. Certainly, however, Preston Manning, who prides himself on his knowledge of history, must have known.

The Reform Party of Upper Canada, led by Willam Lyon Mackenzie, had fought for popular democracy before, during, and immediately after the Rebellion of 1837. After the Act of Union in 1840, the Reform Party of Canada West had formed one-half of what later became the Liberal party. In subsequent years, as the population of Canada West (formerly Upper Canada) began to increase relative to that of Canada East (formerly Lower Canada), the Reformers, led by George Brown, the legendary anti-Catholic, anti-French editor of the Toronto Globe, began to agitate for "representation by population." As Waite relates, however, the "rep. by pop." issue merely disguised a deeper issue:

> the great bulk of the Reform party [of] Canada West wanted an end to French-Canadian influence (or interference) in her internal affairs: nothing less, in fact, than the separation that would be realized in a separate province of

> Ontario, and yet without the disadvantages of a complete dissolution of the Canadian union (1963:v).

Despite its reactionary bent, the Reform Party of Upper Canada became, in the end, one of the major forces behind the constitutional changes that led to Confederation when, in 1864, Brown agreed to an unlikely coalition with Macdonald's Conservatives (see also Creighton, 1944; and Waite, 1977). Could Preston Manning, or the other Reformers, have intended this symbolism? Manning (1992), himself, makes no claims to this.

Perhaps the delegates chose the name meaning solely that they intended to "reform" Canada's existing political system. But the name also had currency with several notable elements attending the convention.

A couple of years earlier, disenchanted Social Credit supporters in B.C. had formed the Reform Party of British Columbia. Similarly, in 1981, several former Alberta Social Crediters, including Alfred Hooke, a long-time member of Ernest Manning's cabinet, got together to form the MIDAS Reform Party of Canada. (MIDAS stood for "Money, Interest, Debt, And Slavery," and encapsulated the old Social Credit doctrine that capitalism was fine, all that was needed monetary reform [Hooke, 1991; Johnson, 1991; MIDAS, undated]).

In the end, the delegates chose the name "Reform Party" by a wide margin over other possible choices. Then the delegates began reviewing a draft constitution put together by a committee headed by Bob Muir. By the time of the Winnipeg convention, the party was already solidly on the right of the political spectrum on economic and social matters. Nonetheless, Preston Manning was accutely aware of the need to attract a wide spectrum of voters if it was to avoid being marginalized. Hence, Manning alone devised ("using materials I had collected for the past twenty years" [Manning, 1992:147]) a comprehensive preamble to the party's constitution that paid homage to a plethora of political icons, including Joseph Howe, Louis Lafontaine, Robert Baldwin, Egerton Ryerson, the Fathers of Confederation ("particularly Georges Cartier, John A. Macdonald, and George Brown"), Louis Riel, F. W. G. Haultain and his followers, the Progressive Party, the CCF, the Social Credit Movement, and "the leaders and supporters of the Quiet Revolution in the Province of Quebec" (Reform Party of Canada [hereafter, "RPC"], 1987). The fact that some of these recognitions were scarcely credible, given the regionalist and increasingly right-wing tenor of the movement, did not seem to bother Manning or, presumably, anyone else.

Ignored, for example, was the fact that the Fathers of Confederation -- hardly populists -- had put together the National Policy, a policy with similar philosophical roots to the hated NEP. Similarly disregarded was the fact that Louis Riel had fought for minority rights, in particular, recognition of a kind of distinct (French-speaking) society that would soon become controversial with Meech Lake. Nor was it apparently recognized by the delegates that the Progressives, the CCF, and even the early Social Credit League of Alberta, in the early days of Aberhart (see Finkel, 1989) believed strongly in government intervention in the marketplace. In this sense, the party's constitution represented, at least in part, an attempt to create a kind of illusory ideological bridge between the past and present.

At the same time, the party also wanted to create, if possible, a bridge between disenchanted Tories *and* those right-wing fringe elements which had been in free fall for several years. Hence, the preamble to the Reform Party's new constitution also paid

homage to "[t]he leaders and supporters of such Western protest groups, parties, and interest groups as the Confederation of Regions Party, Canadians for One Canada, the Western Canada Concept, the Canada West Foundation, and the Committee for a Triple E. Senate..." (RPC, 1987).

An incident at the convention makes clear the political meaning of the latter section of the preamble. In response to a motion to drop mention of WCC an Alberta delegate said: "Let's leave it in. We may need them later on" (Winnipeg Free Press, 1987a:2). The motion was subsequently defeated.

In short, the party leadership was trying to broaden its right-wing support while not entirely surrendering its attraction to fringe elements, at least some of whom were present at the Winnipeg convention. For example, one working delegate at the Convention was Fred Debrecen, the founder of One Nation, One Language Inc. (see chapter two). Another active delegate was Mary Lamont, a founder of REAL Women (AR, 1990a).

That Reform's leadership was acutely aware that the party's success lay in culling its natural support within the right-wing was further evidenced by a speech given at the convention by Stephen Harper. The speech, which even Manning said was "[t]he best speech and most influential presentation" at the convention (Manning [1992:150]), and which propelled Harper into a central role in making party policy, was entitled Achieving Economic Justice In Confederation (Harper, 1987).

In his presentation, Harper recited a litany of western grievances, from Macdonald's National Policy to "the unlimited appetite of the Welfare State for tax grabs" and "the special treatment accorded the Province of Quebec" in the form of transfer payments "paid exclusively by Western Canada" (1987:6). He then stated his reasons for believing that the existing political parties were incapable of correcting these injustices:

> The Liberal Party ... places a profoundly insecure Central Canadian nationalism ahead of its historic commitment to freer trade. The NDP ... places its socialist ideology ahead of its historic roots in Western protest (1987:12).

But Harper's comments regarding the Conservative party were the most telling, revealing implicitly where the new party believed its greatest potential support lay:

> ... the Mulroney government has shown itself far too willing to back down on the issues that matter to its political base. We must serve notice to the Red Tory leadership that we will provide its Western supporters an option they can desert to en masse should they, for any reason, fail to successfully deliver on [free trade] or any other major initiative of importance to Western Canada (1987:12).

In short, Harper, like many of Reform's leadership, believed that the core of its support would come from disgruntled right-wing Tories.

It would take a very special leader, however, to hold together the disparate elements of the fragmented right-wing and to otherwise bathe the party in the kind of respectability that might broaden its appeal. On the second day, the party began the process of choosing a leader.

Since Vancouver, the issue had settled down to a choice between Manning, Roberts, and Byfield. The last, however, wanted to stick to his newspaper business (Manning, 1992).(5) Roberts, too, was reluctant to enter the race. Hence, in the months leading up to the Winnipeg Convention, the only person actively running for the leadership was Manning.

During this time, Roberts apparently became more and more concerned at the direction that he saw the new party taking. A man with pan-Canadian views, he saw the new party as becoming increasingly controlled by a regional and provincial clique operating out of Calgary. Already populism was seemingly being replaced by a kind of quasi-populism. He had long disliked and feared the anti-French sentiment prevalent in the West. He saw the new party as harbouring some of these worst impulses. Moreover, Roberts viewed the movement's lean towards free market solutions alone as excessive (Roberts, 1991). Albeit reluctantly, Roberts decided to enter the leadership race one week before the Convention.

The popular myth growing out of the convention suggests that the leadership contest pitted Roberts's old political style and money against Manning's grassroots populism (see AR, 1987e; Manning, 1992). Certainly, Roberts' campaign featured many of the traditional political accoutrements: buttons, embossed scarves, posters, daily newsletters -- even a hospitality suite for beleagured delegates -- provided at a reputed cost of about $25,000, mostly supplied by Winspear. By contrast, Manning is said to have spent as little as $2,000 (see AR, 1987e).

Still, Manning was hardly the ill-equipped underdog. By then, he had surrounded himself with a cadre of capable political advisors, such as Muir. Manning also had spent several months recruiting delegates, mostly from Alberta, whose allegiance to him was unquestioned.

As the crucial vote neared, tensions between the two camps increased. Fearing that the Roberts camp was about to busload in a number of "instant delegates," Manning supporters closed delegate registration on the Friday evening. (It was supposed to have continued until Saturday.) Winspear, who was supporting Roberts, stood up before the delegates and denounced the decision to suspend registration. This incident was followed by further accusations from Roberts that Association monies were unaccounted for. With animosities rising, Jo Anne Hillier called a meeting between the two sides on Saturday night to attempt to resolve the disputes. The attempt at reconciliation failed.

The next morning, following another effort at reconciliation, Roberts made a brief, emotional statement to the delegates, announcing that he was withdrawing from the race. "It is with deep regret," he said, "that I have taken this step.... This party was founded on the principles of honesty and integrity -- those principles appear to have been compromised during this convention (Winnipeg Free Press, 1987b:A1). Declaring Manning's supporters "fanatical Albertans" and "small-minded evangelical cranks," Roberts then stormed out of the convention (see AR, 1987e:15-20).

Both Winspear (who had been so involved in creating the party) and Andrew Stewart had mixed feelings about the result of the leadership convention. Winspear openly had supported Roberts because he did not want the party to be labelled an Alberta affair. He also was afraid that the party might become just another Social Credit party. But he had been disappointed with Roberts performance at the convention, finding him "erratic" in comparison with the Banff conference of 1978 (Winspear, 1991).

Stewart's reasons for supporting Roberts had been similar:

> ... those of us who knew Roberts and his involvement felt that he had staked a claim to the position of leader; but there was another element. It was obvious that the Party could only gather strength by drawing adherents from other political parties.... There were philosophical differences between Manning and Roberts. Manning was a small c-Conservative; Roberts a small l-Liberal, closer to the middle of the spectrum. It was possible that Roberts would have more appeal to adherents of all parties, from Conservative to NDP. We will never know (Stewart, undated:4).

As for Manning, his only reaction to the events was to tell reporters that, while he would look into his opponent's complaints, the convention would not miss Roberts to any great degree and that the latter had made a mistake in bringing the old political "baggage" into the convention. Some of Manning's supporters were more blunt. "[I]t was ideal," said one Manning supporter from Calgary, calling Roberts' leaving an "absolutely clear-cut exorcism" (AR, 1987e).

Roberts, who was one of the founding fathers of the party, was gone. Later, he would fail in an attempt to gain the Reform Party's nomination in Saanich-Gulf Islands before the 1988 election. The loss effectively ended his involvement with the party. In late August, 1990, he was stricken with a brain tumour, and died on August 30. He was sixty-three years old.

What would the Reform Party have been like had Roberts won the leadership and survived to shepherd it through its formative years? The question is, of course, speculative. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that a party headed by Roberts might have been somewhat less anti-government and more constrained in its attitudes on bilingualism and Quebec. At the same time, it would no doubt have remained supportive of free enterprise.

Would the party have been as successful? Probably not, at least in the short term. As we shall see, the Reform Party under Manning generally has been successful in bringing together many of the disenchanted elements of the extreme right-wing. These elements would likely have viewed Roberts as too "liberal" in some respects. At the same time, the party would have been less open to charges of being a haven of Christian fundamentalism, as suggested by some (see Dobbin, 1991) and therefore might have been more acceptable, in the long run, to moderate voters.

This potential outcome, however, was not to be. In Winnipeg, Preston Manning became, at least for the moment, the undisputed leader of the new party. But who is he? "Off stage," as Goffman (1959) might say, Preston Manning is affable, but quiet and almost shy. A devout Christian (First Alliance Church) and a solid family man (wife Sandra, and five children), Manning possesses a record of helping various community causes and individuals in need (see Stuffco letter, EJ, 1991d:A15). By all accounts, he is a decent man.

As noted early on in his political career (see Barr, 1974:170), Preston Manning also is something of a scholar. He is said to read a lot of history, and is genuinely interested in ideas. Indeed, in this regard, Manning constitutes something of an anomaly among recent Canadian politicians -- Pierre Trudeau being an exception.

In front of a crowd, Manning's frail -- even nondescript -- appearance seems to draw strength. Although a shy kind of nervousness sometimes surfaces, it usually

succumbs to a calm certitude bathed in Manning's slow, almost rasping drawl. His speeches are well-crafted, often strewn with historical images and a kind of folksy humour. His family background, particularly his political and business connections, are never mentioned. He is simply "one of the people." Taken together, these qualities give Manning the appearance of a kind of Jimmy Stewart cum Will Rogers's cum country preacher.

Behind this folksy demeanor, however, Manning is an astute and able politician. His speeches carefully wrap issues in historical symbols that appeal to his audiences. He does not tell the people what they should do about an issue. But he always makes it clear what he thinks they should do. For Manning has very firm -- some would even say "set" -- ideas about Canada's problems and their solutions. There is little casualness or genuine spontaneity in Manning's presentations. Even his humorous anecdotes appear to have been carefully pre-tested (see Sharpe and Braid, 1992:17-8, on the early Social Credit origins of one of Manning's famous quips). In short, Manning is a person of firm ideas and principles.

Indeed, as he stood before the crowd in Winnipeg, Manning seemed to display just how little his political beliefs had evolved since assisting his father in writing Political Realignment in 1967. For, despite drawing upon a modern analogy to give his speech the appearance of currency, the doctrine he espoused that night was traditional social conservatism. "We need efficient solutions to social problems in a welfare state," said Manning. "So, Rambo, meet Mother Teresa" (Winnipeg Free Press, 1987c:1).

The party came away from the convention with a name, a leader, and a constitutional set of principles. The delegates also had given some direction over certain policy initiatives. Over the next few months, the party leadership began hammering out the finer details of these policies. When, in August, 1988, 250 delegates met in Calgary to go over a draft platform of policies drawn up by Stephen Harper (Manning, 1992:168), it was obvious that Rambo had got the better of the aforementioned meeting. The party's policies adopted at that time, and largely unchanged since, married pure populism to free enterprise and traditional conservatism, along with aspects of regional and political alienation, thereby consecrating the party's emergence as a right-wing populist party.

Under a policy section dealing with constitutional reform, for example, the party called for a Triple E Senate; regional fairness tests; popular ratification of constitutional change; the entrenchment of property rights; and the rejection of the Meech Lake Accord. Concerning political reforms, the Reform Party called for more free votes and less party discipline in the House of Commons and party caucuses; greater accountability by M.P.'s; fixed election dates; policies of direct democracy (i.e., referenda and citizens' initiatives); less government bureaucracy; and the end of tax credits for political lobbying. Economically, the party called for a greater reliance on the market; free trade, both with the United States and within Canada; an end to all government agricultural subsidies; changes to monetary and banking policy; tax reform (since translated to mean a flat tax); balanced budgets; privatization of government agencies; tighter control of government spending; and right-to-work (i.e., anti-union) legislation.(6) Finally, on social policy, the party called for an end to the social welfare state; a rejection of proposals for state-run day care; an end to government financial involvement in the unemployment insurance system; an end to federal encroachments on provincial jurisdictions in the areas of medicine (i.e., through the Canada Health Act

which underpins the medicare system), education, and the like; an end to official bilingualism, immigration policies based on primarily economic reasons and subject to public opinion; a "justice system which places the punishment of crime and the protection of law-abiding citizens and their property ahead of all other objectives;" and reform of the RCMP designed to "restore the RCMP to its former stature" (RPC, 1989a).(7)

As the 1988 federal election approached, social conservatism, re-christened "Reform," at last had a vehicle by which it could enter into Canada's political discourse. In the meantime, the party's fortunes were bouyed by the continuing political problems of the ruling Tories.

REFORM AND THE NORTHERN FOUNDATION

Beset by scandals, unpopular policies, and a deep-seated hatred directed at the party's leadership, the Progressive Conservatives languished in public estimation throughout 1986-87. Indeed, as late as May, 1988, the federal Tories were still in third place in opinion polls. At 28 percent, Mulroney's party trailed both the Liberals (39 percent) and NDP (31 percent) (review of polls in Gallup, 1988b).

A number of neo-conservative organizations continued to arise, moreover, which threatened to splinter the Tory's right-wing support in the belief that Mulroney's government was not going far enough in reversing the policies of the previous Liberal regime. One of these organizations -- a kind of umbrella organization for many of the other single-issue, neo-conservative groups -- deserves particular mention because of its links to the Reform Party: the Northern Foundation.

The Foundation's own literature describes its history and purpose:

> The Northern Foundation was started in 1988 by individuals who were concerned and angered by the continuing deterioration of their country. In Canada, common sense had been drowned out while unprincipled politicians, arrogant bureaucrats, and leftist media elites did all the talking -- and thinking -- on behalf of everybody.... [T]here was no party, movement or organization to fight for the needs and aspirations of the majority of Canadians who were common-sense, small-'c' conservatives in both the social and economic sense (Northern Foundation, 1990).

In short, the Northern Foundation portrays itself as a kind of "radical vanguard" for the dissemination of social and economic conservative ideas.

Complaining of socialist/progressive thinking, and a media/political system controlled by "lib/left" elites, who had been "able to impose their agenda on the Canadian people because small-'c" conservatives" had been divided, the Northern Foundation was the creation of a number of (generally) extreme right-wing conservatives, including (among others) Anne Hartmann (a director of REAL Women), Geoffrey Wasteneys (a long-standing member of APEC), George Potter (also a member of APEC), Peter Brimelow, Link Byfield (son of Ted Byfield and, himself, Publisher/President of Alberta Report), and Stephen Harper.

The roster of conservative adherents speaking at Foundation conferences in (variously) 1989, 1990, 1992 is equally instructive. Among speakers were Dr.

Walter Block (the Fraser Institute), Ed Vanwoudenberg (leader of the Christian Heritage Party), Lubor Zink (an extreme right-wing columnist with the Sun chain), Dr. John Whitehall (of the Canadian Christian Anti-Communist Crusade), Ron Leitch (president of APEC), Gwen Landolt (founder of REAL Women), Ken Campbell (founder of Renaissance Canada), Paul Fromm (former member of the Western Guard, a neo-fascist group, and later founder of CFAR), and William Gairdner (author of The Trouble With Canada; see chapter four). The Foundation's quarterly tract, The Northern Voice, regularly provides advertising space for these same individuals, their ideas, and/or their organizations (Northern Foundation, 1990; 1991; 1992).

Ostensibly, therefore, the Northern Foundation is a vehicle for bringing together several disparate right-wing groups and otherwise disseminating an extreme conservative ideology. Significantly, it also has substantial connections to the Reform Party. Brimelow's and Harper's connections to Reform were discussed previously. Link Byfield's father, Ted, was even a founder of Reform. But the ties go even deeper than this. At the 1989 Edmonton convention, a policy resolution was made with the description that it was "proposed by Link Byfield" (quoted by columnist Mark Lisac, column in EJ, 1990b:A11). At times, also, Link's columns in the Alberta Report appear not to be commentaries so much as policy memorandums (see, for example, AR, 1990b; AR, 1991c). And George Potter also is a member of the Reform Party [see Potter's letter in AR, 1991d]), while Gairdner is a frequent speaker at Reform Party functions, including the party's 1991 Saskatoon convention (see chapter four).

Despite these connections, however, there is no evidence that the Foundation is a "front" for the Reform Party. Indeed, it is worth noting that the Foundation later banished Harper from the movement because he was not right-wing enough. (For his part, Harper now calls the Foundation "quasi-Fascist" [Harper, 1991]). In the end, the Northern Foundation appears to represent yet another example of the right-wing's "spinning-off" from political control by either the Tories or Liberals.

REBUILDING THE TORY ALLIANCE

Despite centrifugal forces pulling at his political coalition, Mulroney believed that he could hold on to power if he retained the support of Quebec nationalists and of big and small business interests in the rest of the country. To achieve this support, Mulroney entered upon two fundamental policies, one political, the other economic: Meech Lake and Free Trade.

If Trudeau's central objective in the Constitutional hearings of 1981 had been to bury Quebec nationalism within a strengthened federal state, Mulroney's objective was to bury the Liberal party in Quebec through granting that province greater autonomy. As we have seen, Mulroney garnered the support of Quebec nationalists in 1984 through promises to re-open constitutional discussions, implicitly suggesting that in doing so, he was willing to delegate greater provincial powers to that province. Discussions towards this end began shortly after the Tories took power in the fall of 1984.

Throughout 1985 and 1986, discussion papers flowed between the various capitals. Then, in late April of 1987, Mulroney and the premiers of all ten provinces met in the sleepy resort of Meech Lake, just outside of Ottawa. The meeting was to be part of a series of meetings designed to deal with a set of five points proposed by the Quebec Liberal government the previous May as its conditions for signing the

constitution. These five points were a role for Quebec in selecting Supreme Court justices; greater powers over immigration; return of the constitutional veto lost by Levesque in 1981 or full compensation for opting out of federal programs; a limitation on federal spending power in areas of provincial jurisdiction; and recognition of Quebec as a "distinct society" (Cohen, 1990:6).

Much to everyone's surprise, except perhaps Mulroney's, the meeting arrived at a consensus. The consensus was made possible by the fact that everyone got something. Mulroney got the deal that he had promised Quebec nationalists in exchange for their support. Bourassa got all five of his demands, a fact which would solidify his position with Quebec's electorate. Newfoundland's Peckford and Alberta's Getty received vague commitments from Mulroney and Bourassa to look at the former's concerns over fishing rights and the latter's desire for Senate reform. All of the provinces received additional powers (Cohen, 1990).

Mulroney and the premiers left Meech Lake with what Mulroney would later repeatedly call a "done deal." The agreement had to be ratified by all of the provincial legislatures within the next three years, but that seemed merely a formality.

Few Canadians paid much attention to the announcement of the deal, the debate on the Accord in the House of Commons which followed (May 11), or the Quebec hearings which wrapped up on May 25. On May 27, however, Pierre Trudeau reentered the constitutional process with a blistering attack in the media upon the Accord's provisions (see Trudeau, 1990). From then on, criticisms of the Accord would accelerate. Even as the Accord was formally signed on June 2, 1987, storm clouds could be seen rising on the political horizon.

Although, for the most part, dissension within the Tory party was kept under wraps, confined to the backrooms and silent thoughts of its members, there were early signs of internal dissention. Mark Yakabuski, a senior aide to federal Tory MP Monique Vezina, resigned shortly before the Accord's signing to protest the Accord's hasty creation and its failure to address multiculturalism (G&M, 1987c). Likewise, Pat Nowlan, a long-time Tory backbencher, began also to vocalize his opposition to the Accord (Cohen, 1990).

Similar signs of internal opposition to the Accord existed within the NDP. Although the Accord appeared to point the way towards a more decentralized federation -- something the NDP traditionally had fought against -- the party's executive, particularly the leader, Ed Broadbent, supported the Meech Lake Accord, believing that doing so would enhance the NDP's chances of (at last!) making an electoral breakthrough in Quebec. Still, the party's decision to support the Accord was opposed by some, notably British Columbia MP Ian Waddell (Cohen, 1990).

The Liberal party, however, was particularly divided by the Accord. The party had long fought for a centralized, bilingual country where all of the provinces were treated equally. Now, John Turner's support of the Accord seemed to many in the party to be a dangerous reversal of policy. Trudeau's criticisms of the Accord, which gained approval from several key Ontario Liberals, as well as federalists within the party such as Don Johnston and Charles Caccia, ex-Trudeau aides Dennis Mills and James Coutts, and former finance minister Donald Macdonald, therefore served to spur opposition not only to the agreement but also to undercut Turner's leadership (see Cohen, 1990; G&M, 1987c).

For the most part, however, opponents of the Accord within the major parties

remained silent. In the end, this silence had a political cost. Feeling that their concerns regarding the Accord were not being given a proper, formal hearing within the existing political institutions, the Accord's critics began to use extra-parliamentary means of expressing their concerns, chiefly through the various communications media. Gradually, the existing polity lost control of the issue.

At first, opposition came mainly from Quebec's anglophone population who wanted, at the least, a postponement of the Accord's signing until further study into its effects upon minority rights could be completed (G&M, 1987c). In the months and years that followed the Accord's signing, however, opposition to the Accord also was heard from other groups. Women and some ethnic groups, particularly native Canadians, began to voice concerns that the Accord might abrogate gains won under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. And while some academics warned -- and many politicians and ordinary people outside Quebec feared -- that the Accord gave unprecedented (or unspecified) powers to Quebec, the P.Q. denounced the Accord as a hollow document that did not go far enough in protecting Quebec's distinctiveness (see Cohen, 1990).

Having at first tried to bury discussion of the Accord, and thereby losing control of the debate, the federal government thenceforth tried a tact of familiarizing people with the Accord's provisions. Significantly, however, these attempts only increased the polarization between Quebecers and people in the rest of Canada, in large measure because the Accord's supporters gave differing interpretations to each group as to the substantive meaning of the Accord's provisions.

A Gallup poll conducted a year after the Accord was signed showed that 63 percent of the people in Quebec and 67 percent of the people in the rest of Canada were still not familiar with the content of the agreement. More importantly, while Quebecers who claimed to be familiar with the Accord were slightly more likely to view the Accord as good for Canada than unfamiliar Quebecers (69 to 64 percent, respectively), familiar respondents in the rest of Canada were more inclined than unfamiliar respondents to view the Accord as *not* a good thing (55 to 51 percent). Similarly, familiar respondents outside of Quebec were more likely than unfamiliar respondents to view the agreement as giving too much power to the provinces (54 to 51 percent) (Gallup, 1988c).

The most telling difference between Quebec and the rest of Canada, however, concerned the Accord's "distinct society" provision. While over 70 percent of either familiar or unfamiliar Quebecers approved of the the provision, over 60 percent of either familiar or unfamiliar respondents outside of Quebec disapproved of it (Gallup, 1988c). "Distinct society" already was taking on two very different symbolic meanings and visions of Canada for francophone residents inside Quebec and anglophone's inside and outside the province.

Two Goldfarb polls conducted in Ontario in June and July of 1988 obtained similar results. A majority of those polled wanted amendments to the Accord. Many of the Accord's opponents viewed it as giving too much power to Quebec. They also objected to the clause of the Accord that defined Quebec as a distinct society (reported in G&M, 1988a).

As it turned out, however, the Meech Lake Accord would not be the central issue of the 1988 campaign. Because all three federal parties had agreed to support the deal, it was not a point of difference between them. It was, as Mulroney said, "a done deal," an estimation perhaps grumpily agreed with by the electorate. A Gallup poll released in

October, 1988, just prior to the election, showed that only one percent of the electorate viewed Meech Lake as the main issue of the campaign. The overwhelming issue, said 59 percent of those polled, was free trade (Gallup, 1988d; for a more elaborated discussion of this, see Doern and Tomlin, 1991:238-42).

Next to French-English relations, free trade with the United States historically has been one of the most divisive issues facing Canada. The roots of this discord go back to the mid-point of the nineteenth century.

Between 1854 and 1866, Canada and the United States actually had a Reciprocity Treaty, but it was abrogated by the Americans following their civil war in response to Britain's support for the South. Confederation in 1867 came about, in part, as a response to the ending of reciprocity. Similarly, the Conservative party's National Policy of 1879 was a response to the failure during the subsequent years to reach free trade agreements with the United States as well as Great Britain. Thereafter, the policy took on a political life of its own, with the Tories becoming identified as "protectionists" or "nationalists," the Liberals as "free traders" or "continentalists." The issue of which economic policies to pursue figured prominently in the election of 1891 and, even more, in what became known as the Reciprocity Election of 1911. In both cases, Laurier's Liberal party lost to the Conservatives. Thereafter, although the idea of pursuing free - or at least freer -- trade with the United States would occasionally reappear, on the whole the issue became viewed as a kind of political albatross, good for dinner table theorizing among corporate executives, liberal economists, and government bureaucrats, but otherwise unsaleable to the Canadian public (see Hill and Whalley, 1985; Doern and Tomlin, 1991; also Creighton, 1944; and Careless, 1953).

It is important to note, however, that, even in 1911, the concept of free trade was not rejected uniformly throughout the country. In the years preceding and immediately following the 1911 election, many eastern farmers favoured protectionism as a means of strengthening their home-based markets, while the more export-dependent farmers of western Canada, particularly those in Alberta and Saskatchewan, tended to favour free trade with the United States.

In later years, Central Canada's, particularly Ontario's, development of its manufacturing base enhanced the inclination of people in that region to support protectionist policies. Conversely, after the boom of the late 1940s, Alberta's perceived need for outside capital to develop its oil and gas industry strengthened support for free trade in that province. Along the way, the idea of free trade took on a kind of mythic quality among many in western Canada's business and political elite. Particularly in Alberta, many viewed free trade as an antidote to the perceived injustices of an eastern-dominated economic and political system that skewed the costs of exchange with the East while hindering the development of the West's "natural" trade links to the south. Throughout the decades, however, Alberta's appeal for free trade fell on deaf ears. When at last the idea did begin to receive support, it was because of a reconfiguration of business, regional, political, institutional, and ideological interests throughout Canada.

During and before the 1984 election, Mulroney had denied strongly any interest in pursuing free trade (see Mulroney, 1983). Yet, within a year of taking office, Mulroney met at what became known as the "Shamrock Summit" and signed with US president Ronald Reagan a trade declaration signalling the intent of their respective administrations to examine ways of reducing and eliminating trade barriers between the two countries. How did this change come about?

Ironically, the Conservative government's decision to pursue free trade was something of a bequest from the previous Liberal administration (Doern and Tomlin, 1991:31). In general, Liberal economic policies since the Second World War had moved towards greater continental integration with the United States. In the wake, however, of the Liberal's halting attempts at economic nationalism during the 1970s and early 1980s, the vehement response of the Reagan administration (Clarkson, 1985), and the disastrous recession of 1981-82, the Liberal administration began in the fall of 1981 a full review of trade policy. As part of this review, Trudeau's government established the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, headed by Donald Macdonald, "a strongly partisan Liberal and a member of the nationalist wing of his party" (Doern and Tomlin, 1991:52). The report of the Macdonald Commission, as it came to be called, would later be central both to the Tories' subsequent economic decision to pursue free trade and to the politics of the 1988 election.

During this period, however, the Liberal administration's review of trade policy gave few hints of the comprehensive trade agreement that would eventually emerge. Canadian officials, and even business leaders, were interested primarily in the possibility of enacting sectoral trade arrangements similar to the Auto-Pact. By contrast, although Ronald Reagan mentioned free trade with Canada in his inaugural address in 1981, American officials in general seemed only casually interested in trade issues with Canada. This lack of interest changed, however, with the election of the Mulroney Tories in 1984.

The Reagan adminstration had intensely disliked and mistrusted the Trudeau administration (Clarkson, 1985), but believed that it could do business with Mulroney's government. Many of the Tories, particular Mulroney and Finance Minister Michael Wilson, in turn believed that the structural problems of the Canadian economy could only be addressed by policies that reduced public and business reliance on government and returned sovereignty to the market. In the end, although the FTA did not lead the Tories' policy agenda, it was congruent with the Tory government's general economic strategy (Doern and Tomlin, 1991).

In his first budget, shortly after taking office, Wilson tabled a policy agenda that included an intent to secure market access for Canadian exports, particularly to the United States. The issue was becoming critical as, throughout 1984 and into 1985, American investigations into Canadian export practises and US protectionism both increased. In March, 1985, Mulroney and Reagan held the "Shamrock Summit." The events that would lead to the signing of the Free Trade Agreement had been set in motion.

During the following months, Canadian Trade Minister James Kelleher carried on cross-country consultations on attitudes towards a comprehensive free trade agreement. By and large, business was supportive, labour was not. During this same period, the C. D. Howe Institute produced a report in favour of free trade. In August, the majority report of a House of Commons-Senate Committee cautiously supported pursuit of an agreement. It was opposed by the New Democratic members of the Committee who offered their own dissenting report. Then, a couple of weeks later, the Report of the Macdonald Commission came out recommending free trade with the United States (Doern and Tomlin, 1991).

Doern and Tomlin note the political, as well as economic, importance of the Report:

> [Mulroney] saw immediately the opportunity it presented for a bold policy

> initiative with ready-made bipartisan support. And Mulroney relished the prospect of using a former Liberal cabinet minister to give bipartisan legitimacy to the initiative. The volumes of the report arranged on his desk, Mulroney spread his hands over them and told officials present in his office that summer day that he would use the report to beat John Turner in the next election (Doern and Tomlin, 1991:29).

Mulroney's belief in the political advantages of a free trade agreement was furthered by the support that the prospect of such an agreement began to receive from big business and the regions of western Canada and Quebec -- three core elements of the Tories' 1984 political coalition.

Big business' support for free trade resulted from more than just a fear of American reprisals. Rather, it also was the product of increased confidence among many in Canada's business community that they could compete successfully in the emerging global marketplace (Doern and Tomlin, 1991). This increased confidence had its roots in changes in Canada's economic structure that began in the wake of the economic crisis of the early 1970s.

Following that crisis, a massive consolidation of capital and industry occurred in eastern Canada through a series of mergers and takeovers. During the 1970s, an average of 380 mergers occurred per year; in 1986 this figure rose to 938; in 1987, 1,082. Moreover, the number of large transactions and total value of transactions had increased significantly (see Khemani et al., 1988:5; see also Richardson, 1992). In short, the number, value, and scope of corporate concentration in Canada increased dramatically during the 1980s, particularly during the early years of the Tories' reign. As much as these large corporations wanted ensured access for goods they were already exporting, many also desired opportunities to expand into new markets.

If big business' support for free trade was relatively recent, western Canada's, as we have seen, was historic. In the election of 1911, Laurier's "continentalist" Liberal party won 15 of 17 seats in the grain-growing areas of Saskatchewan and Alberta (see Lower, 1983). Although the region's support for free trade was more restrained by the 1980s -- a report by the Canada West Foundation in 1986 found that support for the deal varied according to the type of business, with 25 percent of businesses supportive, 68 percent indifferent, and 7 percent opposed (Canada West Foundation, 1986) -- political support for free trade, particularly in the wealthy conservative provinces of Alberta and British Columbia, remained strong. Indeed, an issue of Alberta Report in May, 1986, was headlined: "Free Trade: New Hope For The West" (AR, 1986q).

Big business and western Canadian support for free-trade was surprisingly matched in Quebec (Doern and Tomlin, 1991). There, the miracle of "Quebec Inc." had given confidence to government officials and businesspeople that they could compete in outside markets. Their support for free trade was augmented by that of nationalists eager to reduce Quebec's economic dependence upon the Canadian federal state. Hence, as negotiations began in June, 1986, the three major elements of the Conservative's 1984 electoral coalition were "on side." Even before negotiations began, however, the trade agreement was arousing passionate debate in Canada.

Supporters of the agreement argued that it opened the way for expansion into the United States's market and protection against punitive American actions of both the tariff and non-tariff variety (see Laxer, 1986). Business leaders and economists, in

particular, further argued that free trade was justified by comparative advantage, economies of scale, and consumer sovereignty (Crispo, 1988). Practically, free trade would decrease the price of consumer goods, thereby increasing purchasing, hence leading to a further expansion of Canadian plants and equipment, and a second bout of consumer and investment spending (Federal Department of Finance, 1988). Some Canadians, particularly in business, also hoped that free trade would reduce, if not eliminate altogether, the state's "interference" in the market place through such policies as FIRA and the NEP, and the welfare state in general (see Stasiulis, 1988). Finally, Canadian finance capital hoped that free trade would enhance its ability to invest in the United States without fear of American reprisal (see Doern and Tomlin, 1991).

By contrast, opponents argued that the Free Trade Agreement would eventually result in the reduction and/or elimination of social programs as businesses tried to compete with the American market. Such a deal also would make the Canadian economy even more dependent upon the United States at a time when that country's economic dominance in the world was on the wane. Finally, Canada's political, economic, and cultural sovereignty also would be lessened. In the end, the role of the Canadian state would be diminished, resulting in the fragmentation of the country and its eventual absorption into the United States (see Watkins, 1985; Laxer, 1986; Cameron, 1988).

There has perhaps never been a political debate in Canada where the two sides have been more clear-cut, the key proponents of both sides so identifiable, as the ensuing Free Trade election. The pro-free trade side formed around the Canadian Alliance for Trade and Job Opportunities (CATJO). The Alliance was heavily comprised of big business, led by the Business Council on National Issues and the Canadian Manufacturers' Association. But small businesspeople, in selected sectors and regions of the country, also joined the Alliance, led by the Canadian Federation of Small Business. Along the way, most of Canada's major economic think-tanks also lent support to the FTA. Similarly supportive were the right-leaning Tory governments of Grant Devine in Saskatchewan and Don Getty in Alberta, and Socred Premier Bill Vander Zalm in BC, as well as Robert Bourassa's Liberal government in Quebec (Laxer, 1986; Bashevkin, 1991; Doern and Tomlin, 1991).

The opponents of the FTA were equally identifiable, if more diverse. Opposing the FTA was a broad-based coalition, collectively known as the Pro-Canada Network (PCN), consisting of feminists, economic nationalists, organized labour, some farmers (particularly in the fruit and dairy industries), aboriginals, church groups, the cultural community, some small and large businesses in particular sectors (e.g., textiles) and regions, notably Ontario. The NDP government in Manitoba also expressed concerned opposition, as did the recently elected Liberal Premier of Ontario, David Peterson, and several of the Maritime premiers (see Bashevkin, 1991; Doern and Tomlin, 1991).

By the time the election was held in 1988, a clear line also had been drawn politically between the federal Tories and the Liberals and NDP. As Mulroney had predicted, the deal presented particular problems for John Turner and the Liberal party.

As we have seen, the Liberal party historically had been the party of continentalism. During and after the Second World War, under Mackenzie King and his minister of finance, C. D. Howe, the Liberal party had pursued avidly a gradualist policy of economic integration with the United States. Only briefly, under Pierre Trudeau, had

the party attempted to reverse this trend -- much to the chagrin of Turner who resigned from the cabinet at least in part because of the party's increasingly nationalist stand. Now the same John Turner was prepared to fight against free trade. For many traditional Liberal supporters, Turner's conversion to economic nationalism was too much to bear, a combination, they felt, of opportunism and/or poor judgement. When free trade became *the* issue in the 1988 election, these pro-free trade Liberals, including many Quebec Liberal MNAs and at least some Liberal MPs, felt compelled to support the deal. As a result, the Liberal party, which had been in the process of unravelling since the 1970s, entered the 1988 election as a party deeply divided, not only over the Meech Lake Accord, but also over the Free Trade Agreement.

THE ELECTION OF 1988

The "Free Trade" election of 1988, as it came to be called, signalled a revolution in the manner in which politics was carried on in Canada. Long after the election was over, the level of party financial contributions and third party involvements, and the use of the communications media and polling, would raise serious questions about how the election had been conducted.

As we have seen, business had gradually been moving away from the Liberal party and towards the Conservative party since the mid-1970s (see chapter two). Nonetheless, in most elections, business has tended to "hedge its bets" by supporting, more or less equally, both the Liberals and the Conservatives. In 1988, however, business had a clear choice between the Tories, who favoured free trade, or the Liberals, who opposed it. Given its own overwhelming support for the FTA, big business turned disproportionately to the Tories (Doern and Tomlin, 1991). Moreover, the total amount of money received, and subsequently spent or over-spent, by all political parties continued to increase.

In 1988, financial contributions to the Tories exceeded $24.5 million, $14.3 million of which came from corporations, the rest primarily from individuals. By contrast, the Liberals took in $13.2 million, only $8.4 million of which was from business, the rest again mainly from individuals. For its part, the NDP received $17.8 million, counting both federal and provincial contributions. This total consisted of $7.8 million from individuals and $9.7 million from other sources, including $2.7 million from unions (CEOC, 1988a).

But the continued increase in direct funding to political parties was only one issue coming out of the 1988 election. Making full use of the 1984 judicial ruling that had allowed third party involvement in elections, proponents and antagonists of the FTA entered whole-heartedly into the fray. An estimated $4 million dollars was spent by various extra-political organizations in the course of the 1988 campaign, including $750,000 by the Pro-Canada Network, which opposed free trade, and $1.5 million by the Canadian Alliance for Free Trade and Job Opportunities (Lee, 1989:222). Additionally, the National Citizens' Coalition spent $840,000 "exposing" the "frightening agenda" of the NDP, which opposed the deal. (The NCC was on the rise. By 1991, it would claim a membership of 39,000 and had an annual budget reported to be $2.4 million [EJ, 1991b].)

The various parties in the debate spent millions of dollars on glossy pamphlets designed to win converts to their side. Unfortunately, in many cases, these pamphlets

neither informed nor seriously dealt with the important issues. On the one hand, the anti-free trade coalition failed to address the real concerns of businesspeople that Canada's economy was threatened by increased global competiveness and American protectionism. On the other hand, the Tories and their supporters failed to calm the fears of opponents that the Agreement would result in massive restructuring and a loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs, the levelling or abandonment of national social programs, and a reduction in Canadian sovereignty (see Lee, 1989; Doern and Tomlin, 1991).

It was not the massive intrusion of money from special interest groups alone, however, that made the 1988 election unique. More than ever, polling became an integral part of political strategy (see Lee, 1989). Despite a massive and unprecedented attempt by capital to reorganize popular opinion (see Carroll, 1990), many people remained unconvinced as to the necessity of free trade, a fact shown by the volatility of public opinion polls throughout the months leading to the election (Doern and Tomlin, 1991; Richardson, 1992).

As in 1984, the quintessential moment of the campaign occurred during a public debate held in English between the three main party leaders. In 1984, Mulroney had secured victory with his savage attack on Turner's credibility. In 1988, Turner replied in kind. On October 25th, in an exchange that lasted little more than two minutes, Turner and Mulroney engaged in what many perceived to be an embarrassingly theatrical and pompous -- albeit memorable -- display of flag waving. Turner's unexpectedly strident performance electrified many voters and won many votes back to the Liberals (Lee, 1989:206) and cut into Mulroney's margin of victory. Perhaps more importantly, Turner's performance during the debate -- and the election as a whole -- preserved the position of the Liberals as the Official Opposition, much to the chagrin of the NDP and Ed Broadbent who, earlier in the campaign, had predicted that his party was about to supplant the Liberals.

As the election day approached, Canadians remained both volatile and uneasy about free trade. A Gallup poll conducted in late October, just prior to the election, revealed that there remained strong opposition to the Free Trade Agreement. While 34 percent favoured the deal, 42 percent opposed it. Moreover, 61 percent of those polled nationally believed that the United States would gain more from the deal than would Canada. This ranged from 53 percent in the Atlantic provinces to 66 percent in Ontario. At the same time, 42 percent believed that Canada would be better off if tariffs between the countries were eliminated, while 33 percent believed Canada would be worse off. In short, evidence suggests that the public was in favour of free trade *in the abstract* but was opposed to the particular deal (see Gallup, 1988e).

In the end, Canadians felt compelled to make a choice between the still-hated and floundering Liberals and the slightly less disliked Conservatives who, far more than either opposition party, possessed the reputation of being sound fiscal managers (see Richards et al., 1991, re: public perceptions of the NDP on fiscal matters). The Tories won the election, taking 169 seats (43 percent of the vote), including 63 (of 75) seats in Quebec, 46 (of 99) seats in Ontario, and 25 (of 26) seats in Alberta. By contrast, the Liberals took 83 seats (32 percent of the vote), 43 in Ontario, while the NDP took 43 seats (20 percent), mainly in the West. No other party won a seat (CEOC, 1988b).

As in the free trade debate itself, voters for the two sides were somewhat distinguishable by income and (to a degree) gender. Gallup polls, released prior to the

election, tended to show that Tory support correlated positively with increased income, although Tory support in the lower income groups was also strong (Gallup, 1988b). Another poll, released on November 19, showed that 46 percent of those in the highest income category ($40,000 and over) intended to vote Conservative (Gallup, 1988f). It is possible that greater specificity in the higher income categories may have indicated an even more significant pattern of class voting. Some evidence of this is suggested by the finding, reported in the Globe and Mail (1988b) that, in the subsequent election, the seven wealthiest ridings in the country voted Tory while the seven poorest ridings voted either Liberal or NDP.

The same Gallup polls also showed that males were slightly more likely than females (40 to 38 percent, respectively) to support the Tories and that Tory support also increased with age (47 and 41 percent, respectively, for over 50 compared with 36 percent for under 30) (Gallup, 1988b; 1988f). These findings were somewhat altered in another Gallup poll conducted shortly after the election. The poll found an even stronger gender effect (54 percent to 43 percent), with a general reversal of the age effect (Gallup, 1988g).

The same poll also indicated a significant split between the two "founding nations." Tory support was higher among those whose mother tongue was French than among those whose mother tongue was English (60 to 46 percent, respectively) (1988g). Indeed, as Resnick (1990) noted, with no little chagrin, the Tories had received barely 40 percent of the popular vote and a minority of seats outside Quebec, but the 53 percent of the vote which the party received in that province had carried the day.

Owing to the polarizing of the election around free trade and the vagaries of a "first passed the post" electoral system, Mulroney had succeeded in gaining electoral victory. His winning alliance of 1984 had been cobbled together one more time. Beneath the victory hoopla, however, there remained deep divisions within Canada's right-wing, as was made obvious by the Reform Party's performance in the election.

THE REFORM PARTY AND THE ELECTION OF 1988

The 1988 election witnessed the continuation of right-wing political fragmentation that had been occuring throughout the 1980s. That year, CoR took 41,342 votes. Another right-wing party, the Party for the Commonwealth of Canada, a shadowy organization that endorsed the conspiracy theories of now-discredited American entrepreneur and erstwhile presidential candidate, Lyndon LaRouche (G & M, 1988c) captured 7,497 votes. Then, there was the Christian Heritage Party which ran 63 candidates and took 102,533 votes (64,707 in the province of Ontario) in the same election (CEOC, 1988b).(8)

By any standard, however, the Reform Party's performance in the 1988 election was the most remarkable of any of these parties. Only one year old and running in only seventy-two western ridings -- (30 in BC, 26 in Alberta, 4 in Saskatchewan, and 12 in Manitoba) -- Reform nonetheless took 275,767 votes, or slightly more than two percent of the total national votes cast (13,281,191). Computed as a percentage of total votes cast in the western provinces (3,776,373), the Reform Party's share was a not negligible 7.3 percent. This figure rises to 8.5 percent if calculated as a percentage of the total votes cast in the contested ridings (3,240,236) (calculated from CEOC, 1988b).

Further analysis of these results delineates the pattern of Reform support. Reform Party strength was particularly pronounced in its founding provinces of British Columbia and Alberta. In British Columbia, the party garnered 4.9 percent of all votes, while, in Alberta, Reform votes accounted for a remarkable 15.3 percent of all votes cast! By contrast, the party received only 3.3 percent of Manitoba's and .7 percent of Saskatchewan's total votes cast (CEOC, 1988b).

Table 3.1

1988 Reform Party Vote, in Contested Ridings, by Urban and Rural Votes Cast

Province	Polling Station			
	Rural	Urban	Other*	Total
Manitoba	9,678	7,943	138	17,759
Sask.	3,233	587	37	3,857
Alberta	66,975	110,391	1,477	178,843
B. C.	24,962	49,330	1,016	75,308
Total	104,848	168,251	2,665	275,767

Source: Calculated from CEOC, 1988b.

** "Other" refers to "Votes cast under Special Voting Rules" and "Votes cast in the Office of the Returning Officer" (CEOC, 1988b. Neither of these categories is given a rural or urban status by Elections Canada.*

Table 3.2

1988 Reform Party Vote, in Contested Ridings, by Urban and Rural Votes Cast, as a Percent of All Votes Cast in the Ridings

Province	Polling Station			
	Rural	Urban	Other*	Total
Manitoba	5.86	2.59	2.52	3.72
Sask.	3.15	1.93	2.99	2.87
Alberta	21.43	13.08	13.23	15.31
B. C.	6.35	4.69	5.06	5.14
Total	10.77	7.54	7.03	8.51

Source: Calculated from CEOC, 1988b.

** "Other" refers to "Votes cast under Special Voting Rules" and "Votes cast in the Office of the Returning Officer" (CEOC, 1988b). Neither of these categories is given a rural or urban status by Elections Canada.*

Some additional evidence suggesting a pattern of Reform Party support can be obtained by comparing votes cast at rural and urban voting stations. Although Reform gained the majority of its votes in urban ridings, it received proportionately greater support from rural than urban residents in each of the four prairie provinces (Tables 3.1 and 3.2, above). Rural support was particularly evident in Alberta, where the Reform Party received over 21 percent of all rural votes cast as compared with 13 percent of all urban votes.

Does this mean that the success of the Reform Party in 1988 represented a return to agrarian populism alone? Likely not. While many farmers no doubt supported Reform, it is also likely that many rural supporters were employed in other (i.e., service or professional) occupations. The strength of the Reform Party in several urban areas, particularly Calgary, further argues against any description of the party as being simply an agrarian phenomenon.

The Calgary results are worth additional comment. Previously, I alluded to the extreme free enterprise political culture of Calgary, a description shared by Richards and Pratt (1979) and House (1980:110) who noted, at that time, the tendency of most people in the Calgary oilpatch to vote for the Conservative party, despite the fact that many felt that all of the existing political parties were "too socialistic." In subsequent years, people connected to Calgary's oil and gas sector grew particularly angry with federal policies such as the NEP. When their anger was not assuaged by the actions of Mulroney's Tories, some of these people (e.g., Jim Gray) sought out alternatives, including the Reform Party.

In 1988, the seven Calgary ridings returned percentages of Reform Party vote ranging from a low of 12 percent in Calgary-Centre (a low income riding) to 17 percent in Calgary West, a high income riding (CEOC, 1988b). These results lend support to the belief that the anger of people in the oil and gas industries translated itself into support for the Reform Party, a party that, not incidentally, has its head office in that city and which includes prominantly among its founding or current executives several Calgary residents, including Bob Muir, Diane Ablonczy, Cliff Fryers, and Stephen Harper -- all of whom have extensive connections to the oil and gas sector.

Nonetheless, it must be remembered that most people in Calgary do not work directly in the oil and gas industry, though their own economic conditions are no doubt influenced by it. Hence, the results at best support the notion put forward by Richards and Pratt (1979) and House (1980) that the presence of a strong, single industry -- one that is heavily foreign (American) owned -- has resulted in the creation in that city of a unique micro-political culture.

The results from other areas within the provinces, particularly Alberta, are also worth noting. In the Alberta riding of Crowfoot, the Reform Party candidate, Jack Ramsay, former head of Western Canada Concept, received 32 percent of the vote. Similarly, the riding of Wild Rose voted 33 percent for the Reform Party while, in the Yellowhead riding, 28 percent voted for Preston Manning who was running against former prime minister Joe Clark. Other high totals were obtained in Edmonton Strathcona (22 percent) where a well-known television reporter, Doug Main, ran for the Reform Party.(9) Other high percentages of vote for Reform were recorded in MacLeod (31 percent), Elk Island (20 percent), Red Deer (21 percent), and Wetaskiwin (18 percent). In British Columbia's riding of Okanagan Centre, 14 percent

voted for the Reform candidate, former Alberta Socred leader Werner Schmidt, while large percentages were also obtained by Reform candidates in Prince George-Peace River and Saanich (14 and 12 percent, respectively) (CEOC, 1988b).

Why did the Reform Party gain the relative amount of success that it did in the 1988 election? Several factors appear to have been at work. First, as we have seen, the party rode an unprecedented wave of anger towards the federal Progressive Conservatives over such issues as patronage and perceived favouritism towards Quebec. In Alberta, this anger was fueled by the province's second major recession in less than ten years.

Second, in positively detailing its own policies, the Reform Party implicitly appealed to traditional conservative voters by placing on its policy agenda such moral or normative issues as immigration, bilingualism, capital punishment, and abortion. These policies gained appeal through vagueness, a vagueness that was of additional value insofar as it could be further obfuscated by such populist slogans as "letting the people decide." Nonetheless, the majority of Reform no doubt perceived that the party's stand on these policies was essentially conservative and that, moreover, its appeal to a popular democratic policy of majoritarian rule would ensure the implementation of such a regime.

The third reason for the Reform Party's relative success in the 1988 federal election was that it was blessed with certain attributes missing from the right-wing parties of the early 1980s, notably a qualified and able executive, a degree of financial resources, and a credible and recognizable leader. The latter factor should not be underestimated. While Preston Manning was largely unknown, his name resonated with many older voters, particularly in rural Alberta, a fact sustained by the pattern of electoral support for Reform.

As remarkable as was the Reform Party's success in 1988, the fact remains that the party likely would have done even better were it not for the election's focusing around the issue of free trade. As a western right-wing party, one of Reform's major planks was the support of free trade. It had, however, several other policies up its sleave, including free parliamentary votes, referenda on major issues, senate reform, a simplified tax system, balanced budgets, an end to indirect taxes and tariffs on farm inputs, an end to discriminatory freight rates, an end to official bilingualism, tighter immigration laws, and targetted financial assistance to the needy.

When free trade became *the* issue of the campaign, however, the Reform Party found itself in a bind. Because Reform supported the Tories' Free Trade Agreement, it could only score political points against the PCs by claiming that the latter had only been "converted to the free trade position when Quebec demanded it. The West," the party's official organ (The Reformer) went on to say, "needs MPs in the next Parliament who are committed to freer trade on the basis of principle and fairness, not political expediency...." (RPC, 1988a:1).

Despite its substantial efforts to grab the free trade vote, the Reform Party fell victim to the Tories' strategy of polarization. Many western voters, particularly in Alberta, supported the agreement. While they did not like Brian Mulroney's Tories, they feared that a vote for the Reform Party would split the free trade vote, opening the door for an FTA opponent (either a Liberal or an NDP candidate) to win a seat. Hence, many potential Reform supporters likely "held their noses" and voted for the otherwise discredited Tories. The size of the Tories' resultant victory, however, served only to

mask the growing support for Reform.

CONCLUSION

The factors that facilitate the rise of a populist party are not entirely planned. More often, they are fortuitous, the result of failures originating in existing institutions and leaderships. Sometimes, the essential quality of leaders of would-be populist parties is a readiness to seize the moment.

On election night, 1988, Brian Mulroney also attempted to seize the moment:

> Canadians ... have spoken with a loud and clear voice of their desire for unity.... And that's what the election was about.... The Free Trade Agreement and the Meech Lake Accord are the chief instruments of our prosperity and unity. They constitute a brilliant affirmation of the new spirit of national reconciliation and economic renewal that benefits us all (quote taken from Lee, 1989:266).

But Mulroney's words of unity were a sham. He had tried to recreate the Liberal coalition in Tory terms, but had failed. The country, already deeply divided before Mulroney took power, was rapidly sundering along class, regional, and ethnic lines.

On the outskirts of Canada's crumbling polity, the Reform Party already had camped, ready to offer to the fleeing masses a cup of populist rhetoric and a dish of right wing policies. Formed in 1987 by disenchanted western, former Liberal and Conservative businesspeople and politicians, from the start the party had inclined towards pro-free enterprise solutions, while simultaneously appealing to traditional conservative values. Despite its populist appeal, the Reform Party's range of latitude, ideologically, had since become even more constrained, its policies shaped and molded by Preston Manning and an in-group of the largely Calgary-based western political and economic establishment. How far could the party go, however, riding the wave of political discontent? Could it broaden its appeal, becoming perhaps a national force, without losing its western right-wing base? Could it, in short, create a broad-based political coalition? These were but some of the questions facing Preston Manning and the Reform Party as 1988 drew to a close.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE LEGITIMATION OF REFORM

"...'Old Canada' ... is dying.... Can we define a New Canada to replace the Old Canada...?" (Preston Manning, in a speech to the Saskatoon Assembly, April 6, 1991 [1991b:2 and 18]).

INTRODUCTION

The appeal of populist parties and movements is to an historically, geographically, and culturally constituted people whose sense of "peoplehood" is threatened by "outside" elements. As such, the ideological arguments underpinning the party's *raison d'etre* also resonate with history, even as the party deals with issues that, ostensibly, seem to deal with the current organic crisis.

The two years following the 1988 election saw the occurrence of a series of events which not only shattered the Tory coalition but seemed also to threaten Canada's existence. Shortly after the 1988 election, Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa brought in Bill 178, overriding a decision of the Supreme Court that had ruled unconstitutional the province's law prohibiting the use of English on outdoor signs. Bourassa's action reawakened animosities among many in English-speaking Canada who felt that French-speaking Quebecers were imposing unilingualism in Quebec while demanding bilingualism elsewhere. Thus began a series of events which would culminate in the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990.

The failure of the Accord, however, was not the only incident to plague the Canadian body politic during this period. In the spring of 1990, a recession began which further eroded the legitimacy of the Canadian state and of the existing polity, leading many Canadians to believe that -- in Preston Manning's words -- "Old Canada was dying."

In the midst of the resultant legitimation crisis, the Reform Party gained in political stature by offering people outside of Quebec a vision of a "New Canada." This chapter examines the events that led many to question Canada's survival. It examines also Manning's explanation for the failure of the "Canadian experiment," linking this explanation, and the Reform Party in general, to a uniquely Anglo-Canadian brand of nativism. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of two elections that, in the immediate aftermath of the 1988 election, elevated the Reform Party to a place of prominence in the eyes of the Canadian electorate.

GREY AND WATERS: GAINING A PLATFORM

The mood of Canadians as 1989 began was already uneasy. The Tories had won the Free Trade election, but polls showed that a majority of Canadians still wanted the policy put to a referendum. Other Tory policies, such as the proposed implementation of a Goods and Services Tax (GST) and the Meech Lake constitutional agreement, were increasingly coming under intense criticism. There also remained intense anger and mistrust directed at Brian Mulroney, affecting his capacity to form necessary political coalitions. These intense feelings soon translated themselves in the West into two significant political victories for the Reform Party.

The first occurred in the northeastern Alberta riding of Beaver River. Five days after the 1988 election, the newly-elected Tory MP, John Dahmer, died of cancer. Dahmer had won the election handily. The Reform Party candidate, Deborah Grey, a thrity-six year old, straight-talking, gospel-singing school teacher with strong anti-abortionist views and a political pedigree that included a great-uncle who shared British Columbia's Coalition leadership from 1947 to 1952 and a great-grandfather who was a former BC Liberal MP, had finished fourth with 4,150 votes (Manning, 1992:184-85; Zwarun, 1992).

By-elections, however, are notoriously different from regular elections. Unlike regular elections, by-elections allow voters the chance to protest against a government's policies without (usually) bringing it down. Just as the election of WCC's Gordon Kesler in the Olds-Didsbury by-election of 1982 allowed voters to register a protest against federal and provincial policies (see chapter two), the Beaver River by-election allowed voters in that riding the chance to protest against Mulroney's Tories. With free trade assured, voters looked to the candidate whose election would most "shock" the current polity. That candidate was Grey.

Campaigning, in particular, against the proposed Goods and Services Tax (GST) and the Meech Lake Accord and in favour of the Triple-E Senate (see RPC, 1989b), Grey rapidly gained the support of voters in the riding. When the by-election was held on March 13, 1989, Grey took 11,154 votes. By contrast, the second-place Tory candidate took 6,912 votes, while the Liberals and NDP received 2,756 and 2.085 votes, respectively.

A short while after Grey's victory, the issue of Senate reform gave the Reform Party another boost. As we have seen, the idea of Senate reform had grown steadily in the West over the years. Despite the Tory's victory in 1988, discontent with Mulroney's government remained high. This discontent was based in large part on the perception that the Tories, like the Liberals before them, were captive to the interests of central Canada. By 1989, many westerners had come to believe that the powers of an unresponsive and largely eastern-based polity could only be curbed by a reformed Senate.

When one of Alberta's constitutionally allotted Senate seats became vacant, premier Don Getty announced that it would be filled through an election to be held on October 16, 1989. Traditionally, Senate seats have been filled through appointments made by the federal government chosen from a list of names of candidates provided by the provincial governments. Never previously had a Canadian Senator been elected.

Getty's decision to introduce a modicum of democracy into the process was heralded by democrats everywhere. It particularly won him accolades in Alberta where, since taking over leadership of the governing Tories from Peter Lougheed in 1985, support for the party had noticeably declined. Despite winning an election in March of 1989, taking 59 of 83 seats, the party had received only 44 percent of the popular vote (Chief Electoral Officer of Alberta, 1989). Moreover, Getty, himself, had been defeated and only re-entered the legislation following a by-election victory in the "safe" rural riding of Stettler. Ominously, the Tories also gradually were being shunted-off to Alberta's rural hinterland -- the same fate that had befallen Social Credit before its defeat in 1971. Getty's decision to hold a Senate election therefore appears, at least in part, to have been an attempt to bolster his party's sagging political fortunes by laying claim to a popular political issue.

Be that as it may, the ensuing election provided a further opportunity for voters "to send a message" to Ottawa. The election drew an impressive group of candidates (see EJ, 1989c), including the Reform Party candidate, Stanley ("Stan") Waters.

A man of strong conservative convictions regarding fiscal and law and order matters, but somewhat more liberal moral opinions -- unlike Grey, he was pro-choice on abortion (see EJ, 1989d) -- Waters was born in Winnipeg on June 14, 1920. Raised and educated in Edmonton, he later joined the Canadian army and had a distinguised military career, eventually rising to the position of lieutenant-general before his retirement in 1975 (EJ, 1991g). Waters subsequently returned to Calgary where he became a senior executive of Fred Mannix's business empire. Befitting his military background, Waters was a straight-forward man of action who rapidly carved out a prominant status in the business world (EJ, 1991h). By 1980, Waters was president of the Calgary Chamber of Commerce (EJ, 1989d). Like so many others in the Reform Party, he was also a member of the National Citizens' Coalition and the Fraser Institute. The business connections he made during these years proved useful during the Senate election as vast sums of money flowed into his campaign from the corporate establishment, including such people as A. J. Child and Francis Winspear (see Dobbin, 1991, especially p. 92; also Manning, 1992:202-04 regarding Waters's background).

By the time the Senate election was held, the Reform Party was already ensconced in Alberta public opinion as a legitimate vehicle for political reform. Moreover, the election occurred during a period of increasing public anger over the federal Tories proposal to implement a regressive consumption tax, the Goods and Services Tax (GST). Although generally favouring the GST, the Reform Party quickly got in front of popular opinion on the issue, and even subsequently gave token leadership to public protests against the tax measure (see RPC, 1990). In the end, Reform's ability to turn public discontent over the GST into political support for its candidate resulted in Waters handily winning Canada's first Senate election (see Manning, 1992:209 regarding the importance which he attaches to the GST issue in Waters's election). Waters received nearly 260,000 votes compared with second-place finisher (Liberal) Bill Code's 140,000 votes (EJ, 1991h).

The impact of Waters election to the Senate was magnified during the following months by Brian Mulroney's delay in appointing him to the Upper Chamber. Mulroney viewed the election as a high-handed attempt by the Alberta government to force Senate reform upon the federal government and the members of the House of Commons. His refusal, however, to respect the will of the people was widely viewed as undemocratic. The non-appointment of Waters was a public relations gift to Reform, as noted by Stephen Harper:

> I remember Stan Waters calling me the night he won and saying, "Do you think Mulroney will appoint me?" And I said "no." He said, "Well, what can we do to get him to appoint me." And I said, "Nothing. You're more valuable to us as a martyr." And I was right. It became a fundamental question of democracy, and a colossal blunder on Mulroney's part... (Harper, 1991:5-6).

Waters became, in effect, a living symbol of Canada's apparently failing democracy.

Over the next two years, before his death in the fall of 1991, Waters became a key

part of the Reform Party's team. Waters and Grey became complementary bookends for Preston Manning as his entourage moved from town to town, and city to city across the country.

The elections of both Grey and Waters were entirely fortuitous -- the former resulting from the death of a Tory MP, necessitating a by-election, the latter resulting from the political machinations of Don Getty who had hoped to use the Senate election as a means of boosting his own increasingly unpopular government. Nonetheless, Reform's victories provided the party with a degree of instant respectability and, perhaps more importantly, a federal platform from which to observe and comment on the national crisis which would soon destroy Mulroney's fragile political alliance and engulf the country in a mood of national despair.

REFORM, MEECH LAKE, AND THE RECESSION OF 1990-92

As we have seen, Brian Mulroney and the Tories had won re-election in 1988 in large measure because of the Meech Lake Accord and the Free Trade Agreement. These twin policies had won the support of the core elements of the Tory coalition of 1984 -- Quebec nationalists, big business, and the western, particularly Albertan, petite bourgeoisie -- while simultaneously polarizing and fragmenting the opposition Liberals and New Democrats. Despite the Tories margin of victory in 1988, however, support for the party was shallow. Moreover, they forgot, or ignored, the fact that political legitimacy requires constant nurturance; that legitimacy is not something won, once and for all, at election time, but must be reconstructed on a frequent basis if it is to be possessed at all.

Instead, the years that followed saw Mulroney's Tories often pursue policies for which there was no clear popular mandate and to which, indeed, there was often substantial opposition. In the spring of 1990, the resultant public perception that the Mulroney government was autocratic, arrogant and manipulative fueled long-simmering ethnic, regional, economic, and political grievances to bring about the collapse of the Meech Lake Accord. As I will show, the public vitriol surrounding the Accord's provisions and its demise provided the seed-bed for Reform's immediate rise to national prominence.

Concerns regarding the Meech Lake Accord were present from the beginning (see chapter three). Opposition to the Accord became even more pronounced, however, as the three year deadline approached for provincial ratification. A remarkable aspect of this opposition -- and one which Mulroney's Tories in Ottawa and Bourassa's Liberals in Quebec ignored at their peril -- was its disparate nature.

Indeed, Canada's diversity, which supporters of the Accord viewed as making its compromise provisions necessary, was a hallmark of the Accord's detractors. For example, federalists and many on the left in English-speaking Canada viewed the Accord as overly decentralizing a system already dangerously balkanized. Conversely, provincialists in English Canada, bent on using the agreement's treatment of Quebec as a means of prying further powers from Ottawa, complained that the Accord didn't respect the equality of the provinces. The territories, meanwhile, complained that the Accord would be used by the existing provinces to perpetuate the north's second-class status within Confederation. While anti-French bigots in English-speaking Canada viewed the Accord as a "sell out" by Ottawa to Quebec, nationalists in that province condemned it as a

"sell-out" by Bourassa's government of the French historical "fact." And minority groups, particularly natives and women, viewed it as neglecting their concerns and entrenching inequalities.

The Reform Party -- whose Vancouver assembly in 1987 was held, ironically, at virtually the same time as the Accord was formally signed -- both grew out of and tapped into discontent with the Accord. As the 1988 election approached, Reform had concentrated on free trade. Nonetheless, opposition to the Meech Lake Accord remained a consistent part of Reform's agenda, differentiating it from the three major political parties. "The Reform Party is the only party that calls for the withdrawal of the deeply flawed Meech Lake Accord and an end to granting 'special status' for Quebec" (RPC, 1988b). It is important to understand Manning's, and reformers, in general, opposition to the Accord.

According to Manning (1992:239), the Accord's "flaws" involved "the top-down, closed-door approach to constitution making," "the rigid amending formula," and the Accord's "lack of substantial assurances that real progress would be made" regarding Senate reform. There is some substance to Manning's charges. It is unlikely, however, that any or all of these issues alone would have led to substantial opposition to the Accord and, ultimately, its failure. Rather, at the heart of much opposition to the Accord in English-speaking Canada, and among Reform supporters in particular, was the agreement's clause recognizing Quebec as a "distinct society." In Manning's (1992:240) words:

> Behind ... the distinct society clause was a fundamental question, not fully explored during the Meech Lake debate, which will be at the heart of any future attempt to rewrite the Canadian constitution: will we achieve constitutional unity by insisting upon the *equality* of all Canadians and provinces in the constitution and in federal law, or by guaranteeing *special status* to racial, linguistic, cultural, or other groups?

In the end, Manning and his followers believed that the Accord threatened the principle of *absolute* individual and provincial equality, elevating Quebec to a status above that of other provinces and potentially hindering the rights of others.

This belief, which I will explore later in more depth, was festering throughout English-speaking Canada as 1989 began. It grew when the federal Tories, Liberals, and New Democrats, and the various provincial governments, failed to deal with the issue head-on. Concerns over the exact meaning of "distinct society" were only heightened by official statements that, alternatively, told Quebecers that the Accord gave them real powers, then told people in the rest of the country that the Accord was purely symbolic.

This obfuscation soon led to the perception among many English-speaking Canadians that they had not been told the whole truth about the impact of the Accord. Some reactionary elements in English-speaking Canada used this official ambiguity as proof that "the French" were "once more" being given special privileges. Bigotry and fear went searching for an old enemy: bilingualism.

Throughout the fall and winter of 1989-90, under the guise of "fiscal restraint," forty municipalities in Ontario, and several in Manitoba, declared themselves unilingual English. In the fall of 1989, also, a handful of APEC supporters in Brockville, Ontario repeatedly wiped their feet on a Quebec flag. Captured on film, the incident was

repeatedly re-broadcast on Quebec television throughout the spring of 1990, resulting in the expected and also filmed stomping of the Canadian flag by young Quebec nationalists. This symbolic "tit for tat" could not have come at a worse time: the Meech Lake Accord was already in danger of failing and, no matter the rational arguments for why it should or should not have failed, the incidents added an unnecessary emotional content to the already explosive situation.

Sensing the increasing hostility to the Accord throughout English-speaking Canada, Preston Manning and the Reform Party stepped up their campaign against the Accord, in particular its granting of "special status" to Quebec. At the party's third assembly held in Edmonton in October of 1989, Manning's key-stone speech stated what has remained the party's stance on Quebec ever since. Drawing upon an analogy previously used by both Jesus Christ and Abraham Lincoln, Manning's speech, entitled "Leadership for a House Divided," stated:

> Either all Canadians, including the people of Quebec, make a clear commitment to Canada as one nation, or Quebec and the rest of Canada should explore whether there exists a better but more separate relationship, between the two.... Our clear preference is for a united Canada in which Quebec is prosperous and culturally secure.... If, however, we continue to make unacceptable constitutional, economic and linguistic concessions to Quebec, at the expense of the rest of Canada, it is those concessions themselves which will tear the country apart (quoted in Manning, 1992:223-24).

Manning's phraseology is ambiguous. What does "more separate" mean? Does it mean "totally separate"? Or does it suggest a kind of "asymmetrical federalism"? For many in English-speaking Canada, however, Manning's conditions were clear: Quebec would either have to accept a status of absolute equality with the remaining provinces or it would have to leave the federation.

By January, 1990, the Accord clearly was in trouble. Manning stepped up his attacks on the Meech Lake Accord, demanding that the Alberta legislature withdraw its support for the agreement as a means of pressuring the federal Tories to appoint Stan Waters to the Senate (EJ, 1990c).

Despite growing opposition, however, the Accord only could be legally overridden by a failure of provincial ratification. By early 1990, only three provinces -- New Brunswick, Manitoba, and Newfoundland -- remained to ratify the Accord, but the political circumstances of each had changed dramatically since the agreement's signing in 1987.

In New Brunswick on October 13, 1987, Richard Hatfield's Conservatives lost every seat in going down to defeat to Frank McKenna's Liberal party. McKenna, who had opposed the Accord before the election, immediately began to press for changes to the agreement which would ensure protection of minority language rights and the removal of the notwithstanding clause (Cohen, 1990). While this was occurring, events were also transpiring elsewhere.

In March, 1988, the minority NDP government in Manitoba went down to defeat on a motion of non-confidence. The subsequent election saw the Tories under Tuxedo MLA Gary Filmon win a minority government. The rejuvenated Liberals, led by Sharon

Carstairs, became the official opposition while the NDP, under new leader Gary Doer, came third with only 12 seats (Cohen, 1990).

The election of Filmon was even more significant than the election of McKenna. Filmon had vigorously opposed the extension of French language rights in the province in the early 1980s, an opposition which had won him many votes in the 1986 election. He was, thus, beholden to the anti-French vote in the province. Moreover, although he initially supported the Meech Lake Accord, Filmon's support was itself shallow: he had hoped that his support might curry favour with his federal cousins. Hence, when the Accord ran into real problems, Filmon lacked either the electoral base or the principled will to continue the fight.

The Accord's real opponent in Manitoba, however, was Carstairs. A friend and confidant of Jean Chretien, who had become by then the favourite in the race to replace John Turner as Liberal leader and who, himself, strongly opposed the Accord, Carstairs viewed the agreement as involving a significant devolution of federal powers. Following the federal election in November, 1988, Doer took a similar position. Although his predecessor as leader of the NDP, Howard Pawley, had signed the Accord in 1987, Doer felt that the now certain passage of the Free Trade Agreement combined with the Accord to doubly threaten Canada's national social programs.

Hence, when Filmon rose in the Manitoba legislature on December 16, 1988, to speak to the introduction of the bill ratifying the Meech Lake Accord, his political support was precarious. Nonetheless, his speech that day was unqualified in its support for the Accord.

By coincidence, the day prior to Filmon's speech had seen the Supreme Court of Canada rule as unconstitutional Quebec's Bill 101 which prohibited the use of English on outdoor signs. Two days later, on December 18, pressed by Quebec nationalists, premier Bourassa announced that he would invoke the "notwithstanding clause" in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to override the Supreme Court decision.

Bourassa's decision was immediately condemned outside of Quebec and threw a monkey-wrench into the already difficult Manitoba debate. Faced with insurmountable opposition, both inside and outside the legislature, Filmon withdrew Manitoba's ratificiation bill the next day. Thereafter, he would join with Carstairs and Doer in opposing the Accord and demanding changes (see Cohen, 1990).

In Newfoundland, the Conservatives had already ratified the Accord when they were defeated on April 20, 1989 by the Liberals led by Clyde Wells. Like Carstairs, Wells was a staunch Trudeau-Liberal and opposed the Accord as a threat to national unity. On April 6, 1990, Wells' government rescinded Newfoundland's approval for the Accord, demanding that it be re-opened for negotiation. The Accord was in real jeopardy with only weeks to go before the ratification deadline (see Cohen, 1990).

For months, Mulroney had refused to hold a first ministers' conference to deal with the problems with the Accord. The Accord, said Mulroney, could not be re-opened. Those who opposed the Accord were threatening the break-up of the country. Failure to ratify the Accord would be, in Mulroney's words, a rejection of Quebec, leading to that province's secession from Canada. In this hyperbolic vein, Mulroney made constant speeches warning the Accord's chief opponents -- Wells, McKenna, and the Filmon/Doer/Carstairs triumvirate -- of the dire consequences that would befall the country should they fail to ratify the agreement. It was a high risk strategy that ultimately back-fired. Mulroney's interpretation of motives and events, including

repeatedly insisting that Quebec had been "rejected" during the constitutional negotiations of 1981, fanned the flames of separatism in Quebec, while enraging people outside of Quebec who felt that they were being bullied and their legitimate concerns ignored (see Angus Reid analysis in EJ, 1991i; also Cohen, 1990).

As the deadline for the Accord's ratification approached, Mulroney at last called for a meeting of the first ministers. The meeting was, as he later admitted, a "roll of the dice" designed to add further pressure to the dissenting premiers. The ensuing meeting was viewed by many as a sordid display of political brinksmanship, and ultimately brought into further disrepute the Accord and Mulroney's Tories, in particular, and Canadian politics, in general.

Between June 3 and June 10, 1990, Mulroney and the ten provincial premiers met privately in Ottawa, appearing only infrequently to describe for the television cameras their progress in deciding the future of Canada. Excluded from the process, many Canadians watched with growing anger and apprehension as day by day, hour by hour, fatigued and overwrought ministers came outside to give their side of the events transpiring.

Inside, the dissenting premiers were under relentless pressure to reach an agreement. As Mulroney had anticipated, the sheer weight of numbers, the importance of the issue -- "the fate of Canada" -- and fatigue started to wear on the intransigent minority. Before the meeting, McKenna's opposition to the Accord had already begun to wilt in the face of political pressure from the Acadian population within his province. Filmon's opposition, as we have seen, was luke-warm in any case. In consultation with Doer and Carstairs, however, Filmon finally agreed to bring the Accord forward for public hearings and a vote in the Manitoba legislature. Wells, whose opposition to the Accord was perhaps the most principled of any of its opponents, was the toughest nut to crack, but in the end he too agreed to put the Accord to either a provincial referendum or a vote of the legislature. The Accord appeared to be saved (see Cohen, 1990).

It was clear, however, that the mood of many Canadians had been soured by the entire incident. An Angus Reid-Southam News poll conducted shortly after the Ottawa meeting found that only 18 percent of Quebecers and nine percent of non-Quebecers thought that the Accord was a good deal. Still, for reasons of both fatigue and fear of the consequences of rejecting it, the majority of Canadians (55 percent) wanted the Accord passed (poll results reported in EJ, 1990d).

In the days following the Ottawa meeting, however, support mounted in English-speaking Canada for a rejection of the Accord. Preston Manning and the Reform Party joined in calling for the Accord's rejection. Speaking in Brandon, Manitoba, Manning stated:

> ... the people of Manitoba and Newfoundland ... have got [a] real opportunity to pass judgement on the Meech Lake accord now.... Our hope would be that Manitobans would feel free to reject the accord and the top down pressures that were used to pressure your politicians over the last week (EJ, 1990e:A3).

In the end, Manning got his wish.

Believing that Newfoundland was being manipulated into being held accountable for the Accord's defeat, Wells eventually rescinded a decision to place the agreement for a

vote before the Newfoundland legislature. In even more dramatic fashion, a previously little known native Manitoba NDP MLA, Elijah Harper, withheld agreement to proceed immediately with legislative debate on the Accord. Harper's refusal delayed a vote on the Accord, making impossible its ratification before the appointed deadline (see Cohen, 1990; also AR, 1990c).

In a case of supreme irony, the day following the death of the Meech Lake Accord -- June 24 -- was Quebec's national holiday. As could be anticipated, the recent events added renewed fervour to that year's nationalist celebrations. While the rest of Canada looked on via television, Quebecers turned out *en masse* to declare their intentions to pursue independence. The cameras, of course, captured the requisite scene of a Canadian flag in flames.

That same day, in a second bout of irony, Jean Chretien was named the new Liberal leader replacing John Turner. For, in choosing Chretien as their leader, Liberals picked a francophone Quebecer who was overwhelmingly disliked in his home province, but supported in English-speaking Canada while, on that day, Brian Mulroney -- an anglophone Quebecer -- might well have been the most despised man in all of English-speaking Canada, even as he still retained enormous support among Quebec's francophone population.

For their part, people in English-speaking Canada were consumed by a range of emotions. Mostly, however, the events of Meech Lake had left them numb. With trepidation and some fear, they asked: What would happen now? What political leader or party could they turn to at this time of apparent crisis? Underlying all of these questions was an even more fundamental one: Would Canada survive?

The answers were not immediately forthcoming, certainly not from Mulroney's Tories or the other elements of Canada's political establishment. Bourassa announced that Quebec would no longer attend interprovincial meetings. Some of the other premiers, believing perhaps, like many Canadians, that the country was dying, declared their intentions to have first dibs at the carcass.

As other politicians dove for cover, only Preston Manning (and the separatists in Quebec) stood up, unscathed. Uninvolved directly during the growing carnage, Manning was in a good position now to say "I told you so!"

> Meech Lake was dead for a long time. The deal, its supporters and the way it was done were all totally discredited. The question was, would it die now or have to be revealed as unworkable a few months from now (AR, 1990c:10).

But the resultant sense of crisis was also exploited by Preston Manning and the Reform Party during the months that followed to further delegitimate the traditional political parties. With the rise in strength of the separatist Bloc Quebecois, the Reform Party especially began to play upon the fears of English-speaking Canadians that the traditional parties were about to "sell-out" to Quebec in order to buy constitutional peace. Of Mulroney and Tories, for example, Manning stated:

> Mulroney is hopelessly compromised. He is in the most blatant conflict of interest anyone could find himself in. If he presumes to negotiate Quebec's separation on Canada's behalf, it wil be like Quebec negotiating with itself. This is totally unacceptable (Manning, quoted in AR, 1990d:11).

And again (regarding Mulroney and Chretien):

> They're seen as having a profound conflict of interest on this issue. As long as you're playing for votes on both sides ... you can't be trusted by the rest of Canada to articulate its interests (Manning, quoted in EJ, 1991j:A12).

As for the NDP:

> They're going to have to choose. Either you represent the rest of Canada in this, or you represent Quebec. But you can't represent both (Manning, quoted in EJ, 1991j:A12).

In short, Manning and Reform exploited the Meech Lake crisis to further discredit the existing political parties.

What effect did the Meech Lake controversy have upon Reform Party success? We may use Preston Manning's "House Divided" speech to the Edmonton assembly in October, 1989 as a benchmark for measuring the effects of opposition to Meech Lake upon the party's support. A Gallup poll taken in November, following the Edmonton assembly, showed that opposition to the Accord, nationally, stood at 31 percent, up from 18 percent the previous January (Gallup, 1989a). The November poll showed that opposition was particularly high on the prairies (45 percent) and in BC (46 percent) (Gallup, 1989b). Significantly, a Gallup electoral poll, taken that same month, showed that Reform support stood at 16 percent support on the prairies and 14 percent in BC (Gallup, 1989c).

In January, 1990, Reform support stood at four percent nationally, the majority of this support being centred on the prairies and in BC (Gallup, 1990a). During the next few months, however, as the deadline approached for the ratification of the Accord and as opposition to it grew, Reform began a slow rise in the polls.

Between February and May, 1990, Reform support nationally rose by one percentage point each month (Gallup, 1990b, c, d, e). The rise was particularly dramatic on the prairies where, in May, 26 percent of respondents announced their support for Reform (see Appendices A, B, and C). That same month saw opposition to the Accord, nationally, reach its highest recorded level (42 percent). Opposition remained particularly high on the prairies (52 percent) and in BC (46 percent) (Gallup, 1990f).

Being correlational, the evidence does not allow for causal inferences. It is difficult, therefore, to state with certainty the effect of Reform's opposition to the Accord upon the level of party support. Indeed, it is likely that general hostility towards both the Tories and the other traditional parties, arising from other, cumulative issues, also underpinned much of Reform's rise in support during this period. Nonetheless, the Meech Lake controversy was the salient political event in Canada during the first six months of 1990. It is also known (see chapter five) that both Reform Party members and supporters tended to hold strongly negative views regarding Meech Lake Accord well into the following year. Under these circumstances, we can infer that Reform's consistent opposition to the constitutional agreement, while not swaying the degree of public opposition -- it remained at a high level throughout this period -- won the party

support from many in English-speaking Canada who saw themselves, and their vision of Canada, as having been betrayed by the traditional parties.

Over the next two years, there would also be meetings, hearings, reports -- the Spicer Commission, the Belanger-Campeau Committee, the Allaire Report, the Beaudoin-Dobbie Commission, various provincial hearings, etc. -- all of them designed to address complaints arising out of Meech Lake process that "the people" had not been informed or consulted on the constitution. Despite these actions, however, there remained a sense that a constitutional solution would not be found, that this time Canada's historic scars, re-opened by Meech Lake, could not be healed. Whereas, in June, 1990, only 20 percent of Canadians believed that the country was in danger of breaking up, less than a year later this number had risen to 80 percent (see Angus Reid analysis in EJ, 1991i).

Moreover, English-speaking Canada appeared to be growing less willing to accommodate Quebec's differences. An Angus Reid poll, conducted in September, 1991, found that opposition to distinct society status for Quebec had risen to 63 percent, up from 56 percent in May, 1991 (reported in EJ, 1991k). Likewise, support for official bilingualism began to drop throughout Canada. In 1986, three-quarters of Canadians supported official bilingualism (Angus Reid analysis in EJ, 1991i; see also results of CBC-Globe and Mail and Environics polls in EJ, 1991l). The failure of the Accord, however, led many Canadians outside of Quebec to believe that the country was breaking up and that the policy of bilingualism had failed to hold the country together. Between 1990 and 1991, the percentage of Canadians believing that bilingualism was a failure rose from 59 to 63 percent, while those believing the policy was a success dropped from 31 to 22 percent (Gallup poll reported in EJ, 1991m). Canada's "two solitudes" seemed to be drifting inexorably apart.

The failure of Meech Lake in June of 1990 was only the first in a series of crises, however, to afflict Canada's political system that summer. Soon, a conflict between the Mohawk community in Oka, Quebec and its neighbouring white municipality over the proposed use of disputed land to make a golf course resulted in an armed stand-off that lasted for nearly two months. The sight of federal soldiers being sent in to disarm heavily fortified native warriors shocked, angered, and saddened Canadians from coast to coast. Coming on the heels of Meech Lake, the incident reinforced the feelings of many Canadians that the country was coming apart, riven by ethnic, regional, and linguistic differences. The incident also smugly comforted some elements in English-speaking Canada who simultaneously gloated over Quebec's "problem" with its own "distinct society." The hopelessness felt by many Canadians was reinforced by the perceptions that the Tory government in Ottawa, stunned by the defeat of Meech Lake, had lost its direction.

By September, the Oka crisis was competing for public attention with events in the Middle East following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, while in the House of Commons, a critical debate on the government's proposed Goods and Services Tax (GST) got under way. But of all the crises that Canada faced after the Meech Lake debacle, none was more damaging to the country's collective psyche, and to the legitimacy of the Tories, than the recession that followed. In the end, the effects of the recession upon Canadians' confidence in the Tories, and the failure of the other existing parties to replace Mulroney's government in the hearts and minds of some members of the electorate, paved the way for another surge in Reform support.

The material effects of the recession of 1990-92 upon Canada can be measured in

various ways. The unemployment rate, 7.5 percent in 1989, rose to 8.1 percent in 1990 (Alberta Bureau of Statistics, 1991). Throughout the following year, the unemployment rate hovered around 10.5 percent. The average number of Canadians unemployed each month rose 308,000 to 1,417,000 (G&M, 1991b) in 1991 and was still 1.42 million Canadians (10.3 percent) in November of that year (Statistics Canada, reported in EJ, 1991n). But these figures told only part of the story. As the recession wore on, many more Canadians simply dropped out of the workforce altogether and, hence, went uncounted in the official statistics (G&M, 1992a; EJ, 1992a).

As unemployment rose and consumers had less money to spend, small and large business also began to suffer. In 1989, total bankruptcies (and proposals) in Canada had been 38,436. In 1990, this total rose to 55,424 (FCCA, 1991c). In 1991, the figure rose again to a record 75,773 bankruptices (reported in EJ, 1992b).

The recession also negatively, and perhaps permanently, affected the overall shape of the Canadian labour market. In August, 1991, Statistics Canada announced that total employment in Canada had decreased by 254,000 jobs (or almost two percent) over the previous year. More importantly, however, 442,000 full-time jobs (almost four percent) had disappeared, adding to concerns that a structural shift was taking place away from full-time, high-wage, skilled positions towards part-time, low-wage, unskilled and semi-skilled employment (reported in G&M, 1991c; see also Krahn, 1992). Moreover, the overall trend continued into 1992, as Statistics Canada figures released in May showed that Canada had lost 141,000 jobs during the first quarter of that year, even as the American economy showed signs of recovery (G&M, 1992a).

Throughout the period of recession, repeated government predictions that the economy was on the rebound (see Privatization Minister John McDermid's comments in EJ, 1991o and Finance Minister Don Mazankowski's comments in EJ, 1991p, as reported by Southam columnist Eric Beauchesne) were constantly belied by other economic statistics which showed that the recovery was, at best, shakey. Canada's gross domestic product (GDP) during this period revealed the tentativeness of any recovery. Over the four quarters of 1990, the growth rates in the national GDP went from +2.2 to -0.6 to -1.1 to, finally, -4.9. It started 1991 at -4.7, then rebounded to +5.7, then fell again to +0.9, and settled to end the year at an even "zero" (G&M, 1992b).

Moreover, unlike previous recessions, the recession of 1990-92 was not confined to one geographic area of Canada. Rather, it equally devastated the industrial heartland of Ontario (G&M, 1991c), the agricultural lands of the prairies, and the oil fields of Alberta, while bringing even more hardship to the "have-not" areas of the country left reeling in the wake of federal cutbacks in transfer payments.

In short, the recession of 1990-92 was both severe and widespread. What was the effect of the recession upon the Canadian political scene? In particular, what was the effect of the recession upon the fortunes of the Reform Party? In order to answer these questions, it is important first to examine the political effects of the recession upon the ruling Tories and the other contenders for federal office, the Liberals and the NDP.

As Clarke and Kornberg (1992) have recently noted, Canadians are generally more apt to bury than to praise governments for changes in national and personal economic circumstances. The recession, beginning in 1990, devastated the public image of the Tories as sound fiscal managers and otherwise undercut support for specific party policies such as the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the Goods and Services Tax (GST). How much blame did the Tories -- or these policies -- deserve for the effects of the

recession?

In truth, some of the public's blaming of the Tories was unfair. Canada was not alone in experiencing an economic downturn during the period 1990-92. The United States and much of Europe also experienced downturns during this period, part of a worldwide restructuring viewed with almost benign indifference by some economic theorists (see, for example, Ohmae, 1990).

Moreover, the reasons underlying the recession's particularly adverse impact upon Canada were complex, involving historic, geographic, political, economic, and ideological factors (see Clement and Williams, 1989; Porter, 1991; Laxer, 1991; Drache and Gertler, 1991). The more immediate failure of the Liberals in the 1970s and early 1980s to develop a truly *national* economic policy, combined with a heavy debt-load from the earlier recession of 1981-82, had left the Canadian economy in particularly precarious shape when the Tories came to power in 1984.

Nonetheless, the Tories can be criticized justifiably on several counts. They had first won election in 1984 in large part because they were able to convince voters that they were better fiscal managers than the discredited Liberals. And, indeed, the first two years of Tory reign had been relatively bouyant for the Canadian economy as Canada rode the coat-tails of a recovery spurred by American government military expenditures -- what Whitaker (1987:4) once accurately described as "Keynes-in-khaki."

Arguably, however, these first two years were also the period during which the Tories sowed the seeds for much of the country's -- and their own -- later fiscal problems. Following the 1984 election, Mulroney's Tories possessed a massive majority in the House of Commons. They also had widespread public support. Moreover, the prosperity that had preceded them into office, and continued throughout 1984-86, provided the opportunity for the Tories to begin to control and otherwise pay down the gross federal debt (GFD) which stood at $181 billion (in constant dollars) in 1984, or 52.3 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) (Statistics Canada, 1991).

But, like the Liberals before them, the Tories avoided fiscal restraint (Bercuson et al., 1986; Hoy, 1987; Sawatsky, 1991). Certainly, the government made a tentative bow in the direction of the kind of trickle-down economic policies implemented elsewhere (see Whitaker, 1987; Chodos et al., 1991), giving enormous tax breaks to corporations and wealthy Canadians, while shifting the burden of taxation to lower income, primarily middle class, wage earners (Federal Finance Department statistics released in February, 1991 reported in EJ, 1991q; see also Ej, 1991c). But, to the consternation of some supporters, the Tories also retained much of the welfare state infrastructure established by the Liberals. Similarly, the Tories were criticized by some for increasing public spending in some non-essential areas (building roads, prisons, etc.) purely to curry public favour (see Bercuson et al., 1986). Finally, others suggested that tax cuts to the wealthy combined with increased government spending were precisely the wrong prescription for the economic times.

In effect, the Tories ignored John Maynard Keynes's dictum that governments should spend during lean times, thereby stimulating the stagnant economy, and exercise tight money policies during boom times, thereby controlling inflation while using the appropriated monies to also pay down the previously accumulated debt (Keynes, 1936; see also Lekatchman, 1966:246-65; Heilbroner, 1953). Instead, they increased expenditures and overstimulated the economy during a period of economic plenty, while

leaving untouched the gross federal debt (GFD).

By the end of 1986, the GFD, in constant dollars, stood at $224 billion, or 59.7 percent of the GNP. By the election year, 1988, the GFD, in constant dollars, had risen to $254 billion, or 63.7 percent of GDP (Statistics Canada, 1992). By then, the window of opportunity for dealing with the debt was closing, and, in any case, no sitting government attacks a deficit during an election year. Indeed, few of the parties mentioned the federal deficit during the Free Trade election. Perhaps the most outspoken party regarding the GFD was the Reform Party which called for a reduction in federal government spending (RPC, 1988c).

When Canada subsequently was hit by the recession, the Tories' room for fiscal manoeuvring was genuinely constrained by the federal debt. Moreover, as the Tories slipped in public opinion polls, the party also lost political manoeuvrability. The 1988 election had badly polarized Canadian society, cementing the Tories' relationship with big business (Doern and Tomlin, 1991; Chodos et al, 1991) even as it isolated the government from some other sectors of the public. The Meech Lake Accord had only furthered the government's isolation, resulting in many of its traditional small "c" conservatives going over to the Reform Party. In an effort to regain the support of this element, Mulroney's government brought in a series of conservative economic initiatives, including tight money policies, hiring and wage freezes in the public service, the slashing of government programs and spending, the privatization of crown corporations, and the de-regulation of business (see the Tory budget for 1991, reported in EJ, 1991r; also changes in the provisions of the Public Service Reform Act, reported in EJ, 1991s).

Arguably, these economic policies, designed to reduce the federal debt and win back public approval, ultimately strangled the economy, prolonged the recession, and further damaged the reputation of the Tory government, while having little or no effect upon the deficit itself. Moreover, in pursuing their policies, the Tories also undercut the positive effects accruing from, and support for, their most important achievement: the Free Trade Agreement (see Clarke and Kornberg, 1992, on this point).

The timing of the implementation of the FTA, coming only months before the onslaught of the recession, was enough to bring the agreement into disrepute, particularly in the hard-hit manufacturing region of Ontario. But support for the Agreement, and the Tory government, also was severely damaged by the Tories' over-selling of the economic benefits of the trade pact during the 1988 election. As the recession wore on and unemployment rose, Tory promises that the FTA would create 120,000 new jobs within five years, while protecting existing jobs (Federal Department of Finance, 1988), came back to haunt the government. Similarly damaging were Mulroney's largely unfulfilled promises, also made during the election, of "generous" unemployment and retraining programs to offset the deal's negative effects.

Yet, despite these notable political imperfections, and ignoring broader issues of cultural and political sovereignty, the Free Trade Agreement might theoretically have still been economically advantageous to Canada, allowing Canadian companies to increase exports to the United States during this period. Critics argued, however, that, in order for this to occur, three conditions needed to be present. First, sufficient low-interest capital had to be made available to Canadian manufacturers with which to re-tool. Second, the value of the Canadian dollar had to be kept low enough in order to keep exports cheaper than American domestic products. And third, Canadian and US tax

regimes had to be similar (see Drache's comments in EJ, 1991t; also Drache and Gertler, 1991). But these conditions were not met, nor, perhaps, could they be. For, to have brought in similar tax regimes would likely have required the downward harmonization of social programs in Canada that opponents of free trade had warned would happen. At the same time, increasing world economic interdependence placed limits on the Tories' use of monetary policies to shape Canada's economy. In short, Mulroney's government was constrained both by political realities at home and by the dynamics of economic realities abroad.

In the end, the federal Tories, in conjunction with the head of the Bank of Canada, John Crow, opted to keep interest rates above ten percent and the Canadian dollar around 89 cents US for much of 1990-91. While the high rates retained capital in the country, they also had the disastrous and counter-productive side effect of increasing the government's cost of servicing the GFD. Finally, the Tories also introduced the Goods and Services Tax (GST), a tax which raised consumer prices, thereby changing the level playing field created by the FTA into one tilted in favour of the American states.

This being said, the logic behind implementation of the GST was reasonable. The GST was meant to replace the existing Manufacturers Sales Tax (MST) of 13 percent, thereby allowing Canadian exporters to compete more effectively with American companies in the post-free trade environment. The GST also was designed to increase government revenues by broadening the base of taxation and lessening the opportunities of tax evasion. At the same time, the government hoped that a consumption tax would create an incentive for taxpayers to save and invest in the economy. Finally, the Tories viewed a consumption tax as a means of levelling the tax treatment between domestic and imported goods, while not increasing the cost of exports (Federal Department of Finance, 1989:5-6).

Coming in the midst of the recession, however, the tax only further constrained the circulation of money in the economy while, politically, the manner of the tax's implementation proved a further blow to the credibility of the Tories. Already viewing themselves as unfairly burdened by personal tax increases, Canadian voters became more and more restive as the GST moved closer to enactment. The loudest GST protests occurred in Alberta where opponents of the tax attempted (and succeeded in one case) in taking over the riding associations of several Tory MPs (see EJ, 1990f; and followup in EJ, 1991u). The New Democrats and Liberals pounced on this growing popular discontent. Both political parties knew that public opinion polls showed the tax to be widely unpopular, a fact also noted by policy makers within the Reform Party who soon appropriated popular opposition to the GST (see EJ, 1990g; also EJ, 1990h) and even led several anti-GST rallies, including one in Winnipeg that attracted a thousand people (RPC, 1990b).

Seemingly inexorable, however, legislative passage of the GST moved forward. Armed with a massive majority comprised of cowed and compliant MPs, Mulroney's government easily passed through the House of Commons the motions necessary to have the tax made lawful. Soon, the GST required only Senate approval.

In May, however, a Gallup poll revealed that 68 percent of Canadians wanted the Senate to block implementation of the tax (Gallup, 1990j). Faced with two despised alternatives -- a hated, regressive tax vs. a hated, undemocratic Senate -- the public came down on the side of the Senate. Bouyed by this and similar results, the Liberal-controlled Senate made it increasingly obvious that it intended to at least stall, if not

stop, passage of the GST. The Liberals knew a good political issue when they had one and, led by Jean Chretien who had only recently replaced John Turner as leader, were spoiling for a fight. The fight was joined readily by Reform's Stan Waters, who had recently been appointed to the Senate.

Mulroney's government was in desperate straits. With the Meech Lake Accord having recently collapsed, and trailing badly in popular opinion polls (20 percent in an August, 1990) (Gallup, 1990k), it seemed now that the party was also in danger of losing control of its economic agenda. Faced with this situation, Mulroney took an unprecedented action. Relying on an obscure and never before used legal technicality, in September he expanded the Senate by eight seats and filled them with loyal Tory/GST supporters. The hated tax was soon passed into law, but not before the Senate descended into a comic farce of derisive shouts, horn blowing, and pompous posturing by both sides.

The GST incident further soiled the senate's reputation and increased demands for either its reform or abolition. Insofar as the Reform Party had clearly staked its claim as the chief proponent of senate reform, the GST squabble served to further legitimize the party while simultaneously adding to the discredit of Reform's chief rival, the Conservatives. In September, 1990, the Tories slumped to 15 percent in national opinion polls (Gallup, 1990h). Support for the party would remain in the mid-teens well into the next year. At the end of 1991, the Tories were still at 16 percent in the national opinion polls (Gallup, 1991d). The country was still in recession, unemployment remained in double digits, bankruptcies were occurring in record numbers, and the gross federal debt (GFD) now stood at 66 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) (Statistics Canada, 1992a).

Clarke and Kornberg's (1992) study suggests that the recession, and the Tories' perceived handling of it, was the major factor resulting in the party's loss of public support. Combined with other evidence that the majority of Reform supporters are former Tories (see chapter five), we can infer that the recession, in turn, was a major factor in Reform's gains over the following two years (see Appendices A, B, and C). Of equal importance to Reform's success, however, was the failure of either of the Liberals or NDP to take advantage of the crisis of legitimation suffered by the Mulroney Tories to increase or deepen their own support.

The Liberals -- Canada's traditional "natural party" -- had not recovered yet from its devastating defeats in 1984 and 1988. Divisions within the party between those who supported unbridled free enterprise and those who continued to support the welfare state were becoming more evident, as was continued friction between former federalist supporters of Trudeau and those who believed in more provincial power and/or special status for Quebec. The party's fortunes were particularly desperate in its traditional fortress of Quebec where many viewed Jean Chretien as a lap-dog to English-speaking Canada who had long ago betrayed that province's birthright. But much of the West also viewed the Liberals with suspicion. This was particularly the case in Alberta where both memories and the myth of the the National Energy Program had only grown over time, and where, moreover, the Liberals still lacked an effective party organization. Added to these problems was the fact that the party still possessed numerous debts incurred during the previous election.

For its part, the NDP remained a largely untested quantity. In the fall of 1989, the widely popular Ed Broadbent stepped down as leader and was succeeded by Audrey

McLaughlin. A year later, following the collapse of Meech Lake, the NDP was in first place in the national polls (Gallup, 1991l). But this support was soft, bouyed by the party's surprise victory in Ontario in September. As usual, voters tended to view the NDP as well-meaning but untrustworthy in its economic policies (see Bradley, 1985; Richards et al., 1991). Moreover, it had no following in Quebec. Over the next two years, any hopes that the Ontario victory might provide a springboard for the national party were dashed as political inexperience, the negative effects of the recession, and an unrelenting attack by business and its supporters, notably the National Citizens' Coalition (see The Financial Times of Canada, 1992), damaged the public's estimation of the Ontario NDP. Although the NDP won impressive provincial victories in Saskatchewan and BC in 1991, the problems of its Ontario party hounded the fortunes of the federal NDP. In early 1991, the NDP began a slide in national public opinion polls that would see the party hit an eight-year low of 16 percent by August, 1992 (Gallup, 1992c).

In summary, the recession, following in the wake of the Meech Lake fiasco, added further to the sense of crisis felt by many Canadians. When this sense of crisis went unrelieved by the traditional political parties, some elements of the electorate took a second look at the policies, proposals, and personalities of the Reform Party, coming to believe that Canada, as they had known it, was, in the words of Preston Manning, "dying."

PRESTON MANNING'S "OLD CANADA"

Laycock (1990:18) has suggested that "any populist project ... must be integrated into a structure of meanings and connotative associations existing in 'the people's' historical experience." The chief architect of this structure for the Reform Party is Preston Manning. Manning, who prides himself on being a student of history, has spent years devising the historical underpinnings for an understanding of why Old Canada has failed and why a New Canada must arise. Before proceeding (chapter five) to examine the specifics of the Reform Party's vision of New Canada, it is worthwhile to first examine Manning's analysis of the roots of the "problem" of Old Canada.

The most complete description of Manning's version of the history of Canada is in his recently published autobiography (1992:300-305). Manning begins his account with the war between the French and English:

> Following the battle between the English and the French on the Plains of Abraham, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 created the province of Quebec and tried to integrate its economy and institutions into the British system. This attempt failed, so in 1774 the Quebec Act allowed the Quebecois to retain certain distinct institutions.... When Loyalist migration to Canada created conflict within this system, the British settlers were granted a distinctive province and constitution of their own in the Constitution Act of 1791.
>
> In his famous report [1839], Lord Durham said he perceived two nations (the English and the French) warring in the bosom of a single state.... His proposed solution was to attempt to force the assimilation of the Quebecois by the English element by forcing a tighter political integration between Lower Canada ... and Upper Canada....

> The Act of Union of 1840 thus integrated Upper and Lower Canada into one colony, the colony of Canada.... The testimony of history is that the arrangement, whatever its intentions, didn't work, for the same reasons that the attempt to govern Canada today as an equal partnership between two unequal groups isn't working (1992:301).

At this point, it is useful to stop and analyze Manning's argument. From his bare-bones review of Canada's constitutional history, Manning derives three essential "lessons." First, English and French-speaking Canada are historically "unequal." While the use of the word "unequal" might, quite correctly, refer to their relative political power, it is clear that Manning primarily wishes to convey the notion that the English and French communities are "different" or "distinct" from each other. The essence of Manning's meaning is further suggested by his otherwise frequent reference to Durham's metaphoric description of the two nations.

Manning's second lesson, drawn from history, is that attempts to assimilate the two groups or, presumably, any sufficiently large and historically-constituted people, is doomed to failure. A negligent reader might, at this point, put down Manning's book, assuming that the author must therefore be willing to advocate a somewhat looser Canadian confederation comprised of both a French and English "nation." The reader is advised to continue.

> By the 1860s, these institutions and arrangements were in chaos, and the politicians were desperately seeking a solution. The solution they came up with was the Confederation of 1867.
>
> ... Confederation came about largely because of the failure of the "two nations"concept (1992:302).

But had not (Manning just said that) the "two nations" had been Durham's finding, and the Act of Union an attempt to assimilate them? In short, did not confederation come about *in response to attempts to assimilate* the two nations? Again....

> On the one hand, the BNA Act was an act of union.... On the other hand, the BNA Act was also an act of separation in that "the Parts of the Province of Canada ... which formerly constituted respectively the Provinces of Upper Canada and Lower Canada shall be deemed to be *severed, and shall form two separate provinces*" (italics in text).
>
> In other words, the Fathers of Confederation worked to create new constitutional arrangements and structures, which sought to bypass the discredited concept of a partnership between the English and the French, rather than to perpetuate it.
>
> Macdonald and his associates clearly wanted to end the "two nations" problem, not by the political and constitutional integration of French and English institutions, but by the creation of a new nation from sea to sea which itself

> would be part of yet a larger entity, the British Empire. The only "special status" granted to Quebec was that of a province free to preserve its language and culture with the provincial powers allotted to it. It was left to the government of Quebec to deal with the "two nations" problem at the provincial level.
>
> If subsequent generations of politicians had left the problem of French-English tension within the provincial confines to which the Fathers of Confederation had relegated it and expanded and built on the new foundation of Canada as a federation of provinces rather than a federation of founding peoples, Canada might not be in the dilemma it is today. But unfortunately this was not to be (1992:302).

Some readers may feel confused by Manning's interpretation of Canadian history. Manning first admits the existence (before 1867) of "two nations," and goes on to say that the BNA Act granted Quebec "special status" in some areas in order to preserve its continued existence as one of those nations. He also has previously admitted that attempts to assimilate the Quebec nation have been the source of constitutional problems. In the next breath, however, Manning then upholds a notion of Canada as one, decidedly British, nation "from sea to sea." The image is of a Quebec nation denied, from the start, of the possibility of growth; of a minority group whose survival is dependent upon the sufferance of the majority. Indeed, Manning appears to suggest this elsewhere in his biography when he states that, rather than demanding fair treatment from the majority, minority groups should define and achieve "a sovereignty of the spirit, not confined to territory or political institutions, [relying] in the strength of that sovereignty to exert a significant influence on the majority culture" (1992:106-07).

But how accurate is Manning's account of what the Fathers of Confederation saw as the status of the French nation in the new country? It is true that many of the English "Fathers," such as George Brown were leary of French -- more particularly, Catholic - influence. Still, it is far from clear that they saw Canada as the "melting pot" suggested by Manning. This point is made clear by the eminent historian Donald Creighton:

> ... though the new nation was intended to be strongly unified, it was none the less based upon a cultural diversity. There were two main ethnic groups in the Dominion -- French and English; there was a great variety of religions; any attempt ever made to assimilate these minorities had been given up long before 1867. The Fathers of Confederation accepted the principle that a limited number of safe-guarding clauses should be put into the British North America Act to protect minority rights without sacrificing national unity.... The scope of these guarantees should not be exaggerated; but, at the same time, they were important principles of national unity. *The new nation was to be based on a broad spirit of cultural tolerance and goodwill* (1944 [cited in revised edition 1972:311], my italics).

In short, Creighton rejects the view, held by Manning, that the BNA Act was designed to ensure that the French nation would "wither on the vine." More accurately, this had been the intent of the Act of Union of 1840.

Manning's account of Confederation is inadequate in other ways. Readers lacking knowledge of Canadian history would conclude from his remarks that Confederation resulted solely from English-French tensions. It is true that ethnic-based sectional squabbles were problematic and led to the collapse of several Canadian governments before 1867. In fact, however, economic and military considerations were at least as important as political factors in the forging of Confederation (see Careless, 1970; Creighton, 1972; Laxer, 1991). Britain's pursuit of free trade after 1846 had left its British colonies in North America without a secure market. When the subsequent Reciprocity Agreement with the United States was abrogated by that country's government in 1866, the British colonies pursued Confederation, at least in part, as a means of establishing a secure domestic market (see chapter three). An additional factor behind Confederation was the American military threat following the end of that country's Civil War. Let us continue, however, with Manning's interpretation of history following Confederation:

> As each new western province after British Columbia was added -- Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta -- there was a controversy as to whether the constitutions of those provinces should provide special status for the French minority in the areas of education and language. These provisions were promoted by federal politicians of the old two-nation school and provincial politicians from Quebec, and generally resisted by western politicians, who fully embraced the new vision of one nation from sea to sea (1992:303).

Ignoring his minor chronological error regarding the period of entry of Manitoba into Confederation, Manning's account of western settlement is otherwise somewhat misleading. In suggesting that "only" federal and Quebec politicians advocated the protection of minority rights, he implies that the groups themselves were not active in seeking out these protections, a claim that seems scarcely tenable.

Just as Manning views minorities as lacking any "moral" claim to protection from the majority, so too does he appear to view minorities as having no proper recourse to "the rule of law." The legal rights of the French and Catholic minorities in both Manitoba and the Territories (later Saskatchewan and Alberta) were abrogated illegally by the majority during the years 1890-92 (see Creighton, 1944; Careless, 1953; Lower, 1983 for accounts). When finally overturned by the Supreme Court in the 1980s, the governments of these provinces continued to balk at the symbolic, if impractical, redressing of the historic wrongs.

Finally, note should be made of Manning's seemingly innocuous reference to "the new vision of one nation from sea to sea." During much of the 19th century, immigrants to Canada came from the British Isles or, later, with the closing of the American frontier, the United States (International Labour Office, 1929:360-61). The vision of Canada was, in truth, that of a decidely *Anglo-Saxon* nation. It was this vision, carried by Anglo-Saxon elements in Canada West, and supported by the authoritative demands of the Globe and George Brown (see Waite, 1977), that spearheaded settlement of the West in the mid-1800s.

Politically and economically dominant, the Anglo-Saxon settlers subsequently impressed Anglo-Saxon Protestantism upon the western region, partly because they wished to avoid the sectarian (French-English, Catholic-Protestant) conflicts that they

felt had beset Upper and Lower Canada, and partly because they firmly believed in the natural (biological) superiority of the Anglo-Saxon "race" and its institutions (see Palmer, 1982; Palmer and Palmer, 1990). As a result, non-Anglo-Saxons already residing in the region, or those who arrived thereafter, were under strong pressures to conform to the dominant culture. This was particularly the case in Alberta. Describing Alberta's opinion leaders in the early part of this century, Palmer and Palmer note that:

> Virtually all subscribed to the tenets of Anglo-conformity, or the belief that it was the obligation of newcomers to conform to the already fixed values and institutions of Canadian society. These assimilationist assumptions [were] clearly revealed in the popular campaign against French-language rights and Roman Catholic schools in the 1890s [in Manitoba and the Territories]. In the public opposition to bilingualism, the argument was consistently made by politicians and the press that "if the French were to receive language rights, why not Norwegians, Germans, Icelanders, and Hungarians" (1990:78-79).

It is of more than passing interest that this same argument is sometimes advanced today both by Reformers and many western Canadians in general. Now, as then, however, the argument is specious. For Manning, and his followers, Canada's values, institutions, and practices are Anglo-Saxon and Christian (if not Protestant), the end product, in their view, of a kind of "natural selection."

Following from this latter premise, attempts by either groups or governments therefore to thwart this process of natural, cultural selection are not only an interference with the rights of the majority but ultimately are doomed to failure. Manning hints at this point in the next section of his historical review, to which I now turn:

> ... after the disintegration of the British Empire and the emergence of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec, Lester Pearson established the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and revived the concept of Canada as an equal partnership between two founding races, languages, and cultures -- the English and the French....
>
> This vision was pursued with vigour by Prime Minister Trudeau, and it continues to shape the thinking of the current prime minister [Mulroney]....
>
> The revival of the concept of Canada as an equal partnership between founding races was doomed from the start.
>
> .... A nation built on a union of the French and the English is a country built on the union of Quebec and Ontario, in which the other provinces are little more than extensions of Ontario.
>
> .... It largely bypasses the constitutional concerns of Atlantic Canada, western Canada, northern Canada, aboriginals, and the twelve million other Canadians who are of neither French or English extraction (1992:303-04).

Manning's estimation of the size of Canada's non-English-French population is somewhat inaccurate. Although the figure of twelve million is roughly correct if one counts only those who are not *solely* of French and/or English extraction, the number of Canadians, of either single or multiple ethnic origin, who are not to any degree English or French is only 6,325,775 (calculated from 1986 census data obtained from Statistics Canada, 1990).

Beyond this rather minor point, however, Manning's use of the term "race" seems needlessly inflammatory. While there is no doubt that many Canadian figures historically viewed various peoples according to races, there is no current, legal justification for his suggestion that Pearson and Trudeau revived the "concept of Canada as an equal partnership between two founding races." At base, the actions of those Liberal governments can be viewed as meant to address a practical political problem: how to prevent Canada's two major linguistic groups from drifting further apart.

One might argue the benefits of official bilingualism, particularly when weighed against the economic and political costs of its implementation (see Richards, 1992; Fontaine, 1992). But neither Manning's, nor the Reform Party's (see Reform Party, 1991a:32-3), territorial solution to language and culture adequately addresses the problem of Canada's "two solitudes." In particular, it does not appear to deal effectively with the role of language policy in federal jurisdictions.

In other respects, Manning's argument also can be viewed as rather duplicitous. While, at first glance, he *seems* to be demanding equal status for those who are *neither* English nor French, practically he is *actually* calling for a more culturally homogeneous (Anglo-Saxon) Canada outside of Quebec. The accuracy of this depiction of Manning's stance is supported by Reform's continued attacks on such policies as multiculturalism, and the anger of Reform Party members over Sikh members of the RCMP being able to wear turbans. Far from advocating that cultural and ethnic minorities have legitimate "constitutional concerns," Manning in fact seems to want to define out of existence any political, economic, and social differences between groups. (Indeed, as Sharpe and Braid [1992] note, the idea of collectivities of any sort are anathema for Manning.) In Manning's view, and that of most Reformers, "collective differences" are a "problem," a belief he makes plain in the subsequent paragraphs:

> Reformers believe that going down the special status road has led to the creation of two full-blown separatist movements in Quebec and to the proposal of the Quebec Liberals to emasculate the federal government as the price of keeping Quebec in a non-confederation. It has led to desires and claims for "nation status" on the part of hundreds of aboriginal groups, claims which, if based on racial, linguistic, and cultural distinctiveness, are just as valid as those of the Quebecois, if not more so. It has led to a hyphenated Canadianism that emphasizes our differences and downplays our common ground, by labelling us English-Canadians, French-Canadians, aboriginal-Canadians, or ethnic-Canadians -- but never Canadians, period.
>
> In other words, this road leads to an unbalanced federation of racial and ethnic groups distinguished by constitutional wrangling and deadlock, regional imbalance, and a fixation with unworkable linguistic and cultural policies to the neglect of weightier matters such as the environment, the economy, and

international competitiveness (1992:304-05).

It is useful, in summary, to tease out the "lessons" which Manning draws from Canadian constitutional history:

1) Majorities must rule; minorities have no moral, or presumably legal-historical, claims to special treatment. The latter's continued existence depends on the sufferance of the majority and/or the general workings of market selection.

2) Sufferance is possible because, as Manning appears to define it, the majority is not a cohesive group, but consists instead of individuals who may not coercively act in unison. Likewise, market decisions are individual. Hence, individuals, who may otherwise be nominally part of the majority, will support and retain minority values, etc., *if these are perceived as having a value.*

3) Hence, although French-speaking Quebec and English-speaking Canada are different, the former, by dint of its minority status, cannot continue to demand protection for its distinctiveness and still be part of Canada. Quebec must either cast its fate to market forces, thereby risking assimilation to the dominant Anglo-Saxon, Englisl speaking culture, or it must secede.

4) The same argument follows for natives and other minority groups, except that they have no option of secession.

In the wake of the collapse of the Meech Lake Accord and the recession that subsequently hit the Canadian economy, some in English-speaking Canada began looking for an explanation of the crisis. Manning's explanation, glittering with the broken shards of a fragmented popular history, reflected back to many people, particularly those within the once dominant Anglo-Saxon culture, their unconscious interpretation of the source of the problem: that Canada was in trouble because too many people, particularly Quebecers and other minority groups (natives, Asian immigrants), were demanding their individual "rights" at the expense of the majority. Differences were being accentuated instead of similarities, leading to a lack of social direction and purpose.

Manning's analysis of Canada's "problem," and his resultant "solutions," are not new, but mirror similar explanations given in the past when the country has been in crisis. Moreover, they lie at the heart of a peculiarly Anglo-Canadian nativism that has frequently arisen during similar periods of crisis in the country's history.

THE PECULIARITY OF ANGLO-CANADIAN NATIVISM

Nativism is a conjunction of nationalism with prejudicial attitudes based on ethnicity, religion, and/or race (Palmer, 1982). Nativist attitudes generally arise among previously dominant social elements during times of social, political, and economic crisis, suggesting a possible link to relative deprivation, discussed earlier (see chapter two). The demand of nativist groups is for increased conformity to the historically-based traditions and customs common to the territory (Leonard and Parmet, 1971).

American historians first coined the term to describe the attitudinal configuration of such groups as the "Know-Nothings" in the mid-19th century (see Leonard and Parmet, 1971) and the various "America First" movements that arose during the same century (Crapol, 1973). Nativism also lies, at least implicitly, at the heart of

Hofstadter's (1955) critique of populism. Indeed, nativism is a particular aspect or form of the more general phenomena of populism.

Unfortunately, few attempts have been made to apply the concept of nativism to Canadian history. Among notable exceptions are Berger's (1976) examination of Canadian imperialism in the late nineteenth century, Palmer's (1982) study of nativism in Alberta's history, and Robin's (1991) recent examination of right-wing nativism in Canada during the years prior to the Second World War.

As in the United States, nativism in Canada has revealed itself historically in the majority's "opposition to an internal minority on the grounds that it posed a threat to Canadian national life" (Palmer, 1982:7). In particular, visible minorities, such as the Chinese and Japanese on the west coast, Catholics and the French on the prairies, and Jews in the East, at various times have been deemed "threats."

Historically, however, the nationalist content in Canadian nativism has been different from that of its American counterpart. Whereas American nationalism traditionally has attached itself to the territorial, and often imperial, ambitions of the state, Canadian nativism has more often involved a trans-national appeal to the commonality of Anglo-Saxon peoples.

The reasons for this difference are, initially, historical. The United States was born of revolution. The revolution allowed Americans, despite their common heritage with Britain, to separate psychologically from the parent country. Although Americans often have carried on a love-hate relationship with Britain (see Crapol, 1973), nonetheless their identity has attached itself to the national, territorial goals of the United States -- an attachment made easier by the fact of that nation's enormous economic and political power.

By contrast, Canada had no such formative event, although segments of the population can point to certain defining moments in their history. French-speaking Quebecers, for example, can point to the Battle of the Plains of Abraham as the time when their "nation," in the sociological sense, was born. And a similar sense of "nationhood" appears to be reemerging among Canada's indigenous peoples.

English-speaking Canada, however, experienced no such event. Far from breaking with the mother-country, its ties to Britain strengthened after the American Revolution from the arrival of the United Empire Loyalists. The result was the still-birth of any unifying vision of a territorially-based and distinctive nationalism in the English-speaking colonies.

With the retreat and/or eviction of the French culture to its provincial citadel, British North America succumbed to a peculiar form of nationalism that Berger (1976) has termed "Canadian imperialism." This imperial nationalism came in two varieties. The first, nurtured by the Loyalists in Ontario and found in writers such as Stephen Leacock, viewed Canada as a corner of the British Empire; the second, fertilized, particularly in western Canada, by an open-border for goods, people, and ideas, was continentalist, viewing Canada as merely a pale facsimile of the American Republic. The former viewed the British connection as the only hope against annexation into the United States; the latter viewed annexation as inevitable and perhaps even desirable. In the 19th century, the idea that a third alternative -- full independence -- was achievable was either rarely discussed or quickly dismissed.

The debate as to Canada's future gained renewed vigour every time the British colony faced a crisis. The Confederation debates of 1864-67 revolved around the two

"imperialisms" (Waite, 1963; 1977). That Canada lacked a single unifying identity was bemoaned eloquently by Christopher Dunkin during those Confederation debates:

> We have a large class whose national feelings turn toward London...; another large class whose sympathies centre here at Quebec...; and yet another whose comparisons are rather with Washington; but have we any class of people who are attached, or whose feelings are going to be directed with any earnestness, to the City of Ottawa, the centre of the new nationality that is to be created? (quoted in Hamilton, 1952:144).

The same debate over whether Canada was -- or could become -- a genuine nation state defined by a coherent and distinctive cultural identity also underlay the reciprocity election of 1891 (see Careless, 1953) -- prompting Goldwin Smith's Canada and the Canadian Question, discussed in chapter three.

A typical upper class product of mid-century England, Smith viewed with pride his Anglo-Saxon heritage. In particular, he lauded this heritage as having given birth to liberal democracy. But he viewed the United States was his culture's future. Smith's conviction that America was, in Underhill's 1960:88) words, "the hope of the English-speaking race" was reinforced following a trip to that country in 1864.

In Smith's eyes, English-speaking Canada stood intermediate to its British past and its American future, lacking any distinctive identity of its own. Especially after immigrating to Canada in 1871, Smith espoused his belief that the French-speaking nation eventually would assert its independence while English-speaking Canada would recognize its affinity with the broader Anglo-Saxon world and would, thence, join the United States.

The debate as to whether British or American imperialism would frame Canadian identity occasionally arose thereafter. With the collapse, however, of the British Empire at the end of the Second World War, the matter was all but settled. Few people willingly would hitch their sense of identity to a falling star. By contrast, America was ascendant. Moreover, the war had solidified economic ties between Canada and the United States. Under Mackenzie King and subsequent Liberal governments, economic and political ties with the United States only grew stronger. In a sense, the flag debate of 1965 represented the final symbolic act in Canada's escape from British colonial status.

The debate, however, over Canada's identity did not end there. By the 1960s, a new territorial nationalism was arising in English-speaking Canada. Spurred by the Vietnam War and scenes of racial unrest and urban decay in the United States, many Canadians came to believe that their country had to carve out a distinctive identity. The road to the new Canadian nationalism necessarily involved both economic independence and a willingness to forego traditional French-English divisions. Hence, the widespread support for such policies as bilingualism and economic nationalism.

Opposing the new nationalists were the imperial nationalists, both remnants of the British type and continentalists of the American variety, whose allegiance to Anglo-Saxon cultural institutions, including a belief in liberal democracy and free enterprise, was deeply entrenched.(1) These imperial nationalists are the bearers of a tradition of "peculiar" nativism in English-speaking Canadian history. For, while nativism elsewhere involved prejudicial attitudes and actions directed towards minorities perceived as threatening the national territory or nation state, *nativism in English-*

speaking Canada has tended instead to fasten its loyalty to the wider Anglo-Saxon culture rather than to the territorial notion of Canada.

It is important to emphasize that Anglo-Canadian nativism is not solely, nor even largely, a response to the francophone presence in Canada. During the 19th century, immigration came primarily from the British Isles (International Labour Office, 1929), hence posing little threat to English-speaking Canada's predominantly Anglo-Saxon culture. But the early years of this century saw changes to this pattern of immigration. Moreover, these changes accelerated following the Second World War.

By 1958, the trend away from British immigration to Canada was evident. That year, 124,851 immigrants arrived in Canada. Of these, 24,777 (20 percent) came from the British Isles, 75,598 (60 percent) from other European countries, and 24,476 (20 percent) from assorted other countries (Government of Canada, 1961:185). But changes in the origin of immigrants were accelerated, beginning in the 1960s, by a series of administrative changes including the removal of national origin restrictions in 1962, the introduction of a point system in the Immigration Act of 1967, and a closer alignment of immigration to labour market needs during these and subsequent years (Logan, 1991).

In 1978, for example, 14 percent of immigrants came from the British Isles, 21 percent from other European countries, and 65 percent from other countries. 32 percent of all these immigrants settled in western Canada, mainly in Alberta and British Columbia (all statistics calculated from Statistics Canada, 1981a:155-56). In response to criticism from some Canadians regarding the arrival of a large number and percentage of "non-traditional" immigrants, and to the recession of the late 1970s, the Liberals gradually reduced immigration during the years following 1974. In that year, 218,465 immigrants had come to Canada, but only 88,302 arrived in 1984 when the Liberals left office (Statistics Canada, 1992b).

Despite this, many Canadians on the right criticized the Liberals as a party changing the cultural make-up the country (see Andrew, 1977; also Brimelow, 1986). Indeed, as shown in chapter two, anti-immigrant feeling and outright racism constituted at least some of the appeal of the right-wing fringe groups that arose in the early 1980s. Both these extreme elements and more moderate Canadians nonetheless threatened by the increased cultural and ethnic heterogeneity of Canadian society looked to Mulroney's Tories, when they came to power in 1984, to reverse what they perceived as, in Gairdner's (1990:389) words, "the silent destruction of English Canada."

Instead, beginning in 1986, the Tories began to increase immigration levels. That year, 99,219 immigrants entered Canada. In 1987, this total increased to 152,098; in 1988, 161, 929; in 1989, 191,886 (Statistics Canada, 1992b). Perhaps more alarming for Tory supporters was the accelerated rate of non-traditional immigrants entering the country. In 1989, 50 percent of immigrants to Canada originated in Asia (primarily Hong Kong, the Philippines, India, China, and Lebanon), 26 percent in Europe (including the British Isles), 13 percent in the Caribbean and Central and South America, 7 percent in Africa, 3 percent in the United States, and 1 percent in Oceania. 15 and 11 percent of all immigrants settled in British Columbia and Alberta, respectively. The percentage of Asian immigrants settling in BC was slightly higher than elsewhere, with fully 65 percent of immigrants in Vancouver coming from that continent (Logan, 1991).

The changed pattern of Canadian immigration following the 1960s, and the

perception held by some Tory supporters that the party had "betrayed" them in accelerating immigration, particularly from "non-traditional" countries, provides a necessary backdrop to an examination of the nativist leanings of Reform supporters. If the Reform Party is a reflection of traditional English-speaking Canadian nativism -- if, indeed, the party is impelled, at least in part, by perceived changes in Canada's cultural "heritage" -- then we would expect that Reform's leadership, members, and supporters should, by contrast, be predominantly Anglo Saxon and Protestant.

Anecdotal evidence has suggested previously that this is the case (see Braid and Sharpe, 1990; Sharpe and Braid, 1992; Dobbin, 1991). Consider, also, the overwhelmingly "Anglo" background of those key people who have influenced the party's formation: Brimelow, Brown, Burns, the Byfields, Chapman, Copithorne, Fryers, Gray, Grey, Harper, the Mannings, Muir, Roberts, Somerville, Waters, Winspear. (The names even read like a collection of Fleet Street barristers.) But is there any empirical evidence identifying the ethnic and religious backgrounds of Reform members and supporters?

The answer is "yes." In 1991, I attended the Reform Party convention in Saskatoon. While there, I administered fifty-five questionnaires to a sample of party members (Harrison, 1991). While the results of these questionnaires will be examined more fully in chapter five, some findings bearing on ethno-cultural background can be given here.

Of those reporting their religion (n-55), 40 (73 percent) indicated that they were Protestants. Of those answering to a question regarding ethnic identity (n=44), 20 (45 percent) indicated that they were Anglo-Saxon or Celtic, while another 14 (32 percent) answered "Canadian," and one "American." If these latter responses are included in the predominant category -- an inclusion which my own observations would justify --, Anglo-Saxon or Celtic ethnicity within the membership sample would rise to 79 percent (35/44). These results support the notion that Reform Party delegates, at least, tend to share the ethnic and religious characteristics of western Canada's historically dominant culture.

This picture of Reformers as cultural "insiders" also is given some empirical support by results obtained from the 1991 Alberta Survey (n=1,345) conducted by the University of Alberta Population Research Laboratory and subsequently analysed by Dr. Harvey Krahn of the University of Alberta and me.

The results were similar to those obtained in my delegate survey. Of the sample's 247 Reform supporters, 63 percent identified themselves as Protestants, while 29 percent identified themselves as being of Anglo-Saxon or Celtic and 32 percent of European ethnic background. Additionally, 34 percent of Reform supporters identified themselves ethnically as "Canadian." We cannot know, of course, what secondary or even unconscious identifications this latter group may possess, although anecdotal evidence (Dobbin, 1991; Sharpe and Braid, 1992), and my own observations, suggest that they likely also descend from Anglo, or at least European, backgrounds.(2) What is important to recognize, however, is that, for many Reformers, their self-identification as "Canadian" is not merely nominal, but also political. That is, it must be viewed as a kind of political statement made by many Reformers in response to the kind of "hyphenated Canadianism" which they perceive as fragmenting Canadian society.

Table 4.1

Federal Voting Preference by Ethnicity, Alberta, 1991 (in percentages, rounded)

Party	Ethnicity			
	Ang.-Sax.-Celt.*	European**	Canadian	Other***
Reform	19	17	22	8
PC	12	13	13	6
Liberal	12	15	14	25
NDP	15	14	16	12
Other****	42	41	35	50
Total	100	100	100	101
	(373)	(467)	(380)	(113)

Source: Population Research Laboratory , University of Alberta, Alberta Survey (1991).

** Includes all respondents who termed their ethnic heritage as British, English, Irish, Scottish, Welsh, or combinations including at least one of these.*

*** Includes all respondents listing a European heritage separate from Anglo-Saxon-Celtic, or combinations including at least one European.*

**** Includes remaining ethnic categories, except twelve respondents listed as American or Australian, or whose primary ethnic category was unclear.*

***** Includes "don't know," "would not vote," " ineligible to vote," and "other party."*

Table 4.2

Federal Voting Preference by Religion, Alberta, 1991 (in percentages, rounded)

Party	Religion		
	Protestant	Catholic	Other
Reform	21	12	19
PC	14	14	6
Liberal	12	21	15
NDP	12	15	20
Other*	41	39	40
Total	100	101	100
	(739)	(318)	(289)

Source: Population Research Laboratory , University of Alberta, Alberta Survey (1991).

** Includes "don't know," "would not vote," " ineligible to vote," and "other party."*

In a further examination of the same data, we decided to reverse the causal order by asking the question: "What is the preferred party of people who come from Protestant or Anglo-Saxon-Celtic backgrounds?" Tables 4.1 and 4.2 (above) provide some answers to this question.

Ignoring those (self-reported) "Canadians" whose cultural roots are uncertain, the tables indicate that, among decided (self-reported) Anglo-Saxon-Celtic and, to a lesser extent, European voters, and decided (self-reported) Protestant voters, the party of choice tends to be Reform. Although the statistical evidence is not overwhelming, nonetheless, this is precisely the historically-specific pattern of support, in Alberta at least, that one would expect if Reform were appealing, on some level, to nativist tendencies.

The notion that at least some Reform members have strong Anglo-Saxon nativist inclinations is supported, however, by more than merely the background profiles of its leaders, members, and supporters. It is supported also by the words of many of its ideological mentors who depict Canada as not only historically an Anglo-Saxon country but also as part of a wider Anglo-Saxon culture that is in need of recognizing and reestablishing its heritage.

Read, for example, Peter Brimelow's words bemoaning the eclipse of Anglo-Saxon hegemony:

> At the end of the nineteenth century, belief in the superiority of "Anglo-Saxon" values ... [was] the social norm in every English-speaking country.... For WASP supremacists everywhere, however, the twentieth century has been a most distressing experience (1986:140).

Or again:

> The twentieth century has proved bitter. The values that are common to the English-speaking peoples are in a minority in the world, and on the defensive. Future historians might well be surprised that at this late date the English-speaking countries remain so self-absorbed, and despite their common heritage, show so little conscious awareness of their common interests (1986:289).

Voiced by some prominant Reform supporters, the notion of a "common heritage" seems to encompass the white settler colonies of the former Empire, including white South Africa. Consider, for example, Stan Waters' reluctance to criticize the slow pace of ending apartheid in South Africa:

> If history has any parallelism [sic], you might find a very serious problem emerging in South Africa which may dwarf the objectionable features of the current administration.... I always ask Mr. [External Affairs Minister Joe] Clark, if South Africa's going to change, what black nation do you want it to imitate? Most of them are despotic, president for life in almost every case. They don't have a democratic system. Mr. [Winston] Churchill said it best, he said when the freedom was spreading in Africa, he said it will be 'one man, one vote -- once' (EJ, 1989e:A7).

Dobbin (1991:102-07) has extensively chronicled the pro-white South Africa actions and sympathies of numerous people connected with the Reform Party, including Ted Byfield and Arthur Child. (Dobbin contends that the South African government once gave Child its Order of Good Hope for outstanding service to the country and that Child sits on the board of the Canada-South African Society, an organization founded in 1979 to [in Child's words] "counteract the anti-South African sentiment in Ottawa.") Dobbin notes other prominant Reform Party members with South African connections, including: Norman Wallace, a founding member of the Clarke's Crossing constituency (Saskatoon) who has numerous business connections with South Africa and who assisted South African ambassador Glenn Babb during his Canadian tour in 1987; and Donovan Carter, a Reform member in Comox/Alberni, who gained temporary fame in 1989 when the television program "The Fifth Estate" chronicled his efforts to infiltrate anti-apartheid groups and to carry on a disinformation campaign -- all paid for by the South African embassy.

This widespread support for South Africa found within Reform Party circles cannot be explained, however, separate from the identification of party members with "Anglo" culture in general. This identification is no where more strongly enunciated than in William D. Gairdner's (1990) The Trouble With Canada.

Gairdner, a former Olympic athlete, holder of a PhD in English, and member of the Northern Foundation, is a frequent speaker at Reform Party meetings in Ontario. In 1990, he contributed $100 to the party (CEOC, 1990), and was a featured speaker at the party's Saskatoon convention in 1991. His book, a fast-paced, unrelenting denunciation of such things as bilingualism, multiculturalism, immigration, welfare, feminism, and criminal justice, counterposes two simple models of human organization:

> ... all societies must choose between two radically different methods for organizing society: either (1) they must insist on the same rules for everyone and let all social outcomes evolve according to natural and freely expressed individual differences, or (2) they must impose an equality of outcome that can be achieved only by creating different rules for different social groups (1990:3).

Gairdner terms the first method of organizing "English," the second "French." His attempt (p.10) to suggest that these are merely "convenient labels," and that other terms could have been used seems scarcely credible. Gairdner makes clear in his book that he believes in the natural superiority of traditional Anglo-Saxon culture and fears that heterogeneous cultural (and normative or moral) intrusions are eroding this "ideal." Hence, the concern he evinces in chapter fifteen of his tome entitled, "The Silent Destruction of English Canada." For Gairdner (1990:419) Canada's "core heritage and culture ... is [and must remain] Judeo-Christian, Greco-Roman, and Anglo-European."

But Gairdner's belief in this core culture's superiority is not grounded, at least overtly, in pseudo-biology: its primary basis is ideological. Gairdner (and Brimelow [1986] for that matter) contends that the superiority of Anglo-Saxon culture lies in its historical discovery/creation of the values of individualism, free enterprise, and liberal democracy. I will explore Reform's ideology in more depth in chapter five. For now, however, suffice it to say that these values also lie at the core of most Reformers' worldview. For many Reformers, the values of individualism, free enterprise, and

liberal democracy have been "naturally selected," in a very Darwinian sense, over other belief systems, particularly "socialism," in any of its forms. The proof of this test, for Reformers, is the United States. This belief brings me back to the central aspect of Reform's nativism to which I alluded earlier: its incipient pro-Americanism.

Idolatry of "things American," even as he mourns the loss of "things British," moves gently, if inexorably, through Goldwin Smith (1891). The same idolatry runs even more rampant through Brimelow (1986), who now lives and works in the United States as editor of Forbes's magazine, and Gairdner (1990). But one can also detect it in Byfield who, by and large, views the United States as a benign friend (AR, 1982a) and who frequently extols the virtues of the American political system (AR, 1982g), while heaping scorn on those who would define Canadian identity in terms of difference to the United States. And -- although few are as articulate as these spokespeople -- such idolatry also can be found among many Reformers.

This is not to say that many Reformers would desire outright political union with the United States. A Gallup poll released in June, 1990, just prior to the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, found 13 percent approval on the prairies and 7 percent in BC for joining the United States (Gallup, 1990m). We do not know, however, how many of these "annexationists" were Reform supporters.

Furthermore, I would not suggest that all, or even many, Reformers like every aspect of American society. Like many Canadians, Reformers view with smug disdain the homelessness, poverty, and crime that mark many American cities, pointing instead to the apparently greater civility and gentleness still to be found in most Canadian cities. At the same time, however, Reformers generally disparage those aspects of Canadian society, particularly the relatively greater role of government in economic and social policy, as well as efforts to seek a different balance in protecting *both* collective and individual interests, that have historically distinguished Canada's development from that of the United States. In the end, Canada *in its present form* constitutes for many Reformers a kind of "failed experiment" relative to that of the United States.

Undoubtedly, however, the most openly "Americanized" Reformer is Preston Manning, a man whose political ethos is fundamentally republican and who, indeed, frequently quotes from American heroes. Of more than passing interest is that Manning drew inspiration from Abraham Lincoln in making his own "House Divided" speech at the Edmonton convention in 1989. His inspiration by an American president appears symbolic of Manning's vision of "the good society" -- and of New Canada.

Manning's New Canada would be modelled on the American "melting pot." Individual, rather than collective, rights would be upheld. Canada also would be, on the whole, "a better U.S. ally" (Manning, speaking in New York City to the Americas Society, quoted in Dobbin, 1991:158). Above all, Canada would be much more supportive of free enterprise capitalism, a belief he stated most openly at the Saskatoon convention in 1991:

> The proponents of New Canada can safely argue that the constitution of New Canada should entrench a commitment to freedom, federalism, and democracy, but any attempt to go much beyond that -- to entrench the concepts of a Swedish-style welfare state (as Audrey McLaughlin suggests) *or an American style market economy (as some of us might prefer)* cannot, in my judgement, be sold to the Canadian public at this time (quoted in Manning, 1992:283-

84, italics added).

In short, at least in economic matters, Manning's intentions would seem to be to make Canada into a country very similar, if not indistinguishable, from the United States.

Of course, not all Reformers are nativists. Neither would the reverse be true. Moreover, nativism, where it does exist, varies both in form and degree. If some Reform Party members have nativist inclinations, is the party also racist, as some (see Liberal MP Sheila Copps comments in EJ, 1991v) have suggested and others, particularly in the ethnic communities, fear (see EJ, 1989f)? The simple answer is "no." Certainly, it is difficult to attach the label to Manning himself. Regarding Quebec, for example, he has repeatedly stated in the past that, "There is no room in the Reform Party for people whose sole motivation is anti-French, or anti Quebec" (EJ, 1990i:A8).

To their credit, some Reformers also seem to be somewhat aware that the statements of other followers (such as Gairdner's referral to "natural differences" and warnings against "demographic capture, or ... passive racial or cultural take-over" [1990:393 and 413, respectively]) may appeal to exclusionary, xenophobic, and racist instincts. Hence, the party moved at the Saskatoon convention of 1991 to moderate a controversial section of its multiculturalism policy that stated: "The Reform Party supports the responsibility of the state to promote, preserve, and enhance the *national culture*. The state may assist, and should encourage, ethnic cultures to integrate into the *national culture*" (RPC, 1990a:23, italics added). The key section now reads: "The Reform Party stands for the acceptance and integration of immigrants to Canada into the mainstream of Canadian life" (RPC, 1991:35).

Nonetheless, one does not have to go far to find expressions of intolerance, xenophobia, and bigotry made by some Reform supporters. The hysterical reaction of party delegates in 1989 to the decision to allow Sikhs in the RCMP to wear turbans (EJ, 1989a) and the draft proposal made by some members in 1991 that newly-arrived immigrants and refugees be denied Charter protections for five years (EJ, 1991w:A10) provide two examples. (The executive removed the proposal from policy discussion before it made it to the convention floor.) Likewise, delegates to the 1991 Saskatoon convention gave William Gairdner enormous applause, even more than Manning later received for his speech, for his vitriolic speech denouncing feminists, bilingualism, and multiculturalism, among other things (1991; see Dobbin, 1991:147, for some quotes transcribed from the speech).

Consider, also, the following quotes, made in anger and consternation, by John Williams, a party member who has since secured Reform's candidacy for the Alberta riding of Pembina.

> We must tolerate people regardless of their sexual orientation. We cannot take pride in our race for fear of putting someone else down.

And later, from the same individual:

> [W]e have to tolerate everyone's point of view in everything, Canadians stand for nothing (EJ, 1991x:B4).

Examine, also, the remarks made in a letter to Liberal MP Sheila Copps by a self-described Reform supporter:

> Canadians are at 80 per cent saying no to more Third World immigrants. As our governments let them (sic), the minority immigrants force their will on the majority. Now we have mop heads in the RCMP.... It's the end of Canadian ways (EJ, 1991y:B13).(2)

It is clear also that at least some -- perhaps many -- Reformers view the party's policies, and even Manning's public utterances, as possessing an inner code, the meaning of which signals an intent to return to a predominantly Anglicized, white nation (see also Sharpe and Braid, 1992, on this point). Certainly, many extremists appear to view Reform as a comfortable haven. In late 1991, the party was embarrassed when it was reported that Gordon LeGrand, one of the Brockville group who had stomped the Quebec flag in 1989, was a member of the party (EJ, 1991z). This embarrassment was intensified a short while later with the revelation that several neo-nazis, including Wolfgang Droege, head of the extremist group, the Heritage Front had also joined the Reform Party (G&M, 1992c; see also Dobbin, 1991:108-09 re: Droege's pronounced support for Reform). Though all of these individuals were later expelled from Reform (see EJ, 1992c), the fact remains that some extremists are attracted to what they see as covert anti-racial/anti-ethnic overtones and appeals in Reform's message. It is insufficient to explain this attraction with the glib rebuttal that, "A bright light attracts bugs," or that, because populist parties are bottom-up organizations, they are more subject to extremist elements entering them than are top-down parties (Manning, 1992).

Finally, there is another aspect of nativism that appears to underly the Reform Party's appeal: its sense of a calling. Max Weber (1920 [cited in 1987:79]) referred to a calling as the "sense of a life task" and noted, further, that it "has existed for all predominantly Protestant peoples."

As noted, many Reformers are Protestants. (Many are also members of the petite bourgeois, another characteristic implied by Weber's theory of the Protestant ethic, but I will reserve a discussion of Reform's class character until chapter five.) From all accounts, including his own, Preston Manning (1992) is a particularly devout Protestant (see Dobbin, 1991; Sharpe and Braid, 1992). The more important point, however, is the quasi-religious sense of mission that, in any case, tends to underlie nativist and populist (both right- and left-wing) movements and parties. It is not simply that a particular group may be dominant. It is that dominance in itself bestows on the group a sense that it has an historic responsibility -- a calling -- to save a territory, a country or, indeed, the world during times of crisis. This sense of mission seems very much to be a part of Reform's message and appeal.

Take, for example, Gairdner's (1990:44) statement "... we have a new moral obligation to ensure that the principles from which [the tools of freedom and wealth creation] are derived are spread as far afield as possible." Likewise, anyone who witnessed the Reformers' emotional rendition of "O Canada" at the Saskatoon convention, or heard Manning's "charge" to the delegates at the same convention to go out and find the best candidates, cannot doubt the religious sense of mission with which party members are infused. The naming of the Reform Party as beneficiaries in their wills by some

party members in early 1992 similarly evidences the zeal of what Hoffer (1951) has termed "true believers." No one can question that Manning and his followerers are doing what they sincerely believe to be the best for Canada. But what kind of Canada?

On this count, Reformers have little allegiance to Canada *as presently constituted*. Entranced by the "two imperialisms," Reformer's find little of the Canada today that they willingly would retain. Finding nothing positive in existing Canada to validate their identity, many Reformers' allegiance seems instead displaced upon the wider Anglo-Saxon/Anglo-American culture and its "mission" here on earth. Hence, the peculiar strains of a nativist movement which seeks to defend what it perceives as Canada's national interests against internal elements while simultaneously advocating policies that, some would contend, integrate Canada even more tightly into the American orbit.

CONCLUSION

A group's sense of "peoplehood" may be imaginary (Anderson, 1983), but it is not entirely fictitious. Rather, it is a reservoir of symbols, based in history, that may be summoned upon by adept leaderships during times of apparent crisis.

The failure of the Meech Lake Accord, followed by the recession of 1990-92, coming on the heals of integrationist pressures released by the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement, brought into question in the minds of many Canadians the continued viability of the Canadian nation state. In the midst of the resultant crisis, both Canada's traditional political parties and its political system became delegitimated.

Into the resultant void stepped the Reform Party. By playing upon the fears of people outside of Quebec that the country was about to end and/or that they were about to become the victims of a kind of conspiracy hatched by Quebec and the three traditional political parties, Reform gained a legitimacy among certain elements in English-speaking Canada. To these people, Manning held out a vision. "New Canada," he said:

> should be a balanced, democratic federation of provinces, distinguished by the conservation of its magnificent environment, the viability of its economy, the acceptance of its social responsibilities, and the recognition of the equality and uniqueness of all its citizens and provinces (Manning, address to the Saskatoon convention April, 1992, quoted in Manning, 1992:viii).

As visions go, it is rather prosaic. No matter, though. The people that Reform was gathering had had enough poetry from Trudeau, enough pompous bluster from Mulroney. They wanted simplicity, and Manning gave them it. A year and a half after Meech Lake, the Reform Party would have 100,000 members, a substantial war chest, and 16 percent of popular support (see Gallup, 1991d). Moreover, it would no longer be confined to the West. It would be a national party -- *sans* Quebec, of course.

From Canada's increasingly tattered social, political, and economic fabric, the Reform Party was weaving its success. Reason and understanding were in retreat, replaced by passionate intensity. But what did the rapid growth mean for the party? Who was now joining Reform? What would happen to the party's avowed populist roots? These are but some of the questions that I examine in the chapter that follows.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE TRANSFORMATION(S) OF REFORM

"The perversion of populism ... or the disintegration of a populist party ... occurs from within rather than from without" (Manning, 1992:260).

INTRODUCTION

Even given fortuitous historic, economic, and political circumstances, the success of a populist party is not necessarily ordained. Successful populist parties require a capable organization, material and human resources, a coherent ideology, and a credible leadership. Impacting upon all of these attributes is the nature of people drawn to the party.

By early 1992, the Reform Party stood at a crossroads. The party had enlisted its 100,000th member -- a 16-year-old, female, Scarborough high-school student (G&M, 1992d). The previous month, a Gallup poll suggested that Reform would garner 12 percent of national support if a federal election were held (Gallup, 1991d). Reports suggested, moreover, that Reform was gaining a substantial "war chest" with which to fight the next federal election (Stanbury, forthcoming). Finally, it was becoming more evident that, despite lacking any formal power, the Reform Party was nonetheless influencing in a profound way the policies of several parties on both the federal and provincial political scenes.

Countering these harbingers of increasing legitimacy for the party, however, were signs of increasing internal discord. The party's rapid growth since 1987 had precipitated changes that revealed contradictions and tensions within the party and, in turn, challenged the party's profession of grass roots democracy. By early 1992, Reform was being shaken almost daily by membership scandals, expulsions, and resignations, raising accusations from some that the party had abandoned its populist roots.

In this chapter, I examine the continued growth of the Reform Party during 1991-92 as the party expanded eastwards, the political effects of Reform's increased influence during this period, and the concomitant problems for the party which accompanied its rise in stature. Along the way, I also profile the party's executive, members, and supporters, the core principles of Reform Party ideology, and Reform's financing and organizational structure. I examine, further, the notion of popular democracy espoused by Preston Manning. Finally, I speculate upon Reform's future prospects for success. I begin the chapter, however, with a look at the Saskatoon Assembly of 1991 that transformed the Reform Party into the ostensibly "national party" of English-speaking Canada.

ROADS CHOSEN AND ABANDONED: THE SASKATOON CONVENTION

From the inception of the party in 1987, Reform Party members knew that one day they would have to make decisions on two critical issues: whether to form provincial affilitates and whether to expand beyond the party's western base to become a truly "national" party. By the time Reform held its semi-annual convention in Saskatoon in

April, 1991, feelings on both issues were mixed and heated.

Particularly strong feelings in Alberta and British Columbia favoured forming provincial Reform Parties. The ruling parties in each province (Don Getty's Tories and Bill Vander Zalm's Socreds) increasingly were disliked and mistrusted, perhaps as much by Reform's right-wing elements, who viewed these parties as having abandoned their constituencies, as by the non-Reform left who disliked the Tories and Socreds in any case.

The case of provincial advocates was strengthened by an internal survey conducted prior to the party's 1989 Edmonton convention that revealed that 62 percent of party members were in favour of Reform forming provincial parties (AR, 1992a). Moreover, nascent Reform organizations already had been formed in several of the provinces, including B.C. where an affiliated namesake, the Reform Party of B.C., was headed by a former member of the federal Reform Party's executive council, Ron Gamble. Likewise, the CoR party in Manitoba which, from the beginning, has had numerous connections to the federal party, had appropriated the name "Reform" with the intent of running in that province (EJ, 1991aa). In Alberta, meanwhile, the Alberta Political Alliance (APA), a party formed in the early 1980s out of the wreckage of Western Canada Concept (see chapter two) hankered to use the name or, barring this, to otherwise make known its ideological and organizational affiliation with Reform.(1)

The opponents of provincial expansion also were strong. Headed by Manning, who pointed out that the party originally had been formed to address problems in the federal political arena (see EJ, 1990j; AR, 1990e), opponents contended that a premature turn to provincial politics would squander Reform's resources and energies, resulting in abortive gains at both levels of government. They further pointed to a survey conducted at the 1989 convention which indicated that over 75 percent of delegates opposed contesting provincial elections (RPC, 1989c).

Just as opinion on the provincial question was divided, so too was it on the question of whether Reform should become a national, rather than a purely regional, party. Many in the party, including Stan Waters, believed that Reform should concentrate first on winning western Canada; that expansion would spread the party resources too thin; that the party would be swallowed up by the large ridings of central Canada; and that the party might have more influence as a regional party than as a national one.

Some, such as Stephen Harper, also feared that expansion risked the party being swamped by fringe elements. "We're at a stage now where we're attractive to a lot of people on the fringes ... who are anxious to jump in and swing the party to the right" (AR, 1990f:18). Harper's fears were not unfounded, given the past record of extremism in Ontario (see Barrett, 1986).

But the arguments in favour of expansion were equally compelling: that the party would not be taken seriously if it did not obtain a national platform; that its policies on regional fairness would have appeal elsewhere; that Canada outside of Quebec was looking for a party to champion its interests in the constitutional negotiations that were likely to follow; and that the election of the NDP in Ontario had provided a window of opportunity for the right-wing Reformers (RPC, 1991b). Furthermore, the party's executive, fueled by some initial contacts (see below), believed that expansion would bring Reform the kind of corporate funding enjoyed by the Tories and Liberals.

As with the question of provincial parties, Preston Manning had long made his own preference known regarding eastern expansion. As early as the 1987 Vancouver

Assembly, Manning had stated that the new party should have "'room to grow' into a truly national party" (Manning, 1987a). Before the 1991 convention vote, Manning and several other party officials even more insistently had stated that he had no interest in leading the party if the members voted against expansion (AR, 1991f).

By that time, Manning's importance to -- and power within -- the party had increased in geometric proportion to the party's rise in support. Few delegates were therefore willing to go against Manning's wishes on the issues of provincial parties and eastern expansion. In the end the votes were a foregone conclusion. The motion to allow provincial Reform parties was defeated by 61 percent of the delegates (448 to 291) (EJ, 1991ac). Likewise, nearly 97 percent (762 to 27) voted in favour of expansion.

The general membership then voted on expansion. At a Vancouver rally in June, Preston Manning announced the results of the vote. They virtually mirrored the convention decision, with 92 percent of the 24,042 ballots cast voting in favour of expansion (EJ, 1991ad). Reform had recast itself as a national party.

The move, however, was far from spontaneous. Indeed, the party executive had been planning expansion for some time. Spearheaded by Gordon Shaw, a retired oil-field executive, the party had made initial contacts in the East beginning in late 1989. In March, 1990, Manning made a two-week "exploratory tour" to Ontario and Atlantic Canada (EJ, 1990k). Following this tour, six individuals in Ontario, including Brian Hay, a long-time friend of Manning's, volunteered their services to the party (Dobbin, 1991). That same month, Reg Gosse, a certified public accountant and owner of a Kitchener printing and publishing house, contacted Shaw about starting up an expansion committee. These individuals got together in July to form the committee (Manning, 1992:265). The following month, they created the party's first Ontario riding association in Brampton (EJ, 1990l).

In September, Manning made another trip to Ontario. By then, the party's membership in that province had risen from 200 to 1,600 (EJ, 1990m). During that extended trip, Manning was greeted by large crowds in Hamilton, Ottawa, Thunder Bay, Brampton, and Sudbury, and was the guest of mega-millionaire Conrad Black and Hal Jackman, an influential lawyer and prominent Tory bagman, at a private function held at Toronto's prestigious Toronto Club (EJ, 1990n; also Manning, 1992:251-52; and Sharpe and Braid, 1992:106-07).

Throughout the remainder of 1990 and into 1991, the party continued to lay the groundwork for expansion into eastern Canada, excluding Quebec. By the time the party held its April convention -- a convention attended by Reg Gosse and a host of unofficial Ontario delegates -- the mechanics of expansion already were in place awaiting the now largely perfunctory delegate vote.

The organizational preparation for expansion paid Reform immediate dividends. At the time of the convention vote (April, 1991), Reform had 65,467 members, located as follows: Alberta, 28,376 (43 percent); British Columbia, 20,265 (31 percent); Saskatchewan, 5,127 (8 percent); and Manitoba, 4,068 (6 percent). The remaining 7,631 (12 percent) members resided elsewhere (NWT, Yukon, eastern Canada, and unassigned or unknown addresses). In May, overall membership rose to 71,249; in June, to 77,170. Most of these new members were recruited in Ontario. By the end of May, 1991, the party reported having 9,947 members in that province. By the end of June, this figure had risen to 13,687 -- nearly 18 percent of Reform's overall membership at the time (RPC, 1991c)!

The spillover effects of the party's nationally-broadcast assembly and its decision to go east also had immediate impact in polls taken at the time. In March, 1991, Reform stood at seven percent support nationally (Gallup, 1991a). In April, following the convention, national support for Reform jumped to 16 percent. Particularly significant was the rise of Reform support in the prairie region. At 21 percent the previous month, Reform support rose to 43 percent in April (Gallup, 1991e).

Reform's national support would only reach this lofty height once more during the coming year (see Appendices A, B, and C). Nonetheless, polls would continue to show national support for the party in the low teens. Moreover, Reform's decision to go national, combined with increased support for the party, had raised the status and legitimacy of the party and its policies. As a result, Reform's role on Canada's political stage began undergoing a subtle transformation from silent walk-on to that "fifth business" -- a role that is neither "Hero nor Heroine, Confidante nor Villain, but which [is] nonetheless essential to bring about the Recognition or the denouement" (definition quoted in Davies, 1983:frontispiece). Over the next two years, as Canada's economic and political crises drew towards a climax, Reform increasingly would influence the direction of policies followed by the traditional parties, both federally and, to some extent, provincially. For Reform, no one could have written a better script.

THE TIME OF INFLUENCE

As long as Reform remained at 3 or 4 percent in the polls, confined to the West, its influence upon Canadian politics easily could be dismissed. And, indeed, for the first few years, the other major parties scarcely acknowledged the existence of the brawling neophyte, believing that Reform soon would simply fade from view. As time went on, however, they were increasingly forced to reckon with Reform's critique of the existing political system, its proposed policies, and (more importantly) its growing electoral support.

At the provincial level, Reform's impact was particularly pronounced in those provinces -- Alberta and British Columbia, and to a lesser extent, Saskatchewan -- out of which the party had sprung and where its support remained highest.

In BC, a polarized political climate had given rise to nearly four decades of Social Credit rule (see chapter two), and continued in 1986 with Bill Vander Zalm's surprise victory over the opposition NDP. During the ensuing years, however, Vander Zalm's government was rocked by a series of scandals and resignations that cut away at the party's electoral support. Finally, in the spring of 1991, Vander Zalm himself resigned in disgrace following a provincial enquiry that found that he had mixed private business with his public office. Rita Johnston, a long-time cabinet minister and supporter of Vander Zalm, replaced the latter as Socred leader and provincial premier. At the time, polls showed the ruling Socreds trailing badly to the NDP with time running out on the party's electoral mandate. Deciding to ride the coat-tails of Reform's evident popularity in BC -- the party had over 22,000 members in the province -- Johnson announced in September that her government would be designing plebiscites asking provincial voters whether they wanted the right to initiate their own plebiscites or to recall MLAs between elections -- policies found in Reform's Blue Book (1991a; see EJ, 1991ae; G&M, 1991d). The attempt to regain the support of its long-time ultra-conservative supporters, many of whom appeared to now be Reform adherents federally, was both too

late and (likely) too transparent. The ensuing election, held on October 17th, saw the NDP take 50 seats, the rejuvenated Liberal party 17 seats, and Johnston's Socred's 7 seats (EJ/1991af). The right-wing coalition that W. A. C. Bennett had constructed in the early 1950s had, at least temporarily, come unglued.

A similar attempt to co-opt Reform support occurred during this same period in Saskatchewan. Premier Grant Devine's Tories had won in 1986, mainly because of electoral boundaries that favoured rural voters, and the timely intervention of Mulroney's federal government in providing agricultural assistance just prior to the election. The years since, however, had not been kind to either the province's economy or the ruling Tories. Consistently down in the polls to the opposition New Democrats, Devine postponed an election call well into the fifth year of the government's mandate, attempting to improve the Tory's electoral chances through gerrymandering electoral boundaries, buying the votes of farmers, and launching an assault on the largely urban and NDP supporting public service unions (see G&M, 1991e). When these tactics failed to increase their support, the Tories (like the Socreds in BC) announced that they had been -- as some wags were apt to say -- "Divine-ly inspired" to hold plebiscites on the issues of balanced budgets, constitutional amendments, and whether the provincial medicare plan should pay for abortions (EJ, 1991ae). As in BC, the issues selected for plebiscitarian democracy had been lifted from Reform's stated policies (G&M, 1991d). Again, however, the effort to co-opt Reform's positions and supporters failed, in part because Reform's support in Saskatchewan was less substantial than in BC. The subsequent provincial vote of October 21 hence saw the NDP under Roy Romanow returned to power, taking 55 seats to the Tories 10 and the Liberals one (EJ, 1991ag).

Reform's indirect influence, however, upon the provincial political scene in western Canada was perhaps greatest in Alberta. The reasons for this are obvious. Much of the early impetus for creating the Reform Party initially came from Alberta. Since then, the province has supplied Reform with the bulk of its membership. The party's headquarters also reside in Calgary and the most influential members of the party's executive (Harper, Ablonczy, Waters, Fryers) are long-time Alberta residents. And, of course, Preston Manning himself is the son of Alberta's longest-serving premier.

When Alberta suffered through its second major recession of the 1980s (1985-86), the ruling Tories under new premier Don Getty began to find themselves caught between the province's traditional small "c" conservative political culture, of which Reform would later be an adherent, and new political forces that had risen in the province during the boom years and which underscored and solidified the rise of the moderately left-wing NDP in the provincial elections of 1986 and again in 1989. During the recession, and subsequent to Reform's rise, Getty attempted to ride the crest of political opinion, giving voice to western alienation and presenting himself as a staunch ally of the new party on such issues as the Triple-E Senate. But many of the Tories' former (right-wing) supporters remained unimpressed by Getty, a lackluster leader who seemed too often to be unsure of his position and a government that preached free enterprise but had too often intervened in the economy.

In the months following the 1989 election, support for Getty's Tories declined while the opposition NDP, Liberals, and provincially-uncommitted Reform Party gained, the latter noticably in Calgary (EJ, 1989g). A year after the election, an Angus Reid poll indicated that the Reform Party would get 43 percent support if it ran provincially, compared with 20 percent for the Liberals, 19 percent for the New

Democrats, and 18 percent for the Tories. Another poll, conducted by The Dunvegan Group, showed that 20 percent of decided voters would vote for Reform, despite the fact that the party was not named on the questionnaire. These results prompted Getty to respond at the time that: "The Reform Party is strange ... in that they've pretty well picked up on everything that we have stood for in this province except for one and that is Meech Lake" (polls and quote in EJ, 1990o).

To many, it seemed a rather facile attempt to quell disenchantment with his government by tying the Tories to Reform's ascendant star. But the statement also highlights, once again, the centrality of the Meech Lake Accord to the fortunes of the federal Reformers and -- in this case -- also to Alberta's provincial Tories.

From the time of its signing, Getty had been a strong supporter of the Accord. His continued support of it during the fall of 1989 and spring of 1990 further alienated many provincial Tory supporters, many of whom already held dual memberships in the federal Reform Party which opposed the agreement. For many more, however, Getty's performance at the critical first minister's meeting in the spring of 1990 was the final straw, particularly when reports began to leak out that, at one point, he had physically blocked Clyde Wells, viewed by many in English-speaking Canada as a hero, from leaving the meeting (Cohen, 1990).

When the Accord failed in any case, Getty's Tories found themselves in a particularly precarious situation. They had been on the losing end of a widely discredited political agreement. On top of this, the party was denounced as not conservative enough by right-wing supporters, too aligned to big business by the left, and corrupt and incompetent by voters of nearly all political stripes. Support for Getty and the Tories continued to slide over the next year, as shown by an Angus Reid poll, conducted in February of 1991, which found that Reform would get 48 percent of the vote if it ran provincially in Alberta, compared with the Tories 12 percent (reported in EJ, 1991ah).

In the face of these pressures, the Alberta Tories made a dramatic move to the right in an effort to co-opt Reform support. The party's annual assembly in April of that year saw the provincial Tories sever ranks with their federal namesakes, a decision which provincial cabinet minister Ken Kowalski admitted would make Reform Party members in his constituency more comfortable (1991ai). (Reportedly, a third of Kowalski's own riding executive held Reform memberships [1991ac].).

The same assembly saw the normally placid Getty, who previously had been a strong supporter of the federal system, revert to provincialist sentiments in stating what would be Alberta's stance towards the other provinces in the constitutional negotiations soon to begin. "Here in Alberta we have been generous -- not just to Quebec but to all of Canada. But if all we get for our generosity is people turning their backs on us, then the generosity will diminish." As for the threat of Quebec's separation, Getty had a warning. "We don't like the idea of a huge gaping hole in the middle. But if the hole is created in the map of Canada, we too will remember. '*Je me souviens* ' has its own equivalents in English" (1991aj:A1). Getty's stance was widely applauded by Tory delegates to the assembly. But there were even stronger signs of the growing influence of Reform Party policies upon the Alberta government.

During the ongoing constitutional hearings that followed the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, Alberta's provincial Tories increasingly took a hardline stance in parroting the opposition of Reformers to such things as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,

official bilingualism, and multiculturalism, while favouring increased provincial rights and the establishment of a Triple-E Senate (1991ak; 1991al). When taking these stances did not greatly improve the Tories' electoral appeal, Getty and some of his colleagues (particularly those in the rural areas) moved even further to the right. This finally culminated, in early 1992, with Getty's strident, if confused, attack on official bilingualism and multiculturalism (EJ, 1992e) designed to win back disenchanted supporters from Reform.

The move of Alberta's Tories to the right does not mean that the province has necessarily moved with them. Indeed, there have been suggestions that Alberta's previously one-dimentional political culture has become fragmented (Tupper, 1991; Harrison and Krahn, forthcoming). If this is the case -- and the evidence is persuasive -- then the Tory party itself appears to be the major victim of this fragmentation, being no longer able to steer a course between the extreme right-wing, centred in Alberta's so called "Bible Belt," and more moderate voters (EJ, 1992f).

In any case, the Reform Party -- unelected and not even officially a provincial party -- has possessed undeniable influence during this critical period of Canada's existence, pushing the Alberta government to take hardline stances on such issues as "distinct society status" for Quebec and senate reform. In the long-term, Reform's shadowy presence on the provincial scene, combined with the public's perception of Tory incompetence, has discredited government intervention in the province's economy, leading to a retrenchment of the traditional laissez-faire sentiments that impelled Reform's predecessor, Social Credit. Similarly, in the area of moral values, Reform's perceived threat has encouraged verbal support for a return to traditional notions of family values, sexual roles, and law and order among some elements of the provincial Tory's rural constituency.

Reform's considerable, though indirect, influence upon the West's provincial political scene pales, however, in comparison with its influence upon federal politics. As with the various provincial governments, the other federal parties largely ignored Reform during the early days of its existence. Following the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, however, and as it became increasingly apparent that Reform was reaping the whirlwind of resentment swirling around the traditional parties, each began to launch verbal attacks against Reform's policies (EJ, 1991am). The chief agent of these attacks were the Tories, in large measure because much of the evidence suggested that Reform was, by and large, "stealing" Tory supporters. The level and frequency of these attacks only increased in April of 1991 when a Gallup poll revealed that the Tories had slipped into fourth place, with 12 percent support compared with Reform's 14 percent (Gallup, 1991e). "How does one define fringe? Does one define it as someone with less than 14 percent in the polls?" quipped an obviously ecstatic Preston Manning (1991an:A3).

Simultaneous with these attacks on Reform, however, the ruling Tories also began to adopt some of Reform's policies in an effort to win back its right-wing constituency. The exigencies of alliance politics motivated the decision. As will be recalled (chapter three), the Tories had won re-election in 1988 through a coalition of Quebec nationalists, small and big business, westerners (particularly Albertans), and assorted small "c" conservatives everywhere. Although this coalition had since unravelled, Mulroney's Tories still believed that they could bring together the essential elements of this electoral alliance before the next election. Their belief was not then, and is not now, entirely illusory. For one thing, although the failure of Meech Lake had damaged

severely the party's credibility in Quebec, the Liberal party and Jean Chretien, in particular, remained strongly disliked in the province. Likewise, Mulroney's Tories continued to believe that Canada's economy, tied more than ever to the United States, would soon turn around, thus limiting the damage caused to the party by the recession and winning back much of the business support that had been almost solely theirs in recent years. There remained, then, only the problem of how to win back the West, and small "c" conservatives in general, from the surging Reform Party. In the end, the stick attack on Reform began also to be supplemented by the Tory's carrot approach to Reform's membership.

In April, 1991, Mulroney shuffled his cabinet, making Joe Clark minister for constitutional affairs. In a move even more deliberately designed to win back Alberta support, popular Vegreville MP Don Mazankowski became finance minister -- the first time in sixty years that a westerner had held that position. Later that same month, Mulroney gave a speech in Calgary where he simultaneously attacked the Reform Party for its policies on Quebec while making a Reform-like appeal to western history and regionalism, fiscal responsibility, and parliamentary and senate reform (AR, 1991g).

But Mulroney's token efforts at appeasing the right-wing largely were unsuccessful. Hence, during the following months as the Tories prepared for their August convention, there rose among them voices of many of the same extreme right-wing elements from which some of Reform's supporters had been cut, and who previously had been held silent by years of victory or hopes of victory. Down in the polls, perceiving Reform's recent success as having blazoned the trail that the party should now follow, these elements submitted a series of resolutions so extreme, in some cases, as to make one journalist remark that they made "Reformers look like closet Liberals" (EJ, 1991ao:G2). Among the more extreme of these resolutions were ones which would have restricted where new immigrants could live, force other immigrants who had "temporarily left their homeland during difficult times" to return when times improved, and make the Stetson the sole headgear of the Mounties.

The Tories, however, are not a homogeneous entity, nor, despite their evident loss of support, had the party been totally taken over by the lunatic fringe. As a result, these resolutions were defeated at the August convention. Moreover, though no doubt for political reasons, the Tory delegates also grudgingly passed a resolution that recognized the right of Quebec to decide its own political future (EJ. 1991ap), a move that the Reform Party surely would have eschewed. But the Tory delegates also made an implicit appeal to their alienated right-wing in passing, among others, resolutions calling for the restoration of the death penalty, the privatization of the CBC and the dismantling of the department of multiculturalism -- resolutions that seemed to show, as Stephen Harper noted at the time, that "the views of the rank-and-file members of the Conservative party are embarrassingly close to the policies of the Reform party" (1991aq). Indeed, extreme right-wing Tory MPs such as Garth Turner and and fellow Ontarion Bill Domm proudly declared that the Tories had already implemented or were pushing through much of Reform's agenda (1991ar).

But these moves had limited success in reconstituting the Tory alliance. Rather, the party continued to languish in the polls throughout late 1991. Equally important to note, however, is that voter dissatisfaction alone was no longer swelling the ranks of Reform (see Appendices A, B, and C).

Despite the fact that voters were perhaps not moving to the right as quickly as

either the Tories or Reform, the next year nonetheless saw the Tories continue their rightward shift. The clearest indication of this direction was on economic issues. Lacking genuine political support and otherwise beset by continued pressures to deal with the deficit, the Tories proved politically -- some would say viscerally -- unable to take the steps necessary to deal with the ongoing recession. Despite growing criticism, not only from the left, but also from Chambers of Commerce, municipalities, various of the provincial governments, and even small business, the Tories continued to adhere to Reform's narrow focus on the deficit alone, thereby strangling the economy. In the end, the Tories' failure to deal effectively with the recession did immeasurable harm both to Canada's economy and to the party's own electoral chances (see chapter four; also, Clarke and Kornberg, 1992). Similarly, the Tories also followed Reform's economic conservative agenda in capping medicare expenditures and killing plans for a national day-care program (G&M, 1992e).

Meanwhile, during this same period, the moral conservatives within the Tory caucus, emboldened by their relative success at the convention and similarly pressed by Reform's growing support, continued to flex their muscles. In December of 1991, reports suggested that a number of Tory MPs, such as John Reimer of Kitchener, were prepared to make "a last stand" in fighting against proposals to grant gays and lesbians protection against discrimination under the Canadian Human Rights Act (1991as). The proposed amendment to the Act dragged on in committee well into the next summer.

Lest anyone think, however, that Reform's presence on the Canadian political scene (in consort with pressures emerging from other economic and political precincts) had moved the Tories alone to the right, it is worthwhile noting that similarly pressures also were moving the Liberal party to the right during this period. A three day thinkers' conference held in Aylmer, Quebec in November, 1991, in particular revealed divisions within the Liberal party between those who still believed in economic nationalism and the liberal welfare state and those committed to the big business agenda concealed in such terms as "globalization" and "competitiveness." In the end, the renewed right-wing of the Liberal party seemed to win out, a victory signalled by MP (and free-trade advocate) Roy MacLaren's gloating remark, "Eat your heart out, Lloyd Axworthy," a reference to the Liberal party's leading left-wing critic and an outspoken critic of the FTA (EJ, 1991at; G&M, 1991f).

That both the Tories and the Liberals were tripping over each other in moving to the right to undercut Reform support seemed even more apparent the following spring when MPs from both parties overwhelmingly supported a private member's bill, put forward by Tory MP Bill Hicks, that would make it a criminal offence to burn or deface the Canadian flag. "Somebody who defaces the Canadian flag should be put in jail for life," said Liberal MP Mac Harb from Ottawa, a sentiment shared by fellow Liberal MP Dan Boudria who wanted the bill extended to cover provincial flags, and Tory MP Felix Holtsmann who wanted it extended to make it illegal to burn the flag of any country (EJ, 1992g).

Finally, the NDP also tacitly acknowledged during 1991-92 the shifts in Canada's political culture brought about, at least in part, by Reform's presence. This was particularly the case on the provincial scene where, heeding both the economic realities of the recession and the well-orchestrated attacks by business upon the party in Ontario following its victory in 1990, the NDP in Saskatchewan and BC promoted an image of fiscal conservatism during the lead-up to the elections held in those provinces in 1991.

In the end, as we have seen, both party's easily won election, in large measure due to voter displeasure with the governments they replaced. Even afterwards, however, the NDP remained cautious, aware that fiscal and political considerations had shifted Canada's political spectrum to the right. One indication of this is that the NDP in Saskatchewan and British Columbia, like the federal Tories, also capped medicare expenditures.

In summary, the period following the failure of the Meech Lake Accord saw the Reform Party gain not only in members and electoral support but also, perhaps more importantly, in influence. Throughout the following two years, Reform was able to transform significantly the political landscape of Canada, shifting debates as to the nature of the country's problems and the solutions available to their resolution. How did Preston Manning and the Reform Party -- a party formed less than five years earlier -- so rapidly achieve such a level of political influence? In order to understand this achievement, it is necessary to take a look at Reform's organizational structure, including its finances.

REFORM'S ORGANIZATION AND FINANCES

As we have seen (chapter three), the Reform Party originally was formed by several people, primarily men) with extensive backgrounds in both business and politics. The practical experience of these individuals should not be overlooked in the rise of the party as it greatly reduced the learning curve of the party and made possible its impressive performance only a year later in the federal election of 1988.

As a student of history, Manning, in particular, is accutely aware of the importance of organization. He frequently refers to the experience of the Progressives in the 1920s (see Morton, 1978 [1950]), whom Manning rather obviously has used as a kind of "negative model" in shaping Reform. Without organization, the Progressives soon degenerated into incoherency, making the party's MPs easy pickings for Mackenzie King's machinations.

But there is another reason why Manning views organization as vitally important. While Manning views populism as the most "potent political force on the face of the earth," he is not unaware that there is also a "dark side of populism." Hence, the role of political organization is to "tap into ... and harness [the] power [of populism] to the formulation and implementation of public policy" (Manning, 1992:24-25). The fate of the party that fails to do this is, for Manning, clear: "The perversion of populism, as in the case of Peronism in Argentina, or the disintegration of a populist party, as in the case of the Progressives in Canada, occurs from within rather than from without" (1992:260).

I will return to a discussion of the meaning of populism within the Reform Party towards the end of this chapter. For now, however, it is sufficient to suggest that much of Reform's organizational structure appears designed with the purpose of allowing the party executive to harness these populist impulses. To this end, the party possesses a simple, rationalized, and centralized organizational structure, comprised of head office in Calgary and the riding constituencies. Observers both inside and outside the party describe the heart of this formal power structure as being comprised of a "clique" of Manning confidants, mainly Harper, Ablonzcy, Shaw, Fryers, and, until his death, Waters (see Dobbin, 1991; Sharpe and Braid, 1992). From the start, head office has

maintained a tight control over policy, strategy, and communications, while leaving the constituencies the task of signing of new members and soliciting funds, although, in recent years, this latter function seems also to have fallen increasingly under the direction of headquarters.

The issue of financing requires a brief digression. In the course of my investigations into Reform's finances, I discovered certain anomalies regarding the party's official statements to Elections Canada. My attempts to clarify these discrepancies led me to Dr. W. Stanbury who has been studying party finances for the Royal Commission on Election Expenses and whose book, Money in Politics: Financing Federal Parties and Candidates in Canada is scheduled to appear soon in bookstores. Dr. Stanbury confirmed my initial findings. He explains the major discrepancies as arising in the following manner.

The Reform Party has four major sources of funding: memberships ($10 per year), contributions (usually by members), merchandise sales (t-shirts, buttons, etc.), and entrance fees (usually $10) to rallies. Although Reform Fund Canada (the party's official business agent) has reported regularly the revenues received from "donations and memberships, merchandise sales, assemblies, and other," the list of contributions appears to have been treated somewhat separately from memberships and merchandise sales. Moreover, it is unclear how or where the money from rallies is reported. Does it remain in the riding? Does it end up in headquarters? Who keeps tabs on this money? According to Stanbury, no one within Reform seems to be able to answer these questions.

A second more serious problem arises out of Reform Fund Canada's relationship to the party's more than 200 riding associations. Financial contributions to the latter are funnelled through Reform Fund Canada for the purposes of issuing a tax receipt, then 95 percent of the money is returned to the riding. In the past, however, Reform Fund Canada has only reported among its revenues the 5 percent which "headquarters" keeps for itself. In short, previous official reports of Reform's financial position may have significantly underestimated the party's funds. With these clarifications and problems in mind, it is nonetheless possible to arrive at an overall picture of Reform's financial situation, and how it has changed over time.

According to Stanbury, in 1987 the Reform Party collected approximately $250,000, mainly from farmers or small and independent business people. In December of that year, Francis Winspear donated a further $100,000. It is likely that some other prominent business people also gave money to the party. In any case, however, Reform closed out 1987 with a deficit of $30,700 (Stanbury, forthcoming).

Stanbury contends that the party in 1988 had total revenues of $799,134 ($688,419 from memberships and donations; $108,402 from sales of merchandise, such as signs, buttons, etc.; and $2,313 from "other" sources).(2) It is here, however, that some of the discrepancies mentioned by Stanbury become important. For example, he notes that Reform Party candidates raised $1,001,600 in 1988 -- more than the total revenues stated above -- and that they spent $995,695 on "election expenses" and $57,696 on "personal expenses."

Worth noting are the names of some of Reform's contributors in 1988. Winspear provided ($15,000) and Canadian Occidental Petroleum Ltd. ($10,000). Other notable Reform contributors that year included Bob Matheson, a lawyer and former supporter of WCC ($1,000), Beaver River Ranch Ltd. ($1,000), Big Rock Brewery Ltd. ($500),

Maraval Resources Ltd. ($1,000), John Poole ($200), and Truco Resources ($1,000) (all figures from the CEOC, 1988a). In the main, however, the Reform Party seems to have remained supported by moderately wealthy individuals and small businesses, mainly Alberta-based, and primarily connected with the oil and gas industry.

In 1988, the party was still reliant upon Byfield's magazines to disseminate Reform's "message." In April of that year, however, the party also started its own internal newspaper, The Reformer. It is a measure of how small the party remained at this time that its first editor was a nineteen-year-old University of Alberta student (Manning, 1992:156).

The election of that year similarly reflected the party's newness, combining a kind of fresh enthusiasm and inventiveness with surprising competence. The party organization's electoral strategy was simple and effective, appealing to anti-government, anti-establishment sentiments and focusing upon a few basic issues (fairness, honesty in government [see chapter three]).

The simplicity, however, of Reform's style belay its organizational sophistication. Just as Hemingway worked extra hard to write "naturally," Manning and his executive worked hard to maintain an image of grassroots simplicity. By and large, the electoral strategy went off without a hitch. The other parties contemptuously dismissed Reform as unsophisticated and Manning as a kind of gawky country bumpkin. They thought that Reform would be only a temporary blip on the electoral landscape. To say the least, they were wrong.

The only real difficulty faced by Reform in 1988 was, as Manning might have predicted, internal. Even then, however, Manning's refusal to sign Doug Collins's nomination papers for the B.C. riding of Capilano-Howe Sound (see chapter three) was not without benefits. Although the incident perhaps cost the party some support in the province and continues, as I will show, to have ramifications in that province today, Manning's actions undoubtedly garnered the party support from more moderate voters.

In any case, by the end of 1988, the Reform Party already was a substantial force. It gained further legitimacy through the elections the following year of Deborah Grey to the House of Commons and Stan Waters as Alberta's nominee to the Senate. That same year, it held its first convention since 1987.

That the party was gaining in legitimacy is shown by the fact that, by the time of the Edmonton assembly, Reform had more than 26,000 members, 1,000 of whom attended the assembly (Manning, 1992:214). The convention attracted widespread attention, increasing Reform's profile. It also launched Manning's entry into the debate over the Meech Lake Accord which was soon to consume the country and, as we have seen, propell the party into a second stage of major growth which would see its membership grow to nearly 33,000 by the end of 1990 (RPC, 1991c) and 100,000 by the end of 1991 (G&M, 1992d).

Reform's increased legitimacy is demonstrated further by its revenues in 1989 and subsequently. That year, Reform Fund Canada reported total revenues from memberships and donations, merchandise, interest, and other of $1,116,645 (Stanbury, forthcoming) while, at the same time, declaring total contributions to the party of $1,350,918.(3) Specific donors included Winspear, who again gave $15,000. Among the party's other notable contributors that year were two numbered companies, Alberta Ltd. #280955 and #125482 Canada Inc. which gave $1,000 and $15,000, respectively. The largest single contribution came from Jack Mackenzie, an oil business

executive (see Manning, 1992:92 and 229 regarding Mackenzie) and founder of the Marigold Foundation (see chapter two) who gave $16,000. Again, a number of other oil and gas companies provided monies to the Reform Party, including Numac Oil and Gas ($1,000), Gasland Oil Ltd. ($1,000), and Permez Petroleum Ltd. ($1,000), while John Poole also gave $3,000 (CEOC, 1989).

In 1990, Reform Party contributions rose to $2,213,762 (CEOC, 1991; also Stanbury, forthcoming). The size of some individual and business contributions rose markedly during this period. Major business contributors to Reform were Van Naren Construction ($10,000), Vycom Electronics ($5,000), and Winspear Securities ($5,000). (Francis Winspear also personally donated $5,700.) Reform also received $3,445 from the Pirie family and its oil-based company, Pirie Resource Management (see Manning, 1992:229, regarding the Pirie family). Individual contributions to the party included John Poole ($1,200) and several party insiders, such as Cliff Fryers ($1,560) and Diane Ablonczy ($300). Other "insider" party supporters included Ron Gamble ($550), George Visser ($200), Lloyd and Helen Kirkham ($3,221), and George Van Den Bosch ($1,150) -- all of whom (ironically) left or were later expelled from the party. Finally, Reform also received contributions from a couple of notable authors in 1990, William Gairdner ($100) and W. P. Kinsella ($3,000) whose controversial literary portrayals of native people have occasionally been condemned as racist (all individual contributions taken from CEOC, 1990).

In order to place the Reform Party's receipt of funding in context, it is useful to compare its sources of funding with that of the other major parties. Table 5.1 shows party contributions during 1989 and 1990, according to three classes of contributors: individuals, businesses and corporations, and "other."

Table 5.1

Party's Financial Contributions by Class of Contributors, 1989 and 1990
(in thousands of dollars and percentages)

	1989				1990			
	PC	Lib	NDP	RP	PC	Lib	NDP	RP
Class								
Ind.	6,850	2,385	5,982	1,206	4,686	7,441	6,035	2,076
	(50)	(38)	(43)	(89)	(42)	(62)	(39)	(94)
Bus.	6,943	3,931	54	141	6,350	4,568	141	138
	(50)	(62)	(nil)	(10)	(58)	(38)	(01)	(6)
Oth.*	8	8	7,828**	4	10	29	9,263**	0
	(nil)	(nil)	(57)	(nil)	(nil)	(nil)	(60)	(nil)
Total	13,801	6,324	13,864	1,351	11,046	12,038	15,439	2,214
	(100)	(100)	(100)	(99)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)

Source: CEOC, 1990.

**Refers to money received from unions and other social organizations.*

*** Includes both federal and provincial contributions.*

Before examining Reform's financial position, note should be taken of that of the other major parties. As indicated in Table 5.1, the NDP continued to get the vast majority of its funding from non-corporate forces. By contrast, the Tories remained during this period the overwhelming choice of business, even as the party's individual contributions declined. Finally, the figures also appear to indicate that the Liberal party had regained some support in 1990. The extent of this recovery, however, should not be overestimated. Much of the increase in Liberal contributions in 1990 was probably attributable to the leadership campaign of that year. Moreover, the Liberal party continued to service a large debt -- roughly $3.7 million -- throughout 1991, compared with the Tories who continued to build a large war chest and the NDP which finally retired its debt from the 1988 election (report in EJ, 1992h).

For the Reform Party, the news was mixed. The party continued to gain support overall, but, as the tables indicate, the party still lacked big business sector support. Two things appear to explain this lack of support. First, Reform was not yet perceived by the business community at large as a legitimate contender for power. Second, during this period, the party was still confined to the western region -- not the heartland of corporate donors. Much of Reform's financial support continued to come from small to medium sized Alberta companies, primarily within the oil and gas sector. The narrowness of this support was, and continues to be, a potential problem for the party, particularly given the uncertain economic situation of that sector in recent years. With the twin collapses of the Meech Lake Accord and the Canadian economy in 1990, however, and Reform's move to become a national party in 1991, the party nonetheless had high hopes of gaining financial support from Ontario's corporate sector that was, moreover, still reeling from the election of an NDP government in 1990.

Despite its increased funding and popular support, some party insiders had become concerned that organizational weaknesses might hinder Reform's success. In the fall of 1990, the party's biggest booster, the Alberta Report, starkly detailed these problems.

The magazine specifically noted that Reform was "almost a one-man show," that the "party hierarchy, with disproportionate representation from the Calgary legal community" had not produced anyone "to share the role of chief public spokesman with Mr. Manning," that [t]he Calgary headquarters has reportedly gone through four office managers in three years," that "Reform's upper echelon is conspicuously short of professional political experience," and that "[i]t has been operating without first-rate polling, public relations and fund-raising services" (AR, 1990g:18-23).

Not everyone within the party apparently believed that Reform needed to adopt more sophisticated methods and techniques in order to compete with the traditional parties. Stephen Harper, in particular, expressed doubt about where strategic polling and public relations material had gotten the Tories.

Nonetheless, in May of 1991 the Reform Party underwent a massive reorganization. Diane Ablonczy became special council to Preston Manning, while Tom Flanagan, a well-known (and somewhat controversial)(4) professor of political science at the University of Calgary became -- in an apparent demotion of Harper -- the party's new director of policy. That spring also saw the party's head office in Calgary moved to larger premises in the same city.

Other major organizational changes soon followed. In September, the party commissioned a Canadian polling firm and hired a Calgary-based advertising organization, Hayhurst Communications. During this same period, the party hired

Frank Luntz, an American pollster and campaign strategist who had previously worked in the Reagan White House (see Sharpe and Braid, 1992:8) who had also written a text on political campaigning (see Luntz, 1988).

The most important change, however, saw the appointment in May, 1991 of Cliff Fryers as the party's chief operating officer and chair of its executive council. The appointment of Fryers, a lawyer with extensive corporate contacts, particularly to the oil and gas sector (see chapter three), signalled that the party hierarchy was about to make a serious effort to gain corporate donations. As suggested by the above tables, at the time the Reform Party was lagging behind both the Liberals and Tories in corporate support. Stated the Alberta Report: "Mr. Fryers says his party will embark on a major corporate drive in the near future." In his first interview following his appointment, Fryers announced that projected revenues for 1991 were $3 million, but that he expected them to range between $10- and $15-million before the next election with much of this gain coming from the corporate sector (AR, 1991a).

The decision to increase efforts to gain corporate financial support was not surprising. As we have seen, Reform's leadership already has well-established links to the western -- primarily, Calgary -- business community. Indeed, this sector constitutes the chief reference group for Reform's leadership, a group to whom Manning himself made several unabashed "pitches" during 1990 and 1991 (see Manning, 1992; EJ, 1990p; and EJ, 1991au). Among eastern business leaders, however, Manning and his party remained largely unknown in 1990. It was a situation that Reform set about correcting in September of that year.

On September 5th, Manning primed the pump of corporate support at the much publicized private dinner (described earlier) held at Toronto's prestigious Toronto Club and hosted by Conrad Black and Hal Jackman. Afterwards, Black gave not only a favourable review of Manning's economic policies, but also contributed $5,000 through one of his companies, Sterling Newspapers (Sharpe and Braid, 1992:106-07; see also EJ, 1990n; Manning, 1992:251-52). Throughout the remainder of that year, as the party executive prepared for Reform's expansion into the East, overtures continued to be made to eastern Canada's business community.

Fryers's statements therefore in June of 1991 could have been anticipated. Moreover, within months of Reform's launching of its "corporate offensive," Fryers stated that donations had "come in from major companies such as Canadian Pacific Limited," -- $25,000 -- "Pan Canadian Petroleum, and Canadian Occidental Petroleum Ltd., as well as key corporate players from some of the larger and more influential companies across the country" (McNellis, 1991:19). That same month, Fryers announced that the party soon would be beginning a campaign directed specifically at gaining corporate support. "Corporations are part of our constituency," he said (McNellis, 1991:25), a remark echoed several months later by Gordon Wusyk, Reform's chief executive in Edmonton: "What we have to offer corporate Canada is significant" (EJ, 1992i:A3).

During this same period, the party also revised upwards its estimates regarding the amount of money it anticipated having in the bank by the time of the next election to $20,000,000 (reported in Stanbury, forthcoming).

Manning kicked off the campaign for corporate funds the following month with another trip to Bay Street. While there, he gave a talk to 450 members of the Financial Services Institute, an organization described by journalist Norm Ovenden as "an elite

organization made up of bank, trust company and insurance executives, top corporate lawyers, accountants, stock brokers and pension-fund managers." Ovenden reported that the trip also saw Manning hold several informal discussions with "investment dealers, the Canadian Bankers' Association, and company presidents, as well as one meeting at the exclusive Toronto Club attended by at least three chief executive officers of Canada's big banks." While not overly impressing the corporate chiefs, Manning apparently did gain some support. According to Ovenden, Helen Sinclair, president of the CBA later told Manning "We want to have you with us, as much as you want to have us with you" (entire report in EJ, 1991av:A3).

October saw the beginning of a different kind of financial campaign, the "Save Canada Campaign." Directed at the party's then 90,000 members, and operating within the period of November 6, 1991, and February 6, 1992, the campaign was designed to collect $12 million. The campaign proved less successful than the corporate offensive, however, a victim (according to Reform officials) of bad weather and the recession, and was mothballed at the end of 1991. Nonetheless, during its brief period of existence the campaign apparently solicited $2 million (covered in Stanbury, forthcoming).

It is worthwhile, at this point, to review Reform's organizational structure and capacity as it stands in mid-1992. The Reform Party continues to be highly centralized, professional, and tightly controlled. The party has a full-time pollster, a campaign manager, and an advertising agency working full-time in preparation for the next federal campaign. Along the way, the party organization is assisted by a number of enthusiastic members, whose number has now passed 133,000 (EJ, 1992j). Finally, the party continues to pull in money -- approximately $5.95 million in 1991, most of this continuing to come, however, from individuals rather than from large corporations (EJ, 1992k). Still, Reform is making some inroads into the business community, particularly in western Canada. In a pattern reminiscent of the western business class's abandonment of the Liberals in the late 1960s and 1970s, an Edmonton Journal report in July, 1992 detailed the flight of Alberta businessmen from the Tories to Reform (EJ, 1992l).

In short, within scarcely five years of existence, the Reform Party has developed into a remarkably efficient political organization. And it is to the efficiency of this machine -- its capacity to mobilize and utilize resources of both money and people, and to churn out a set of coherent and saleable policies -- that we must attribute much of the political success of the party.

Despite this, the Reform Party is also far from infallible. Indeed, the organization has suffered some rather well-publicized embarrassments. On the financial end, the failure of the "Save Canada Campaign" and the party's continued inability to sell itself to the corporate sector already have been noted. To these failures may be added the dubious efforts of some zealots in Reform's organization to convince party members that they should take out insurance policies listing Reform as the chief beneficiary (EJ, 1992d).

In January, 1992, the party's political image took a blow when the press got hold of an internal memo, sent out by Tom Flanagan, that seemed to smack of political dirty tricks. Specifically, the memo asked constituency associations:

> Study the careers of the incumbent and of all other candidates. Search to see if they have violated legality, morality or propriety in their public lives. Keep a current newspaper clipping file on these people; look also for material

> in old newspapers, magazines and books. Study their public statements to see what causes they have supported and what promises they have made in the past (EJ, 1992m:B13).

The publication of such a memo would have hurt any party, but to one like Reform that has built its reputation in opposition to the unethical practices of the old-line parties, the stories were a particular embassassment.

Throughout 1991 and early 1992, long-time party members increasingly complained about what they perceived as the authoritarian manner in which the party was being run (see below). The result was a series of resignations and expulsions in each of the western provinces, particularly in Alberta and British Columbia (see AR, 1991h). Some Reformers again complained in early 1992 when Tory MLA Ray Speaker, a twenty-eight year member of the Alberta legislature, former Socred, and personal friend of Manning, resigned his seat to run for Reform's federal nomination in the Alberta riding of Little Bow. Other candidates for the Reform nomination were highly critical of Speaker's sudden entry into the race, seeing him as symbolic of everything the new party was supposed to be against. Some party members were also very critical of Manning's obvious welcome of his personal friend to the party, viewing this as blatant interference with the independence of the constituency (EJ, 1992n). In the end, Speaker won the nomination, but hard feelings remained.

The party's organizational problems, however, have not been confined to headquarters alone. Some party members in Ontario have accused the party's regional coordinator, Reg Gosse, of being autocratic and secretive. These accusations go back to before expansion to December, 1990, when Gosse apparently dismissed Ontario's expansion committee in favour of a parallel committee that he secretly had created the previous September (Dobbin, 1991:148-155).

As the party prepares for the upcoming election, Reform also has suffered from a number of scandals at the constituency level. Specifically, the party has been hit by accusations of dirty tricks and voting irregularities at nomination meetings held in Medicine Hat and Edmonton South, with the result that several long-time Reform Party members have resigned in disgust (EJ, 1992o; EJ, 1992p).

As Stephen Harper feared, there is also a good deal of evidence that expansion has resulted in some local constituencies having been taken over by right-wing extremists. This appears to be particularly the case in Ontario, a province which, as Barrett (1986) notes, has a long history of right-wing extremism (see also chapter two).

Dobbin (1991:152-53), for example, documented evidence suggesting that CoR has succeeded in taking over the executive of at least one Ontario constituency (Peterborough). In a similar vein, radio reports during the winter of 1991 stated that seven members of Burlington, Ontario's executive had resigned, complaining that the party was racist and sexist, and that the Calgary head office had ignored their concerns.

But a series of even more politically damaging stories became public in late 1991. In December, a news report stated that Gordon LeGrand, one of the Brockville protesters who became famous in 1989 for stomping on the Quebec flag (see chapter four), was the secretary of Reform's Leeds-Grenville riding association. To make matters worse, the party at first expressed no plans to get ride of LeGrand. "For something someone has done before they joined the party, it has to be pretty significant before the Reform party (sic) will expel them," stated Virgil Anderson, Reform's national director of constituent

development and a party policy officer, (EJ, 1991z:A4). It was a singularly naive statement considering Reform's public image in some quarters that its policies tended to cater to racists and extremists.

In January, under intense political pressure from the other political parties and from the media, Manning reversed this decision, announcing that LeGrand would either have to resign from the party or be expelled under a clause in the party's constitution.

> The Reform Party advocates mutual respect among Canadians --we don't tolerate the deliberate insulting of one Canadian group or another. It's the symbolic nature that's the concern -- particularly when we're getting into a very tense discussion of relations between Quebec and the rest of the country (EJ, 1992q:A3).

A short while later, while declaring his continued support for the party, LeGrand resigned.

Even more embarrassing, however, was the discovery in late February, 1992 that several neo-Nazis, including Wolfgang Droege, head of the extremist Heritage Front, had joined the party and that the Front had been encouraging other members to join Reform in hopes that Manning's party might provide a vehicle for bringing about the racial "purification" of Canada (G&M, 1992c). A few days later, Cliff Fryers announced that Droege, three other Heritage Front members, and an executive of the Beaches-Woodbine Reform constituency who had signed up the neo-Nazis, had been expelled from the party. Fryers announced at the same time that a committee had been set up to weed out "unacceptable" membership applications. The expulsions brought to 17 the number of members who had (mostly recently) been cast out of the party (EJ, 1992c).

These incidents rekindled questions about Reform's members and supporters. If not neo-Nazis and assorted rednecks, who were the people joining the party? To whom did Reform's anti-government, anti-welfare state, pro-free enterprise message appeal? With these questions in mind, I turn now to an examination of the profile of Reformers.

WHO ARE THE REFORMERS?

Previous, largely journalistic, descriptions of Reform Party supporters generally have focused on its leadership, including the executive. These accounts describe the party's executive and membership as consisting of white, middle aged or elderly males (AR, 1987e: AR, 1990h; EJ, 1990q), of upper or upper-middle class, professional and businessmen or agrarian backgrounds (AR, 1990h; EJ, 1990q). Reports also suggest that members are predominantly discontented former supporters of the Progressive Conservative party, with significant connections also to both the Social Credit party, particularly in Alberta and British Columbia, and more extreme right-wing fringe parties (i.e., Western Canada Concept, the Confederation of Regons Party) (EJ, 1990q; Braid and Sharpe, 1990; Dobbin, 1991).(5)

Unfortunately, many of these descriptions are based either on unsystematic observations or a reduction of party supporters in general to the condition of certain of the party's high profile members. It remains to be proven whether the characteristics of high profile members of the party adhere to the general party membership or to the party's supporters as a whole. Do these characteristics, in fact, carry into the lesser

echelons of the Reform Party? Are party members similar to supporters in the general public? Moreover, has the party's profile changed over time?

To answer these questions, I have examined the background characteristics of three distinguishable, though not entirely discontinuous, categories of Reform supporters: party executives, general members, and electoral supporters.

The sample of party executives is drawn from the totality of members elected to the Reform Party's executive council in 1987 (n=11), 1989 (n=11), and 1991 (n=16), ignoring replacements due to resignations or other causes (data compiled from Manning, 1992; EJ, 1990q; and RCP, 1991d).

The party's first executive council in 1987 featured 8 males and 3 females. This distribution has become more skewed since then. In 1989, 10 males and 1 female (Diane Ablonczy, who repeated from the first council) were elected. In 1991, the distribution was 15 males and 1 female (Danita Onyebuchi, who is Ablonczy's sister).

The average age of councillors may have dropped somewhat since the first executive was elected, although the available information is insufficient to state this with certainty. The only executive council for whom sufficient data exists (1989) suggests that the average age of councillors that year was 52.

The first executive featured three former Social Credit supporters, four former Tory supporters, and one former NDP (Henry Carroll, also a former NDP MLA in Manitoba). Since then, the Social Credit element appears to have vanished from the executive. For those about whom I possess information, there were seven former PCs and one Socred in 1989. In 1991, all five members for whom I have information, were former Tories.

Throughout its first three years of existence, Reform's executive council tended to be heavily laden with small business people, (often self-employed) professionals, and/or retired individuals. For example, the first council featured three lawyers (Ablonczy, Carroll, and Bob Muir), three business people (Ron Gamble, Ian McClelland, Joan Tait), one real estate agent (Val Meredith), one financial consultant (Werner Schmidt), one retired oil executive (Gordon Shaw), one retired contractor (Short Tompkins), and one farmer (Alan Beachell). On the second council were one lawyer (Ablonczy), two retired businesspeople (Neil Weir, Ted Krause), one teacher (John Cummins), two independent engineers/consultants (Gordon Duncan, Lee Morrison), one maintenance supervisor (Lloyd Kirkham), one insurance broker (Wayne Smith), a farmer (Elwin Hermanson), and Shaw and Tompkins.

The 1991 executive witnessed a slight change in the executive with virtually all the new members being professionals with connections to the financial service sector. For example, of that council's sixteen members, two were tax lawyers (Cliff Fryers, George Van Den Bosch), three were accountants (Lloyd Davis, Stew Dent, Myles Novak), two were life underwriters (Mike Friese, Gordon Wusyk), and two were financial consultants (Dick Harris and Wayne Smith). Most of the remaining seven positions went to incumbents -- Duncan, Cummins, Hermanson, and Morrison. The other three newly-elected members consisted of two managers (Onyebuchi and Monte Solberg) and a businessman (Don Leier).

For comparison's sake, and remembering that executives are elected while cabinet ministers are appointed following election, this profile of Reform's executive can be profitably set against that of previous federal cabinets. Such a comparison is justified, at least in part, by the fact that several high profile former or current members of the

party executive (Schmidt, McLelland, Ablonczy, Solberg) have won party nominations in preparation for the next election and would be potential cabinet ministers in the unlikely situation of Reform forming the government.

Work conducted over the years has provided a rather consistent profile of federal (i.e., Tory and Liberal) cabinets. Guppy et al. (1988), reviewing previous work conducted by Porter (1965), Olsen (1980), and material supplied by Canadian news sources and the Chief Electoral Officer, provide a relatively clear picture of the occupational status of previous cabinet members. In particular, Guppy et al. (1988) show that, although the number of lawyers in federal cabinets has declined markedly between 1940 and 1984, they still made up 35.1 percent of all cabinet appointments between 1974-84. The drop in the number of lawyers gradually has been filled over the years by business/executive and public/armed service people and teachers/academics. Similar work by Lammers and Nyomarkay (1982), focusing solely on comparing the Clark cabinet of 1980 and the Trudeau cabinet of that same year, generally confirms these findings while also suggesting that the profile of Liberal and Conservative appointees may be gradually diverging, with Tory cabinet ministers being more likely to have business and legal backgrounds, and less likely to have teaching and journalistic backgrounds, than their Liberal counterparts. In all cases, cabinets traditionally have been dominated by males, although there has been some small shift towards greater female representation in recent years.

Compared against this evidence, it appears that, at least occupationally, a Reform cabinet might be more similar to that of the Tories than the Liberals. Reform's executive may be more over-representative of small business than either of the two major parties, and somewhat less representative of the legal profession. But even this latter conclusion must be tailored with the acknowledgement that several of those lawyers who are, or have been, part of Reform's executive (in particular, Ablonczy, Muir, and Fryers), and several who have not (Bob Matheson and Virgil Anderson) appear to wield an inordinate amount of power relative to their numbers on the executive.

Other conclusions regarding Reform's executive can be advanced. First, the average age of the executive is probably decreasing over time (average today: probably in the late 40s), whether reflecting a change in the party membership as a whole or a change in voters' preferences. In any case, this may account for the gradual reduction in both former Social Credit supporters and retirees on the executive. Second, Reform's councils tend to be heavily male-dominated, in part because relatively few women run for office, in part because delegates appear to be reluctant to vote for women. In any case, gender differences probably do not diverge significantly from the pattern set by either the Liberal or Conservative parties. Finally, Reform delegates increasingly appear to prefer candidates with professional credentials, particularly in the financial service sector -- a fact that may also mitigate, to some extent, against women. Are Reform's executive council's reflective of the party membership?

Not entirely. There have been four empirical attempts at profiling Reform's membership. The Reform Party has, itself, made three of these efforts.(6) In 1989, the party surveyed 5,000 members. That same year, Reform circulated a questionnaire to 2,000 delegates to its Edmonton convention. In 1991, the party again surveyed its general membership, using a sample of 1,784. Finally, I circulated a questionnaire among a small, non-random sample (55) of delegates to the party's 1991 Saskatoon

convention (Harrison, 1991; see chapter four). Some results from each of these studies are shown in Table 5.2 below.

Table 5.2

Comparison of Results from Four Surveys of Reform Party Members, 1989-1991, (in percentages, rounded)

Characteristic	Survey			
	1989 (Gen.)	1989 (Con.)	1991 (Gen.)	1991(Con.)
Gender				
F	28	32	29	33
M	72	68	71	67
Age (50 +)	- -	65	66	54
Educ. (H.S.+)	- -	74	49	76
Retired	38	23	35	24

Sources: 1989 General Survey (details reported in McCormick, 1991; Pearson, 1990); 1989 Convention Survey (RPC, 1989c; also reported in McDougall, 1990); 1991 General Survey (RPC, 1991e); 1991 Convention Survey (Harrison, 1991).

A cautionary note in interpreting these results is in order. It is unclear whether any of these samples is representative. My own sample is particularly suspect given its small size and non-randomness. There is, moreover, the question of the comparability of convention samples with other samples. Past studies have shown that convention delegates differ in significant ways from the general population or, we may presume, from party members as a whole.

Lele et al. (1972) found, for example, that delegates to the federal Conservative convention in 1967 and the Liberal convention in 1968 were significantly better educated than the average Canadian of the time (64 and 63 percent, respectively, with greater than high school education compared with 13 percent in the general population). Delegates tended also to have much larger incomes than the average Canadian (41 percent and 44 percent, respectively, in the two highest income categories vs. 2 percent in the general population). Certain occupations (professionals, owners, managers, executives) were vastly over-represented relative to their numbers in the general work force (59 percent for each party vs. 21 percent in the general population). 24 percent of the Tory delegates and 26 percent of the Liberal delegates were fifty-one years of age or older. Finally, the gender breakdown of delegates, of all types (ex-officio, at-large, and constituency), was weighted heavily in favour of males (ranging from 78 to 91 percent males).

Comparing these results only with Reform's convention samples (columns 2 and 4 in Table 5.2) reveals some interesting differences and similarities. Like delegates to the previous Tory and Liberal conventions, delegates to the Reform conventions in 1989 and 1991 appear to be better educated than the Canadian population as a whole. The data also suggest that the percentage of women Reform delegates was closer to the Canadian average than that found at either the Tory convention of 1967 or the Liberal convention of 1968.

although, on this point, I would hesitate to make any conclusions. The Reform conventions may have been more egalitarian than past Tory and Liberal conventions; it is unclear whether that would be the case today. Finally, however, it is quite clear that delegates to both Reform conventions were considerably older than appears to be the norm, a fact that dovetails with the large percentage of retirees in attendance.

Compared with each other, the sample results appearing in Table 5.2 suggest that Reform's convention delegates have tended to be somewhat better educated and less likely to be retired than Reform Party members in general. Nonetheless, the differences are small. As a whole, the data support depictions of Reform Party members as elderly, often retired males. Moreover, this profile of the membership does not appear to have changed substantially over time.

Among other findings, it is worth repeating (see chapter four) that 73 percent of the delegates in my survey indicated that they were Protestants, while perhaps as many as 79 percent came from Anglo-Saxon-Celtic backgrounds. Unfortunately, this finding cannot be confirmed because, for what appear to be both political and ideological reasons, the Reform Party has not collected data regarding either ethnic or religious variables.

The party does collect information, however, on occupational status. Here, too, however, a problem emerges insofar as Reform's internal surveys frequently conflate class and occupation, making evaluation of either of these categories difficult. Nonetheless, farmers (the "rural" petite bourgeoisie) appear to be overrepresented within the Reform Party relative to their numbers at large. The 1989 convention study found that more than 8 percent of its respondents were farmers. Similarly, the 1991 general study found that nearly 15 percent of party members were engaged in agriculture. This compares with recent Statistics Canada figures showing that only 1.6 percent of Canada's workforce is engaged in farming, 4 percent if those engaged in horticulture or animal husbandry are included in the total. Nor is the amount of Reform support among farmers explained by controlling for regional variations. Statistics Canada figures show also that farmers make up only 3.4 percent of western Canada's labour force, a figure that rises to only 7 percent if we include those engaged in horticulture and animal husbandry (all percentages calculated from Statistics Canada, 1986:1-226). This finding of high support among farmers coincides with other information present in Reform's 1991 survey which indicates that the party tends to draw a significant proportion of its members (49 percent vs. the Canadian average of 37 percent) from rural rather than urban areas (RPC, 1991e).

Like the Liberals and the PCs (see Guppy et al., 1988), the Reform Party also appears to draw its membership disproportionately from autonomous professionals (particularly in the legal and financial service sectors), independent businesspeople, and managers. While, again, occupation should not be equated totally with class, this finding suggests that much of Reform's membership may come from the "urban" petite bourgeoisie. This suggestion is further supported (indirectly) by the fact that only 15.5 percent of employed Reformers are union members (RPC, 1991e) compared with the Canadian average of 37.7 percent union members among non-agricultural paid workers (see Krahn and Lowe, 1988:193 regarding Canadian averages). In this regard, also, Reformers appear to most clearly resemble the Tories and (to a lesser extent) the Liberals (see Archer, 1990).

In general, Reform Party members possess moderately high incomes. 42 percent of the 1989 convention survey reported total family incomes of over $50,000, with the

median income being between $40-50,000. Similarly, the party's 1991 general survey found that 43 percent reported family incomes of $50,000 or more (mean of $44,340). My own survey findings on this point must be taken with extreme caution. Only 47 of the 55 respondents answered the family income question. This small sample size, and the fact that three of my respondents reported family incomes of between $190,000-300,000, no doubt skewed the average family income ($86,532, with a median of $75,000). At best, the findings may suggest, similar to the education results, that the higher the social class of a party member, the more likely that he or she will attend party conventions.

Finally, each of the studies tend to support the contention that Reform Party members are, in general, disgruntled Tories or previous supporters of other right-wing parties. For example, Reform's 1989 convention survey found that nearly 64 percent previously had been members of another federal party. Of these, 78 percent had been Tories, 5 percent Socreds, 5 percent Liberals, and just over 1 percent CoR members.(7) The party's 1989 general survey furnished similar results, with 73 percent stating that they had (generally) supported the Tories, while 22 percent said they had supported Social Credit (reported in McCormick, 1991). My own 1991 convention survey of fifty-five delegates indicated that 91 percent had, at some time, supported the Tories, although several respondents reported having supported more than one party (Harrison, 1991). Finally, Reform's 1991 membership survey indicated previous support for other federal parties as follows: PC, 72.9 percent; Liberal, 9.6 percent; Social Credit, 7 percent; NDP, 4.4 percent; and other (or multiple), 6.1 percent.

A comment is in order regarding the party's support from previous Socreds. Given Reform's strength in Alberta and British Columbia, the historic heartlands of Social Credit in Canada (see chapter two), this finding is not unusual. As previously shown, however, the party recently has made significant gains in eastern Canada. If this continues to occur, the percentage (if not the total) of former Socreds in the party should diminish. Conversely, given previous trends, and barring that Reform fails in garnering support from previous Liberal and NDP supporters, the overall percentage of former Tories in the party may increase. Alternatively, the percentage of members from such Ontario-based fringe parties as the Christian Heritage Party is also likely to increase.

In the meantime, it is possible to describe a typical Reform Party member. A Reform Party member is likely to be an older, fairly well-educated male, likely a member of either the rural or urban petite bourgeoisie, retired or nearing retirement, who tends not to belong to a union. He is well off, but not rich. (In the words of columnist Jeffrey Simpson, "Many [Reformers] have nest eggs; few have yachts" [G&M, 1991g:A14].) He has formerly voted for (and often been a member of) the Progressive Conservatives and most likely lives in Alberta, British Columbia, or (increasingly) Ontario.

How does the profile of Reform supporters compare with that of Canadians in general? A poll conducted on 224 Reform Party supporters by Environics Research in May, 1991, and subsequently matched against selected national statistics, sheds some light on this question. 66 percent of Reformers were men; 97 percent were English-speaking; 27 percent were older than sixty (vs. 21 percent nationally); 22 percent were retired (vs. 16 percent nationally); 62 percent were Protestants (vs. 36 percent

nationally, 54 percent excluding Quebec [latter figure calculated from Statistics Canada, 1981b]; and 15 percent were university educated (vs. 13 percent nationally) (Environics Research, reported in the Toronto Star, 1991).

Table 5.3

Federal Voting Preference by Socio-Demographic Characteristics, Alberta, 1991
(in percentages, rounded)

Party	Characteristic: Location --	Edm.	Cal.	Oth. City	Town/ Rural
Reform		12	21	17	23
Liberal		20	16	18	8
NDP		20	12	14	13
PC		9	15	11	12
Other*		40	36	40	45
	Characteristic: Gender --	Female	Male		
Reform		15	21		
Liberal		14	16		
NDP		14	16		
PC		11	12		
Other*		46	34		
	Characteristic: Age --	18-29	30-44	45-59	60+
Reform		12	21	20	23
Liberal		19	15	12	9
NDP		15	17	13	6
PC		13	11	13	13
Other*		41	36	41	47
	Characteristic: Education --<12 yrs.		12	13-15	16+ yrs.
Reform		16	14	20	22
Liberal		10	15	15	20
NDP		10	19	14	15
PC		11	10	14	12
Other*		53	42	36	30

Source: 1991 Alberta Survey, reported in Harrison (1992).
* includes "don't know," "would not vote," "ineligible to vote," and "other party."

Similarly, how does the profile of Reform supporters compare with that of other party supporters? Another poll conducted by Environics Research (sample size of

1,952) between July 15 and August 15, 1991 addresses this question. Relative to other party supporters, Reform supporters are disproportionately male, older (over 60), retired, home-owners. Mirroring previous findings (see chapter four), Reform Party supporters, moreover, tend to be English-speaking, Protestant, and European. In comparison with the Liberals, Conservatives, and NDP, Reform also draws somewhat more of its support from people in technical, professional, administrative, and skilled (or semi-skilled) occupations, with high household incomes ($50,000 +), and a high number of years of schooling (Environics, 1991).

Dr. Harvey Krahn and I conducted a similar comparison of federal party supporters. Drawing upon data from the University of Alberta's 1991 Alberta Survey, mentioned in chapter four, we examined the sample characteristics of supporters of the four major federal parties in Alberta (see Table 5.3, above).

Keeping in mind the large number of people (540) in the sample who listed no party preference, the results shown in Table 5.3 are nonetheless congruent with previous descriptions of Reform Party supporters. Although the results indicated that Reformers' household incomes were not significantly different from those of other federal party supporters in the province -- indeed, Reform appeared to be receiving support within all income groups -- we also found that Reform Party supporters were more likely than other party supporters to be home owners and non-union members. Calgary and small town/rural residents and older, better educated males tended more than other voters to be attracted to the Reform Party.

In a specific test of theory, Dr. Krahn and I also examined the class backgrounds of party supporters. We were particularly interested in testing Macpherson's (1953) assumptions regarding petite bourgeois support for populist parties. On the surface, the theory appeared to be applicable to the Reform Party. As frequently noted, previous descriptions of the party's leadership, members, and supporters have remarked upon the number of farmers, small businessmen, and autonomous or semi-autonomous professionals and technicians connected with Reform.

The 1991 Alberta Survey was particularly well-suited to conducting just such an empirical test. Using a combination of questions dealing with occupational, employment, and supervisory status within the workplace, we were able to determine seven classes: farmers, owners, the urban petite bourgeoisie, senior and middle managers, semi-autonomous workers, foremen and supervisors, and workers.(8)

The results shown in Table 5.4 (below) indicate only partial support for Macpherson's theory. It is significant that 41.3 percent of Alberta farmers (the rural petite bourgeoisie) stated that the Reform Party was their electoral preference, compared with only 14.8 percent for the Tories, 7.8 percent for the NDP, and 3.0 percent for the Liberals. It should be noted that this was one of the few instances in which decided voters for *any* party actually outnumbered those in the "other" category (33 percent), and that, if only committed voters are considered Reform support among farmers actually rose to 62 percent. Moreover, it is worth noting that a Dunvegan poll, conducted in early 1992, similarly found that 79 percent of decided Alberta farmers and 59 percent of decided farmers in the three prairie provinces planned to vote Reform (EJ, 1992b). By contrast, however, neither small business owners (the urban petite bourgeoisie) nor members of any other class were significantly more likely to support Reform than any other party.

Table 5.4

Federal Voting Preference by Class Position, Alberta, 1991 (in percentages, rounded)

Party	Class						
	Farmers	Owners	Petite Bourgeoisie	Managers	Semi-Autonomous	Foremen	Workers
Reform	41	27	21	22	20	16	14
Liberal	3	27	11	20	16	15	16
NDP	8	7	16	8	15	7	18
PC	15	12	13	18	16	11	9
Other*	33	26	39	32	33	51	43
Total	100	99	100	100	100	100	100
N=	(78)	(21)	(102)	(108)	(229)	(126)	(659)

Source: 1991 Alberta Survey, reported in Harrison and Krahn (1992).
** Includes "don't know," "would not vote," "ineligible to vote," and "other party."*

Do the results mean that Reform is, in fact, a reflection of traditional agrarian populism? No. In our sample, farmers made up only 13.3 percent of Reform's overall supporters. The results suggest simply that, if one is a farmer, then he or she is likely to be a Reform supporter. The party, however, is also drawing reasonably well from other social classes in the province.

In summary, the characteristics of Reform's executive, members, and supporters are as follows. Reform's executive tends, perhaps increasingly, to be male, middle-aged, and professionally-trained. Reform's members and supporters tend also to be males, but somewhat older than the executive. Reformers, in general, appear to be better educated than the general population. Regarding its class composition, the party cannot accurately be categorized as petite bourgeois, although farmers are over-represented among both its membership and electoral supporters. In general, the party tends to attract a disproportionate number of rural dwellers. Finally, Reform's supporters tend to be of Anglo-Saxon-Celtic or European heritage, and predominantly Christian, mainly Protestant (see chapter four), a finding that also appears to hold true for party members. Taken together, these characteristics tend to differentiate Reformers from supporters and members of the other major parties, although Reformers tend to mirror the Tories more closely than either the Liberals or New Democrats.

But if Reformers tend to possess certain social characteristics in common, what beliefs might also be them together? Is it possible, a la Macpherson (1953), to decipher a coherent ideology driving Reform? Moreover, can such an ideology, if found, be understood in the broader context of the class, or other social locational, positions of its members? In order to answer these questions, I turn now to an examination of the ideology of Reformers.

WHAT DO REFORMERS BELIEVE?

Although Preston Manning has insisted from the beginning that the Reform Party is non-ideological, it is hard to imagine a more ideologically-driven party or leadership. Indeed, as we've seen (chapter two), Manning was, himself, heavily involved in the writing of Political Realignment, a text that called for political parties to return to pure ideology. This same insistence on ideological purity, or non-pragmatism, is found in Gairdner's (1990) division of the world into two philosophical camps (see chapter four), and in the Byfields' frequent derisive labelling of non-ideologues as "muddlegrounders."

It is clear, moreover, that Reform Party members view themselves from an ideological perspective. The party's own 1989 convention survey found that on a seven point scale defining left-right ideology (left=1, right=7), Reformers placed themselves at 5.08 and the party at 5.09, compared to the perceived positioning of the Canadian electorate (3.74). By comparison, Reformers' positioned the federal PCs at 3.5, the Liberals at 2.63, and the NDP at 1.85. It is interestingly to note that the convention delegates tended to view the provincial wings of each of these parties, especially the Tories, as being somewhat more right-wing (PCs, 4.26; Liberals, 3.25; and NDP, 1.97), while Reform delegates from BC gave the Socreds in that province a rating of 4.96 (Reform Party, 1989c; also reviewed in McCormick, 1991). In short, delegates to Reform's 1989 convention tended to view themselves and their party as far to the ideological right of both the Canadian electorate and most of the existing parties, either federally or provincially.

Such a finding of strong ideological commitment may not be unusual for a new party. Indeed, we might expect that only those with pronounced ideological beliefs would be willing to expend the energy and resources necessary to start up a new party or to sustain one with a commitment to ideas over power alone. In this sense, the motivations of Reform members appear more similar to that of NDP members, another ideologically-driven party, than either Liberals or Conservatives whose motivations for joining the party tend to be more social and/or instrumental (see Conley and Smith, 1983 regarding the motivations of members of the three major parties).

What beliefs do Reformers hold? Table 5.5 (below) compares attitudinal data obtained from delegates to Reform's 1991 Saskatoon convention with data obtained from the 1991 Alberta Survey.

Comparing first the Reform Party delegates and supporters (columns 1 and 2), and keeping in mind the small (55) sample of delegates, it is worth noting that the latter appear to have been somewhat more strongly opposed to the notion of distinct society (#2), much less open to notions of distributive justice (#4), and much less supportive of women working outside the home than the party's supporters (#11). Both Reform delegates and supporters were strongly differentiated from other party supporters in their dislike of government efforts to promote women's equality (#13). The delegates also appear to have been much more concerned about the power of government (#7) than the supporters of any of the parties, including Reform.

Table 5.5

Reformers' Attitudes, Convention Delegates, 1991, and Alberta Supporters, 1991
(percentage agreeing)

	RP (Con.)	RP	PC	Lib.	NDP	Oth. *
(1) "The GST will benefit most Canadians."	18	23	54	24	19	24
(2) "Quebec should be officially recognized as a 'distinct society' in Canada."	2	13	22	28	34	21
(3) "Canadian senators should be elected."	96	97	90	91	84	81
(4) "People with high incomes should pay a greater share of the taxes than they do now."	40	79	76	75	87	74
(5) "The difference between the rich and the poor is too great in Canada."	51	72	66	76	86	77
(6) "I don't think the federal government cares much about what people like me think."	80	88	59	77	87	77
(7) "The 'government' is too powerful in Canada."	86	79	52	70	78	71
(8) "We need more laws to limit the powers of unions."	55	53	61	55	39	53
(9) "Large corportions are too powerful in in Canada."	60	66	55	66	79	72
(10) "Society has become too lenient with criminals."	87	89	85	78	77	85
(11) "It is all right for a married woman with pre-school children to work outside the home."	45	58	54	64	73	64
(12) "Abortion should be a matter of a woman's personal choice."	65	65	68	65	74	67
(13) "More should be done by governments to promote equality for women in Canada."	38	50	62	62	82	67
(14) "Canada should continue to accept large numbers of immigrants."	31	28	27	38	34	25
(15) "The aboriginal people of Canada should be treated the same as other groups who live in Canada."	33	81	87	84	76	86

Sources: *RP Convention Survey (Harrison, 1991); all other data from the 1991 Alberta Survey, reported in Harrison (1992).*
**includes "don't know," "would not vote," "ineligible to vote," and "other party."*

But the delegates' responses regarding native people (#15) is the most intriguing. Given Reformers' fairly strong belief that everyone should be treated the same -- that is, after all, the party's central argument against "distinct status" for Quebec -- why did the delegates answer in the way they did? The answer lies, I think, in the fact that some in English-speaking Canada, following the Oka crisis and during the time of the Saskatoon convention, viewed native demands as pressing particularly against Quebec's own call for increased autonomy -- a kind of "stew in your own juices" sentiment. As such, the apparently anomalous response of the delegates to question #15 may in fact be viewed as quite congruent with their response to question #2.

It should be noted, however, that "distinct society" status for Quebec received little support among any party adherents while, conversely, the question regarding elected senators (#3) received almost unanimous support. Reformers tended to mirror Tory supporters on such traditionally conservative concerns as the treatment of criminals (#10) and immigration (#14). But Reform supporters were closer to the Liberals on issues regarding unions (#8), the power of corporations (#9), abortion (#12), and the treatment of aboriginals (#15). Finally, to complete a somewhat confusing picture, Reformers were similar to both the Liberals and NDP in their dislike of the GST (#1) and seemed to share with NDP supporters a high level of political alienation (#6).

Taken together, the findings suggest that Reform supporters may possess a unique and coherent configuration of attitudes, while remaining similar to other party supporters regarding certain issues.(9) Is it possible to tie together this pattern of attitudes with the structural characteristics of Reform Party members?

I believe so. As I implied in the early chapters of this thesis, the roots of the Reform Party go back much before the Vancouver assembly of 1987. Indeed, Reform's roots can be found in a series of structural and ideological changes that have occurred in Canada (and all of western society) over the past (at least) thirty years. In many case, these changes have been revolutionary, and like all revolutions have had negative consequences for people in certain social locations. Over time, these negative consequences resulted in setting free from the influence of the dominant political parties many of the people residing within these social locations, making them potentially vulnerable to any legitimate political alternative promising to restore the traditional order.

In chapter four, I provided evidence to the effect that, among decided voters of Anglo-Saxon-Celtic and Protestant backgrounds, a large number would vote for the Reform Party. In terms of status and power, has any ethnic and/or religious group lost more than Anglo-Saxons and Protestants since the 1960s (see Ogmundson and McLaughlin, 1992)? Moreover, have not anglophone powers been challenged most directly by francophone Quebecers and visible minorities -- two groups towards whom Reformers tend to harbour particularly negative attitudes? While it seems true that francophone Quebecers and visible minorities also are not particularly well-liked by other party supporters, Reform seems to have provided a legitimate vehicle for the expression of anger over these changes in Canada's status and power hierarchies.

I also have shown that an overwhelming number of farmers, and rural voters in general, are Reform supporters. Has any occupational and class location in Canada lost more income and status than farmers in the past five years? Have not rural dwellers, in general, seen their way of life slipping under the wheels of seemingly irresistable modernity?

Likewise, the statistical evidence presented here shows that males tend to be over-represented among Reformers, and that Reformers are less supportive of gender equality issues than other party supporters. Has not the traditional occupational and social status of males been gradually eroded by the gains of women over this same period?

But I do not wish to convey the notion that all attitudes are irreducible to structural factors alone. Ideas are not always directly anchored in concrete circumstances. Rather, they possess a certain degree of freedom. Thus, even in circumstances where people's social locations are not directly affected, they nonetheless may feel a sense of dislocation resulting from changes in their normative order. This

sense of social dislocation, I believe, explains much of what Reformers' feel. For, in the face of numerous changes -- economic, political, and ideological -- that have beset the Canada that they once knew, many Reformers would simply like the world, if it cannot be stopped, to at least slow down for a while.

Taken even farther, however, can Reformer's attitudes and beliefs be raised to a different level of abstraction? Further, is it possible also to define what might be termed an "ideology"?

Yes. Two major ideological elements have coalesced within Reform Party thought. The first of these elements is pure populism, dealing with primarily political issues: power to the people, greater accountability by elected officials, an end to political patronage, and a curtailment of the power of the "big interests." Because populism, excluded from any discussion of the means of achieving these goals, is not easily reducible to a right-left categorization, it provides the Reform Party with a potential bridge to those many Canadians of various ideological persuasions who have grown disillusioned with government bureaucracy, scandal, insensitivity, and arrogance.

Contiguous and, in some cases, overlapping with this populist element in Reform is a second element: neo-conservatism. As described in chapter one, neo-conservatism, in North America at least, combines classical liberal economic and political theory with traditional conservative social and moral doctrine. In practical terms, neo-conservatism has proven particularly useful as an ideological umbrella for the creation of political alliance in opposition to the dominance of post-war, or welfare state, liberalism. In the strictly coalitional sense, Reform is a "neo-conservative" party.

In truth, however, few Reformers -- except perhaps Preston Manning himself -- literally embrace all the purported tenets of neo-conservatism. Moreover, within Reform's corridors of power, the forces of economic liberalism appear to dominate over both traditional conservatism and the impulses of populism.

Economic liberalism dominated even at the party's inception. As I have shown, the party was formed with generous financial and administrative support from the western business community and has made recent efforts to increase its corporate support elsewhere. As well, most of Reform's executives have strong ties to the corporate community, particularly the oil and gas sector, a sector whose espousal of strict laissez-faire economics (even as it benefits from all kinds of government intervention and support) is notorious (see House, 1980; see also Laxer, 1983, 1986). The party's chief ideological mentors, Brimelow (1986), Gairdner (1990), Manning (1992), and Byfield (any Alberta Report) also express an extreme faith in unbridled capitalism, individualism, and the workings of the market place. Since the beginning, Reform also has had uncomfortable links with the National Citizens' Coalition, an organization with strong ties to Canada's business community (see Dobbin, 1991).(10) During the 1988 election, Reform supported the free trade interests of big business with at least as much ardour as the Tories. Moreover, as we have seen in its efforts to obtain financial support, Reform makes no efforts to hide its affinity to business interests.

But Reform's radical pro-market stance is not confined to the party's hierarchy alone. Rather, as shown in the survey results above, Reform Party members and supporters, in general, tend to have a rather uncritical -- some would say "naive" -- faith in corporations and the business sector.

The results of a Gallup poll, conducted in late 1991, reveal this uncritical attitude. In response to the question, "In general, who do you believe are more honest and

trustworthy, political leaders or business leaders?." Reformers' overwhelmingly (74 percent) selected the latter. By contrast, Tory supporters voted 57 percent business, Liberals 60 percent business, and New Democrats 54 percent business. (NDP supporters appeared to be the most cynical, with 40 percent opting for "no opinion" in the matter [results in Gallup, 1991f].)

Reform's current policies on privatization, property rights, social programs, flat taxes, agricultural subsidies, and labour relations similarly reflect this unquestioning support of business and the private accumulation of capital. For many Reformers, the central problem of modern life is "big government," while the solution lies in turning Canada into the kind of *ideal* "free market" economy described by Smith and Ricardo roughly two centuries ago.

Consistent with this ideal, the Reform Party has among its policies one that calls for the "elimination of subsidies and tax concessions to business" (RPC, 1991a). True to its erstwhile ideological roots, the party proposes "letting the market decide," even if this presumably means allowing large corporations to fold as a result of (perhaps) shor term economic downturns.

Even ideology, however, has its limits. In time, I believe that the Reform Party largely will abandon this policy. Manning, and the rest of Reform's executive, are too close, psychologically and politically, to big business to ever cut loose the corporations. In the end, the laissez-faire liberal ideology that currently dominates Reform polices likely will evolve into the kind of right-wing, pro-business conservatism practiced by Preston Manning's father in the 1950s and 1960s when he was premier of Alberta.

As this occurs, I further would predict that the economic liberal elements within Reform increasingly will move to curtail the party's populist drives since these drives, if left unchecked, ultimately might challenge the leadership's rather restricted notion of political democracy. Indeed, as I will show later, the populist elements of Reform ideology already are being restrained and rechannelled.

What of Reform's traditional conservative element? There is no doubt that conservatism has a strong voice within the party. For example, Preston Manning (1992) and Deborah Grey are staunch and outspoken anti-abortionists. Likewise, such issues as immigration, multiculturalism, and "feminism," which disturb Reformers' sense of "normative order," rankle many in the party. In general, however, the degree of support for traditional conservative values is not as pronounced as it is for economic liberalism and demands for less government. (Note, in Table 5.5, for example, the position of delegates and supporters regarding abortion.) Nor, excluding Manning and Grey, are the values of traditional conservatism readily found in the highest echelons of the party. To the extent that moral conservatism, and such issues as a return to "law and order," recently have been resurrected by Manning (1992j), I suggest that it reflects a tactic designed more to rekindle the party's stagnant fortunes than any deep-seated belief in the issues.

In the main, however, Manning studiously avoids discussing moral questions and even has begun suggesting that the party stay away from talking about such normative issues as immigration (Sharpe and Braid, 1992:132-35). While Manning's motive seems to be to avoid controversial issues that might harm the party's electoral chances, a significant number of influential people in the party appear genuinely uninterested in the conservative moral agenda. Stephen Harper fits this description, as does Brimelow (1992) whose writings lean towards libertarianism. Similarly, Stan Waters was pro-

choice on abortion and once remarked, "[W]hy do middle-aged men in Parliament want to decide what a woman should do?" (EJ, 1989d:A1) If the economic liberals within the party are opposed to programs or policies that might change the normative order, their opposition stems less from a moral imperative and more from a desire to reduce government expenditures.

This discussion regarding economic liberalism and traditional conservatism provides the basis for a brief analysis of a fundamental conflict at the heart of neo-conservative coalitions. To paraphrase Lenin's (1893-94; see chapter one) rather well known quote regarding the petite bourgeoisie, neo-conservatism is a Janus-headed ideology. While one of neo-conservatism's faces looks to the past, longing for the sense of community, stability, and permanence, its other, more classically liberal, face looks to the future, denigrating the past and bridling at the fetters that history and tradition place upon its personal freedom.

Macpherson (1962) defined the essential "ethos" of classical economic liberalism as "possessive individualism." Possessive individualism is based on the assumption that people are free and human by virtue of their sole proprietorship of their own persons and capacities, a proprietorship for which they possess no intrinsic obligation to society (past or present), such "society," to the extent that the term applies, being defined as essentially a series of market relations between atomistic individuals solely motivated by economic considerations. That Reform ideology carries within it this aspect of classical liberal thought is aptly displayed by William Gairdner:

> I will argue ... that a key factor in the moral and economic success of democratic capitalism is ... its very *impersonality*, and that this impersonality is not cruel, but humane.... it is precisely its vast network of impersonal, economic actors, each serving the whole in a self-interested, but necessarily other-regarding way, that breeds success, and greater wealth for all (Gairdner, 1990:364, italics in original).

Such a notion of society and social obligations clearly would be anathema to many traditional conservatives, although it is worth noting that Gairdner received repeated, thunderous ovations from Reform delegates who heard his speech at the Saskatoon convention. Moreover, at least two Reform Party delegates to the same convention expressed to me the same atomistic (if not anti-social) view that they should not have to pay for such things as health care ("I'm never sick.") or school tax ("I don't have children.") In the above quotation, however, what is most worth noting is Gairdner's rather tortured efforts to retain some basis of social obligation. Why, for example, are economic actors "necessarily other-regarding"?

Manning attempts to overcome the conflict between possessive individualism and social responsibility through a resort to religious notions of reward and punishment meted out in the hereafter. Those who give in to excessive self-indulgence and fail to meet their social obligations "will be held accountable to God for their actions" (Manning, 1992:135; see also Dobbin, 1991, and Sharpe and Bird, 1992, regarding Manning's religious beliefs). But how are people to learn of their obligations towards self and others?

For Manning (1992) and other Reform mentors, such as Byfield and Gairdner, the family is ultimately the chief social agent charged with this task:

> If the first building block of democratic capitalism is the individual and his person-hood, the second is the family, which nurtures and creates this reality. Practically speaking, however, we could reverse this order, and say that the family is first, for it is in the bosom of the family that the crucial values, disciplines, and standards of individual behaviour are formed, and transmitted from generation to generation (Gairdner, 1990:80).

The idea that the family and marriage are important elements in Reformers belief systems has some statistical support. Environics (1991), for example, found that the Reform Party was the only federal party , including the Bloc Quebecois, whose percentage of support among married voters was greater than the percentage of support among unmarried voters. Likewise, Reform's own research indicates that 82 percent of its members are married (RPC, 1991e), a much higher percentage than found in the general Canadian population (see Veevers, 1991). In short, Reformers appear to view the family as a kind of safe haven, emotionally, and symbolically, from the pressures of the individualizing market place.

The haven, however, is permeable. Indeed, the supposed separation into public and private spheres increasingly is illusory. Like all social formations, the family since the Second World War has been rent by centrifugal forces originating, in large measure, in the dynamics -- and ideology -- of capitalism. As a collectivity, the emotional and psychological structure of which is the reverse of possessive individualism, the family is caught within the internal logic of capitalism. This logic demands the intrusion into, and revolutionizing of, not only the narrowly defined instruments of production, but all social formations, including the family.

Reformers are not uninformed people. Many are probably aware, at least at some level, of the pressures that the market place has put upon the family. Few, however, appear to recognize the systemic quality of these pressures. In the end, most Reformers are left with only a vague perception of the overall nature of the forces threatening both their economic and social existence and the values that they hold dear.

What lies ahead for an ideology whose separate elements are in fundamental contradication with each other? In the United States, under Ronald Reagan, neo-conservatism provided a convenient umbrella for the creation of a coalition of interests during much of the 1980s. But the coalition has recently shown the beginnings of fragmentation, particularly over the emotional issue of abortion. Already there are similar signs that traditional conservative elements within Reform are beginning to bridle at the party's dominance by economic liberals.

An early example of dissent occurred in December, 1990, when a number of supporters of REAL Women found that the party had set up a women's work group. Mary Lamont, a founding member of both REAL Women and the Reform Party stated that she was "shocked by the material" presented at the meeting.

> I've been involved in the Reform party from the start and I've always thought of its as a strong conservative party. I thought it stood for a different approach. I expected it would do more on these family issues than give us feminist slogans, attitudes and agendas. The feminists get enough attention from the other parties (AR, 1990e:16).

The controversy ended when the women's group folded. But the potential internal conflicts extend to other issues, no one more than the abortion question. In a personal interview, Ted Byfield (1991) suggested that the abortion issue has the greatest potential to split the Reform Party. A letter to the Alberta Report regarding Waters's defence of abortion rights captures this conflict exactly:

> [Stan] Waters states he is personally supportive of the right of women to have an abortion and that the issue should [be] resolved through a referendum. He follows the pathetic populist Reform party line of succumbing to the tyranny of the majority.... [T]hese power-mad 'Reformers' would decide whether the pre-born child lives or dies by the sentiment of a mob.... (AR, 1990i:3).

Likewise, some of the party's traditional small "c" conservatives may have begun to strain at Manning's insistence upon strict liberal economic initiatives. The issue of ending farm subsidies provides a good example. So controversial was this proposal that Saskatchewan delegates to the Saskatoon Assembly in 1991 had the issue tabled, insisting that they could not sell their local memberships, or the voters, on such an idea. In response, Manning and Reform's executive oversaw a watering down of the proposal, stating that the party would not advocate Canada's unilateral abandonment of farm subsidies.

At a meeting in November, 1991, however, Manning returned to his advocacy of strict free market principles, suggesting that Canada would have to move to a market-driven system and that this would mean fewer farmers, and that those who remained would have to become accustomed to "living with less" (E.J. 1991aw:A7). In apparent response to this statement, George Visser, a well-known Reform Party member, suggested at a meeting of Christian Farmers of Alberta that Reform reverse its policies and guarantee grain farmers floor prices but "not call them subsidies" (AR, 1991h).

The conflict between Manning and the farming community over solutions to Canada's agricultural problems escalated in August, 1992, following a speech in which Manning stated: "The brute truth is that the Prairie provinces can't support, with a high standard of living, the number of farmers they have been supporting." The next day, both Charlie Swanson, president of Manitoba Pool Elevators, and Hartmann Nagel, president of the Alberta farm group, Unifarm, condemned the speech, insinuating that Manning does not understand the problems of farmers (story and comments in E.J. 1992a).

A similar potential split in Reform ranks appears to be arising around the issue of the universality of old-age pensions. Reform's policy regarding income security and income support programs reads, in part, as follows:

> The Reform Party supports the development of a family or household-oriented comprehensive, social security system administered through the income-tax system. This could replace many forms of social policy, such as the Family Allowance, Child Tax Credit, Spousal Exemption, Child Exemption, federal contributions to social assistance payments, retirement plans, federal social housing programs, day-care deductions, and minimum wage laws (RPC, 1991i:p.20).

In simple terms, Reform seems to advocate non-universal social policies, including programs for the elderly, that are based on means-tests. Perceiving such a proposal as a threat to their pensions, a number of seniors have recently withdrawn support for the party, urging others to beware of Reform's agenda (EJ, 1992f; EJ, 1992u). Given the concerted anger which greeted Tory attempts to de-index old age pensions in 1985 (see chapter three), and the fact that (see above) Reform supporters tend to be somewhat older than other party supporters, this controversy suggests the potential for yet another fracture in Reform support.

Perhaps the growing clash between the two ideological halves of the party was made most evident, however, by an incident at the Saskatoon convention. A guest speaker at the convention was Ruben Nelson, a "futurologist." Like other utopian theorists of recent decades (Toffler, Naisbett), Nelson described in flowery and optimistic terms a new high-tech world order based on knowledge where change was infinite and people endlessly adaptable. The better educated, younger, urban members of the party were highly impressed. They had seen the future, and it looked worthwhile entering. By contrast, the older members seemed rather scornful of Nelson, seeming to view him as a purveyor of pseudo-intellectual bafflegab. As one older woman said me, "How has the party strayed so far from its original path?"(11)

In summary, by and large the Reform Party is a Canadian populist version of neo-conservatism. To date, the party tends to be dominated by its classical liberal elements. There are intimations, however, that the party's uneasy alliance between classical liberals and traditional conservatives may yet run into problems.

This raises, finally, questions of power, control, and decision-making within a populist party. As we have seen, Reform's growth has been accompanied by problems as well as benefits. On the one hand, in a few instances, the voice of the people has appeared as a shrill injunction to racism and bigotry. On the other hand, the voice often has seemed to be that of Preston Manning alone, uttering the same views on moral, economic, and political matters that he held twenty-five years ago when assisting his father in writing his political tome (Manning, 1967). What is the nature of this relationship between party and leader? How are consultation and policy legitimation achieved within Reform? In short, what is the nature and place of democratic populism within the Reform Party? I turn now to this important question.

REFORM AND THE POPULIST "IDEAL"

As previously noted, late 1991 and early 1992 saw the Reform Party shaken by a series of expulsions and resignations. Some of these expulsions, such as that of Gordon LeGrand and Wolfgang Droege, were understandable and acceptable to the membership at large. More damaging, however, were a number of incidents that seemed to call into question Preston Manning's, and the party's, commitment to genuine populist politics. Typical of the complaints heard were those of Sylvia Rothwell, a Reform Party riding director in North Vancouver:

> The party is functioning in a top-down manner -- some say more so than the three major parties -- and appears to be giving 'lip service' only to the ideals of direct democracy ... Head office insists the business of constituency executives is to build membership and warchests, period! I didn't join a

> political party to be a cheerleader-fund raiser only (reported in AR, 1991h:9).

In Reform's influential Wild Rose (Alberta) constituency, Dal Brown (the party's candidate in 1988), Vic Weibe (party secretary), Jim McRae, and Norm Gaskarth (director) raised similar complaints. Said Gaskarth: "A lot of people are frustrated -- we're seeing the inevitable erosion of grass-roots politics into a smaller, more dominating group at the top" (AR, 1990j:9; see also recent Wiebe letter in AR, 1992a; and also Dobbin, 1991).

In the wake of the Ray Speaker incident, previously mentioned, Manning's earlier insistence that prospective party candidates be required to complete an apparently intrusive questionnaire, and later reports that Manning was actively seeking other high profile candidates to run for the Party (EJ, 1992v), some party members complained that head office was attempting to manipulate the nomination process. This feeling was made explicit in a letter to the Edmonton Journal by Charles Cripps, a Reform Party candidate in the 1988 election:

> It would appear that an organization akin to that of the Social Credit party under the direction of E.C. Manning is emerging, a strong and tightly-controlled nucleus equal or superior to any of the "old boy" networks in the mainline parties.... I now have serious misgivings regarding the veracity and purpose of [Reform's] policy-makers (the national executive) as they steer the party into the future. After a great deal of soul-searching, I am obliged to relinquish my party membership (EJ, 1992w:A13).

In short, many long-time party insiders have complained recently that Reform has begun to abandon -- some would say "has abandoned" -- its populist roots; that, instead, Reform has become a tightly-controlled organization that manipulates its members into pursuing the aims of Manning and his Calgary clique.

There appears to be some truth lies to these allegations, although Michels (1915) "iron law of oligarchy" is not entirely applicable to the case of Reform. Far from reflecting a developmental process of increasing elite manipulation and control, as theorized by Michels, the Reform Party, from its inception, has possessed a highly centralized and even oligarchic organizational structure. Nonetheless, it is also true that many members view the degree of centralization as having increased over time.

In large measure, Reform's tightly controlled and centralized organizational structure appears to reflect both Manning's (1992) deep reservations about populism and his own view of leadership. Ted Byfield, one of Reform's most ardent supporters, describes Manning's ambivalence about populism in the following way:

> It always seems to me that he [Manning] is always advocating something [populism] that is absolutely incompatible with his own instincts. Nevertheless, I think he is quite sincere in saying that he believes in populism. And I think that will likely get him into trouble before he's finished, too, because it isn't his [first] instinct. [Preston] is an authoritarian of the first order, [just] as his father was....

And again:

> It is not that [Preston Manning or other populist leaders] say things [about popular democracy] that they don't believe. They do believe it. It's just that [popular democracy] is not compatible with their own inclinations (both quotes from Byfield, 1991).

Concerned with the possible excesses of popular democracy, Manning thus places his faith in organizational and technocratic mechanisms that can "tap and harness" the energy of populism. What are these mechanisms?

Several authors (Dobbin, 1991; Sharpe and Braid, 1992) have highlighted Manning's role in this process. Of Manning's relationship to the membership, Sharpe and Braid (1992:17) state: "His bond with the party runs so deep that members accept inconsistencies from him that they simply would not tolerate in another politician." But what is the basis of this bond?

At least initially, I would suggest that this bond is a by-product of the general homogeneity of Reformer's backgrounds and ideology. Beyond this explanation, Manning clearly understands the worldview of his followers. Understanding their worldview, and possessing a knowledge of the narrative symbols necessary to enter into a dialogue with them, Manning in turn is able to constrain the questions and, hence, the responses of Reform members to specific proposals. The GST provides a useful example.

Originally, the Reform Party opposed the tax and gained a lot of support by doing so. Indeed, Waters's election to the Senate may be attributable directly to Reform's opposition to the GST. Shortly after the GST's implementation, however, Manning reversed his promise to scrap the tax. His reason for deciding to support a tax which shifts the tax burden from business to consumers is understandable given Manning's emotional affinity and close relationship to the business community. Rather than admit this affinity, however, Manning's defense of his apparent "flip-flop" has taken a different and more saleable tact: the government needs money to pay the deficit. The deficit, defined by Manning as *the* critical issue hence becomes the means of defending the tax, while ignoring the general question of tax policy. With the terrain of discussion delimited in this fashion -- who, after all, is not concerned about the deficit? -- Reform members accepted Manning's change of position.

In this way, Manning regularly weights policy discussions so that the questions asked and answers given by the membership are constrained, but not in an obviously coercive manner. Indeed, members are left believing that they have made the decisions. In contrast to the leadership style practiced by the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties, Reformers do not feel that the decision has been made from above. Believing that they have made the decisions, members in turn also presumably experience an enhanced sense of self-efficacy. The party is them, and they are the party. Thus, the party is legitimated in the eyes of the membership at the very instance of their ostensible control by Manning. The party's populist image -- "control by the people" -- is strengthened.

The GST incident is not the only example of this method of executive control. The most glaring example, however, of Manning's manipulation of popular democracy occurred in Manitoba in early 1992. Despite possessing apparently favourable conditions for Reform -- the CF-18 controversy still rankles, and a large segment of

the province is staunchly anti-bilingual -- Manitoba is not yet a hot-bed of Reform support. Nor have its few members been pliant to the dictates of Reform's Calgary executive. The autonomy of Manitoba members was made particularly apparent at the Saskatoon convention in 1991 when Winnipeg tax consultant George Van Den Bosch, who was later elected to the executive council, stood up and asked that the party declare its support for universality of health care. An obviously uncomfortable Manning immediately stood up and suggested that universality was "implied" under Reform's policy of "ensuring that adequate health-care insurance and services are available to every Canadian..." (RPC, 1991a). Van Den Bosch's motion was subsequently driven from the floor.

The growing dissent in Manitoba came to a head in late 1991 when discontented party insiders released a year-old memo to the press. The memo recommended replacing policy task forces with a member of the party policy committee headed by Manning. (Confronted with the memo, Stephen Harper suggested that it was meant to protect the grassroots members and head office from the "unorthodox and most times extreme policy opinions" of members of the task forces [1991ay:A16]. On the surface, this was a plausible explanation of its purpose. On the other hand, Harper's comments did not address how the grassroots were to be protected from an increasingly centralized head office.)

It is apparent that the leaked memo provided Manning and Reform's head office with the excuse to silence an increasingly independent and vocally critical branch of the party. Claiming that Van Den Bosch was the source of the leak, and that other members of his St. James riding were otherwise "guilty" of arguing over who should pay for telephone bills, trying to set up their own provincial organization, and failing to put their efforts towards obtaining new members and money, Manning sent out a letter to Manitoba's 5,268 members asking them to vote on whether or not the four dissident members -- Van Den Bosch, Lloyd Kirkham, Gary Cummings, and Herb Shulz -- should be expelled from the party. In his letter, Manning revealed something of how he views the issues of power and control in populist parties.

> The difference between a traditional party and a democratic populist party like the Reform Party is the manner in which internal discipline is exercised.
>
> In a traditional party, internal discipline is exercised almost exclusively from the top down.... In a democratic populist party, internal discipline must be exercised 'from the bottom up' by the rank and file membership itself, in co-operation with the party leadership, caucus and national office (quoted by John Dafoe in G&M, 1992h:D2; see also EJ, 1990o; and G&M, 1992i).

But the case of the "Manitoba four" reveals even more. In particular, the incident suggests that Manning advocates direct or popular democracy not as a value in itself *but rather as a means of legitimating the actions taken by a leadership and therefore pre-empting dissent.*

Indeed, despite his frequent populist musings, Manning seems far more at home with the traditional idea of representative democracy than that of direct democracy. This is hinted at in Manning's own statements regarding what he perceives to have been the

problem posed by dissidents in Manitoba and elsewhere:

> In each case, a small group of individuals claimed that their position on the issue in dispute was more legitimately representative of majority opinion within the party than the position of the executive council and leadership, *which the membership itself had chosen through a party assembly* (Manning, 1992:260, italics added).

In short, when faced with opposition, Manning falls back upon the argument that, during the period of his tenure, the leader's position on issues cannot be challenged seriously. Manning appears to view referendums as instruments used only under certain circumstances to support, and therefore legitimate, the actions that the leadership already wishes to pursue. The nature of these "certain circumstances" is specific, i.e., those occasions when no clear consensus is apparent and/or when the leadership would suffer a loss of legitimacy from acting unilaterally.

The Manitoba incident supports this conclusion. Why was a vote not required in the case of other expulsions from the party, as discussed above? The answer is self-evident. Unlike other expulsions from Reform, the members expelled in Manitoba were not demonstrably without support. They were well-respected members of the Manitoba community and had held lofty positions within the Reform Party. They even were major financial contributors to the party. In short, the dissidents were credible. For this reason, Manning could not expel them unilaterally from the party. *He needed the appearance of popular support to proceed with the expulsions.* But what if the Manitoba members had voted not to expel the dissidents? To pre-empt this possibility, Manning wrote the letter, described above, to the members in such a way as to "weight" the vote in the direction of his own preference. The letter stated the dissident's "crimes" (but no possibility of defences). Stated also was Manning's recommended "sentence." The membership, confused by accusations presented only through the media, were left with no formal or actual means of resolving the impass except to accept Manning's recommendation.

The Manitoba incident suggests some of the pitfalls of plebiscitarian democracy, a mode of democratic practice that Richards (1981) has suggested is a defining quality of right-wing populist parties. Populism as more than just a style of leadership must involve the direct participation of all citizens or, in this case, members of a party, in a political discourse occurring within an "ideal speech situation" (Habermas, 1976; McCarthy, 1976) designed to arrive at a rational decision based on the force of better arguments. By contrast, plebiscitarianism too easily devolves into political manipulation by a governing party and/or a well-financed private elite and/or prestigious group of "experts." Under such circumstances, issues and solutions are distorted readily, leaving people with the semblance but not the substance of genuine democratic participation.

In stating the evidence that Reform's leadership manipulates its member's decisions, I hasten to refute any suggestion that Reform Party members are dupes. Indeed, as we have seen, many are well educated and capable people. It would also be wrong to suggest that Reform's "masses" do not, in some sense, support Manning's positions and policies.

The idea of populism, however, is its own form of intoxicant. Delivered by

Manning, a man whose utterances Reformers appear too readily to accept at face value, the elixer is particularly potent. In the politically unwise words of Stephen Harper, "It's amazing what you can persuade [the membership] to do once you convince them that it's the leader who is telling them" (quoted in Dobbin, 1991:116). The result is that many Reformers appear to latch on to Manning's particular diagnosis of Canada's problems and solutions without due consideration for the long-term consequences of what is proposed.

Having said this, it is unclear whether the form of populism advanced by Reform different from that of previous populist parties, either right-wing or left-wing. Leaders are, by nature, people with strong views and an inclination to persuade others as to the correctness of their views. Certainly, this was the case with both Tommy Douglas of the left-wing CCF/NDP and Ernest Manning of the right-wing Social Credit. The extent to which a populist party remains true to its democratic roots appears to depend upon mechanisms of grass-roots involvement and the regular replacement of executive members, including the leadership. On this count, Reform's form of populism -- and perhaps, ultimately, the limitations of popular democracy within the party -- reflect the primacy of Preston Manning himself to the party. For, as one member is reported to have commented, concerning Reform's rise, "It wasn't a group [Reformers] picking a leader; it was a leader [Manning] picking a group" (quoted in Dobbin,1991:120).

In the end, despite Manning's, and the party's, rhetoric, Reform's populist impulses are guided by the leadership rather than driven by the membership. In large measure, Reform's populism can be categorized by what Laycock (1990) has referred to as a style of leadership. But I would go further in suggesting that Reform's leadership employs the *idea of populism* , rather than its substance, as a kind of organizational resource for the mobilization of other resources towards goals and policies espoused by Manning and a small party elite whose aim is not the extension of genuine democracy but, rather, the carving out and/or protection of a niche within Canada's currently existing bourgeois political and economic establishment.

What are the chances of Reform's leadership attaining their aim? What does the future hold for the Reform Party in general? In the final section of this chapter, I turn to a discussion of the party's future prospects.

PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS: THE FUTURE OF THE PARTY

The Reform Party has come a long way since its formation in 1987. It has more than surpassed any of its recent predecessors in terms of political acceptance and influence. The party now has over 133,000 paid members, a sizeable war chest, and regular support in national opinion polls of approximately 14 percent. Along the way, the party has had a great deal of influence in shaping Canada's political landscape, placing into debate such previously taboo subjects as bilingualism, multiculturalism, and universality of social programs and bringing into common political usage such phrases as "the Triple-E Senate," "referendums," "recall," and "initiatives."

Such achievements are not small; nor are the party's ostensible demands for greater political accountability, honesty, and trust to be disparaged. What are the limits, however, of Reform's growth? In particular, what are the possibilities of the Reform Party moving beyond a position of mere political influence to actual political power?

Reform's greatest assets remain the weakness and fragmentation of the Tories (EJ, 1992x), Canadians' profound dislike for Brian Mulroney, in particular, and the concomitant inability of the Liberals and NDP to fill the gap left by the Tories. Despite these advantages, however, Reform has itself been thus far unable to appeal to a wider spectrum of voters.

Manning is clearly attempting to do this. He has suggested, for example, that, having pulled away as much of the Tories support as possible, he now will go after Liberal supporters. His "bait" in catching Liberal supporters is to suggest that Reform policies reflect the "true" Liberal policies abandoned by Trudeau during the 1960s and 1970s (EJ, 1992y). As I have suggested elsewhere in this thesis (chapter two), Manning is not entirely wrong. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that many Liberals are prepared to abandon that party -- a party that show every sign of winning the next federal election -- in favour of an untested party with 14 percent of the vote and a reputation for extremism. Moreover, it is likely that many of the Liberals who hated Trudeau have long-since left the party in any case (e.g., Francis Winspear). The chances of Reform making gains in the centre of the political spectrum thus appear slim.

Equally, eastern expansion has failed to bring Reform any noticeable benefits. Although party memberships have soared, particularly in Ontario, since April, 1991, these gains have been countered by an embarrassing infiltration of extremist elements. Moreover, eastern expansion may have cut into the party's western support. At the time of the April, 1991 convention in Saskatoon, a Gallup poll gave Reform 43 percent support on the prairies (1991e). This dropped to 25 percent in May (1991g) and was still at only 27 percent in December, 1991 (1991d). In short, the Reform Party may be gaining in breadth while loosing in depth, resulting in the possibility that the party today would elect fewer seats overall than it would have in 1990.

Even more problematic for the Reform Party is the fact that its political fate lies largely outside of its control. As I have shown, Reform's transformation from a fringe party to one with real national strength resulted from the failure, in 1990, of the Meech Lake Accord and the devastating effects of a recession that began shortly thereafter. How have constitutional and economic events impacted upon Reform since that time?

In August, 1992, after two years of consultation and discussion, the federal government, federal Liberal and NDP parties, and all of the provincial premiers announced agreement upon a new constitutional package, the Charlottetown Accord. During the ensuing debate, the Reform Party positioned itself on the side opposing the agreement. In a referendum held on October 26th, 1992, 54 percent of Canadians, including majorities in six provinces and the Yukon, voted against the agreement. Despite Reform being on the "winning" side, however, an Angus Reid poll taken shortly after the vote showed no increase in the party's popularity (EJ, 1992z). The campaign appeared to damage both Preston Manning's and the party's public image. It also opened rifts within the party, resulting in the departure of several key Reform officials, including policy director Tom Flanagan, communications manager Wendy Watson, and speech writer George Koch. Moreover, the campaign depleted Reform's finances (EJ, 1992aa, 1992ab). In a wider political sense, however, the referendum, irrespective of the result, may have caused Reform particular harm insofar as the constitutional ennui now felt by many Canadians may have removed from Reform's platform its constitutional plank.

Meanwhile, the other pillar of Reform success -- the recession -- continues with

little sign of relief. To the extent that Reform's hopes, particularly in Ontario, are largely predicated on a continued economic downturn, the party's chances are certainly enhanced. Yet, it remains unclear whether Reform will be the major beneficiary of the current economic crisis. The recent election of the Clinton Democrats in the United States suggests that government, business, economists, and citizenry, in general, may have begun to reconsider the economic practices of the last decade. If this is the case, Reform's adherence to free market, trickle-down economics and its commitment to the abandonment of the welfare state may also prove to be somewhat of an achilles heel.

There remains an additional external threat to Reform: that the traditional parties, chiefly the Tories and the Liberals, will simply "borrow" the most saleable aspects of Reform's platform. Indeed, as I have shown, this already is happening. The Tory convention during the summer of 1991 saw that party's delegates pass policy resolutions that, in some cases, made Reform seem moderate by comparison. Similarly, the Liberals also have begun embracing a more pro-business, fiscally conscious approach to government.

As the next election nears, several "unknowns" also face the Reform Party. As Sharpe and Braid (1992) have suggested, there is no way of knowing how Manning, or the party in general, will stand up to the heavy hitting of a real election campaign. Manning has never won an election, and many of those who will run for Reform are political novices. Many of the party's policies remain controversial and unlikely to attract support from ethnic minorities, women, workers, public servants, or people in general who are dependent upon government assistance in some form. Moreover, as we have seen, some of Reform's policies have already begun to alienate some of its core constituents, notably farmers and the elderly.

Once elected -- as surely Manning and some of his colleagues will be -- there remains the question of how the party will perform. The Reform Party could not have achieved its current success without able and competent people. Nonetheless, Manning, himself has never even run a large office prior to becoming party leader. For all his self-promotion as a person skilled in conflict resolution (Manning, 1991a; 1992), he has shown few skills in that direction. Indeed, the recent spat of expulsions, firings, and resignations from the party, including those following the referendum (EJ, 1992ab), suggest that Manning is most at ease with only those people who agree with him and his vision.

Perhaps Reform's ultimate problem, however, is that its political and fiscal reforms may stop short of making a real and positive change in people's lives. In the main, the Reform Party is accurate in suggesting that government is too large, too bureaucratic, and too expensive. The party also has given a legitimate voice to complaints that too many politicians are arrogant and out of touch with their constituents, and that for too long the hinterland regions of Canada have been left out of policy decisions. But how will ending bilingualism make a real difference to Canadians? Would flat taxes and the ending of universality in health care make Canada a better place? Would more free votes result in anything substantive? Canada's greater political problem is that too many people are excluded from political power, not only in the limited sense of participating in elections, but also in the broader and more significant sense of having power over their day to day lives. The Reform Party, however, has little to say about this critical issue.

Finally, Reform also faces an increasing problem of identity. As the party has

attempted to broaden its appeal to more moderate voters, Reform has alienated some members (see EJ, 1992ac) while coming more and more to look like just a scaled-down version of the Tories. Come the next election, if people really want to vote Tory, won't they vote for the real thing? Conversely, if voters want to toss out the Tories and their policies, what then are the prospects for a party such as Reform that offers slightly more right-wing versions of the same policies?

How well will Reform do in any uncoming election? At a minimum, the party will likely take 20 seats, mainly in Alberta; at a maximum, perhaps 40 national seats are within the party's grasp. In any case, however, Reform is assured political influence if only because Manning's and the party's followers almost messianic devotion to certain principles provides the party with a public image of honest certitude not currently possessed by the other political parties.

CONCLUSION

The "success" of a populist party is measured as much by its influence upon the given political culture of the day as by its electoral wins. As I have shown in this chapter, on this basis, the Reform Party has been markedly successful since its founding in 1987.

However measured, this success is determined in large degree by its capacity to mobilize people towards an alternative political vision. In turn, leadership, organization, access to financial resources, and a coherent ideology are key elements in this mobilization. For this reason, in this chapter I also looked at Reform's organization and finances, and the background characteristics and attitudes of elements recruited to the Reform Party. Finally, I also examined the particular meaning of populism espoused and practiced by Preston Manning and the Reform executive, and the prospects for Reform's future success.

This concludes my examination of the Reform Party. There remains, however, the broader questions with which I began this thesis: Why do populist parties arise? What factors influence the ideological orientation of populist parties? And what is the nature of populist parties in the late twentieth century? I return to these questions in the concluding chapter of this thesis.

CHAPTER SIX

THE "PROBLEM" OF POPULISM REVISITED

"The very process of governance seems to be 'escaping the categories' of the nation state" (David Held, 1991:143).

INTRODUCTION

This thesis addressed two fundamental questions: Why do populist parties arise? And what factors influence the ideological orientation of such parties? In this chapter, I examine insights garnered from the case of the Reform Party and how these insights, in turn, help answer these questions. In doing so, I return to the populist debates discussed in chapter one. But I also go beyond these debates, in a broadly theoretical and admittedly speculative and personal manner, to consider the reemergence of populism in the late Twentieth Century and its relation to the changing role of the state.

REFORM AND THE POPULIST DEBATES

One easily can recognize the place of the Reform Party in several classification schemes proffered by theorists of populism. Reform fits rather comfortably into Canovan's (1981:15) subspecies of political populism known as "politicians' populism," defined as a manipulative appeal to "the people" used by politicians for the purposes of integrating and legitimating political support. The Reform Party is even more recognizable in Richards' (1981) and Laycock's (1990) respective categories of "right -wing" and "plebiscitarian" populism.

According to Richards' (1981:19-20), right-wing prairie populism in Canada tended 1) to mobilize along regional rather than class lines in its fight against outside ("eastern") interests; 2) to limit its critique of capitalism to the banking system; 3) to view "big government" as the central problem; and 4) to eschew participatory democracy in favour of plebiscitarianism. Reform conforms to the last two criteria. It also fits the first criteria, if we substitute "Quebec" for "eastern" interests. To the extent, however, that Reform lacks even a limited critique of capitalism, the party seems to diverge (perhaps significantly) from Richards' depiction of past populist movements.

Reform is fairly congruent also with Laycock's (1990) description of a "plebiscitarian" populist party. Like Richards' "right-wing populism," Laycock's plebiscitarian variety tended 1) to mobilize along regional lines in opposition to central (i.e., "eastern") interests and 2) to espouse a limited view of democracy, often confined to such practices as plebiscites and referendums. But Laycock's "type" includes also two slightly different "traits": 3) A tendency for rule by a technical elite; and 4) A tendency to present its critique of society as radical and even morally justified. The contours of the Reform Party are recognizable in each of these characteristics.

To paraphrase Marx, however: The theorists have categorized populism, in various ways; the point is to explain it. Particularly, how does this study of Reform, and the historical-sociological framework used to analyse the party, help us to explain the rise of populist parties? The theory employed in this thesis to examine the rise of the

Reform Party possessed six basic elements. These elements may be summarized as follows:

1) Social and political stability, in the final instance, results from the capacity of a dominant class (or classes) to form hegemonic alliances between otherwise conflicting social elements and/or fragments of these elements.

2) Political parties are both the practical embodiment of these hegemonic alliances and the major instrument for their construction.

3) Over time, however, significant changes occurring in the ideological, economic, and political spheres of society may result in an "organic crisis," in the course of which the previous system of political alliances begins to unravel.

4) During this period of unravelling, the existing political order is delegitimated among certain historically-specific social elements.

5) If the existing political parties are unable and/or unwilling to reincorporate these latter ("vulnerable") elements, within an unspecified period of time, thus setting them free; and if these elements share sufficient historical, ideological, territorial, and demographic commonalities and characteristics by which to identify themselves as "a people;" and if further, there exist within this group actors with sufficient organizational resources and leadership skills to articulate to the freed social elements a new vision of the social and political order: then a populist party may arise.

6) The type of populist party that emerges (i.e., either right-wing or left-wing) is contingent on the interplay of several factors, both endogenous and exogenous to the territory in which the movement arises, the primacy and directional influence of any particular factor being, moreover, historically specific. Endogenous factors include the region's historically existing political culture, the class configuration of elements lacking a current political allegiance, the fortuitous timing of economic crises, and the degree of legitimacy of organizations and potential leaders capable of constructing a counter-hegemony, while exogenous factors include the world-historical dominance of either right-wing or left-wing ideology at a given moment .

The logic of this theory led me to direct my research in certain ways, in particular: 1) to examine recent economic, political, and ideological crises affecting Canada's dominant hegemony; 2) to determine, specifically, the impact of these crises upon existing political alliances in western Canada; and 3), where fragmentation of these alliances occurred, to determine the structural, ideological, organizational, and historical factors shaping the potential for a reconfiguration of alliances, either within the existing polity or through a new political alternative. The value of my theory, and the research agenda arising from it, can be measured if set against other theories of populism, beginning with Macpherson's (1953) theory of the petite bourgeoisie.

Based on traditional Marxist theory, Macpherson contended that Social Credit in Alberta was the product of a homogeneous class structure featuring petite bourgeois farmers and urban small business people. Although his particular arguments regarding Social Credit have now been refuted (see Bell, 1989; 1990), Macpherson's (1953) general theory still possesses a powerful charm. This thesis therefore tested the applicability of Macphersons's theory to the case of Reform.

The evidence showed only partial support for Macpherson's theory of the petite bourgeoisie. Farmers (the rural petite bourgeoisie) are over-represented within the Reform Party. The urban petite bourgeoisie, however, were no more likely to support Reform than any other party. Moreover, since farmers make up only slightly more than

13 percent of Reform supporters, class position alone provided only a partial explanation of Reform support.

In a further test of theory, based on assumptions gleaned from Hofstadter's (1955) characterization of populist movements as reactionary and nativist, this thesis also examined the ethnic and religious backgrounds of Reform's executive, members, and supporters. The results showed that Anglo-Saxon Protestants tended to be more likely to support Reform than any other party. Again, however, ethnic and religious variables did not fully account for the rise of Reform.

Indeed, a number of other structural and background characteristics were found to vie for importance with class, ethnic, or religion in explaining Reform Party support. Age (older), gender (male), location (rural), and education (higher than average) were also found to be significant socio-demographic descriptors of Reform Party supporters. The evidence is thus congruent with Laclau's (1977:163) observation that, "[i]ndividuals are the bearers and points of intersection of an accumulation of contradictions, not all of which are class contradictions."

Nonetheless, structural factors alone proved insufficient to explain the Reform phenomenon. Rather, this study revealed significant independent effects for certain attitudinal and ideological values. In particular, Reformers tend to reflect significantly strong and negative attitudes towards multiculturalism, gender equality, and distinct status for Quebec. They also tend to be highly politically alienated.

The relationship between structure and ideology is, of course, complex. Few theorists would now support a theory of populism that reduces political phenomena to class alone (Laclau, 1977). Nor would a simple inclusion of other structural variables seem sufficient to flesh-out such a theory. At the same time, it is hardly satisfying to surrender to the anarchy of ideas ungrounded in daily experience (see, for example, Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). I would argue, instead, for a theory that recognizes a certain, though never total, independence of ideology from structure; that recognizes, moreover, that the distance between both is contextually and historically contingent.

The same indeterminacy must be applied to economic factors. In this thesis, I specifically examined the adequacy of relative-deprivation theory (Graham and Gurr, 1969) in explaining the rise of Reform. The evidence generally supported the theory. Reform initially rose and has continued to be strongest in Alberta and British Columbia, the two western provinces whose economic situations were most volatile during the 1980s. By contrast, the party has had much less success in Manitoba and Saskatchewan whose economies are significantly poorer but less volatile than their western neighbours.

But people must still evaluate the causes of economic events and, although relative-deprivation theory is embedded with social psychological assumptions, it seems insufficient to explain the nature of these evaluations, the pattern of political expressions arising out of this formulation, or why populist parties -- should they arise -- might take on a particular political orientation. In short, relative-deprivation theory alone does not provide an adequate theory of populist mobilization.

This thesis also provides support for organizational theorists such as Tilly (1978) and McCarthy and Zald (1987). As I have shown, many of Reform's policies are almost indistinguishable from those of the right-wing fringe parties of the early 1980s that failed. Indeed, numerous members of these parties support Reform. Unlike these earlier parties, however, Reform is blessed with an able and respected leader, Preston

Manning, who, moreover, possesses immediate name recognition, particularly in western Canada. Second, the party has a highly functional organizational structure defined by centralized control over policy. This organizational structure provides Reform with a public profile that generally is coherent, while allowing it to also control fringe elements that might damage the party's reputation among moderate voters. It has also enabled Reform to mobilize, swiftly and efficiently, more financial and human resources than its erstwhile right-wing predecessors.

Yet political organizations do not just arise out of thin air. Organizational theory can provide us with insights into the differences between successful and unsuccessful political movements and parties; the dynamics of mobilizing discontent. It cannot tell us, however, the causes of this discontent, why it was not channelled into other, existing political parties, or the possible parameters of mobilization open to the new party.

If this study has pointed to the incompleteness of previous theories of populist mobilization, in general, it also has pointed to the inadequacy of previous examinations of the Reform Party, in particular. Dobbin's (1991) account, for example, alternates between factual analysis and murky accusations of a right-wing conspiracy. Likewise, although Sharpe and Braid's (1992) depiction of Reform is less strident than Dobbin's in tone, and better in dealing with the party's historical and ideological context, it, too, falls short of an adequate account of the origins of Reform. In particular, both Dobbin's (1991) and Sharpe and Braid's (1992) accounts are atheoretical.

By contrast, this thesis has attempted to weave a dialectic between a general theory of populism and the specific circumstances of Reform. The result has been a number of insights into Reform that, in turn, bear upon populist parties in general.

For example, both previous theories of populist parties, as well as Dobbin's (1991) and Sharpe and Braid's (1992) specific texts on Reform, have tended to depict populist parties as discrete entities, arising on the fringes of political life. Both my theory and the evidence presented here refute this assertion. Far from being products of the "strange and extreme," my study suggests that populist parties are, by and large, made up of elements at the core of social and political life. This is not to say that some members of the political fringe do not support Reform. But Reform's strength and legitimacy are products of broad-based class support, particularly within the West's agrarian and business communities.

Along this line, the results of my study also differ somewhat with depictions of Reform as merely a group of recalcitrant Tories. To be sure, the majority of Reformers were, in their immediate past political life, members of the Conservative party. But my study also suggests that, to a large degree, Reform is as much an off-shoot of the traditional Liberals as of the later Tories. For example, many of the business people, in particular, supporting Reform (e.g., Francis Winspear) were lapsed Liberals before they were Tories. One conclusion deriving from this finding is that political support, once dislodged, might enter a prolonged period of volatility.

Unlike previous accounts, my study also provides an in-depth analysis of the attitude responses of current Reform members and supporters and of their background characteristics. But my analysis of this data has gone beyond merely detailing this data alone. Rather, by placing the data, including statements and writings of the party's mentors, into an historical context, I have shown that Reform possesses, at least in part, nativist inclinations. In particular, I have suggested that Reform follows in the path of, what I have termed, a "peculiar" type of Anglo-Canadian nativism.

In a broader sense, the study has justified my general theory that populist parties are a natural result of the fragmention of political coalitions and their subsequent reconfiguration. But the study also points to the importance of illusion at the heart of political coalitions. All social formations of a non-primary type, whether organizations, religious groups, or nations are, to some extent, what Anderson (1983) has termed "imagined communities." This is no less the situation of political parties which are coalitions of interest founded, in large measure, on the illusion that those interests are compatible. For both the leadership and/or the various fractions within a party, the problem always exists of pursuing conflicting interests, even while preserving the appearance of internal solidarity. Increasingly, Reform exhibits the strain produced by this conflict.

On the one hand, Manning and the party have attempted to draw, as in the party's constitution, a line around a fairly broad definition of "a people" united in opposition to the other "mere" political parties that would harm Canada. On the other hand, variances in power among different fractions within Reform, have increasingly resulted in some interests being advocated either by the leadership or through party policy to the detriment of other segments of the party (e.g., "free enterprise" vs. agricultural subsidies).

Ironically, the strains upon maintaining the illusion of a commonality of interest are increased when, as in the case of Reform, a party is led by a principled ideologue such as Preston Manning. While ideological purity clarifies, it also tears at a party's imagined sense of political solidarity. In this sense, one of the chief mechanisms working against the continued sense of mission -- of quasi-religious fervour -- that often infuses nascent populist parties may be their own success. For, as they gain support, or at least have hopes of future success, a populist party must choose between becoming a political party, much like the others, or retaining a voice of political purity.

Concerning the trajectory of political parties, I would like to briefly address the question: "Was Reform destined to be right-wing?" To a large degree, the answer is "yes." Given the party's lack of organic development, its rapid move from protest group to organized party, one only can agree with the statement that, "It wasn't a group picking a leader; it was a leader picking a group" (quoted in Dobbin, 1991:120). Manning, and many others with influence and power within the party hierarchy, appear to have bided their time, waiting for the moment when they could call upon the residual political culture of Alberta and British Columbia in forming a true "social conservative" party, as Manning's father had envisioned so many years before.

Political events, however, of the last few years, including the rise of the Reform Party, also raise questions concerning the role of ideology upon party support. While I would agree with those who contend that people are motivated by ideas, I remain unsure how many of Reform's supporters are necessarily right-wing. For example, many Reformers appear to be no more enamoured of big business than of big government. Their limited concentration, however, upon a few perceived "problems" (e.g., the deficit, immigration, bilingualism), and their adoption of right-wing solutions to address them, may be more a testament to the persuasive capacities of Preston Manning, Reform's organizational apparatus, and the failure of the left-wing to articulate a politically saleable alternative, than to any necessary and unshakable "worldview. In short, I would concur with Weiler (1987:44) who states that "populism can be wedded to any ideological program." Ultimately, the many manifestations of populism, including

that of Reform, are the product of an ideological struggle, albeit one that takes place under real historic, political, and economic circumstances.

Finally, this thesis raises some additional questions regarding the nature of populism. In particular, why has populism re-appeared in so many countries at this stage of the Twentieth Century? This is a large and complex question. Nonetheless, I would like to advance a tentative answer to it, beginning, in a round-about manner, with a re-examination of the differences between left-wing and right-wing populism.

RIGHT-WING AND LEFT-WING POPULISM

American journalists and historians coined the term "populism" in the late 19th century to describe an ideal of grass-roots participation in the democratic process. The populists of the time aimed at creating a just social order that preeminently recognized the collective needs of society while still protecting the rights of individuals. Populists believed that the chief stumbling block to democracy and the just social order came from the possession by some group (or individual) of a monopoly over a source of power.

In a real sense, the credo of populism is summed up in Lord Acton's remark that, "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." As a corollary, one might add that powerlessness tends to result in the deferment of responsibility and absolute powerlessness in the absolute deferment of responsibility. At its best, therefore, the aim of populism always has been the empowerment of people to the degree that they can be responsible citizens while simultaneously preventing their social irresponsibility deriving from either an insufficient or an over-abundant amount of power.

In practice, however, the ultimate source of illegitimate social power always has been a point of ideological contention between left-leaning and right-wing populists (see Richards, 1981). Ideologies always edify and illuminate; they also ignore and obscure. I am interested here in the latter, or what I would term the "blind spots" in traditional left- and right-wing thinking.

For those on the left, the blind spot has been an unreasonable faith in the state and government as bulwarks against the illegitimate powers of the capitalist economy. For those on the right, in contrast, the blindness traditionally has taken the form of an irrational separation of politics and economics into separate spheres, circumscribing and delimiting the meaning of democracy while placing undue faith in the supposedly "natural" workings of the market.

Ideologies die hard. The last hundred years have been sobering for the left. In the face of an obdurate reality marked by Stalinism, in all its forms, not to mention recurrent recessions, countless wars, poverty, overpopulation, environmental catastrophes, continued racism and sexism, the left has undergone a series of -- sometimes excruciating -- ideological debates. Some of these debates resulted in mere rationalizations and justifications, a kind of re-establishment of a faith that Marxism was correct and that, eventually, reality would catch up with theory.

By the 1960s, however, many on the left had begun to question sincerely their suppositions and beliefs. This questioning resulted in the New Left. In contrast to the Old Left, an important element of the New Left was its radical rejection of the state in general, and "big government" in particular, as a mechanism for change. Contrary to their oft-made assertions, neo-conservatives are not alone in recognizing the

limitations of state control and intervention. Many on the left have long concurred with criticisms of the type made by Reform supporters that the state is too large, too bureaucratic, and frequently inefficient. In short, the scales have fallen from the eyes of most left-wing supporters. In this time of neo-conservative dominance, as corporate and state affections grow more incestuous, only the intellectually blind can overlook the fact that the state too frequently is a source of entrenched inequalities, perfidious secrecy, undemocratic license, and increasing coercion (see Whitaker, 1987; Stasiulis, 1988).

But if the left-wing has -- sometimes reluctantly -- come to see its own ideological limitations, the same cannot be said of the right-wing. No doubt this continued blindness redounds in large measure to the intoxication of apparent victory. For these are indeed heady days for the right-wing. Communism, the zenith of left-wing totalitarianism, the arch-enemy of rampant individualism, private property, Christianity, and the market place, lies prostrate and bloodied. The victory of right-wing forces under the umbrella of "neo-conservatism" is, at first sight, convincing.

Behind the scenes, however, in the opposing dressing-room, a different reality is apparent. Although the right-wing has managed to stay on its feet long enough to raise its gloves in triumph, it too is now severely bruised, a victim in large measure of self-inflicted blows. The worst blows have come from an unrelenting recession that has brought massive unemployment and increasing disparities of wealth to many western industrialized nations, particularly those countries -- Britain, the United States, and, to a lesser extent, Canada -- that have adopted most fervently the neo-conservative economic agenda (Davidson and Rees-Mogg, 1991; Galbraith, 1992). Hand in hand with the victory of the neo-conservatism coalition has been an unprecedented rise in corporate theft of both an ostensibly legal (see Crystal, 1991; see also Hardin, 1991) and illegal variety and increasing violence in the streets. Meanwhile, in a rising number of countries, both east and west, capitalism's offspring -- fascism -- waits in the wings, ready to issue its challenge.

For over two decades, neo-conservative icons, from Hayek to Friedman to Gilder, have reified and deified private property and "the market" as the basis of freedom, democracy, and justice. Now that the neo-conservative Heaven has arrived in the aforementioned countries, why do they look, metaphorically, like Beirut suburbs, their bombed-out landscapes pockmarked by massive unemployment, rising bankruptcies, and increasing poverty? Why do more and more police guard the Pearly Gates, more and more bars cover the Holy windows? Economists, politicians, journalists -- and sociologists -- may give different, complex answers to these questions, but they all come down to one thing: When freedom and justice themselves are commodities, a few people will "own" disproportionately more than the rest.

One of the profound ironies of the Reform Party, and the neo-conservative movement in general, is that its supporters -- sincerely, I believe -- espouse popular democracy while clinging to a naive belief in the so-called "free market" that can only result in democracy's destruction. In one breath, neo-conservatives declare the sovereignty of people over the state, yet in the next defend the sovereignty of the market over people. They intone the divine right of people to determine their lives, but then raise the impersonal flag of capital over community, morality, ethics, or even consciousness. Similarly, they decry what they term "social engineering" by the state, schools, media, etc., but raise not a hint of condemnation over the freedom of capital to

mold, shape, and even enslave people's values, morals, tastes, and actions through advertising.

Above all else, however, neo-conservatism, in the broadest sense, calls for and defends a separation of economics from politics that can only lead to the destruction of political democracy itself. Voltaire once said that, "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." But what is free speech, what is democracy when people are denied the practical (i.e., economic) means of making use of it? Real political democracy ultimately is inseparable from social and economic equality, for democracy, like capitalism, works only in situations of competition; of checks and balances. A monopoly, whether over goods and services, or *actions and ideas*, is inherently destructive to democracy. The defence of any democratic system must be based on this fact: that it cannot survive unless each of its citizens possesses sufficient resources to stand up, informed and unafraid, against large monopoly interests. Hence, the need for a genuinely popular democratic state, acting outside of the market, to restrain the latter's inherent drive to monopoly while (in turn) levelling the social redistribution of wealth. But what happens to democracy if the state turns its back on this role? Is popular democracy possible without a redistributive state?

POPULISM AND THE NATION STATE

John Lennon said it: "Imagine there are no countries." Imagine, instead, that there is only a global market, peopled by (theoretically) mobile individuals who are linked by transportation facilities, electronic communications, and the flow of capital, overseen by large multinational corporations that are, themselves, tightly linked to financial institutions. What would democracy look like in such a world? Would political democracy, as we know it, be possible?

These questions are particularly topical and pertinent in an age when, as we are constantly told by right-wing politicians, business leaders, academics, and the media, that we have entered the age of globalization. Excepting the United States, whose military has the continued capacity to act as a kind of enforcer for the new economic order, the role of small- and medium-sized nation states, such as Canada, and of the government's within them, appears to be increasingly redundant. Indeed, questions regarding the continued role and capacity of the state in an era of globalization underlay Canada's Free Trade debate of 1988. Similar questions of sovereignty and local control also have recently led to much popular unrest in Europe as that continent has moved towards further economic and political integration. For, as David Held (1991:143) has stated, "Regional and global interconnectedness contests the traditional national resolutions of the central questions of democratic theory and practice. The very process of governance seems to be 'escaping the categories' of the nation state."

Not everyone, of course, is unhappy with this development. Neo-classical economists and the heads of multi-nationals, in particular, backed-up with pie-graphs, charts, and statistical models, are near redolent with joy as they chant the glories of a "borderless world" driven by "natural," "market-driven" forces supposedly absented from politics (see Ohmae, 1990; see also Held, 1991, on the claims of globalization).

I say "supposedly" because this futuristic world is not one devoid of politics, nor would the elimination of elected governments from economic decision-making eliminate politics from economics. To paraphrase Clausewitz, the market place is just politics

carried on by different means. Giving control over to this market thus simply removes economic decisions from discussion within the directly political arena, placing power instead inside the shadowy boardrooms of multi-nationals, several of which are already economically larger than most nations (see Veltmeyer, 187:78-9; EJ, 1991ay).(1) The result is the removal, in real time and space, of democratic control and responsibility from people affected by corporate decisions. To put it another way, globalization, in the form that it is currently being carried out, does not separate politics from economics; it simply renders Adam Smith's "invisible hand" more invisible than ever.

But there also is a great irony in all of this. For, as triumphant global capitalism now discards the potentially radical democratic accoutrements of the nation state, which once it needed but now views as a fetter, so also it sows the seeds for the kind of political and social instability adverse to its own flourishing. As long as capital remained tied to its country of origin, governments could appropriate such a portion of this capital through taxes and/or royalities as was reasonably necessary to rebuild the country's infrastructure, legitimate themselves and the state, in general, and otherwise contain and rechannel political discontent.

This appropriation is no longer possible, however, once corporate capital is freed from its national roots. Driven by the internal logic of capital accumulation and the cult of possessive individualism, corporate and private individual wealth possesses neither a sense of loyalty nor responsibility to any community, whether defined as country, state, city -- or even family. Indeed, the rational decision -- and neo-conservatism's "economic individualist" is nothing if not rational -- is to take the money and run, leaving the overhead and reproductive costs to those citizens within the dying communities who are less mobile than capital.

In this regard, there is a monotonous similarity in Galbraith's (1992), Davidson and Rees-Mogg's (1991), and Weiner's (1992) recent descriptions of a future world in which disintegrating cities are marked by uncontrolled violence, tribalism, racism, poverty, and fanaticism; where vigilante groups and private paramilitary forces patrol the streets, and where the only hint of civility is found in the feudal suburban enclaves of the rich, cut-off and protected from the surrounding madness by their own private armies and private surveillance systems. We do not need, however, to read hypothetical accounts: The recent LA riots, set off by the decision of a jury in the white enclave of Simi Valley -- which then escaped the rioting--, provide an ample mirror with which to view the possible future of North American society.

But of the social, economic, and political forces behind these events, the followers, if not the leaders, of current right-wing populist movements remain blind. For they fail to see the world hegemonic project being constructed by global capital. Equally, they fail to recognize, or choose to ignore, the complicitness of their champion -- the neo -conservative state -- in this enterprise, or the growing intrusiveness and authoritarianism of this so-called "minimal state" whose legitimacy lies increasingly in the number of police and military at its disposal (see Whitaker, 1987; Stasiulis, 1988; Galbraith, 1992). For the role of the neo-conservative state is not the expansion of democracy and freedom. Rather, it is to contain those "excesses" of democracy that hinder capital accumulation through demands for greater equality. Again, however, right -wing populists do not see this.

The title of this thesis revolves around a passage from Yeats (see frontispiece). The passage is, in part, wrong. The worst are not always those of passionate intensity. Apathy in the face of genuine discord seems at least equally a fault.

But in other respects, the passage is applicable. For much of this century, the tension of conflict between the right and left held the shape of our world in balance. In the wake, however, of the Pyrrhic victory of capitalism, the core of social life has been replaced by a vacuous and endless pursuit of individual ends by any means, powered by excesses of wealth increasingly protected by private arms. Under these conditions, the sense of a loss of community, for people on both the left and right, is palpable.

While the former, however, have at least a dim view of the causes of this loss, the latter sense only that the world, as they have known it, is falling apart; that the centre no longer holds; that moral and political anarchy seems loosed upon the land. And, thus, with all the misbegotten passion that they can muster, a variety of right-wing parties, Reform least among them, construct a counter-hegemony, but in opposition to an imagined hegemony peopled by "collectivists," "liberals," "feminists," trade unionists, "gays," visible minorities, and other groups. Witness, for example, the inane search in recent years for supposed purveyors of "political correctness." Regarding, however, the increasing power of unelected capital, housed in the sacrosanct precincts of multinational enterprises and financial institutions, the right-wing remains silent. Still half-blind, the right-wing desperately searches the sky for the falcon, hoping against hope that it might return.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER ONE

(1) This review of populist debates owes much to Conway (1978).

(2) Several distinct methodologies are evidenced in this thesis, with data coming from primary and secondary sources, surveys, unstructured observations, and interviews. The sources for primary data include government and party documents, popular newspapers and magazines, and various electoral and public opinion polls. Secondary material from previous studies also was employed where appropriate. Both primary and secondary sources are cited and can be located by turning to the bibliography.

Two original sources of survey data also are used in this thesis. During the winter of 1991 the University of Alberta Population Research Labratory conducted its annual Alberta Study. In all, 1,345 residents of Alberta, over the age of eighteen, were randomly selected and interviewed. This data has been extensively analysed by Dr. Harvey Krahn and I. The sources reporting the results of these analyses are cited in the bibliography (see University of Alberta, 1991; Harrison, 1992; Harrison and Krahn, 1992; and forthcoming).

A second survey, based on a non-random sample of fifty-five members of the Reform Party, was garnered by me at the party's 1991 convention in Saskatoon. The questions asked were a subset of those asked in the 1991 Alberta Study described above. Neither this data, nor any results from it, have previously been reported. A summary of the results, however, can be obtained by writing to me (cited in Harrison, 1991). Unstructured observations of the party were also conducted during this same convention, and at various other Reform gatherings.

Finally, data also is presented in this thesis from personal interviews that I conducted with certain key figures associated with the Reform Party.

A brief note on research ethics is in order. I obtained permission from the Ethics Review Committee of the Department of Sociology at the University of Alberta before conducting both the questionnaires at the Saskatoon Assembly and the interviews reported above. In the case of the former, any information that might identify the respondents has been scrupulously hidden. Regarding the latter, similarly rigid ethical standards have been maintained, to wit: Following the interviews, subjects were given either summary statements or abbreviated transcripts of their comments for editing and clarification. The subjects were told that only information appearing in these statements/summaries would be used in the thesis and that they had a completely free hand in altering or even eliminating any statements. In most cases, the statements/summaries were returned to me with minor hand-written changes, with the subject's acknowledgement of the accuracy of the transcription signalled in writing.

In only one case was the transcript not returned with the subject's signature. In this

instance, the subject was repeatedly contacted in an effort to elicit corrections to the transcript. For a variety of reasons, apparently unconnected to the interview itself or the research, the subject failed to respond. Because of the value of the information contained in the interview, I have deemed the subject's non-response as an assent to use the material as contained in the last transcript given to the subject.

(3) Chirot's (1985) work suggests a general model of world crises in modern (capitalist) countries, and details the approximate dates during which these occurred. Gordon et al. (1982) reinforce the use of these dates in their study of the United States. Other excellent analyses of the process of alliance formation in response to these crises include Leys's (1983) examination of British political ideology from 1850 to the rise of Thatcher, and Esping-Andersen's (1985) comparison of class formations in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark.

CHAPTER TWO

(1) In 1986, Keegstra ran for leadership of the national Social Credit party, but lost to an Ontarion, Rev. Harvey Lainson by 67 votes to 38. Lainson's winning platform included the right to bear firearms, opposition to abortion and metrification, and support for a 6 1/2 percent ceiling on interest rates (AR, 1986a).

(2) The Heritage Party was so named because one of its central planks was that the province's Heritage Trust Fund be placed under control of a public board, and that $25,000 be given to every Albertan upon their twenty-first birthday. In return, recipients would be ineligible for welfare or unemployment benefits until age twenty -five. The party was otherwise an inconsistent supporter of free enterprise, recommending the selling off of all crown corporations, while simultaneously supporting tax breaks and transportation subsidies for farmers and low interest loans to farmers and businessmen (AR, 1985b).

(3) The Representative Party was created following the 1982 Alberta provincial election by two Indpendent MLAs, and former Socreds, Walter Buck and Ray Speaker, in an attempt to gain both the status and the perquisites of official opposition status along with the NDP who also took two seats in that election.

CHAPTER THREE

(1) The Coalition fought the law on the basis that it was an infringement of the right to free expression granted under the Charter of Rights. Ironically, the Charter is opposed by many on Canada's right-wing [see, for example, AR, 1981d; Forster, 1989; Gairdner, 1990].

(2) According to Palmer and Palmer (1990:58), the Ranchman's Club "was founded in 1891 on a set of rules based on those of an exclusive men's club, the St. James Club in Montreal."

(3) Not only were the polls suggesting this possibility, but also Ivor Dent's near victory in the 1986 Pembina by-election and the election of a record 16 NDP seats to the Alberta legislature that same year provided evidence that the grip of the right-wing upon that province's political culture was lessening.

(4) Mansell and a University of Alberta economist, Mike Percy, gained fame in the early 1980s when their study, commissioned by the C. D. Howe Institute, concluded that the NEP had led to an outflow of nearly 8 thousand dollars per capita per year from Alberta and had intensified the effects of the recession (see Braid and Sharpe, 1990:185-86).

(5) What renowned constitutional expert Waite once said of George Brown might also be said of Byfield: "He was a journalist, not a politician. Certainly he liked power, but he also disliked responsibility" (Waite, 1977:43).

(6) The first two of Reform's policies on labour-management relations read as follows:

> The Reform Party supports the right of workers to organize democratically, to bargain collectively, and to strike peacefully.
>
> The Reform Party supports the harmonization of labour-management relations, and rejects the view that labour and management must constitute warring camps.

This apparently conciliatory and balanced approach is undermined by a third clause that could be viewed as supporting "right to work" legislation:

> The Reform Party supports the right of all Canadians, particularly the young, to enter the work force and achieve their potential. Unions and professional bodies may ensure standards, but should not block qualified people from working in a trade or profession or from gaining the necessary qualifications (RPC, 1989a; 1990a; 1991a).

In "56 Reasons Why You Should Support the Reform Party of Canada," a glossy brochure produced by the party for popular circulation, the substance of only the second of these clauses is repeated (RPC, undated).

(7) While it is true that Reformers generally frown upon open immigration and multiculturalism, and believe that the penal system is too soft on criminals, the last two items gained saliency among many Reform supporters as a result of two specific incidents. RCMP uniforms became an issue as a result of a recent federal government ruling that Sikhs would be allowed to wear their turbans in the police force. The issue was one both of respecting deeply-felt religious beliefs and of practically attempting to recruit a minority group into the RCMP. That the long-entrenched RCMP dress code, a carryover from British colonial days, should be altered in this fashion offended numerous Anglo-Canadians, both Reformers and otherwise. At the Reform Party's 1989 convention, delegates voted that RCMP uniforms should remain free of turbans and other religious adornments (see EJ, 1989a).

Similarly, the issue of crime became salient as a result of one specific case involving the capture in Canada of a man, Charles Ng, who was wanted in California for trial on charges involving a particularly heinous crime: mass murder. A series of hearings into his legal rights under the Charter of Rights held up Ng's extradition to the United States. Specifically, the hearings dealt with whether or not Canada, a country without a death penalty, would be infringing on Ng's rights by returning him to California, a state with a death penalty. For many Canadians, the idea of debating the rights of an accused mass murderer seemed absurd. But Ng's case may also have aroused passions for another reason: he is Vietnamese. Hence, the issue brought together several issues of concern to the right-wing, particularly non-white immigration, law and order, and the controversial provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (see chapter two). The fact that Ng was not an immigrant -- he had entered Canada illegally -- was immaterial to these right-wing elements, a fact indicated by a draft resolution submitted by the Lethbridge constituency of the Reform Party in response to the Ng case which called for immigrants and refugees being denied Charter protections (EJ, 1991e). In the end, the Reform Party dropped the resolution before it came up for debate (EJ, 1991f). As for Ng, he was extradited to the United States in September, 1991.

(8) The CHP presents an interesting comparison to the Reform Party. The CHP held its founding convention in Hamilton, Ontario, on November18-21, 1987 -- ironically, at virtually the same time as the Reform Party formed in the west. Despite the location of the convention, many of the 520 delegates who attended the event were from the west. Indeed, its leader and founder was Ed Vanwoudenberg an otherwise unknown Surrey, B. C. businessman (EJ, 1989b). Like most of the party's 2,500 members, Vanwoudenberg belongs to the Canadian (Dutch) Reformed Church (AR, 1987f).

The policies ratified by the CHP at its founding convention, and since reaffirmed, suggest that it is an essentially ethno-centric (white, English-speaking, western-European), Christian, petite-bourgeois party motivated by fears of social and cultural change, and a concomitant desire to return to traditional mores and values. The party's policies on immigration, bilingualism, and multiculturalism are similar to positions taken by the Reform Party that emphasize a retention of Canada's historic cultural and linguistic "mix." In contrast to the Reform Party, however, the CHP tends to be more overtly ethnocentric and Christian-focused, with policies frequently justified on the basis of Biblical references. For example, the Policy Manual's section on economics uses *twenty -eight* Bible readings to support its espousal of free enterprise capitalism (CHP, 1988).

While both the Reform Party and the CHP are right-wing on economic matters, the latter is more typically petite-bourgeois. That is, the CHP's policies are rife with the kind of contradictions noted by Macpherson (1953) of a class threatened by the same capitalist system it espouses. Hence, the "backbone of the private enterprise system" (CHP, 1988:23) are small (owner-managed) businesses, including farm operations. The government's role is to ensure that "no one individual or group is able to manipulate supply and demand to their (sic) own advantage and to the detriment of the community" (p. 16). "Although [b]usinesses should not be overregulated" the party "recognize[s]

that economic power and political power are inseparable, and that the state must therefore be able to mitigate monopolistic business practices" (p. 16). This particularly applies, the manual notes, to farming where the "[o]wnership of farmland by large corporations should be restricted" (p. 36).

Similarly, the CHP expresses a fear of foreign ownership and "the expansion of corporations through mergers and holding companies [which] is often a form of covetousness [and] which in the long term may bend entire national economies to the will of a few private individuals" (p. 24). For this reason, the CHP suggests that "[b]usinesses tied to multi-national corporate control and slated for closure or major reductions in production should be subject to government approval, or sale to Canadian interests" (p. 25). By contrast, the Reform Party, since its inception, has been far more supportive of free and unregulated markets. Neither foreign ownership nor the fate of small businesspeople and farmers is of particular concern for the Reform Party. Such issues are left to the market.

Finally, the CHP is more open than the Reform Party in espousing traditional conservative morality. The CHP upholds traditional gender (p. 9) and sex (pp. 45-46) roles, the "sanctity of marriage and the family" (p. 45), capital punishment (p. 50), and Senate reform (p. 57), while opposing abortion (p. 44), insanity pleas (p. 49), and "Gay-Rights" legislation (p. 69). By contrast, the Reform Party has argued that such matters should be put to a referendum -- a view scornfully attacked by the CHP as unprincipled.

Narrowly-based and exclusionary by definition, the CHP was from the start a party with little room for growth. The party reached a reported membership total of 16,000 in 1989 (EJ, 1989b), and obtained a significant portion of the vote, particularly in the rural ridings of Ontario and some parts of Alberta and British Columbia, in the federal election of that year (Report of the Chief Electoral Officer). In the years that followed, however, the CHP found its role as a vehicle for right-wing discontent steadily eroded by the Reform Party. By the Fall of 1991, the CHP was in disarray. Several members of the party executive resigned, citing the dogmatic religious nature of the organization. The attempts of many of these same members to have the party amalgamate with the Reform Party was defeated by the party brass. In 1991, Vanwoudenberg resigned as leader (AR, 1991e) and was replaced by Charles Cavilla, a teacher from Lethbridge, Alberta.

(9) Main subsequently ran -- and won -- under the Tory banner in Alberta's 1989 provincial election. He was later named culture minister. In the fall of 1992, following the resignation of Don Getty as Alberta premier, Main ran unsuccessfully for the Tory leadership on a platform blatantly attempting to curry support from Reform's constituency.

CHAPTER FOUR

(1) Doug Christie and Dick Collver might be viewed as providing extreme examples of

each of these imperialist types (see chapter two).

(2) Subsequent analysis of the 1991 Alberta Survey data has shown that, far from being amorphous, this "Canadian" group is actually fairly distinctive. Ninety-six percent of those self-identified as Canadians were born in Canada. Seventy-two percent stated that their father had been born in Canada, 12 percent said the United Kingdom or Ireland, 5 percent the United States, while most of the rest mentioned some other European country. Almost identical results were found for mothers' place of birth. Finally, 91% also stated English as their first language.

(3) The derogatory sentence "mop heads in the RCMP" refers to the decision to allow Sikhs in that organization to wear turbans.

CHAPTER FIVE

(1) The APA features among its prominent members Reformers such as Dal Brown, a Reform Party candidate in 1988, APA founder Howard Thompson, and current APA leader Mark Waters, Stan Water's son (see AR, 1990e; EJ, 1991ab).

(2) The Reformer of May, 1989, reports somewhat higher total party revenues for 1988 of $804,521 made up of $737,848 from memberships and donations; $113,793 from sales and merchandise; and $11,945 from other" (RPC, 1989d).

(3) The Reformer of May, 1991, reports total revenues for 1989 of $,1,100,096 (RPC, 1991d).

(4) Both native groups and fellow academics severely criticize Flanagan's (1983) writings regarding Louis Riel, the Rebellion, and aboriginal landclaims in Manitoba.

(5) The party has a number of well-known former Tories, including former Alberta PC MLA's Stephen Stiles, Walter Szwender, Marvin Moore, and Ray Speaker, although Speaker's more notable past affiliation was with the Social Credit Party (see EJ, 1989h). Burt Brown, the Alberta PC's senatorial candidate in 1989, also is a member of Reform. The party also has several high-profile former Socreds, including former Alberta MLAs Werner Schmidt (who was also the Socred leader for a time), Jim Henderson, and Fred Manderville (AR, 1987e). Francis Porter, the aged and frail former vice-president of the Alberta Social Credit League, back in the days of Ernest Manning (see Barr, 1974:159), is a regular attendant at Reform Party conventions. Former British Columbia Socred MLA Jack Kempf also is a member of Reform (EJ, 1989i).

There also remains a significant right-wing fringe element in the Reform Party. Jack Ramsay, the former head of WCC in Alberta, and Reform's candidate in Crowfoot in 1988, is a prominant voice at party functions, as is Edmonton lawyer Bob Matheson, a former high-profile member of CoR. In recent years, Douglas Campbell, the octogenarian former Progressive, former Manitoba Liberal leader, former CoR

supporter, also has joined Reform.

Despite Manning's espoused desire to recruit prominant people from the other major parties, Reform only can point to its early recruitment of Manitoba MLA Stan Roberts, former Alberta MP Jack Horner (AR, 1987e), and Francis Winspear as significant Liberal "catches" while former Manitoba MLA Henry Carroll remains the sole NDPer of note recruited into the party.

(6) Ron Wood, the party's public communications director, has downplayed the party's demographic profile, stating, for example, that Reform is "colour blind," and therefore does not keep statistics on the number of women and minorities in the party. "We don't pay any attention to those things but I would say our demographic mix is no different than the Liberals or the Tories" (AR, 1990h:16). The party's own efforts, however, at profiling its members and supporters belies Wood's feigned indifference. In conversation, Harper (1991:14-15) has made clear that the party is concerned about its "mix," particularly if structural problems prevent some social groups from participating in the party. Nonetheless, he states that the party will not alter its policies to appeal to certain social elements. For example, Harper explains the dearth of women in Reform as occurring, in part, because women make up a:

> larger percentage of the welfare state clientele ... people who are easily convinced that the Reform Party is a threat to their interests, and whose circumstances have led to a value orientation that is liberal and opposed to free enterprise.... [I]f that's the thing, there's nothing we can do about it. We aren't going to change our policies to support the welfare state. But we have to watch that it isn't a thing where the Reform Party is seen as being uninterested or unintelligent on women's issues.

(7) The party's own figures do not add to 100 percent.

(8) The classes were defined using a modification of neo-Marxist categories as suggested by Wright (1976) and recently validated by Johnston and Ornstein (1985, 1988) and Baer et al (1987). Dr. Krahn and I created the class categories through a two-step process. In the first step, we constructed a seven class scale from occupational data obtained in the survey and coded according to Pineo's (1984) classification scheme. High level managers and owners were classified as the "bourgeoisie," while middle level managers were classified as "managers." Farmers were classified as the "traditional petite bourgeoisie" while other self-employed professionals or small businesspeople were classified as the "new petite bourgeoisie." Foremen/women and supervisors were coded as "foremen." Those occupations, such as technicians, semi-professionals, and employed professionals, where occupants possess some degree of control over the work process but not over other employees, were classified as semi-autonomous employees. Farm labourers, unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled manual workers, unskilled, semi -skilled, and skilled clerical, sales, and service workers were coded as "workers."

The Pineo scale makes implicit assumptions, however, regarding the scope of control over the work process possessed by the broad occupational category. In a second step, we

decided therefore to test the validity of these assumptions by correlating the Pineo categories against the results of two questions: "Are you mainly an employee working for someone else, or self-employed?" and (if self-employed) "Do you have any paid employees?" This test revealed a number of logical discrepancies in the class categories. Hence, in a third step resulting from this process, we manually examined each of these discrepancies, repositioning them within more theoretically consistent class categories. The end result was the obtaining of what we believe is an exceptionally "clean" measure of class.

(9) In ongoing work with these attitudinal questions, Dr. H. Krahn and I have constructed several attitudinal indexes, using factor analysis. These indexes, along with preliminary results from a logistic regression analysis, appear in Harrison and Krahn (1992).

(10) The links between the Coalition and Reform have been mentioned throughout this thesis and elsewhere (Dobbin, 1991; Sharpe and Braid, 1992). Ernest Manning and Eric Kipping, a former New Brunswick PC MLA and current Reform member, were founding members of the NCC. William Gairdner is also a member of the Coalition, as was the late Stan Waters. His son, Mark Waters, is a high ranking NCC official and, along with David Somerville, has been a formal observer at every Reform Party convention, including the Assembly, since the party's inception. The NCC regularly engages in political battles with the Reform Party's political enemies, and Somerville has claimed that "The Reform Party has cribbed probably two-thirds of our policy book" (quoted in Sharpe and Braid, 1992:65). But there appears to be more than just an affinity of ideas between Reform and the Coalition. Rather, the Coalition appears to have an "in" to the party executive through which it is perhaps able to directly influence Reform's policies and strategy, as I discovered at the party's convention in 1991.

Earlier, I mentioned the questionnaire that I circulated at that convention. I previously had gained permission to employ the questionnaire from various people in the Reform Party. All of these officials had seen the actual questionnaire.

Sometime during the convention, Somerville and Mark Waters became aware of my questionnaire. An anonymous informant later told me that Somerville and Waters brought a copy the questionnaire to Diane Ablonszcy with the warning that such studies could be used by "left-wingers" to besmerch the party's image. As a result of this expressed concern, the party held a special meeting on Saturday morning, attended by both Somerville and Waters, to discuss the questionnaire and how to handle it.

My point in relating this story is not that the party should not have been concerned with my research; any group engaged in practical politics would be, although, to reiterate, the questionnaire previously had been cleared with several high profile party members and no attempt was made to hide my activities at the convention. The point is rather that both Somerville and Waters had such political *entre* as to be able to act in the role of political advisors.

(11) Nelson ran unsuccessfully, in the fall of 1992, for the position of Alberta premier

vacated by the retiring Don Getty.

CHAPTER SIX

(1) In 1985, multinationals comprised 46 of the largest economies in the world. The largest of the multinationals, General Motors (18th place), had a larger volume of sales than the GNP of Sweden, Switzerland, and several other prominent countries (Veltmeyer, 1987:78-9). By 1991, multinationals made up 47 of the top 100 economies. Although General Motors had slipped to 20th place on the list, several other multinationals, including Ford Motor Co., Exxon Corporation, and International Business Machines, had risen against the position of various nations (EJ, 1991ay). For those contending that shareholders provide checks-and-balances to the power of multinationals and their executives, I would recommend Crystal's (1991) scathing indictment of executive salaries and benefits. For those seeking something immediate to consider, ponder this: In 1991, Coca-Cola's head was paid -- it is scarcely credible to say "earned" -- $86 million (US) (see EJ, 1992ad). Would genuinely knowledgeable and empowered shareholders have willingly okayed a salary that siphoned this much capital from the company?

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1980b "Independence Alberta style." 6 June: 2-4.

1980c "Breakaway rivals." 28 November: 5-7.

1980d "Collver and Christie collide." 6 June: 2-3.

1980e "The Collver bombshell." 21 March: 19.

1980f "What they're saying." 30 May: 6.

1980g "A vote that split a nation." 29 February: 8-10.

1980h "So what if the West is absent." 29 February: 8-10.

1980i "Blow-up at Banff." 12 December: 2-6.

1980j "The cry for a free west." 28 November: 2-3.

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1981g "Horner is hooted down." 27 February: 6.

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1991n "Jobless rate rises to 10.3%." 9 November: A4.

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1990b "Ruling Conservatives have record low public support." 22 February.

1990c "Tories remain mired in political doldrums." 22 March.

1990d "Tories in third place for fifth consecutive month." 19 April.

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1990g "Conservatives remain mired in third place in standings." 28 June.

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APPENDIX A

Support for the Major Canadian Political Parties, Canada, 1990-1992 (in percentages, by monthly quarters)



Source: Gallup, 1990c, g, h, i; 1991a, b, c, d; 1992a, b.

APPENDIX B

Support for the Major Canadian Political Parties, Prairies, 1990-1992 (in percentages, by monthly quarters)



Source: Gallup, 1990c, g, h, i; 1991a, b, c, d; 1992a, b.

APPENDIX C

Support for the Major Canadian Political Parties, British Columbia,1990-1992 (in percentages, by monthly quarters)



Source: Gallup, 1990c, g, h, i; 1991a, b, c, d; 1992a, b.